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SUMMARY 
This study attempts to offer a reading of Msimang' s poetry from the perspective of 
deconstruction. In this course it is necessary to introduce and elaborate on certain 
deconstruction strategies. This is mainly effected in the second chapter, where 
consideration is given to diachronic and synchronic perspectives on deconstruction. 
However, not all the ramifications of the various radical insights offered by 
deconstructive approaches into the various fields are explored, only the significant 
texts by mainly French theorists and their American disciples are investigated. 
Secondly, this study seeks to show that the Zulu poems under consideration are 
highly amenable to a deconstruction reading. This thesis examines the various 
practices to absorb, transform, and integrate deconstruction and to make the theory 
applicable as a critical method within the African languages critical environment. In 
the third chapter, I am chiefly concerned with the claim that a text never has a single 
meaning, but is a crossroads of multiple ambiguous meanings. Explaining the 
historical context, the interdisciplinary scope, and the philosophical significance of 
Derrida's project are explored in the fourth chapter. Language has no determinate 
centre nor any retrievable origin or truth. Belief in such is no more than nostalgia, 
says Derrida. What actually exists is a complex network of differences between 
signifiers, each in some sense carrying the traces of all others. With psychoanalysis 
in the fourth chapter, the focus is not on the differences between the deconstructive 
and psychoanalytic critics, but on their shared assumption that works ofliterature are 
in some sense indeterminate. These properties lead to the sixth chapter, which deals 
with intertextuality according to Derrida, Barthes and Bloom. The seventh and last 
chapter is the general conclusion in which main observations are summarized and 
important aspects highlighted. Finally, this thesis attempts to illustrate why the 
deconstructive procedure of analysing texts in such a way as to explicate their partial 
complicity with the theory, makes this deconstructive reading ofMsimang' s poetry 
possible. 
Keywords: 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Preamble 
When writing was invented thousands of years ago, it was hailed as an innovative 
contribution to the world. Spoken words were written down and preserved ro/-~ 
,, 
posterity. Nowadays, the attitude towards writing seems more dubious. The act of 
writing is seen as a risk. Its perilousness is firstly enclosed in the fact that the writer 
exposes his or her vulnerability in writing. There are furthermore definite limitations 
to what writing can represent. 
Adding to this predicament, the variety of modern literary theories scrutinize not 
only the writer, but also the text, the readers and their various mutual relationships. 
Some critics contend that certain theories simply seem to pull the work to pieces -
like the post-structural strategy, deconstruction. Deconstruction's principal. 
proclamation is that writing is incapable ofrepresenting, but is self-referential. This 
elusiveness, again, cannot be represented: it can only be illustrated in the act of 
writing itself In the deployment of deconstructive strategies which exist in the void 
of representation, the critic or reader is as such trapped in the rhetorical labyrinth of 
the text. Frank Lentricchia (1980: 172) offers his insights about deconstruction: 
an activity of textual privatization, the critic's doomed attempt to 
retreat from a social landscape of fragmentation and alienation ... 
Later on, he labels it 
... (a) technique of trouble ... (1980:186). 
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M.H. Abrams (1979a:217) complains that a deconstructive reading is "parasitical" 
on an "obvious or univocal" reading. This post-structuralistic practice has been 
branded as absurd, puzzling, infuriating or exasperating. Deconstruction is chided 
for its elimination of an intentional subject, its insubstantial inception of opposition, 
its celebration of impotence - simply for its severance from practice. Miller 
(1989: 103) summarizes the negative feelings regarding the results of a 
deconstructive reading: 
Paul de Man or Jacques Derrida make such extravagant demands on 
the mere act of reading a poem, a novel, or a philosophical text that 
it makes one tired just to think of it. Surely reading cannot be all 
that difficult! Or require such self-consciousness, such hesitations. 
Surely no one can be expected to master the intricate rigour of the 
deconstructive way of reading and apply it habitually. 
This leads Geoffrey Hartman (1979:283) to the conclusion that 
. . . no wonder some are scared witless by a mode of thinking that 
seems to offer no decidability, no resolution. 
While the above and other critics have advanced some very useful arguments about 
the dead-endedness of the deconstructionist assignment, this arduous reading project 
still needs to be paid attention to. Critics need not only to consider the claims of 
deconstruction acutely but they should also understand its origins and take its 
existence seriously. 
1.2 Aim of study 
The purpose of this study is to attempt a deconstructive reading of the poetry of the 
Zulu poet C.T. Msimang. Specific attention will be given to his two creative 
volumes namely,lziziba Zo Thukela (1980) and UNodumehlezi KaMenzi (1990). An 
effort will be made to give a critical investigation into the relevance of the 
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deconstruction theory for the genre of poetry in Zulu literature. This investigation 
into certain aspects of the relationship between genre manifestation and evaluation 
with reference to the deconstruction theory and criticism in Zulu will show that post-
structural literary theories do have a role to play in African languages. This thesis 
will try to explore the significance of the above through the twin activity of an 
examination of deconstruction criticism and the contemplation of relevant poems. 
Every endeavour is made in this study to demonstrate a deconstructive method of 
reading in which Msimang as subject is put into question and shown to occupy an 
indeterminate position in the textual field, where he is not seen to be in control of his 
writing but rather controlled by writing. Through this deliberation of deconstruction 
and some ofMsimang' s verse, I hope scholars will firstly become more aware of the 
existence of this rich body of poetic material, as well as consider the potentiality and 
feasibility of this post-structural project - something they have perhaps not tested 
critically before. 
One of the aims of this assignment is to render a critical and comprehensive account 
of deconstruction, and at the same time to place deconstruction in multiple 
perspectives. It will attempt to examine the dilemma in which deconstruction finds 
itself Despite its adversarial rhetoric, deconstruction possesses irrefutable value as 
a radical praxis. An assessment of deconstruction in relation to other disciplines will 
also be endeavoured. 
Deconstruction is first and foremost associated with the French thinker, Jacques 
Derrida, but secondly also with his American disciples such as the so-called Yale 
deconstructionists - J. Hillis Miller, Geoffrey Hartman and Paul de Man. It is 
furthermore possible as well as necessary to utilize the thinking of a wide range of 
post-structuralistic theorists, which include Barbara Johnston, Shoshana Felman and 
Joseph Riddel. In particular, many ideas can be enhanced by way of psychoanalytic 
terminology. The writers associated with post-structuralism and deconstruction 
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seem to favour psychoanalytical interpretations; for example, Michel Foucault claims 
that psychoanalytic thought not only underlies contemporary thinking but is its 
condition. However, Derrida and de Man are more cautious. For Derrida, the 
psychoanalytical model is a metaphorical structure, not a literal one. Accordingly, 
he challenges Jacques Lacan for postulating the phallus as a transcendental signified. 
He is disinclined to adopt any model of interpretation, even a psychoanalytical one, 
because it represents a stable point of reference and a closed system. Both views will 
inform the point of view adopted by this study, for they are not mutually exclusive. 
Deconstruction has largely been ignored in African languages to date. There is 
especially an urgent necessity for literary critics to examine more closely the concepts 
of deconstruction as it applies to African languages. This study will attempt to 
illustrate how deconstruction is liable to misunderstanding and non-recognition, 
especially in South Africa. The usual propensity for misunderstanding is the belief 
that deconstruction seeks purely to undermine the text. This position stems from the 
fact that deconstruction is detached from its materialist basis - nothing exists but the 
text and its modifications. It is also simply the failure to understand deconstruction 
as essentially a critique of metaphysics, of philosophy, a deconstruction of idealism 
and all its implications and not of texts as such. When texts are read or written, they 
are used to illustrate concepts and not to unearth codes of society structured by 
certain convictions. The deconstructionist needs to know exactly what he or she is 
trying to escape from and needs to make visible these hidden tenets of ideologies. 
From there, they have to supply intertextually validated alternative interpretations. 
When working with a deconstructive concept such as intertextuality, it necessitates 
a background examination on the subject so as to shed some light on the influences 
which to a large extent played and still play an important role in the poet's work. 
Important deconstructive concepts such as differance, dissemination, logocentrism, 
phonocentrism, trace, supplement, rhetoricity, intertextuality, etc. will be applied to 
the selected works. For example, intertextuality in poetry will exhibit the writer's 
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control of archaic textual, biblical, traditional, political, societal and other influences. 
However, although the critical procedures of deconstruction inform the survey of the 
poetry throughout, the reading is not dictated to by these procedures. According to 
the deconstruction theory, language is unavoidably rhetorical, it is impossible to 
unravel the tropes of language by means of language. All that is possible, 
deconstruction attests, is to deploy a variety of rhetorical strategies, sometimes 
concurrently, in an attempt to illuminate the rhetorical maze of the text. 
The contribution ofthis post-structuralist project towards developing the literature 
will also be demonstrated, e.g. deconstruction enables us to experiment with certain 
contemporary developments in literature, which also enhance the teaching of 
literature. 
1.3 Scope of study 
In the introduction, attention will be given to the fact that much negativity exists 
around deconstructive literary criticism in the Western world as well as in African 
languages. Very important is to illustrate the fact that almost no data on the chosen 
post-structural theory or even research on this topic can be found within Zulu 
literature. The only Zulu deconstructive study to date on Bloomian intertextuality 
is that ofK.G. Nkumane in her Vista MA dissertation entitled 'A study ofL.B.Z. 
Buthelezi' s poetry' (1995). Deconstruction is as such virtually non-existent as a field 
of study in African languages, and little has been done in Zulu specifically. This 
study aims to be a contribution in this field. Studies of this kind are done by scholars 
all over the world. As such, the point will be proven that post-structural literary 
theories do have a role to play in literature. A short biographical sketch of the 
poet/writer C.T. Msimang will be given so as to portray his background and the 
respective influences in his life. Msimang is one of the few major modern poets 
whose work has not been given the attention it deserves in Zulu. 
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In the second chapter of this study, consideration will be given to diachronic and 
synchronic perspectives on the evolution of this selected literary theory as well as the 
development of literary theory in African languages. An intelligible outlay 
presupposes a knowledge of concepts of deconstruction, the reading strategy 
introduced and practised by Derrida. There is a discussion of the most important 
terms which are defined and elaborated on. Necessarily, theoretical concepts like 
writing, subject, etc. will also be discussed under the framework of deconstruction. 
This is essential for a complete understanding of the utilization of deconstruction in 
the Zulu texts, as well as understanding the problems encountered with literary 
theory within African languages and outside African languages. Different approaches 
to understanding deconstruction are outlined. The argument that deconstruction is 
progressive holds that it liberates the reader or critic from all thematic interpretations, 
that it highlights the text itself (textual nature of reality), and challenges the 
institutions of traditional analysis. 
This chapter will also furnish an explication on the problems of deconstruction, as 
well as the applications thereof to Zulu literature. Research in the field ofliterature 
in general and of African literature in particular is quite a recent development. Many 
publications study the text in its different aspects and relations to the author, the 
reader, and their respective social and cultural context. Zulu critics specifically seem 
to make use of either extrinsic approaches since they put emphasis on factors outside 
the text or structuralist theories. Although critical attention focussed on the text as 
such is of great importance, it is beneficial to scholars of literature to know and 
understand post-structuralist processes of analysis as well, to obtain new methods 
which are useful in studying specific texts. 
The main chapters of this study are the third, fourth, fifth and sixth ones, where 
detailed examinations of the deconstructive literary theoretical concepts will be 
applied to the selected poems. These chapters are concerned with a process of 
reading or interpretation. The third chapter concerns typical deconstructive 
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rhetorical readings at its most basic level. Each of the selected poems by Msimang 
represents a different formulation of an introspective quest. That Msimang actively 
transformed received ideas are evident in the way his poetry can be read at any level 
of physical, emotional or intellectual response. His figurative language operates on 
many different levels. The poems examined could be interpreted, for example, as 
poems about writing poems, and as such they could be called metaphors of writing 
or even myths of writing. The poems examined do not simply reflect Msimang' s 
concern with social problems, education or sceptical thoughts about love, but reflect 
specifically his preoccupation with the status oflanguage and writing. 
The fourth chapter concerns the question of reference and truth. In this chapter, it 
will be attempted to show that the effect of deconstructive writing is not to eliminate 
the referential power of texts, but rather to offer a rethinking of the terms in which 
they have been conceived. More specifically, through the analyses of the work of 
Paul de Man and Jacques Derrida, the study attempted to argue that deconstruction 
does not deny reference, but denies that reference can be modelled on the laws of 
perception or of understanding. Such models, which suggest that reference is 'seen' 
or grasped as outside the text, ultimately place limits on reference that in fact 
constrict it rather than open it to the new. What cannot be simply perceived or 
grasped, becomes from this point of view a mere fiction. The analyses by which 
deconstruction comes to distinguish reference from perceptual or cognitive models 
do not altogether eliminate reference, but rather examine how to recognize it where 
it does not occur as knowledge. It is indeed in this surprising realignment of 
reference with what is not fully masterable by cognition that the impact of 
deconstructive writing can be said precisely to take place. 
In the fifth chapter themes and images in Msimang' s poetry are read deconstructively 
in accordance with psychoanalysis. In this chapter I have sought to sketch a kind of 
re-thinking of the relations between these two theories and Msimang's poems. As 
will be seen from the poems and the texts of Lacan and Derrida, the core of 
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deconstruction's problematics is situated in the attitude towards life of man, as well 
as in the language certainty confronted with the biological involvement with death. 
Deconstruction sees all poems as dealing as much with the nature of poetry as with 
their ostensible subject which are in all three cases, the relationship between the 
speaker, Self and the Other. In fact, this relationship could be seen to be a :figurative 
commentary on poetic discourse. The transformation is only achieved, however, 
through an equivocal play of resemblance and difference: that is, through the 
deployment of a mobile army of tropes which follow the indeterminate path of 
differance. The value of deconstruction as a critical tool capable of producing hidden 
contradictions which systematically undermine the overt meaning of a text will be 
illustrated in this chapter. 
In chapter six intertextuality will be discussed, the manner in which it is evident in 
Msimang's poetry, its use and abuse and general contribution to Zulu poetry. In 
attempting to analyse certain intertexts in Msimang' s poetry, one has to look at 
various other components. The method of identifying intertexts and especially the 
role of the critic in determining the different types of sources in a text also play an 
important role. Many external influences can also be encountered in Msimang' s 
poetry, however, only the evidence of allusions and influences within the poems will 
be discussed. The scope of this study, however, does not allow for a lengthy 
discussion of all subjects concerned. Furthermore, a content analysis of all his poems 
and all intertextual traces, from past to present, is also not possible, thus only 
prominent poems and striking traces will be touched upon. 
The seventh and last chapter is the general conclusion in which main observations are 
summarized and important aspects highlighted. My general conclusion provides a 
resume of the most important points made in the course of the thesis. 
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1.4 Method of study 
As the focal point of this project is to view Msimang' s poetic texts from a 
deconstructive perspective and to give a general survey of the deconstruction theory 
and practice, as well as the development thereof in order to indicate how it is used 
in literature today, it is apparent that the applications and procedures of 
deconstruction will be implemented. I have mostly worked within the framework of 
the abridged, elliptical style of deconstruction, but I have necessarily also adopted 
different forms of analysis which were used in particular circumstances. I have 
utilised the expository style of close textual analysis, but simple, basic linear 
argument was also employed. The reason for adopting different registers lies in the 
premise adhered to throughout the study - that language is inescapably rhetorical, 
and that it is impossible to get behind, or get under or penetrate the figurative use of 
language by means oflanguage. According to deconstruction, all that is possible is 
to employ a variety of rhetorical strategies, sometimes concurrently, in an attempt to 
illuminate the tropological, multifaceted intricacy of the text. This thesis attempts, 
accordingly, to illustrate this polyvocal mode of discourse. It is sometimes suggested 
that in doing this deconstruction simply continues the method of close reading as 
practised by the New Critics. However, (although in a complex way), deconstruction 
holds together and makes sense, it further emphasises the way in which a text 
becomes problematic and confused. 
It is fairly well known that deconstruction is not so much a philosophy or a 
method/ school of thought, as a specific way or "strategy" of reading. Although there 
is no specific approach or method to the deconstructive practice, the pattern is often 
to take a small section of text and to point out just how problematic the passage is. 
While probing Msimang's poetry, I will at times only examine certain segments of 
selected poems - especially to demonstrate certain outstanding features observed -
but most of the time the whole poetic composition will be considered. 
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With all English translations of the Zulu poems, literary translation is adhered to as 
far as possible. However, where literal translation fails to convey the intended 
meaning, free translation is adopted. Not all of the poems are translated in full in the 
thesis as such, but the fully translated versions do appear in the appendix. 
Furthermore, for translations and etymological explanations of words, I utilized as 
many dictionaries as possible. The most frequent used dictionaries are however 
Doke and Vilakazi' s Zulu-English Dictionary, Nyembezi' slsichazimazwi Sanamuhla 
Nangomuso and Nkabinde's Isichazamazwi. 
Certain key terms will be employed in the investigation of the poetry. I shall focus 
on a few scholars whose explanations of key terminology I consider to be 
representative of the main ways of looking at the problems encountered in the 
discussions ofMsimang's poems. 
When examining Msimang' s verse, certain external factors will be contemplated for 
comparison and clarification. This seems to clash with the internal nature of 
deconstruction, but deconstructionists like Derrida or de Man are certainly not 
entirely intrinsic, solely concerned with language as such or limited to language in 
elevated isolation from the extralinguistic. There is a fully elaborated theory of the 
historical, psychological, and ethical relations of literature already present, for 
example in de Man's Allegories of Reading. In his work, he has progressively 
focussed on the almost universal shift to politics, history, and society which marks 
the typicality of the current moment in literary study. If one of the dimensions of 
de Man's work is a conscientious accounting for the referential, historical, social, and 
political effects of literature, the same thing can also be demonstrated for Jacques 
Derrida, who has all along included consideration of the institutional, political, and 
social implications of his work. This can be seen in Positions, for example or in an 
interview entitled 'Deconstruction in America' (1985:1-33). However, the 
opponents of the rhetorical study of literature still continue to misrepresent 
deconstruction as ahistorical and apolitical. This may just indicate the importance of 
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what is in question here. 
1.5 C.T. Msimang and his work 
The renowned Zulu poet Christian Themba Msimang was born on 25 October 1944 
at Ethalaneni Mission in the district Nkandla, KwaZulu. As the first born ofMichael 
and Allina, he had a strict, but constructive upbringing. His mother, an ex-lay 
teacher and disciplinarian, already started coaching him at home. His aunt, 
Khabonina Judith Msimang, a spinster who stayed with them, pampered and spoiled 
him with fabulous stories. She is regarded by Msimang as a great historian and poet. 
She had lived with his grandfather, who fought under Cetshwayo in the Anglo-Zulu 
war. It was from his aunt's tellings that he later wrote Izulu Eladuma ESandlwana 
(1976), basing one of the characters on his grandfather. 
As a former alter-boy, who tried hard to live up to his given name Christian, 
Msimang and the other boys from the mission station were constantly challenged by 
those traditionalists living outside the radius of the missionary. Msimang regards this 
conflict as a significant sculpturing in his life and poetry. Throughout his works, 
these two elements of traditional life and religious experiences can be detected. 
Msimang received his primary education at a mission school in Zululand and later 
went on to obtain the Junior and Senior Certificates through the TransAfrica 
Correspondence College. After completing Form 2, at the age of sixteen, he was 
obliged to seek work. Through his uncle Nxumalo, he got in touch with his 
grandfather, Shange, in Johannesburg. His application to a compound manager failed 
because of his young age. A domestic job with a monthly income of six pounds was 
organised for him with an English couple, Mr. and Mrs. Park in Inanda. 
Having attended a disadvantaged school where the only book was the teacher's copy, 
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it was understandable that he had not read many books before this position in 
Johannesburg. One of his co-workers, Elizabeth Khumalo, a not very learned but 
avid reader, used to hand him books which their employers had passed on to her. 
These books were mainly popular literature, mostly thrillers, like James Hadley 
Chase. It was only then that he got the inspiration to write. This opened up a whole 
new world to him. 
In 1965, Radio Zulu announced a competition for short texts of± 20 pages. Being 
too late to submit his text, he travelled to Alexandra where he met the renowned 
Zulu novelist, James Gumbi. From Gumbi came the advice to seek help from UNISA 
where he met Prof Louw, Mr. van Rooyen and Mr. D.B.Z. Ntuli. He held a series 
of meetings with Ntuli who introduced him to Zulu literature and gave him invaluable 
information, especially on story writing. Ntuli discouraged him to write on the 
exhausted 'Jim goes to Jo'burg' theme which was predominant in the 60s and 70s. 
He then abandoned the township-life theme, and turned to themes based on his 
traditionalist experiences. This led to Akuyiwe Emhlahlweni (1973), which was 
submitted to the SABC and produced by the acclaimed Alexius Buthelezi for radio. 
(One of the cast members was Jimmy Khumalo, who became a life-long friend.) 
From here he never looked back. 
After working as a domestic worker for eight years, he was employed by Werksman 
Attorneys in Johannesburg as a filing clerk in 1970. When he commenced his law 
studies they appointed him as an articled clerk. He continued his studies through 
UNISA, obtaining a BA degree in 1974 and an LLB in 1978. In January 1977 he 
was appointed by UNISA as a Professional Assistant in African languages. He 
obtained both his Hons BA and MA with distinctions. His MA dissertation, entitled 
Folktale influence on the Zulu novel, has been published by Via Afrika. This study 
assesses the extent to which the folktale has influenced the Zulu novel, whether 
positive or negative. This was achieved mainly by examining motifs, motifemes and 
core-images in both genres. 
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He obtained his D.Litt et Phil degree in 1989. In his thesis, 'Some phonological 
aspects of the Tekela Nguni dialects', Msimang initially traces the history of these 
enigmatic speech forms, some of which are found also in the traditionally non-Nguni 
areas. He has used the findings of his extensive and thorough research in the field 
and in the available literature to prove, by means ofinterdialectal phonology, that all 
the Tekela dialects are off-shoots at various stages in the past, of one Tekela 
language. The work is at the same time a natural point of departure for students 
interested in the pre-history of the languages of the South Eastern Zone of Africa. 
He was promoted to an associate professorship in 1990, and full professorship in 
January 1992. On 1August1992, Msimang was appointed to the post of Head of 
the Department of African languages; a post he filled until 10 March 1997 when he 
was seconded to the position of Acting Registrar: Academic at UNISA. 
Msimang is a very involved and dedicated academic. Not only has he delivered 
papers on literature and linguistics at local and overseas congresses, but he serves on 
various language and cultural bodies. He was chairman of the Zulu Subject 
Committee of the Department of Education and Training as well as member of the 
Combined Subject Committee and Examinations Board of the same department. He 
was an examiner for Standard 10 as well as for postgraduate studies. He was 
chairman of SAFOS (i.e. Southern African Folklore Society), and is chairman of 
ST ANON (i.e. an HSRC project on Standard and Non-standard Languages in South 
Africa). He also sits or has served on the following committees: ACCLLS (i.e. 
Advisory Committee for Comparative Linguistics and Literature under the auspices 
ofLITERATOR); Interdisciplinary congress on Values chaired by Prof J.J. Burden; 
Zulu Language Board; Bureau for Zulu Language and Culture; USIBA Writers Guild 
and ALASA. He served on the SABC panel of adjudicators for both Radio and 
Television Artes Awards since 1986 (for radio) and 1991 (for TV). He also 
adjudicated the M-NET Book Prize in 1994. 
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For the past six years Msimang has been a member of the Heraldry Council. He was 
a member of the committee concerned in processing the various flag proposals in 
1994 and as a member of Council took part in the final recommendations that led to 
the adoption of the new National Flag. In January 1995 he was appointed to 
LANGTAG - Subcommittee: Language Development. In March 1996 he was 
appointed to P ANSALB, as a member of the decision making team on language 
matters. 
Msimang is an ardent historian, an interest which was aroused by his aunt Judith. He 
majored in history, wrote many historical poems, stories and one historical novel, and 
is currently engaged in penning down the history of the reigning Zulu monarch, 
starting from Ndaba, the founder of the clan which was the core of the Zulu tribe. 
Besides history and law his other favourite subjects are folklore, sociolinguistics, 
Zulu literature and linguistics. His Akuviwe Emhlahlweni and Izulu Eladuma 
ESandlwana were serialised by the Zulu service of the SABC as radio plays. He has 
written a number of articles and reviews, as well as a number of books on Zulu 
literature. He has edited and translated several publications. His publication, 
Kusadliwa Ngoludala, won the B. W. Vilakazi award in 1984; and his novel, Buzani 
KuMka,bayi, won the De Jager Raum over-all literary prize in 1982 and the B.W 
Vilakazi award in 1986. He received the coveted Vilakazi literary award once again 
in 1988 for his book Izimbongi Izola Nanamuhla 1 (Poets - Yesterday and today) 
which is an evaluation of Zulu poetry from 193 5 - 1980 with an anthology. In July 
1991 at a biennual ALAS A conference at the University of Port Elizabeth he received 
the Shuter and Shooter Literary prize for studies in African Literature with his article 
'Reception of Shaka Zulu: An evaluation of its cultural and historical context'. He 
also received the De Jager-RAUM (Kagiso) Literary Prize for Zulu in 1995 for a 
manuscript of short stories entitled Igula Lendlebe Aligcwali. 
A romanticist at heart, Msimang deems Margaret Mitchell's Gone with the wind and 
Ann Rand's The Fountainhead as the two texts which made the biggest impression 
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on him. · It was only in the second year of his Zulu studies that he became totally 
immersed in Zulu poetry. He embarked on reading B.D. Ntuli's Imitation in Zulu 
Poetry, which introduced him to the whole survey of Zulu poetry. Ntuli' s thesis on 
the poetry of Vilakazi was read repetitively, and consequently, Vilakazi became one 
of his most admired Zulu poets. His current favourite African poet is C.S. Ntuli, for 
whom he has tremendous respect. Msimang' s introduction to Zulu poetry as such 
was not with the texts themselves, but from the criticism of the texts, such as in 
Ntuli's two works. 
His artistic skills, even in genres other than poetry, have earned him favourable 
comments from prominent scholars such as D.B. Ntuli (1982: 148) who refers with 
admiration to the creativity of Msimang's meritorious works, as well as E.T.Z. 
Mthiyane who describes Msimang as a "da Vinci" who "has a perfect feel for 
conciseness and incisiveness as can be observed in character portrayal and imagery 
depiction" (1984:131-132). 
C.T. Msimang is well-known for the numerous articles and reviews he wrote for 
various journals. He has written many research and grammar books and compiled 
and edited several literary anthologies. Other than the two collections of poetry to 
be considered in this study, further creative writing include: 
Akuviwe Emhlahlweni. Via Afrika, 1973 (novel). 
Jzulu Eladuma ESandlwana. Van Schaik, 1976 (Historical drama). 
Buzani KuMkabayi. De Jager-Raum, 1982 (Historical novel). 
Jziziba ZoThukela. Via A:frika, 1980 (poetry collection). 
Amaseko. Centaur Publications, 1990 (One-act plays in co-authorship with D.B.Z. 
Ntuli & M.N. Makhambeni - Ed) 
UNodumehlezi KaMenzi. Bard Publishers, 1990 (poetry collection). 
Ucu Olumhlophe. Macmillan Boleswa, 1991 (Annotated poetry collection - in co-
authorship with L.T.L. Mabuya). 
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Igula Lendlebe Aligcwali, Kagiso Publishers, 1995 (Short stories/essays anthology) 
"-J.1.6 Resume 
Chapter one was purely introductory. The aim, method and scope of this project 
were mainly elaborated on, in which the most important aspects on which this thesis 
is based, were covered. Both post-structuralism, as an umbrella term, and 
deconstruction were touched upon for, as one would expect, their terminology are 
intricately related. The negative attitude that most critics have towards 
deconstruction theory and practice was highlighted. Furthermore, a background 
study of the poet under discussion, Msimang, was given. This is done mainly for the 
sake of intertextuality. The primary objective behind deconstruction is that texts 
should be read differently now, partly as a result of new ways of reading which have 
shown that they are far more problematic than perhaps they once seemed. 
Traditionally, critics and readers viewed literary texts as a store ofinformation on the 
values and ideas of their cultural tradition. Post-deconstructively, literary works 
should be seen as especially concentrated forms of universal features oflanguage, the 
tendency of figurative language, for example, to subvert straightforward grammatical 
or logical meaning. Additionally, works are read differently now because they are 
read in a different context, by readers shaped by the mass media. Influences like 
television, cinema, and popular music, for example, should also be taken into 
consideration. Especially in South Africa, with our new multilingual, multiracial 
society, a modem society with increasingly amalgamated cultural traditions, we must 
again become focussed on the all important traditional task - the teaching ofreading. 
CHAPTER2 
BACKGROUND TO DECONSTRUCTION AS A 
POST-STRUCTURAL LITERARY THEORY 
2.1 Introduction 
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In order to fully grasp the performance and implications of deconstruction, certain 
basic deconstructive verities have to be explained. In this chapter an attempt will be 
made to introduce the fundamentals and functions of deconstruction. This approach 
to literature is considered by many theorists to be the most intellectually formidable 
method of literary analysis. 
Deconstruction forms part of the literary theories grouped together as post-
structuralism. It can only be fully understood when seen in its post-structuralist 
framework, when certain structuralist thinkers started to question certain 
structuralist concepts. This cast doubt on the present thinking and caused a 
considerable reaction to the literary theory of the day. Deconstruction was the most 
controversial outcome of structuralism, and still evokes a great deal of attention and 
even resentment. It could be said that in the last decade, criticism and theory has 
partly been a rejection of and reaction against deconstruction, but it has also at the 
same time been an absorption of, and a working forwards from, deconstruction 
(Peck and Coyle, 1993:197). 
As stated before, this post-structural approach to literary analysis is rather a 
philosophy than a literary theory, a point which will be explained in this discussion. 
The theory of deconstruction also comprises of no specific method - there are no 
specific guidelines to follow when reading a text carefully and closely. The 
procedure simply criticises the sign and the possibility of meaning in a text. Peck 
and Coyle (1993:194) views this as follows: 
A deconstructive reading is a sort of double reading: it 
acknowledges the way in which the writer attempts to order things, 
but then points to the contradictions and problems in the text, the 
complications that the writer cannot pull into her or his system. The 
critic's own response, however, can also be deconstructed, for the 
critic, too, is involved in trying to create coherence where none exits. 
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',f: To many this appears to be a negative, destructive approach. The customary 
objection to deconstruction is then that it is a form of criticism which, rather than 
valuing what a text says, emphasises a text's difficulties in saying anything. 
Although there is thus no specific approach to deconstruction, a repetitive pattern 
does appear when analysing Derrida's work. While examining individual texts 
closely, he searches for contradictions and, "particularly in his studies of 
philosophical writing, the gaps in what appears to be a logical argument" (Peck and 
Coyle, 1993:195). He knows that his own readings of these texts can also be 
deconstructed, for all readings are misreadings in that they compel ordering-
strategies: 
... without being able to isolate (the) elements and atoms (of the old 
structure), the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way 
falls prey to its own work (Derrida, 1976:24). 
Therefore 
above all the work of deconstruction, its 'style', remains by nature 
exposed to misunderstanding and non-recognition (Derrida, 197 6: 4 ). 
The above-mentioned ordering strategies will be fully discussed later in this chapter. 
Deconstruction probes readings which act as conferments of an individualist's vision 
that was relevant to, and could inspire, all of society. It focuses on the reason why 
19 
such readings result in certain messages with mostly positive meanings that not only 
the critic, but his or her followers want to hear. Traditional literary criticism can be 
seen as a sort of scheme in which particular critics praise literature for its 
manifestation of specific values. Post-structuralism, and then to an even greater 
extent deconstruction, stepped back from this conspiracy and scrutinized it with a 
naked eye. 
Certain individuals contributed to and were associated with the movement of 
deconstruction. The principal person who launched this approach was the French 
philosopher, Jacques Derrida. The term itself also originates in the writings of 
Derrida. Derrida based his work on Ferdinand de Saussure - his conception of 
language consists of a differential network of arbitrary signification. Derrida 
however raises a number of points of criticism against de Saussure's language 
theory. His work has been heralded as the most significant in contemporary 
thinking, but it has also been denounced as a corruption of all intellectual values. 
Any reader or critic of deconstruction who had assimilated even a sliver of the 
message of structuralism and deconstruction cannot return to the old principles of 
criticism, it is impossible to think along the old lines again. This is so, for 
deconstruction has "exposed the kind of comfortable complacency of much 
traditional criticism, in which the critic found a coherent pattern and set of values in 
the text which he could endorse"(Peck and Coyle, 1993: 197). Deconstruction has 
changed the way in which a text is read. 
2.2 Diachronic and synchronic perspectives on deconstruction 
The creation of a theory discloses much regarding the content of that theory. Some 
theories like feminism and black literary theories were powered through their 
opposition to established theory and their resentment against exclusion. Their claim 
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was that the literary tradition has been ignorant or insensitive of any alternative 
tradition. Deconstruction, however, did not have its origin in opposition to any 
theory, but it also did not agree with any specific theory. 
Deconstructive theory and practice had its origin in structuralism already, but it is 
grouped with the post-structuralistic approaches. An examination of post-
structuralism will elucidate the roots of deconstruction further. The history of 
deconstruction as well as modern day views by allies and adversaries will also 
explicate the theory. 
2.2.1 The rise and influence of post-structuralism 
The rise of literary theory, from the 1960s to the present, is no more than an 
imperative response to the repressing effects of a no longer dynamic or investigative 
institutionalized technique. The New Critics' close analysis became rigid, inflexible 
and self-preservatory. Critics believed that the theory was losing its skill in 
interpretation. Certain structuralists began to doubt the suitability of the theory that 
they were imposing on literature. In reaction to this, the post-structuralistic theory 
was triggered in the seventies. With new insights, they hoped to regain the 
interpretive skill. 
Post-structuralism is sometimes used almost interchangeably with deconstruction, 
however, deconstruction only represents an important, even dominant element of 
post-structuralism. Post-structuralism covers all the approaches that have developed 
in the wake of, and which take account of, the new perceptions into language that 
sprang from structuralism. Other post-structuralistic theories are reader-reception, 
new historicism, psychoanalytic theory and feminism. Peck and Coyle (1993:196) 
offer the following insight: 
Traditional critics accepted that a text offered a coherent response 
to life and that critics could make sense of this. Post-structuralist 
critics, by contrast, tend to find incoherence, contradiction and 
anxiety in texts from the past; they tend to stress the fragility of the 
ideological order of society rather than the strength or coherence of 
any period. 
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Although deconstruction forms part of post-structuralism, there is a degree of 
uncertainty as to the use of this term. According to Richard Harland (1987:2) post-
structuralism can be divided into three, i.e. groups which he had compiled according 
to different contributing persons. Alex Callinicos, however, proposes a rather 
different division of post-structuralism into two main strands of thought: textualism 
and Michel Foucault's "power-knowledge" (Callinicos 1989:68). The textualists, 
according Richard Rorty (1982:139) include the so-called 'Yale School ofliterary 
criticism', which he maintains centres around Harold Bloom, Geoffrey Hartman, 
J. Hillis Miller, and Paul de Man; post-structuralist French thinkers such as Jacques 
Derrida, Jacques Lacan and Michel Foucault, historians such as Hayden White, and 
social scientists such as Paul Rabinow. What all of these individuals have in 
common, according to Rorty, is an antagonistic position to natural science and the 
belief that we can never compare human thought or language with "bare, unmediated 
reality" (1982: 139). Rorty sees these positions as constituting a textualism which is 
the contemporary counterpart of idealism, and its practitioners as the spiritual 
descendants of the idealists (1982: 140). The textualist version of post-structuralism 
has had a far more significant impact on literary studies than the F oucaultian variant. 
Textualist post-structuralism represents at the same time both a development and a 
deconstruction of structuralism (Hawthorn, 1992: 137). These post-structuralists 
caused an even more radical break with the New Critics. These critics involved 
themselves with the deconstruction of a text and the reconstruction of a new text. 
The predominant influence on post-structuralism is Derrida, who is primarily 
associated with deconstruction. However, the bulk of post-structural literary theory 
is more political than deconstruction. "However, these theories still appertain to 
deconstruction in that they all remain external to the traditional values. Both 
Marxist and feminist criticism possess this involvement, as well as psychoanalytic 
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criticism which examines the construction of the subject in society. It is also true of 
new historicism which, rather than just drawing a picture of a period, speculates on 
how and why any period constructs itself in a certain way"(Peck and Coyle, 
1993:198). 
Post-structuralism starts with Ferdinand de Saussure, everything follows from his 
Course in General Linguistics, published in 1916. With regards to communication, 
De Saussure makes a distinction between sign, signifier and signified: a particular 
language sign consists of sound plus a form of writing which is called the signifier 
and a concept or meaning associated with the sensory perception which is called the 
signified. Applied to literature, this means that a text equals a sign which consists 
of symbols (signifiers), and which signifies the reality in which we live (signified). 
De Saussure also makes a distinction between two systems with regards to language, 
namely langue and parole. With langue he refers to a system of conventions of 
language (rules and norms) and with parole to the manifestation of that system in 
speech and writing. 
De Saussure's notions have three implications for literature: firstly, that a text being 
a sign which communicates, also consists of different parts the same way language 
comprises different words; in the second instance, that there is always a certain 
relation between these constituent parts of the text; and thirdly, that meaning is 
conveyed not by one item in the text only, but by each individual part together with 
the whole of all the constituent parts. Structuralism regards a text as a structure 
which has been structured in a specific and unique way by organising unorganised 
and artistically indifferent material in such a way that it becomes meaningful. To the 
structuralists, the meaning of a specific text is of secondary importance since they 
are primary interested in how literature produces meaning. Selden (1988a:52) 
mentions that "structuralist poetics draws attention to the codes we used to 
construct meaning." 
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While structuralism is engrossed with establishing a firm hold on the text, post-
structuralism is concerned with acknowledging the text's elusive nature and the 
fallibility of all readings (Peck and Coyle, 1993: 194). It stresses the indeterminacy 
of all texts and the inadequacy of all readings. For de Saussure, meaning is firstly 
produced in the formation of signs as two-sided entities. Secondly, meaning is also 
produced in a play of differences. Because de Saussure's sign is premised on a 
binarism which he claims is indissolubly related, Derrida is immediately suspect. 
Although Derrida accepts de Saussure's principle that meaning is the product of the 
differential relations between signifiers, he does not agree with the viewing of 
language synchronically only. According to him, the diachronic aspect, of how 
language develops and changes over time, should also be taken into consideration. 
Derrida argues that de Saussure applied logocentric thinking when he elevated 
speech above writing. This implies that meaning is conceived as existing 
independently of the language in which it is communicated and is thus not subject 
to the play of language. Subsequently, it discloses the belief that the signifier and 
the signified could be merged within the same temporal plane. Derrida argues that 
one can discover - by deconstructing de Saussure's argument and by pursuing the 
implications of his arguments as far as possible, de Saussure's maintenance of a strict 
distinction between "the signans and the signatum, [and] the equation of the 
signatum and the concept", which, he argues, 
inherently leaves open the possibility of thinking a concept signified 
in and of itself, a concept simply present for thought, independent of 
a relationship to language, that is of a relationship to a system of 
signifiers ... (198lb: 19). 
Derrida is totally opposed to this view and he deconstructs and inverts his hierarchy 
oflanguage and writing. He transforms the terms, and the relations between them. 
He believes that writing - where the signifier is always productive - is a better model 
for understanding how language works. This shatters the idea of a permanently 
binding of the signifier and signified. Derrida's principal aspiration has thus been a 
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commitment to the eradication of the belief in absolute and extra-systemic 
determinants of meaning: 
Thus central to the post-structuralist impact on literary theory and 
criticism has been its argument that the play of signifiers cannot be 
stopped or made subject to the fluctuation of any extra-textual 
authority (Hawthorn, 1992:138). 
Language is seen as a never-ending chain of words where meaning is produced in 
an infinite number of possible future contexts. 
2.2.2 Deconstruction and its exponents 
Deconstruction might be the most difficult to summarize of all the developments in 
contemporary literary theory. The reason for this is that deconstruction has no 
specific definition. As varied as critics ofliterature are, so then are the answers to 
what deconstruction might represent. Some critics seem to think that this post-
structural theory is a way of doing philosophy or of reading theoretical texts - the 
latest fashion in literary theory. More negative responses were that it is a device for 
making trouble or that it is literature's revenge on philosophy. Again, articles on 
deconstruction mostly aspire to decipher the theory itself which leads to a further 
problem. There has been more talk about deconstruction, as a 'theory' or as a 
'method', attempts to applaud it or to deplore it, than there has been an attempt to 
actually do it, to show how it is applicable to literary works. 
Geoffrey Hartman (1989:98-99) attempts to describe deconstruction as follows: 
Deconstruction belongs to the sphere of the essay, because 
deconstructive reading no longer aims to establish a master-code but 
undoes every totalizing perspective. Yet it also belongs, in spirit, to 
the science of literature. We certainly have cause to place 
deconstruction on the side of theory . . . It cannot be classified 
disjunctively as a philosophy or as a type of literary analysis. It is 
clearly both; and while it implies a theory of reading, that theory 
seems to be effective only as a set of practices, of actual readings, 
which revise and so revive texts in an 'intellectual' tradition 
stretching from Plato to and beyond Mallarme. I sometimes feel that 
deconstruction itself is the impasse. The name stresses analysis ... 
Perhaps the best one can do is to 'place' deconstruction, and to 
show that it is not a foreign import ... 
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Many critics maintain that deconstruction involves no actual change in theory of 
literature, but a definite modification in the theory of teaching; that is, in the critical 
reading ofliterature. Ralph Cohen (1989:xiii) comments: 
Here 'reading', in the sense ofrhetorical analysis of the most vigilant 
and patient sort, is indispensable. How else are we going to know 
just what a given text is and says, what it can do? 
Although deconstruction is associated with Derrida, it is not the work of one person. 
Deconstruction is a change of mind, the way literature and its interpretations are 
looked at. It suspends everything the reader took for granted about language, 
experience and communication and led to the overthrowing of traditional concepts. 
Traditional critics maintain that moral and ideological meanings are ever present in 
literary theory. Before deconstruction, interpretation meant the process of giving 
meaning to words and images. But deconstruction hinges on one aspect: what one 
person reads and interprets is not the same as another person's perception. It is an 
investigation ofintertextuality, on the traces of other texts. The deconstructive critic 
unravels the usual rhetorical structures, searches for influences of earlier texts, 
makes an investigation into the etymology of the used words and tries to combine 
from the as such deconstructed text a new text, which again opens itself up for a 
new deconstruction. Traditional critics have also indicated that certain texts contain 
several echoes and traces of earlier texts, but these are transformed and difficult to 
recognize. The most important task of the deconstructionist is an ongoing 
investigation into old traces. Even old texts made use of even older traces. Even 
the literary-critical text is a link in an everlasting chain. 
'\ 
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Structuralism also viewed the text as having a fixed meaning, and the critic had to 
discover the meaning. Deconstruction is opposed to the above approach. A critic 
cannot unsuspectingly try to capture the meaning of a text. A text is a tapestry 
which is combined from several intricately woven threads. The following of one 
thread only leads to an incorrect representation of facts. But the following of more 
threads does not lead to the determination of one definitive meaning. Criticism leads 
to aporia, a not-knowing, a meaning of which one knows no other alternative. Hillis 
Miller illustrates this situation with the image of the Ariadnes thread, which 
differently from the mythological tale, does not show the way out of the labyrinth, 
but ensnares the searcher finally in the labyrinth. 
Deconstructionists are also against the view in which the text is depicted as a 
representation of reality. On the contrary, so they say, the text is actually creating 
a reality. The realistic impression of true presence is precisely the result of the 
language's ability to, what is absent in facts, recall as reality. The language creates 
reality. There are no events or characters in a text, only language forms which 
, convoke these with the reader. Deconstruction questions the idea of the sign and 
langue of the text. It questions the idea of the context, the idea of the author as well 
as the reader, the role of history, interpretation, the forms of critical writing. 
Deconstruction is aimed towards revealing in which way the writer has made use of 
language and thought patterns handed down to give form to a particular vision. 
Deconstruction questions the New Criticism's explication of the difference between 
rational language and poetic language. 
The deconstructive procedure is not opposed to or does not want to change other 
theories, but permits these apparent adversaries to develop their theories. Many 
theories such as New Criticism, feminism, psychoanalysis, Marxism and New 
Historicism comprise of components such as aims, methods, vocabularies, images, 
arguments that are not all in conflict. Like deconstruction, most of these approaches 
insist on close and careful reading of texts. This is the legacy of deconstruction and 
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it is incorporated into even those theories which resist deconstructive views of 
language. 
\As already discussed, deconstruction originated in France with Derrida, but it is also 
practised immensely in America. In France deconstruction came into being as a 
reaction against structuralism, while deconstruction in America emerged against the 
background of the New Criticism. Certain individual critics like Roland Barthes, 
Jacques Derrida, Julia Kristeva and Phillippe Sollers, who were associated with the 
journal Tel Quel developed a theory of the text in Paris during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. They debated contemporary theory, especially psychoanalysis, 
structuralism and Marxism. Barthes explains the inception as "the meeting of 
different epistemes: Freudianism, Marxism and Structuralism" (Barthes, 1981 :35). 
Barthes himself demonstrated his shift towards the post-structural position with his 
essay 'The death of the author'(1968). Again, in 1970 his text S/Z - which is 
regarded as the first important post-structural manuscript - was published. The first 
deconstructive essay in English translation was Derrida's own 'Structure, Sign, and 
Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences', first delivered as a lecture at John 
Hopkins University in 1966 and published in 1970 in The Structuralist Controversy. 
This essay has been extremely influential on literary theory (Newton, 1988: 148). 
Derrida's deconstructive analyses ofliterary texts have also been a major inspiration 
to literary critics, for unlike the previous theories which exhibited the structural unity 
of a text, he shows how a text foils its own presumptions and is thus divided against 
itself 
In 1971 Paul de Man's Blindness and Insight ushered in deconstruction as a critical 
movement in America. The theory was then taken up primarily by other American 
critics such as J. Hillis Miller. Miller was one of a group of critics at Yale University 
in the 1970s and early 1980s who adopted a deconstructionist position. Their type 
of American deconstruction constitutes a rather less broadly-based outgrowth of 
structuralism. They produced the notion of 'misreading', which is also found in the 
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work of Harold Bloom and Paul de Man. According to Culler (1983: 178) they 
mimicked Derrida's reversal of language and writing by inverting the hierarchy 
between reading and misreading. Reading then becomes only a special case of 
misreading. Misreading would then "resist metaphysical idealizations and capture 
the temporal dynamic of our interpretive situation" (Culler, 1983: 178). However, 
even if the word 'reading' is not utilized because ofits idealist connotations and the 
word 'misreading' is used instead, misreading still implies some true reading. Hillis 
Miller, for example, discusses in one of his articles how principal images collide with 
and undermine the writer's claims for impartial vision. Another deconstructionist, 
Geoffrey Hartman, has written about the 'vision' in poetry (Peck and Coyle, 
1993: 196-197). Whereas most critics concentrate on the substance and significance 
of this vision, Hartman stresses how it lies beyond the reach oflanguage, and shows 
how the poet's verse repeatedly becomes confused and puzzled because there is 
such a gap between the feeling and words (Peck and Coyle, 1993:94). These are 
typical deconstructive readings, emphasising the contradictions the writer cannot 
control. According to the American deconstructionist Barbara Johnston (1981: 167) 
a deconstructive reading is a reading which analyses the specificity 
of a text's critical difference from itself 
The critical difference of the text is explained as follows: 
Difference is not engendered in the space between identities, it is 
what makes all totalisations of the identity of a self or the meaning 
of a text impossible (Johnston, 1981 : 166). 
Deconstruction is thus a specific way of reading which deconstructs itself without 
posing any alternative. Among the American deconstructionists one finds many 
different interpretations of deconstruction. Another mode of deconstructive reading 
identified simply applies Derridean terminology, using deconstruction as a model for 
the interpretation of literary texts - a way of solving hermeneutic problems. Not 
everybody agrees with the latter approach, some traditional deconstructionists feel 
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that it weakens the original formulations of Derrida. But according to Culler 
(1983 :228), to set up Derrida's work 
as the original word and treat other deconstructive writing as a fallen 
imitation is precisely to forget what deconstruction has taught one 
about the relation between meaning and iteration and the internal 
role of misfires and infelicities. Deconstruction is created by 
repetitions, deviations, disfigurations. It emerges from the writings 
of Derrida ... only by dint of iteration: imitation, citation, distortion, 
parody. 
It could be said that the statement ignores Derrida's insistence on the manner in 
which deconstruction should not only invert, but also transform. However, many 
literary critics have accepted a post-structuralist position, but object to following 
Derrida's textual approach too narrowly. Other deconstructionists' strategies, like 
Foucault, for instance, are more acceptable, for the critic is able to pursue beyond 
the textual to other dimensions of texts. 
It would certainly seem that deconstruction involves one inescapable implication for 
the process of interpretation - literary or otherwise. This is that the interpretation 
of a text can never arrive at a final and complete 'meaning' for a text. As Derrida 
himself remarks about a reading of the Marxist 'classics', 
These texts are not to be read according to a herrneneutical or 
exegetical method which would seek out a finished signified beneath 
a textual surface. Reading is transformational (198lb:63). 
Deconstructive procedure simply demands an improved method of reading. Not just 
reading, but each reading. Thus for Derrida the meaning of a text is always 
unfolding just ahead of the interpreter, unrolling in front of him or her like a never-
ending carpet whose final edge never reveals itself (Hawthorn, 1992:33). 
Like structuralism, deconstruction appears to stand outside the values and beliefs of 
society, but is even more all-questioning. The deconstructive reader appears to 
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believe that nothing can be finally understood. In contrast, structuralism contains 
a strong element of reason in believing that it is possible to explain how literature 
works (Peck and Coyle, 1993: 196). 
Deconstructive critics, then, stress the problems language experiences in trying to 
cope with life. Such an approach might seem negative, but deconstructive criticism 
is often very lively both because it recognises that the text is a complex thing and 
because the critic's sense that there is no determinate meaning to the text allows a 
degree of reckless freedom in discussing it. 
In an interview with Imre Salusinszky, Johnston has further commented that 
Ifit is indeed the case that people approach literature with the desire 
to learn something about the world, and if it is indeed the case that 
the literary medium is not transparent, then a study of its non-
transparency is crucial in order to deal with the desire one has to 
know something about the world by reading literature (Salusinszky 
1987:166). 
The question then is whether it is really possible to learn something about the world 
through literature or whether this is only a delusion experienced by 'people' who can 
be relieved of their inappropriate 'desire' through a study of the literary medium's 
non-transparency. 
Johnston does, however, go on to distance herself and deconstruction from the 'self-
involved textual practice of close reading' of the New Critics mentioned by her 
interviewer, suggesting that deconstruction necessarily involves a political attitude, 
one which examines authority in language. She further notes that Karl Marx was as 
close to deconstruction as are a lot of deconstructors - particularly by virtue of his 
bringing to the surface of the hidden inscriptions of the economic system, uncovering 
hidden presuppositions, and showing contradictions (Salusinszky 1987: 167). 
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~.The theory of deconstruction can be viewed as the liberator of all texts, the 
democracy of literary theory. It does not want to bind a single text to certain 
interpretations, but sets these free. Richard Machin and Christopher Norris note that 
post-structuralist readings tend to "feature the text as active object" (1987:3). The 
author is no longer seen as the source of meaning, and deconstruction is guilty of 
being an accessory after the fact with regard to the death of the author. There is, as 
Derrida infamously puts it, nothing outside the text. 
Post-structuralism is therefore implicated in the death of the author, 
and in consistently opposing any textual interpretation claiming 
either finality or undeconstructable authority. It has also contributed 
to a suspicion of any argument or position which grants the 
individual human subject powers of self-determination or of 
historical causation (Hawthorn 1992: 138). 
Later on in their introduction, Machin and Norris seek to establish that whereas each 
reading in the collection "develops an insistent coherence of its own that drives 
towards conclusive and irrefutable conclusions", the possibility is nonetheless held 
open of"a multitude of competing meanings, each of which denies the primacy of 
the others"(l987:7). 
Deconstruction implies, as Jonathan Culler puts it, that the hierarchical oppositions 
of Western metaphysics are themselves constructions or ideological impositions 
( 1988 :20). Deconstruction thus aims to undermine Western metaphysics by undoing 
or deconstructing these hierarchical oppositions and by showing their logocentric 
reliance upon a centre or presence, which reflects the idealist desire to control the 
play of signifiers by making them subject to some extra-systemic transcendental 
signified (Hawthorne, 1992: 31). It is, at the same time, more openly doubtful, 
inclining to expose all the tactics any writer utilizes to deploy experience, and 
working with an idea of the impossibility oflanguage achieving any kind of coherent 
commitment with the world. 
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2.2.2.1 Jacques Derrida 
Many divergent things can be said of deconstruction. Nonetheless one finds 
consensus on one point: its leading exponent has been Jacques Derrida. Although 
Derrida is a philosopher - he studied and taught philosophy in Paris and in America -
he has never written anything straightforwardly philosophical. His writing 
challenges the usual notions of truth and knowledge. It disrupts traditional ideas 
about procedure and presentation and questions the authority of philosophy. 
Philosophy is first of all writing and therefore it depends on the styles and forms of 
its language - figures of speech, metaphors, even layout on the page, just as 
literature does. Derrida's critique of philosophy puts the boundaries between 
philosophy and literature into question and destabilises the boundaries. Reactions 
to this have ranged from deliberated critique to sheer denunciation - deconstruction 
has been extremely controversial. Prof Barry Smith and other traditionalist 
academics from the University of Cambridge protested in a letter to The Times 
(Saturday, 9 May 1992): 
M. Derrida describes himself as a philosopher. His influence, 
however, has been to a striking degree almost entirely in fields 
outside philosophy. . .. M. Derrida's work does not meet accepted 
standards of clarity and rigour. 
M. Derrida's writings seem to consist in no small part of elaborate 
jokes and puns. He seems to have come close to making a career 
out of translating into the academic sphere tricks and gimmicks 
similar to those of the Dadaists or the concrete poets .... 
M. Derrida's voluminous writings in our view stretch the normal 
forms of academic scholarship beyond recognition. Above all, his 
works employ a written style that defies comprehension. When the 
effort is made to penetrate it, it becomes clear that, where coherent 
assertions are being made at all, these are either false or trivial. 
It is true that Derrida's critique is not a standard analysis as it is not couched in the 
usual terms. Derrida doesn't adopt any fixed position among competing tendencies 
and traditions. He doesn't simply advocate or refute any of them, and he doesn't 
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advance any overarching theories, concepts, methods or projects of his own. As 
such, Derrida's writing is impossible to summarize. In his terms it has no 'basic' 
concepts or methods to pick out and explain, yet it alludes constantly to a wide 
range of thinking. It is often strategically convoluted. It disobeys the usual 
procedures - start at the beginning, lay out the exposition, advance the propositions, 
make a conclusion, etc. Derrida's writing is difficult and maybe subversive. It has 
a rigour and a logic, but of an unfamiliar order. Derrida's writing undermines the 
usual ideas about texts, meanings, concepts and identities - not just in literary theory, 
but in other fields as well. 
Derrida's deliberations were published in 1967 in three books: Speech and 
Phenomena, Writing and Difference, and Of Grammatology. These were his first 
major publications that announced his complex assault on metaphysical thinking. He 
pursued to their conclusion some of the structuralist insights about a language. The 
main theme ofDerridean deconstruction is the displacement oflanguage by writing. 
Derrida attacked the logocentrism which, by giving primacy to speech over writing, 
presupposes a fusion between the signifier and the signified. Aristotle first 
represented this traditional notion oflanguage: 
Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written 
words are the symbols of spoken words (Derrida, 1976:30). 
De Saussure continued this tradition at the beginning of the twentieth century and 
claims that: 
Language and writing are two distinct systems of signs; the second 
exists for the sole purpose of representing the first (Derrida, 
1976:30). 
Derrida inverts this hierarchical ordering oflanguage and writing, and thus redefined 
them in the process. Derrida gives primacy to writing, where the realisation of the 
meaning is always postponed by the very fact that it will always be read and re-
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interpreted in the future. This fact separates the signified from the signifier 
temporally. The meaning is 'deferred', and Derrida coined the word differance to 
express the dual spatial difference and temporal deferment detaching the sign from 
the full presence of its meaning. He denies that writing is secondary to speech or 
doubles the gap between signifier and signified. Derrida does not regard writing as 
a supplement to speech, but sees it as both taking the place of speech and adding to 
it. De Saussure's definition deconstructs itself - if writing is represented as the 
secondary signifier - which is then a signifier of a signifier - then the possibility exists 
that language - which was the original signified - can be seen in exactly the same 
way. This enables Derrida to conclude that 
the signified always already functions as a signifier. The secondarity 
that it seemed possible to ascribe to writing alone affects all 
signifieds in general (Derrida, 1976:7). 
Language is seen as only an aspect, a type of writing. Language's material nature 
has been repressed by 'logocentrism' since Aristotle. 
In his early essay, 'Structure, Sign and Play in the discourse of the Human Sciences', 
Derrida argued that the deconstructive practitioner must relinquish all longing for 
presence, and search for its opposite 
- the joyous affirmation of the freeplay of the world and without 
truth, without origin, offered to an active interpretation . . . This 
affirmation then determines the non-centre otherwise than as loss 
of centre. And it plays the game without security. For there is a 
sure freeplay: that which is limited to the substitution of given and 
existing, present, pieces (Derrida, 1972:264). 
In 'Differance', he continued, "in the delineation of deconstruction everything is 
strategic and adventurous. Strategic because no transcendent truth present outside 
the field of writing can govern theologically the totality of the field. Adventurous 
because this strategy is not a simple strategy in the sense that strategy orients tactics 
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according to a final goal, a telos or theme of domination; a mastery and ultimate 
reappropriation of the field" ( 1982: 7). 
In 'Living on: Border Lines', he proposed that "all organized narration is 'a matter 
of the police'," insofar as it posits a "narratorial voice [that] is the voice of a subject 
recounting something, reinventing an event or a historical sequence, knowing who 
he is, where he is; and what he is talking about" (1979:104-105). 
In Positions, where he clarified and defined the essential terms of deconstructive 
practice, Derrida claimed that the strategy of binary opposition characteristic of all 
Western metaphysics entails not "the peaceful co-existence of a vis-a-vis", but a 
"violent hierarchy". It is the goal of deconstruction, accordingly, to "overturn", 
"displace" and "transgress" this hierarchy, its strategyofundecidability"resists" and 
" disorganizes" binary opposition. Deconstruction aspires not simply to "neutralize 
the binary oppositions of metaphysics [by] residing within the closed field of these 
oppositions, thereby confirming it", but instead to "overturn" and "transgress" and 
"displace" in a double gesture that is simultaneously negative and positive 
(1981a:41,66). 
Derrida explains in his work Of Grammatology that the title designates a "science 
of writing", that he believes is showing signs of liberation all over the world 
(1976:4). This is not, however, a full-bodied science with basic principles which are 
established and final, but - as he implies - a science in which everything is 
questioned, including its own basis and history (1976:28). At the beginning of the 
text, Derrida claims that "phonetic writing, the medium of the great metaphysical, 
scientific, technical and economic adventure of the West, is limited in space and 
time" (1976: 10). For Derrida, it is not a question ofrejecting notions such as time, 
presence, truth, fixity, telos, totality and all that accompanies logocentrism, for "they 
are necessary and, at least at present, nothing is conceivable for us without them. 
It is a question at first of demonstrating the systematic and historical solidarity of the 
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concepts and gestures of thought that one often believes can be innocently separated 
(197 6: 13). Derrida believes that in deconstruction, one is 
operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all the strategic and 
economic resources of subversion from the old structure (Derrida, 
1976:24). 
His general position as a philosopher, however, is to discard hierarchical 
formulations of relationship by firstly reversing them (speech/writing, 
nature/civilisation, good/evil) and then disposing of the reversal. In literature this 
process of deconstruction enables us to identify when and where a text breaks the 
framework it seems to make for itself, and thus disintegrates. 
The title of another of Jacques Derrida's books, Dissemination (1981 b ), describes 
that state of endless seeding and potential growth of meaning said to characterize the 
play of signifiers in the absence of signifieds. According to Spivak, the term refers 
back to "the seed that neither inseminates nor is recovered by the father, but is 
scattered abroad" (Derrida 1976:xi). Unlike "representation", which simply 
"castrates", and even "polysemia", which remains committed to a "teleological and 
totalizing dialectics", dissemination "marks an irreducible and generative 
multiplicity" (1981a:41,43,66,45). The flow of new meanings can never be 
exhausted, nor can these be in any way attached to an author - they are the product 
of language itself. 
There is no absolute agreement concerning what implications Derrida's more general 
positions hold for literary criticism and theory. For Barbara Johnston, 
deconstruction is not a dissipated abandonment of all restraint, but a disciplined 
identification and dismantling of the sources of textual power: 
Deconstruction is not synonymous with 'destruction'. It is in fact 
much closer to the original meaning of the word 'analysis', which 
etymologically means 'to undo' ... The deconstruction of a text does 
not proceed by random doubt or arbitrary subversion, but by the 
careful teasing out of warring forces of signification within the text 
(1981:5). 
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Most other theorists agree on this point - for them deconstruction also involves an 
articulation of the said and the unsaid, of the discursive and the non-discursive. 
2.2.2.2 Paul deMan 
After Jacques Derrida, Paul de Man's contribution to the deconstructive literary 
criticism and theory has been immense. De Man has been one of the most 
influential figures in American criticism and theory since the 1960s. He participated 
in Reuben Brower's 'Hum 6' course at Harvard University, and so the era of 
deconstruction in American was launched. De Man's earlier writings in the 1950s 
was a sort of analytical criticism, focussed on imagery, but later in the 1970s, while 
in contact with Jacques Derrida and deconstruction, he developed a style of 
rhetorical readings (Culler, 1989:269). 
Just like Derrida, de Man established a definite break from previous literary 
traditions. De Man differs with the New Critics in his concept of intention. In his 
essay 'Form and Intent in the American New Criticism', de Man finds the New 
Critics' 'Intentional Fallacy' illogical. The New Critics asserted that any 
consideration of the writer's intention is situated outside the boundaries of criticism 
and that "the design or the intention of the author is neither available nor desirable 
as a standard for judging the success of a work ofliterary art" (Wimsatt, 1970:3). 
The New Critics believe in only one type of intention, that which the writer has in 
mind at the time of formulation, and which can be deduced only from biographical 
details. De Man argues that the New Critics' emphasis on the organic unity of a text 
compelled them to actually disregard the writer's intention. The intention that the 
New Critics distinguishes, de Man argues, is different from the intention which is 
realised in the structure of a work of literature. According to him, the structural 
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intention directs and controls various components of a work and designs them into 
a whole. De Man insists that a literary work is an intentional object - it is created 
by someone; like a pot, it is not a natural object like a plant. 
Furthermore, de Man asserts that the New Critics' accent on irony and ambiguity in 
literature undermines organic unity: "instead of revealing a continuity affiliated with 
the coherence of the natural world, it takes us into a discontinuous world of 
reflective irony and ambiguity"(1979b:28). Ironically, by emphasizing these 
qualities, the New Critics unwittingly accept intention in by the back door, for both 
irony and ambiguity can only characterize an intentional object. 
Jonathan Culler (1989: 271-279) maintains that de Man gave five contributions that 
seem important for the future of criticism and theory - a cursory outline will be given 
of each aspect. One of the first developments was his revaluation of the allegory. 
The post-Coleridgean criticism preferred the symbol as superior figure of speech, 
and they treated the allegory as an undesirable and unsuccessful type of figuration. 
De Man links allegory and irony because of their discovery of discontinuity, 
disjunction, non-identity. For him, texts function as allegorical statements about 
language, literature, and reading, and by foregrounding this aspect, he questions the 
relation of figuration to interpretation. 
Another of de Man's achievements has been the rediscovery of romanticism, which 
was seen by the New Critics as deluded or sentimental. Poetic language, according 
to deMan 
seems to originate in the desire to approximate the condition of the 
natural object, (but) this movement is essentially paradoxical and 
condemned in advance to failure (1984:7). 
Thirdly, there is de Man's identification of the relationship between blindness and 
insight, to which he dedicated a whole book of the same title. De Man argues that 
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critics "owe their best insights to assumption these insights disprove'', a fact which 
"shows blindness to be a necessary correlative of the rhetorical nature of literary 
language" (1979b:141). 
The above insight caused a "phenomenological vocabulary of consciousness" 
(Culler, 1989:274) which de Man created in Blindness and Insight. De Man 
transforms this vocabulary to a rhetorical terminology which starts to focus on 
operations of language: "The assumption that there can be a science of language 
which is not necessarily a logic leads to the development of a terminology which is 
not necessarily aesthetic"(De Man, 1982:8). Like Derrida, de Man shows that 
language is not coextensive with meaning; rhetorical reading becomes in part an 
exposure of the ideological imposition of meaning on language. Literature, 
conceived as the rhetorical character oflanguage revealed by close reading 
involves the voiding, rather than the affirmation, of aesthetic 
categories. One of the consequences of this is that, whereas we have 
traditionally been accustomed to reading literature by analogy ... we 
now have to recognize the necessity of a non-perceptual, linguistic 
moment ... and learn to read pictures rather than to imagine meaning 
(De Man, 1982:13). 
Much of his career is staked on the premise that close reading attentive to the 
working of poetic language will expose the totalisations undertaken in the name of 
meaning and unity: 
What is meant when we assert that the study of literary texts is 
necessarily dependent on an act of reading, or when we claim that 
this act is being systematically avoided? ... To stress the by no means 
self-evident necessity of reading implies at least two things. First of 
all, it implies that literature is not a transparent message in which it 
can be taken for granted that the distinction between the message 
and the means of communication is clearly established. Second, and 
more problematically, it implies that the grammatical decoding of a 
text leaves a residue ofindetermination that has to be, but cannot be, 
resolved by grammatical means, however, extensively conceived ... 
(De Man, 1982:14). 
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De Man believes that deconstruction seeks to undo all oppositions that, in the name 
of unity, purity, order and hierarchy, try to eliminate difference by 
the replacement of a hermeneutic by a sellliotlc model, of 
interpretation by decoding, would represent, in view of the baffling 
historical instability of textual meanings ... a considerable progress 
(De Man, 1982:14-15). 
In 'Rhetoric of Temporality', de Man's reading reveals the way the linguistic 
character of language undermines its apparent offer of meaning. He describes how 
the language of the most lucid and rigorous Romantic writers deconstructs its own 
notion of trope as literary symbol; de Man's deconstructive reading allows the very 
rhetoric of the Romantic discourse about the symbol to expose the fraudulence of 
its own illicit assertion of an intrinsic (metaphorical as opposed to metonymic) 
relation ofimage and meaning. In a later essay on Friedrich Nietzsche 'Rhetoric of 
Persuasion (Nietzsche)' complicates this picture of language's power of internal 
subversion, charting a constant, unresolved oscillation between language's claim to 
assert truth and its apparent performative power to enact a deed. De Man points to 
a recurring tension in language between its tropological and performative functions. 
He argues that these two functions work together finally to undermine the 
performance oflanguage in favour ofits (failed) epistemology. The essay on Shelley 
'Shelley Disfigured' focuses on the violent, coercive workings of that performative 
or 'positing' power of language in its own right. Taken together as a series, the 
essays outline an increasingly sever view oflanguage: as failed effort at knowledge; 
as undecidable oscillation between knowledge and performance; as arbitrary and 
violent imposition of power. 
Finally, de Man's later essays, collected in Aesthetic Ideology, undertake a critique 
of an aesthetic ideology which imposes, even violently, continuity between 
perception and cognition, form and idea, and which literature, properly read, is 
always undoing. 
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If Jonathan Culler's listing of the contributions Paul de Man has made to literary 
theory and criticism is considered, one realizes that some of these have been 
incorporated into theories that renounce de Man's attitudes to grammar, rhetoric, 
and language. But even when theorists incorporate his views of reading, they add 
to them the hypotheses that value assumptions govern readings. Reading involves 
the values that one wishes to test or discover or confirm. Particular readings are 
connected with values that are confronted by others who oppose them. Readings 
can even reveal values that were unanticipated. 
De Man's illuminative writing grants great authority to texts but little authority to 
meaning. His constant insistence not to give in to the desire for meaning encourages 
a rigorous questioning of any moment that might convince us that we have attained 
a demystified knowledge. Reading follows suspensions of meaning and resistance 
to meaning 
... more than any other mode ofinquiry, ... the linguistics of 
literariness is a powerful and indispensable tool in the 
unmasking of ideological aberrations, as well as a 
determining factor in accounting for their occurrence. Those 
who reproach literary theory for being oblivious to social and 
historical (that is to say ideological) reality are merely stating 
their fear at having their own ideological mystifications 
exposed by the tool they are trying to discredit (1982: 13). 
Deconstruction's value as an instrument of ideological expose will, I believe, prove 
productive for criticism as it explores the resources of de Man's writing and its 
possible links with other contemporary theoretical discourses - of psychoanalysis, 
feminism and Marxism. Criticism has not yet fully explicated or worked with the 
more difficult and unsettling aspects of de Man's writing on language and their 
relation to the questions of history. 
After his death in 1983, a great collection of difficult texts - many still unpublished -
were left behind. These texts still have to be interpreted and explored, a major 
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assignment for the future ofliterary theories. Only then will the implications of de 
Man's critical and theoretical writing be holistically grasped. Not only will it be a 
daunting task to understand what these texts say and why, but especially the 
potential correlations to other contemporary critical discourses, such as 
psychoanalysis, feminism and Marxism, which have recurrently also interested 
deconstructionists. 
}~·3 Concepts in deconstruction 
Because of the relative unfamiliarity of some of the ideas to be treated in this study, 
the reader must be introduced to the important arguments of deconstruction. Both 
Derrida and de Man were great coiners of neologisms. In order to avoid any 
repetition, only certain terms will be explained here. The other terminology, such 
as supplement, trace, site, etc., will be explained as they are practically applied in the 
chapters to come. Deconstructive terms pertaining to psychoanalysis will be 
explicated in the chapter on deconstruction and psychoanalysis, etc. What must be 
kept in mind, however, is that none of the following deconstructive concepts are 
stable definitions or possess fixed meanings. This is a strange idea, for language 
only makes sense to the readers if they impose an established meaning on the words. 
Readers search for such a meaning because they are committed to the notion of 
presence, to the idea that there should be some referent and that words should make 
sense in relation to some presence outside the text. The meanings of Derrida's 
neologisms, however, are constantly deferred and subject to difference. There is no 
firm or fixed presence that can guarantee or underwrite the meanings of these terms. 
If there were, then this theory on which the term depends would of course be in 
error. 
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2.3.1 Differance 
Differance is not a French word, but it is related to the noun la difference (the 
difference), the verb differer (to differ, and to defer) and the verb-adjective differant 
(the condition of differing, or of deferring). This neologism tries to supply a number 
of semantic equivalents simultaneously which includes difference, delay, divergence 
and deferment. It covers all other absences and occlusions of meaning across the 
above related nouns, verbs, etc. (Derrida, 1982: 89). According to Selden 
(1985:85) 
Derrida invents the term 'differance' to convey the divided nature of 
the sign. 
He coins the word in order to get away from the structuralist' notion of fixed 
differences in language when they argue for a system of binary oppositions. Derrida 
sees a constant sliding between meanings and a plurality of differences in which 
opposites always bear traces of each other. As such, differance sees the text as an 
endless stream of signifiers, with words only pointing to other words, without any 
final meaning. Words are defined by their difference from other words, and any 
meaning is endlessly deferred as each word leads us on to another word in the 
signifying system. 
Derrida employs and examines the term throughout his writing, it is a central idea 
in his critique against hierarchical thought. He identifies three main meanings for the 
term: 
First, differance refers to the (active and passive) movement that 
consists in deferring by means of delay, delegation, reprieve, referral, 
detour, postponement, reserving . . . Second, the movement of 
differance, as that which produces different things, that which 
differentiates, is the common root of all oppositional concepts that 
mark our language, such as, to take only a few examples, 
sensible/intelligent, intuition/signification, nature/culture, etc. . .. 
Third, differance is also the production, ifit can still be put this way, 
of these differences, of the diacriticity that the linguistics generated 
by Saussure, and all the structural sciences modelled upon it, have 
recalled is the condition for any signification and any structure ... 
From this point of view, the concept of differance is neither simply 
structuralist, nor simply geneticist, such an alternative itselfbeing an 
'effect' of differance (1981b:8-9). 
Thus, according to Derrida, differance is 
... the systematic play of differences, of the traces of differences, of 
the spacing ( espacement) by which elements relate to one another. 
This spacing is the production, simultaneously active and passive ... 
of intervals without which the 'full' terms could not signify, could 
not function (1981a:27). 
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Differance is the opposite of and alternative to logocentrism. Logocentrism posits 
the existence of fixed meanings guaranteed by an extra-systemic presence or origin. 
Differance, again, undermines logocentrism by implying that meaning can never be 
fully present since it is always deferred in an open-ended chain of meaning with 
temporal as well as spacial dimensions. Such a view rejects reason as merely an 
ordering-strategy that the reader imposes on literature: the reader wants to pull the 
text into his or her own frame ofreference (Hawthorn, 1992:43). 
2.3.2 Binary oppositions and undecidability 
The standard ordering strategy of Western and other cultures is the organisation of 
thoughts in binary pairs (for example, good and evil, black and white, man and 
woman). Binary oppositions classify and organise the objects, events and relations 
of the world. There are many such oppositions, and they are all governed by the 
distinction, either/or. Deconstructive critics argue that meaning is not oppositional 
and that binary terms are never isolated - there is always a trace of the other in them. 
A deconstructive reading undoes these oppositions by pointing to the way the terms 
invade each other and how each shows traces of the other, so that, in the end, it is 
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impossible to decide the difference between the two terms. Derrida demonstrates 
the method by accounting that his writing has a matrix which contains two strands: 
derailed communication and undecidability. Derrida finds both of these in the figure 
of the virus, which can be many things. The virus introduces disorder into 
communication - a derailing of coding and decoding. A virus is also not a microbe, 
it is neither living nor non-living. If the virus is neither dead nor living, then it is 
puzzlingly undecidable. Undecidables are threatening for they poison the comforting 
sense that we inhabit a world governed by decidable categories. 
Undecidables disrupt the oppositional logic of the binary structures of metaphysical 
thinking. They slip across both sides of an opposition but do not fit properly either, 
they play all ways, but takes no sides. They are more than the opposition can allow 
and because of that, they question the very principle of 'opposition'. Derrida 
comments: 
In a classical . . . opposition we are not dealing with the peaceful 
coexistence of a vis-a-vis (facing terms), but rather with a violent 
hierarchy. One of the two terms governs the other (axiologically, 
logically, etc) or has the upper hand. To deconstruct the opposition 
is, first of all, to overturn the hierarchy at a given moment 
(198la:41). 
Derrida draws attention to the presence of as well as the inadequacy of such an 
ordering strategy in texts but is also aware that his own text is likely to betray a 
similar dependency upon binary pairs in order to create a coherent case. The terms 
used to describe the virus depend on the binary opposition 'life' and 'death' : a pair 
of contrasted terms, each of which depends on the other for its meaning. Even 
something as simple as structuralism's notion of how society and thinking are 
constructed on the model of binary pairs, for example the pairing of man and 
woman, could lead to the idea that this particular pairing would privilege the man 
and marginalise the woman. Undecidables would overturn this binarism, but would 
leave no certainty of a privileged foundational term against a subordinated second 
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term. Deconstruction emphasizes the plurality of differences rather than difference 
fixed on opposition. 
2.3.3 Logocentrism 
Jacques Derrida's coinage oflogocentrism was constructed from the Greek word 
'logos ' which can mean logic, reason, the word or God. Richard Harland provides 
the following useful annotation on Jacques Derrida's use of this term: 
a Greek word that illuminatingly brings together in a single concept 
the inward rational principle of verbal texts, the inward rational 
principle of human beings, and the inward rational principle of the 
natural universe. Even more illuminating, 'logos' combines all these 
meanings with a further meaning: 'the Law'. For 'logos' as an 
inward rational principle serves to control and take charge of 
outward material things (1987:146). 
Metaphysics ascribes truth to the logos, along with the origin of truth in general. It 
is the drive to ground truth in a single undivided point, an ultimate origin. In 
Derrida's perspective the sense of security provided by a belief in logos is illusory, 
it is "the deluded sense of mastery of concept over language"(Norris, 1982:29). 
Derrida's task is to undermine metaphysical thinking - to disrupt its foundations, 
dislodge its certitudes, turn aside its quests for an undivided point of origin. As 
such, "logocentrism refers to systems of thought or habits of mind which are reliant 
upon what Derrida, following Heidegger, terms the metaphysics of presence - that 
is, a belief in an extra-systematic validating presence or centre which underwrites 
and fixes linguistic meaning but is itself beyond scrutiny or challenge"(Hawthorn, 
1992: 94). Derrida argues that the dismantling oflogocentrism is simultaneously the 
deconstruction ofidealism or spiritualism "in all their variants" ( 1981b:51 ). Derrida 
says of the history of metaphysics that it has 
always assigned the origin of truth in general to the logos: the history 
of truth, of the truth of truth, has always been ... the debasement of 
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writing, and its repression outside 'full' speech (1976:3). 
According to Derrida, speech has been privileged through the millennia as the 
medium if meaning (phonocentrism). Writing (ecriture) merely represents speech. 
Logocentrism is thus associated by Derrida with the making of ecriture subject to 
speech. However, literacy (the writing of books) is the cornerstone of Western 
civilization. The so-called civilized cultures depend on books for religion, political 
systems, education, etc. To Derrida, it seems as ifthe West has in fact privileged 
writing, and he sets to reverse this logocentric foundation. For Derrida, such a 
position is integrally idealist. He has never claimed that what he does is possible. 
He knows that no critique can ever totally escape from what it is criticizing. 
2.3.4 Presence 
Derrida criticizes the way in which Western philosophy has tried to make meaning 
seem full, unified and immediate, centring upon an ultimate principle or presence. 
According to Jacques Derrida in an early article 
all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the centre 
have always designated an invariable presence - eidos, arche, telos, 
enerfeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject) aletheia, 
transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and soforth(1978:279-
81). 
The concept of presence is closely bound with the idea of logocentrism. Both 
notions refer to the phantasm that the endless play oflanguage can be avoided on 
the grounds that something, by means ofits presence, can guarantee certainty. The 
metaphysics of presence, then, is a logocentric belief in and reliance upon some of 
the above quoted extra-systematic points of reference or authority. Abrams 
attempts to clarify this: 
By 'presence'[Derrida] designates ... a foundation outside the play 
of language itself which is immediately and simply present to us as 
something ultimate, terminal, self-certifying, and thus adequate to 
'centre' the structure of the linguistic system and to guarantee the 
determinate meaning of any utterance within that system 
(1979b:569). 
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Metaphysical oppositions rely on assumptions of presence. The first binary term 
carries 'full' presence, and its subordinate absence, or of mediated, attenuated 
presence. Presence to Derrida can be spatial as well as temporal. Speech has been 
privileged because it seems to carry full presence, while writing depends on 
absences. The order of writing is distance, delay, opacity, ambiguity and death. 
2.3.5 Ecriture 
According to French-English dictionaries, the meaning of ecriture is equivalent to 
'writing' in English. M.H. Abrams has annotated ecriture as "the written or printed 
text" (1977:428) in an article on deconstructive criticism. Many contemporary 
critics persist in using the French term, because, they suggest, the English translation 
of ecriture as writing may be misleading. 
Jacques Derrida's use of the term ecriture also illustrates a loss of complexities when 
translated into English. Writing becomes a palaeonyrnic in Derrida's hands. It no 
longer designates scripting rather than speaking but rather the undecidable play in 
both. It inhabits spoken words, inscribed marks and all other signs. At least two 
meanings of the word 'writing' are discernible in Derrida's writings: the accepted 
meaning, which opposes (phonetic) writing to the speech that it allegedly represents 
and a more radical meaning that determined writing in general, before any tie to 
what glossators call an 'expressive substance'. This more radical meaning would be 
the common root of writing and speech. The treatment accorded to writing in the 
accepted sense serves as a revelatory index of the repression to which arche-writing 
is subject (Derrida 1981b:7-8). For Derrida, ecriture and arche-writing can on 
occasions perform almost interchangeable roles. 
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The conclusion cannot be made that the term was now possessed of a relatively fixed 
set of meanings: because of the centrality of the role played by the term in a range 
of actively developing contemporary theories, its meanings seem to be characterized 
more by continued expansion than by finality or fixity. 
2.3.6 Transcendental signified 
The influence ofJacques Derrida has radically changed the connotations of the word 
'transcendental' and its cognates for many. Whereas at one time its associations 
were mainly positive - that which is above all other categories of thing - since 
Derrida the word is associated with a belief in fixed, extra-linguistic points of 
meaning-determination, a view which he characterizes as logocentric and 
representative of the metaphysics of presence. 
Derrida believes that Western metaphysics suppresses the signifier and uses the 
signified as grounding term. When the signifier is evaporated, all that is left is a 
'pure thought' - the transcendental signified. This, according to metaphysical 
conviction, is most complete in the speaking voice, that is, when speech and thought 
is almost unified. However, Derrida (1981b:49-50) himself, from his very first 
published work has sought to 
systematize a deconstructive critique precisely against the authority 
of meaning, as the transcendental signified or as telos, in other words 
history determined in the last analysis as the history of meaning, 
history in its logocentric, metaphysical, idealist ... representation. 
Derrida attacks the desire for the transcendental signifier for a stability of meaning 
which derives from outside language. For Derrida, there is only language and 
differance - that is, meanings which are always differential and deferred. According 
to Alex Callinicos (1989:74), Derrida believes that 
any attempt to halt the endless play of signifiers, above all by 
appealing to the concept of reference, must ... involve postulating a 
'transcendental signified' which is somehow present to the 
consciousness without any discursive mediation. 
50 
The implications of such a position for literary criticism are not far to seek: the text 
is also subject to a totalizing play oflinguistic difference which cannot be fixed or 
organized by any extra-systemic reference-point - author, authorial intention, 
'common reader's' interpretation, or whatever. Derrida believes that "the absence 
of a transcendental signified extends the realm and the play of signification to 
infinity" (Abrams, 1979b:570). 
2.4 Problems encountered with deconstruction 
In America and Europe there has been a massive shift of focus in literary study since 
1979 away from the intrinsic, rhetorical study of literature toward study of the 
extrinsic relations ofliterature. Literary critics were concentrating on writing about 
struggles of power, history, ideology, the institution of the study ofliterature, the 
class struggle, the oppression of women, and the real lives of men and women in 
society as they exist in themselves and as they are reflected in literature. It seemed 
to signal to many that the era of deconstruction was over. 
Along with this deviation away from rhetorical studies, one often finds erroneous 
statements of what de Man, Derrida, or their colleagues actually said about the 
extrinsic relations ofliterature. It is said that Derrida and his devotees are concerned 
only with language and they cut language off from the real world of history and of 
living men and women. As such, it is opposed to the newer sociological methods 
which are pragmatically engaged in the real world outside language. Deconstruction 
is thus piled onto the garbage heap with other outmoded, 'sterile', and 'elite 
formalisms'. 
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The question is what this (extrinsic methods) has to do with the study of literature. 
It is in defining that liaison that the difficulties and disagreements begin. My 
contention is that the study ofliterature has a great deal to do with history, society, 
the self, but that this relation is not a matter of thematic reflection within literature 
of these extra-linguistic forces and facts, but rather a matter of the way the study of 
literature offers perhaps the best opportunities to identify the nature oflanguage as 
it may have effects on what de Man calls "the materiality of history". 
Traditionalists furthermore argue that although deconstruction has some substance, 
it is basically only valid at a theoretical level. They claim that when readers do share 
a context of understanding with a writer, they can assign a meaning to what the text 
says. Customarily, the aim with literature study is to give a systematic, verifiable 
description of the meaning of a literary text through analysis and interpretation. 
Deconstructionists assert that although this direct engagement with a text may be 
possible, it is only an illusion. They, again, insist that traditionalists are simply 
imposing determinate meaning on words - the meaning of a text is never found -
there is an unending multiplicity of meaning. 
Because deconstruction refers to a type of philosophy and a conception oflanguage, 
the practice thereof is on the whole rather confusing. There is space for much 
subjective speculation, the desired never-ending continuation of the investigative 
process leads to the application of every form of association possible by 
deconstructionists. This form of criticism becomes strongly bound to the knowledge 
and personage of the critic. The denial of reality behind the text can easily be taken 
up too literally. The metaphorical style of the deconstructionist can lead to an 
isolation of this literary criticism. To relay or explain the method is difficult because 
one has no determined boundaries on the overlapping/laying of connections with 
other texts. 
Many scholars interested in deconstruction have been blamed for being more 
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attracted to the critic's attitudes than with agreement with the informing theory. 
This outlook is seen as one of non-involved scepticism of a world which is chaotic 
and balling. 
Machin and Norris (1987:3) note that deconstructive readings tend to feature the 
text as active object, the author is no longer seen as the source of meaning, and 
deconstruction is guilty of being an accessory with regard to the death of the author. 
Later on, they argue that each reading "develops an insistent coherence of its own 
that drives towards conclusive and irrefutable conclusions", there is "a multitude of 
competing meanings, each of which denies the primacy of the others"(1987:7). 
According to Hawthorn, scepticals are not yet convinced by the probability of such 
a "paradoxical blending oflinear rigour and pluralistic co-existence" (1992:33). He 
sums up the situation as follows: 
. . . one of the most recurrent cnt1c1sms of the readings or 
interpretations generated by deconstruction is that they are not 
subject to falsification. Another objection is that these same readings 
and interpretations have a tendency to end up all looking the same, 
all demonstrating the ceaseless play of the signifier and nothing much 
else ... (1992:33). 
Objections are further raised against the belief that the ego is undetermined by and 
independent of social and cultural forces (transcendental subject), and that it 
constitutes a unity rather than a site for the play of contradictions. Murray Krieger, 
in his brief survey of Western critical theory, argues that moral and ideological 
meanings are ever present in literary theory. Even when the critic focuses on ever 
present structure, as in deconstruction, his attitude to the structure itself brings out 
his moral concern. He denounces deconstruction, that with its dissociations of 
language from reality and the emphasis on pure temporality, expresses by implication 
faith in "the disappearance of God" (1989:16-19). He implores: 
Has all that the history of criticism taken so seriously for so long 
been demythified, demystified and deconstructed away? Is there 
nothing left except for us to examine the history and the nature of 
our deceptions and self-deceptions? (1989: 17). 
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Some critics complain that to take what deconstruction says seriously about the 
language of literature or about language as such, might cause an indefinite delay in 
turning the attention to the relations of literature to history, to society, to the self 
De Man has analysed the reasons for this impatience and desire to evade the 
difficulties of seeing literature clearly and thinking out rigorously its nature as a 
specific use of language. Looking closely at the language itself (at the particular 
word used and its implications) does not let emotions, values or thematising get the 
upper hand. Even if a particular text has been analysed by generations of reviewers, 
this cautious way of reading cannot be taken for granted. 
Regardless of all the negativity that surrounds this post-structural practice, and 
whether one objects to the theory or embraces it - if deconstruction is able to only 
let the reader or critic stop and think about the validity and possibilities of his/her 
interpretations, it has already achieved something. 
2.5 Deconstruction in African languages: the present and the future 
As previously stated, deconstruction is a concept rarely, if ever used, in African 
literary theory. The main problem concerning the adoption of this approach into 
African literature is confusion about the subject. This bewilderment is seen not only 
in African languages, but in the Western world as well. It took a long time for 
America and Europe to receive Derrida and de Man - not only to receive, but quite 
relevantly to ask how their work might benefit the study of literature. The long 
processes of questioning the use and value of the approach seem to be at an end in 
these countries, while here in African languages the questioning has not yet begun, 
or has begun in a very limited way. Ignorant statements that deconstruction has 
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nothing to do with literature seem to exacerbate the situation. 
The usual reactions against deconstruction which were discussed earlier also apply 
to the critics of deconstruction in African languages. However, an additional 
element is encountered here. The main obstacle in employing deconstruction and 
other post-structural literary theories appears to be that these conceptions are 
regarded as foreign Western concepts, ideas applicable only to Western culture and 
symbolism. This is only partly true - culture does play a role - but in reading a text 
deconstructively, the rhetorical manipulation of language is important and not 
meaning as such. Deconstructive literary theory in African languages needs to be 
thoroughly discussed in order to find any differences or similarities in the 
employment thereof At this time it is urgent in African languages to indicate how 
especially Derrida might intervene and disrupt our reigning orders ofknowledge, our 
disciplinary arrangements. 
In deciphering an African text, the emphasis on the process draws attention to 
deconstruction as a reading strategy rather than a method or a specific product of 
interpretation. This intimidates and discourages potential deconstructive literary 
scholars in African languages. However, armed with a basic background on the 
ideas and principles of the strategy, the potential researcher can scrutinize literary 
texts, developing his/her knowledge as he/she goes. 
The subject of this study is dualistic: the study of deconstruction as well as African 
literary texts, i.e. Zulu poems. African literature is seen as that which is written 
in an African Language, in English, French or Portuguese by 
Africans. It is written out of the emotional, intellectual and physical 
experience of an African people, fashioned by their cultures 
(Chaphole 1984:105). 
This can create its own set of problems. Difficulties may be experienced when 
African literature is examined in the light of a new 'Western' literary theory. One 
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can view this study furthermore as a comparative literary study - the study of 
literature beyond the boundaries of one nation or culture or language. The Western 
world has, in its position of power, had an enormous impact on world literature. It 
seems like Western literature and Western traditions have become the normative. 
Before one condemns the application of Western theories to African languages, one 
has to keep the evolution of African studies and more specifically, Southern African 
literature, in mind. According to Gerard ( 1971 :2 ), "African literature is an immense 
field and ... a multilayered quarry". Most of the literature consists of oral folk art, 
which also forms the literary prehistory of the then illiterate culture. 
"Diachronically, the second layer of African literature is constituted by such writing 
as was produced before exposure to Western in:fluence"(1971 :4). As yet, this only 
applies to the African countries which were in contact with the Arabic people. 
However, Gerard (1971 :4) remarks that it was not until Europeans settled in Africa 
that modem literary activity emerged on the black continent itself As such, the third 
stratification is reached, which "is made up of the works that were written and 
printed under European in:fluence"(1971:4). Africans were taught literacy in an 
European manner, the texts they write today are mostly based on Western forms and 
techniques. However, this does not have to stop these writers from developing any 
theory further, or even developing a new theory. Ntuli (1987:137) offers the 
following insights: 
Critics, too, should come together to review their approaches. We 
know that articles and theses have been written on general surveys, 
specific genres, special authors and other aspects of literature ... It 
is important for scholars to come together to take a closer look at 
the critical yardstick they are using for vernacular literature. It has 
been suggested, for example, that engagement should be adopted as 
a literary criterion for this literature. How far should we go with this 
proposition? We have sufficient material to be able to sit down and 
determine whether we can make our own contribution towards 
literary theory using vernacular work as a basis. The coming 
together of critics need not aim at reaching some kind of consensus, 
but it should be an exercise directed at the promotion of African 
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literature. 
Given the basic foundations of literary criticism, a new development in African 
languages is a great possibility. New perspectives on the world lead to new texts, 
and new perspectives on literature need a new kind of criticism. On the basis of so 
much new data being received, it is inevitable that, at the level of research, a number 
of concepts and views must be redefined or modified. Just as Derrida coined 
neologisms and palaeonymics, new concepts and ideas have to be described, named 
or renamed that had never before existed in African languages. 
However, the questions Chap hole (1984: 107) asks regarding critical standards for 
African literature holds true to the question of applicability of deconstruction and 
other post-structural theories to an African literary text: 
1. Do we continue to employ Western standards as if nothing 
has happened? OR 
11. Do we develop brand new African standards to handle the 
new literature that clearly shows influences of both 
traditions? 
m. Do we modify existing critical procedures in order to make 
honest, informed judgements about African writing; bearing 
in mind that what functions as criticism for one literature 
may not necessarily function for another? 
I do not think that a different set of criteria should be evolved for the criticism of 
African literature. An adaptation in the way of appending African requirements onto 
the existing post-structural theories, will be more feasible. This is, however, no 
small task. This being the case, one has to affirm the questions Schipper (1989:26) 
asks: How Western is the study of literature and how Eurocentric is literary 
research? Shouldn't the term 'universal' apply to literary criticism nowadays? 
In applying a so-called Western concept to African languages, a critic has to ask 
how, why and for whom the fixed canon is a reality. In Black Literature and 
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Literary Theory, Henry Louis Gates Jr. (1984:3) posed a number of relevant 
questions about the formal relations between Black and Western literatures: 
What is the status of the black literary work of art? How do 
canonical texts in the black traditions relate to canonical texts of the 
Western traditions? As if these questions were not problematic 
enough, how do we read black texts? Can the method of explication 
developed in Western criticism be 'translated' into the black idiom? 
How 'text-specific' is literary theory, and how 'universal' are 
rhetorical strategies? If every black canonical text is, as I shall 
argue, 'two-toned' or 'double-voiced', how do we explicate the 
signifying black difference that makes black literature 'black'? And 
what do we make of the relation between the black vernacular 
tradition and the black form tradition, as these inform the shape of 
a black text? Do we have to 'invent' validly 'black' critical theory 
and methodologies? 
If Western literature has a canon, then so does Western literary 
criticism. If the relation of black texts to Western texts is 
problematic, then what relationship obtains between (Western) 
theories of (Western) 'literature' and its 'criticism' and what the 
critic of black literature does and reflects upon? 
What is the relevancy and usefulness of the existing literary theories developed by 
Western scholars, formed by Western theoretical and literary traditions for those 
who want to study African literature? Writers and critics in Africa are increasingly 
aware of the dangers ofEurocentrism and they have often reacted against it. In the 
early 1960s, the Zulu poet, R.M. Kunene, was one of the first critics who advocated 
against "the ritualistic adoption of such Western poetic techniques as rhyme, syllabic 
metre, or regular stanza forms, all of which, he claims, are alien and even 
antagonistic to the very spirit of the Bantu language" (Gerard, 1971 :269). 
Various researchers have expressed their views on Zulu literature. Gerard 
(1971:270) complains about the "disquieting amount of childish stuff'' being 
published in Zulu. Many critics of Zulu literature state that the immaturity of works 
not only in Zulu, but in all the Southern African languages, originates from the fact 
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that there is no organised form ofliterary criticism whose function would be to set 
up the standards. This could be true, for many literary critics in Zulu generally 
complain of the violation of the basic literary requirements. This is why the 
introduction ofliterary theories and criticism will be a contribution to this field. To 
know the medium you are working with, will result in better work being produced, 
better writers and better literary critics. 
Decoding African texts deconstructively from either an African or a Western 
perspective may seem arduous. Chap hole ( 1984: 107) also experiences problems in 
this regard: 
Jabbi suspects that a critic better informed in Western literature than 
in traditional African forms may see modem African writing as 
emerging mainly from Western forms; another critic, more nostalgic 
towards African traditions, may see things the other way round. 
Then there is the cautious critic who is hesitant to be caught out. 
We must all consider and accept our individual limitations in the 
presence of the vast complexity of cultural factors. Any bias of 
knowledge will always involve a degree of covert ignorance or overt 
indifference to certain relevant cultural considerations. African 
literature cannot afford prematurely rigid alignments in criticism and 
scholarship in the early stages of its development. 
In an interview with Mineke Schipper (1989:44), the father of negritude, Leopold 
Senghor, confirms the constructiveness of interaction between Europe and Africa, 
whatever level it may be: 
L 'Europe nous apportera, essentiellement, avec son esprit de 
methode et d'organisation, ses decouvertes scientifiques et 
techniques. L 'Afrique, je veux dire l 'Afrique noire, apportera ses 
vertus communautaires et artistiques, singulierement sa philosophie 
de la vie, fondee sur la comp/ementarite, et, dans /es arts, son sens 
de I 'image analogique, du rhythme et de la me/odie. 
(With its spirit of method and organization, Europe will bring us, 
mainly, its scientific and technical discoveries. Africa, I mean black 
Africa, will bring its communitary and artistic values, particularly its 
philosophy oflife, based upon the complementarity, and, in the arts, 
its sense of analogical image, of rhythm and of melody). 
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The comparative study of criticism from different cultures will certainly be quite 
enlightening, because a different cultural background may lead to completely 
different interpretations of a text. The mother-tongue reader has an obvious 
advantage in this regard on the non mother-tongue reader, however, problems may 
also be experienced by the uninformed mother-tongue reader. Irele points out that 
African literature enjoys an ambiguous critical position. First, the African critic 
draws from an indigenous oral tradition and a Western tradition. These two 
traditions combine to provide a background of responses which forms the basis for 
judgement (Chaphole 1984:107). In my analysis, I will draw from my knowledge 
of these two resources. 
When analysing a text, Western or African, the critic's responses and interpretations 
are not always so instructive or revealing as they may be, for his/her range of 
information has grown from a matrix of values which he/she has in common with 
mankind as it has developed within the tradition. The level of response will vary 
with each person, depending upon the degree of complex understanding which 
he/she is able to bring to the work. A difference in interpretation may appear with 
readers with different language knowledge, with different literary experience and 
with a different outlook on life. This can create problems when dealing with 
deconstructive aspects like the origin of words or intertextuality, where considerable 
background information is expected. But although the reader's view in a frame of 
reference is always per se coloured subjectively, the aim of deconstruction is not to 
give solutions, but to disarrange and re-arrange the text. Furthermore, even if, 
practically, readers are unconsciously influenced by their own value systems, and 
also because they know too little about the many existing literatures in our world, 
and they make not so well-grounded systematic or objective judgements as the 
discipline demands, deconstruction can still be practised. 
60 
~2.6 Resume 
\ 
In the above discussions, the ongm and growth of post-structuralism and 
specifically, deconstruction was illustrated. It was noted that deconstruction and 
other post-structural theories stem from de Saussure's structuralist theory which 
presupposes that all systems are structured like a language. Deconstruction, 
however, opposes and modifies structuralism in many ways. Certain deconstructive 
concepts were discussed for application in later chapters. Problems with 
deconstruction in general, as well as in African languages specifically, were also 
highlighted. Many critics queried the political implications of deconstruction which 
to them appear as a kind of apolitical, endlessly sceptical game. Peck and Coyle 
(1993:198) comment however: 
The story, however, is more complex than a rejection of 
deconstruction, for what Marxist and feminist critics realised is that 
structuralism and deconstruction between them had offered the most 
radical analysis yet of the way in which Western society had 
constructed itself . . . What structuralism and deconstruction 
encouraged people to see was, in essence, that the order of the world 
was not something given, but something that the world had chosen 
to construct through language. Deconstruction, in short, provided 
a new angle from which to analyse the structure ofWestem society, 
for example, traditional critics had always endorsed the individual; 
deconstruction, taking a rather more sceptical view, could see the 
fragility of the construction of the notion of the individual. 
It would be a catastrophe for the study ofliterature if the insights of deconstruction 
were to be forgotten so that they no longer need to be taken seriously in the present-
day work of literary study. I should go so far as to say that the task of literary 
criticism in the coming years will be mediation between the rhetorical study of 
literature, of which deconstruction is by far the most rigorous in recent times, and 
the now so irresistibly attractive study of the extrinsic relations of literature. 
There is also absolutely no reason why deconstructive analyses of the kind suggested 
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by Derrida and de Man would not be applicable, with proper modifications of 
technique, to Zulu literature. The study of literature is accompanied by serious 
reflection on the specificity ofliterature as a mode oflanguage. This will in fact be 
the test of African literary criticism in the coming years, to incorporate and expand 
new knowledge ofliterature. As Toynbee (1970:62) concludes: 
The scholar, critic, student or teacher of literature ought to strive 
now with all his or her might to widen his or her public's literary 
horizon; and to do this he or she must begin by widening his or her 
own. 
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\'.CHAPTER3 
POETICTRANSFORMATIONINTHEPOETRYOFC.T.MSIMANG 
3.1 Introduction 
Traditional literary theories insist on a simple mode ofreading in which one 'literal' 
meaning is searched for. According to convention, a poem is considered a direct 
utterance from a specific human consciousness, the poem's language can express the 
unique and individual thought of that consciousness and the poem's meaning is 
stable and determined by certain objective factors, like the author's intention. These 
metaphysical beliefs, according to the post-structuralists, led to the loss of 
interpretative flexibility. Deconstruction enters at this stage as a supplement to the 
recovery of a forgotten skill. The purpose of deconstruction is to unhinge restrictive 
traditionalist thinking, which is based on a misguided pursuit of a fixed, unified and 
self-validating meaning. 
Deconstruction unmasks the ambiguity of the text by engaging an effective strategy 
to designate the rupture or splitting open of the text. It lays bare the assertions of 
the text in claiming a self-presence of meaning by revealing the perpetual play of 
infinite substitutions that comprise the text. As Spivak explains: 
Sign will always lead to sign, one substituting the other (playfully, 
since 'sign' is 'under erasure') as signifier and signified in turn 
(1976:xix). 
Subsequently, the circle of representation is shattered, and what was considered as 
identity or meaning is shown to be merely displacement, deferment, differance. De 
Man emphasizes that this theory of interpretation "denies the possibility of a 
straightforwardly literal or referential use oflanguage" (Selden, 1988a:94) in the 
ambiguities generated by rhetoric. He establishes that language does not 
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communicate single, stable meanings but rather continually signifies a web of 
interconnected and incompatible senses. 
De Man asserts that texts, in reality, dismantle themselves. When their language is 
closely scrutinised, it falls apart into contradictory meanings. The task of the 
deconstructor is to merely uncover the hidden potency and repercussions of the 
disruptive logic inherent in language. Young ( 1981: 10) characterizes post-
structuralist criticism in the following terms: 
As a self-reflexive discourse, which constantly divides itself against 
itself and transgresses its own systems, post-structuralist criticism 
avoids becoming fixed, avoids becoming an established method. 
Young accentuates the "self-critical, self-transforming aspect" (1981 :7) of post-
structuralist writings which makes it difficult for the reader "to pin down and 
systematize a series of texts" (1981 :7). This self-alteration facet of critical discourse 
is made possible by its realisation ofits own differance in the sphere of signification. 
This basically means that post-structuralist criticism is aware ofits rhetorical status, 
and, in exploiting and playing with it, transgresses any self-identical system it may 
have posited. Reading any literary work becomes, thus, a disentanglement of the 
figurative threads of the literary text, and an indefinite production of meaning during 
the course of which the boundary between literary text and critical text becomes 
blurred as the two texts become interwoven (Young, 1981:7). This means that the 
difficulty in comprehending the meaning does not lie in its belonging to another 
dimension, but in the ambiguous metaphors and rhetorical figures employed to 
'dress' the meaning. 
In this chapter the aim will be to make a reading ofMsimang's poetry in order to 
demonstrate a poetic transformation as seen through deconstructionist' s eyes. The 
angle of approach this reading will take in particular is that which has as its most 
important premise the impossibility of ever arriving at self-presence of meaning. 
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In this reading, displacement - which is a powerful deconstructive rhetorical tool -
will be deployed. Deconstructive practice is to subject the text one is reading to 
displacement. This is achieved by inverting the dualistic conceptual framework -
undoing the opposites with the aid ofinversions, reversions, irony and paradox - and 
by extending the text beyond its traditional boundaries to create an intertextuality of 
writing. Intertextuality itself will be fully discussed in a further chapter. One has to 
commence with the deconstructionists' one inescapable implication for the process 
of interpretation - rhetorical reading. 
3.2 Rhetoricity in Msimang's poetry 
Deconstruction questions the structuralists' assumption that structures of meaning 
correspond to some deep-laid mental set which determine the limits ofintelligibility. 
It shows how this structure is subverted by the working of the texts themselves, and 
asserts that behind the structure of the text the structurality oflanguage is at work. 
Deconstructionists show that language is not co-extensive with meaning, and 
rhetorical reading becomes in part an exposure of the ideological imposition of 
meaning on texts. It further sees language as a system of signs which are in constant 
play, and meaning is a product of this play of differentiation. However, this view 
does not entail that everything goes with regard to the interpretation of texts, but 
signifies that one is sensitive to the presence of phrases of countless other words and 
other texts, which are absent. A text is further seen as an intertextual event itself 
and changes continually for the interrelationship between signs are never constant. 
Instead of producing a univocal meaning, the text at every stage exhibits infinite 
polysemy. 
Derrida's approach to unveiling the layers of infinite meaning is to look for "the 
moment that is undecidable in terms of the text's apparent system of meaning, the 
moment in the text that seems to transgress its own system oflaws" (1976:xiix). 
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This, one is further told, is the moment "that its [the text's] 'origin' and its 'end' are 
given over to language in general . . . the moment in the text which harbours the 
unbalancing of the equation, the sleight of hand at the limit of the text which cannot 
be dismissed simply as a contradiction" (1976:xiix) and finally, it is "the moment of 
the forgetting of the trace" (1976:ix). Having detected the fissure in the apparent 
closure of the text - the irretrievable and permanent cleavage between sign and 
meaning - the deconstructor reveals the chain of substitutions that characterizes the 
text and links it to all other texts. 
Paul de Man characterises literature as "the rhetorical model of the trope" 
( l 979a: 13 6). In its deployment of metaphor and other rhetorical patterns, literature 
uses "resemblance as a way to disguise differences" (1979a: 137). This disguise is, 
however, incomplete: "a literary text simultaneously asserts and denies the authority 
of its own rhetorical mode ... " (1979a: 139). The literary text can therefore be 
regarded as constituted by an indeterminate and paradoxical play of resemblance and 
difference, sameness and otherness. The mask of an original and self-identical 
meaning - the sign - slips and reveals an infinite regression of origin and a plurality 
of meanings: 
Rhetoric radically suspends logic and opens up vert1gmous 
possibilities of referential aberration. And although it would perhaps 
be somewhat remote from common usage, I would not hesitate to 
equate the rhetorical, figural potentiality oflanguage with literature 
itself I could point to a great number of antecedents to this equation 
of literature with figure; the most recent reference would be to 
Monroe Beardsley's insistence . . . that literary language is 
characterized by being 'distinctly above the norm in ratio of implicit 
(or, I would say rhetorical) to explicit meaning' (De Man, 
1979a: 136). 
As far as literary criticism is concerned, the implication of this slipping of the sign -
or what is also termed "deflection" and defined as "any slight bias or even 
unintended error" (1979a: 127) - is far-reaching: 
The deconstruction of metaphor and of all rhetorical patterns, such 
as mimesis, paranomasis, or personification, that use resemblance as 
a way to disguise differences ... puts into question a whole series of 
concepts that underlie the value judgements of our critical discourse: 
the metaphors of primacy, of genetic history, and, most notably, of 
the autonomous power to will of the self(1979a:137). 
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In another essay de Man argues that when 'figure' is given privilege over 
'persuasion' , "rhetoric becomes the ground for the furthest reaching dialectical 
speculations conceivable to the mind" (Young, 1981:276). As Robert Young 
makes clear, in the play of resemblance and difference which constitutes the 
rhetorical basis of the literary text, what is pursued is not self-present literal 
meaning, but rather the 'dialectic' to which de Man refers. Discussing Derrida's 
strategy, Young says the following: 
Undoing the values of truth, unequivocal meaning and 
presence, deconstruction shows the possibilities for writing 
no longer as a representation of something else, but as the 
limitlessness ofits own 'play'. To deconstruct a text is not to 
search for its 'meaning', but to follow the paths by which 
writing both sets up and transgresses its own terms, 
producing instead an asemantic 'drift' (derive) of differance 
(1981:18). 
The notions to be explored at this stage thus includes the text as a play of 
resemblance and difference (in other words, the rhetorical status of the text) as well 
as the questionable autonomy of the self, and writing as transgression. The above 
terminology requires explanation and ramification, which will be offered in due 
course with the aid of the following ofMsimang's poem 'Iziziba zoThukela': 
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Iziziba zoThukela 
1 Ziziba ezizonzobele 
2 Zolani ningisondezele. 
3 Ngiyabesaba oben' ubunzulu, 
4 Ngiphonse itshe lazika, 
5 Nokho ngiyanomela 
6 Ngoba ngiyanazi, 
7 Ophuza kini phinde ome. 
8 Ngibabaza leyo ntobeko 
9 Nokuma ndawonye ngesineke. 
10 lzimpophoma anizigqizi qakala, 
11 Zingishayel' ihlombe liphuma lishona. 
12 Imithelela niyithi klabe, niphole; 
13 Nazi kahle, iphanga nje umdaka, 
14 Ekuphethe akupheleli ndawo. 
15 Ngiphuze qede yangibangel' inkwankwa, 
16 Uphuza kuyo uphinde wome. 
17 Nolwandle niluhlek' usulu, 
18 Lugubh' amagagasi lungaphezi 
19 Lwehla lwenyuka lungenasinqe. 
20 Nimile ngentobeko nibheke phezulu, 
21 Nimile sengathithi anisacwayizi, 
22 Nikhongozele inhlakanipho yezulu 
23 Ephuma ngokuphuma kwekhwezi, 
24 Esa ngokusa kwelanga, 
25 lnifice nikhangezile nilindele, 
26 Nilindele umyalo wengilosi 
27 Eyathi babusisiwe abalindayo. 
28 Kunengcebo ukujula kunobude. 
29 Imifula engemi iphikelele kude, 
30 Ilanga liyilindele emadotsheni, 
31 lhwamuke iphelele ezeni. 
32 Amanzi izowachitha enqutshini 
33 !sale ize, nisale nimile. 
34 Nami ngimile kini ngazibuka, 
35 Nganibuka niphenduka isibuko, 
36 Nangikhombisa ubunqunu bami, 
37 Ngazibonela ubunhluzwa bami. 
38 Ingqondo seyagqwala yathomba, 
39 Ngokulalelwa ngamazolo nesithwathwa 
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40 Inhluzwa, ingembethe. 
41 Khiphani itshe lelula 
42 Nikhuhle, nihlikihle, nihlambulule. 
43 Ziziba zokucwengeka ngicwengeni; 
44 Uqubhu nezibhidi enhliziyweni, 
45 Olugobhozela kunembeza, 
46 Lugeleze lwemuke, 
47 Sicwebe isiziba semicabango, 
48 Ngibone izimfihlo zokujula. 
49 Ngethekeliseni ezimfihlweni zokujula, 
50 Ngishiyeleni ngentshengula ethongwaneni 
51 Ngicakuleleni ngenkezo embizeni, 
52 Ngikhangezeni ngokhezo okhambeni, 
53 Ngigezeni isigonogono endlebeni, 
54 Nesule ubhici emehlweni, 
55 Nibhucunge insila engqondweni, 
56 Ingqondo ibone yehlukanise 
57 Amabala amnyama kwelimhlophe, 
58 Ihlanganise amnyama kwelimhlophe, 
59 Axoxele izizukulwane indaba 
60 Ethi: Kwasukasukela; Zithi: Cosu! 
This poem is, as its summary title suggests, about the pools of a river, specifically 
those of the Thukela river in KwaZulu-Natal. Structurally, the poem can be divided 
into six parts, which accordingly agrees with the six stanzas of the poem. The first 
stanza concerns the speaker's awe of the depth and hypnotic power of the pools. 
In the second stanza the speaker praises the pools for their courage, tranquillity and 
demure, while comparing them to the frivolous waterfalls. The third stanza again 
is a comparison between the serene pools and the restless sea. The fourth stanza 
consists of the pools being compared to rivers, which can dry up at any time. The 
fifth and six stanzas are remarkable, for the relationship between the pools and the 
speaker is very intimate here. The speaker connects spiritually with the pools, in 
order to cleanse him, to impart on everyone who has humility, wisdom. 
The tone of this poem develops from the first stanza to the last. In the first stanza, 
the tone is that of awe, fear and respect. Later on it transposes to an attitude of full 
trust and devotion towards iziziba. 
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The poem is mostly assumed to be simply about nature. The speaker in the poem 
draws the reader's attention to the beauty of nature, water, etc. Superficially, this 
poem is about pools, but the reader is warned from the first stanza, that beneath this 
integument is something deeper, an urgent message, which touches on the 
fundamental aspects oflife. Evolving from the endless play of signifiers in the poem, 
one finds a mise- en abyme situation - described by deconstructionist' writers as the 
sense of vertigo produced by the instability of meaning. Diverse interpretations of 
this poem can be extracted - on an individual and a spiritual level, for example. The 
calm of the deep pools of uThukela river unperturbed by the change of seasons 
makes the speaker envious, wishing that the same calm could prevail in his/her inner 
being, irrespective of the ups and downs oflife. In the depths of the pool man could 
learn of man's shallowness in thought, mirrored by the waters. Also, inspiration for 
writing may, like the river water, rush about only to dry up when winters of life 
come along, when the mind becomes clouded. 
The pool has, according to Zulu culture, other associations as well, which 
substantiates the idea of a new life. A pool is the place of 'uhlanga', in other words 
the origin of man. The reeds are the carriers of water, they penetrate the earth, 
causing conception of man (Berglund, 1989:144). The pool of water can also be 
associated with the water surrounding a child in the womb, which again signifies 
water of birth. 
On a religious plane, the speaker wishes that the clear waters could rinse off the 
worldly dirt and rust from his mind, soul and conscience. The speaker is privy to 
profound Biblical information: "Ophuza kini phinde ome "(who drinks from you [the 
pools] never becomes thirsty)[line 7]. The sinner will convert from a destitute 
person "inhluzwa" (line 40) to a Christian "ngembethe" (line 40). If one confesses 
one's iniquities "hlambulula" (line 42), one can just like the pools become clear 
"sicwebe" (line 47) or considered theologically, be holy. The pools discriminate 
between good and evil, represented as white and black. However, the pools can also 
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join, unite black and white in complete harmony, who one day will tell the story to 
the coming generations. The imagery of black and white colours uniting, support 
a political theme for this poem. The theme may even be education - striving for 
learnedness strips you ofignorance. The traditional elements in this poem may again 
focus on a wish the speaker has; that is, not to lose your culture in a fast 
westernizing world. 
Because of the use of traditional objects and terminology, linked together with the 
specific Zulu river and the praises and forms, one can make the assumption that this 
poem can also symbolize a meeting with the forefathers. The poem has distinctive 
cultural associations. This last stanza is reminiscence of the 'ukuvuma idlozi ' 
practice, that is when a diviner 'isangoma ' accepts the call of the ancestors to 
become a diviner. This activity is always done in a pool, where at the bottom of the 
pool the ancestors await, normally in the form of snakes. They ask the diviner, who 
is naked Gust like the speaker) to smear himself with a white clay (black becomes 
white, in line 57). His sickness or sin is then left behind - it is a sort of a burial 
'ukuguqula ubuntu ', it is the pool that changes the man. It is said that when a man 
comes out of the pool, it is known that he comes from the ancestors in that he comes 
out white (symbolizing a definite break with the old life and a start in the new). The 
colour white (in the 6 stanza) is also associated with the ancestors, as Berglund 
(1989:371) claims: "shades, like the cattle of the underworld, are thought to be 
white ... No Zulu whose thinking on shades is representative doubts that they are 
white". One is also white at birth. This definitely links up with the last stanza's 
ceremony. One can also thus interpret the poem as such. 
However, any endeavour to give a systematic, verifiable description of the meaning 
of this literary text through analysis and interpretation is according to the 
deconstructionists, never found - there is an unending multiplicity of meaning. 
Derrida coined the term 'differance' which sees meaning as permanently deferred, 
always subject to and produced by its difference from other meanings and thus 
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always volatile and unstable. Trying to pin down meaning is impossible for the 
meaning is always unfolding just ahead of the interpreter, unrolling in front of him 
or her like a never-ending carpet whose final edge never reveals itself 
Msimang' s poem however clearly depends throughout on a set of simple, clear-cut 
oppositions: up/down, still/move, deep/shallow, knowledge/ignorance, 
humility/arrogance, calm/agitated, come/go, quiet/noise, complete/incomplete, 
permanent/temporary, ascend/descend, heaven/earth, light/dark, wealth/poverty, 
abundance/shortage, naked/clothed, stripped/covered, soul/body, life/death, 
clear/muddled, white/black, good/bad, speech/writing. 
The speaker's sense of "iziziba" is inserted into these binary oppositions. The pools 
are deep, the river shallow, the pools are clear, the speaker's mind is muddled, the 
pools give knowledge, the speaker is ignorant, etc. The terms 'knowledge' and 
'ignorance' form a binary opposition: a pair of contrasted terms, each of which 
depends on the other for its meaning. There are many such oppositions, and they're 
all governed by the distinction, either/or. If this is acceptable, conceptual order 
which makes decision possible, is established. Derrida, nevertheless, 'unfixes' these 
oppositions by offering a different way of thinking. He turns both terms of the 
polarity into undecidables. These undecidables constantly slip across each other's 
boundary resulting in a relation which is more than the opposition can allow. And 
because of that, they question the very principle of' opposition'. 
To illustrate the concept of undecidables a relatively easy example will be used - that 
of abaphansilamathongo, implied in this poem and used in many other poems by 
Msimang. Abaphansi is translated in English with the word 'ancestors', although this 
translation contains the meaning of' deceased persons' which is incorrect. The term 
abaphansi in itselfis already a binary opposition - 'those below/under' - are with us, 
are all around us, up above, etc. Prof J. Mbiti in the book African Religion and 
Philosophy speaks of"the living dead" (1969:34). The abaphansi might either be 
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alive or dead. But they cut across these categories: they are both dead and alive. 
Equally they are neither alive nor dead, since they cannot take on the 'full' senses 
of these terms. The abaphansi short-circuit the usual logic of distinction. Having 
both states, they have neither. They belong to a different order of things: in terms 
of life and death, it cannot be decided. Ancestors are inscriptions of the failure of 
the 'life/ death' opposition. They show where classificatory order breaks down: they 
mark the limits of order. 
Like all undecidables, the concept of abaphansi infects the oppositions grouped 
around them. These ought to establish stable, clear and permanent categories. But 
what happens to 'light/dark', 'good/evil', 'humility/arrogance' and 
'knowledge/ignorance', when the dark sinister pools also give light, when they 
incorporate both good and bad characteristics, both humility and arrogance? It is 
the speaker who attributes the pools with having humility (meekness, mildness) - but 
from the first stanza of the poem the actions of the pools illustrate the opposite -
they grow overpowering, they move aggressively as if to attack, they mock the 
rivulets, they laugh cynically at the sea to scorn - these aren't virtues of humility. 
Ironically, when the speaker pleads with the pools to wipe the oozings from the eyes 
"Nesule ubhici emehlweni" (line 54), he indirectly asks them to humble themselves. 
According to Zulu folklore (Nyembezi, 1962:70), an old woman whose eyes are full 
of discharge, asks certain characters to clean her eyes. Those who humble 
themselves are blessed, while those who refuse suffer the fatalistic consequences. 
The allocation of this term illustrates the speaker's blindness. It is possible that the 
perception the speaker of the poem has of the pools is precisely the opposite of what 
he/she believes it to be. The speaker's so-called insight into the worthiness of the 
pools - "ngiyanazi" (I know you) [line 6] - is accompanied by his blindness to the 
workings of his own rhetoric - this again mystifies the nature of this poem. 
Derrida furthermore introduces the term supplement. For Derrida, the sign is 
irrefutably bound up with the supplement: 
Somewhere, something can be filled up of itself, can accomplish 
itself, only by allowing itself to be filled through sign and proxy. The 
sign is always the supplement of the thing itself (1976: 145). 
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The word 'supplement' derives from the French language and means both addition 
and replacement. The pools are part of the river, they are supplements to the river. 
The supplement both extends and replaces - similarly, the pool as supplement both 
adds to the river and is part of the river. The supplement obeys a strange logic. To 
be an addition means to be added to something already complete, yet it cannot be 
complete ifit needs an addition. The river is complete and has an addition; however 
needing an addition, the river is not yet whole. The supplement extends by 
repeating. The pools have the same water as the river and are the river's extension. 
But the word 'supplement' also means replace, it opposes by replacing. The pools 
will usurp the river, take its place. In this poem the pools are placed in opposition 
to the river in terms ofimportance, the poem illustrates the significance of the pools, 
not the river. In the first line the relative "ezizonzobele" is used to describe the 
pools : the word means 'to grow overpowering', 'to spread over and beyond others 
in fame and achievement', in other words also to usurp. But if the pools (as 
derivatives) are opposing the river, its source and creator, they are actually opposing 
themselves. They are undecidables. They signify a floating signifier, something 
which puts the poem into play. Every act of the pools is marked by an unstable 
ambivalence. The noun "isiziba" incorporates the verb '-ziba' which means 'to 
deceive, to pretend, mislead or bribe'. The pools have no proper determinate 
character. They are terrifying to the speaker, yet the speaker describes them as 
possessing humility. This ambiguous quality is highlighted throughout the poem. 
The speaker apostrophises the pools in the first two lines: "Ziziba ezizonzobele I 
Zolani ningisondezele" (lines 1,2). These strategically placed introductory lines 
evoke many associations, the most prominent one being the characteristic praise of 
Dingane: "isiziba esizonzo sinzonzobele" (the deep pool, still and silent, has 
overpowering force). This praise refers to Dingane's sly, scheming ways, his 
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suspicious silence. The English proverb 'still waters run deep' or the Afrikaans 
proverb 'Stille waters diepe grand, onder draai die duiwel rond' - still waters, deep 
in the ground, the devil is turning around fits this translation better. These lines also 
allude to the following praise from Shaka: ''Ichibi elinzonzo linzonzobele" (The 
silent pool has grown overpowering). Again, the pools are fixed with double play, 
they are not to be trusted. The second line of the poem also correlates well with 
Dingane's praises. The speaker is afraid when the water moves towards him. 
Dingane's stealthy slyness is reflected in his praise name Manyelela' (stealthy 
mover). The verb "-sondezela" does not only mean 'moving towards', but also has 
the meaning of 'taking up position for attack, taking up action stations or marking 
an opponent'. The speaker desires to be like the pools. Yet as an unstable 
supplement and undecidable, what the speaker desires could not be the positive 
aspect we thought it was. Wishing to gain these qualities of the pools, the speaker 
becomes a supplement to the pools, with its spiralling consequences. This 
supplement generates another supplement and again another - an endless 
reproduction and proliferation announcing integrally 
an infinite chain, ineluctably multiplying the supplementary 
mediations that produce the sense of the very thing they defer: the 
mirage of the thing itself, of immediate presence, of originary 
perception (Derrida, 1976: 157). 
The above situation is embodied in Msimang' s text in the following lines: 
Nami ngimile kini ngazibuka, 
Nganibuka niphenduka isibuko, 
Nangikhombisa ubunqunu bami 
(And I stood with you [the pools] and looked at myself, 
I watched you change into a mirror, 
And show me my nakedness) 
The image of the speaker as supplement looking into the pool produces the initial 
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recognition: he/she isn't flawless, similarly the pools aren't the ideal. The ideal 
image is, upon closer examination, itself a distortion, just like language does not 
mirror without distorting. The use of metaphor makes things look alike that are in 
fact very different. In Derrida's hands, the text unravels - his strategies unfix order. 
It is the play of possibilities, the movements back and forth, into and out of the 
opposites. 
In the last four lines of the last stanza, the black and white marks could represent 
writing, however the story they 'tell' takes the form of an oral narration. The binary 
opposition speech/writing could be made here. In casting the key term 'speech' 
against its opposite, 'writing', speech has been privileged as the first term - it is the 
positive term, that which articulates the fundamentals, principles or the logos 
(ultimate truth). The second term is subordinated, it has to be negative or the first 
term can't be positive. It has to be deficient, lacking, corrupt or just derivative. 
Derrida claims that throughout the millennia - from Plato to de Saussure - speech 
has been privileged. This leads to the term 'phonocentrism', which claims that the 
voice is the privileged medium of meaning. Writing is derivative, it merely 
represents speech. In Derrida's view, writing has characteristics that can't be 
decided within these oppositions. It plays across good and bad, curative and 
injurious, as Derrida ascertained with his analysis of the word pharmakon, which 
means both cure and poison. Derrida therefore inverts the ontological hierarchism 
that elevates speech above writing. His purpose in giving writing precedence is to 
demonstrate that language cannot represent something non-linguistic. Speech is here 
subsumed under the general notion of writing: it is merely a phonetic form of 
writing. For this very reason writing has always been constituted a threat: 
What writing itself, in its non-phonetic moment, betrays, is life. It 
menaces at once the breath, the spirit, and history as the spirit's 
relationship with itself It is their end, their finitude, their paralysis. 
Cutting breath short, sterilizing or immobilizing spiritual creation in 
the repetition of the letter, in the commentary or the exegesis ... it is 
the principle of death and of difference in the becoming of being 
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(Derrida 1976:25). 
In this poem Msimang also disrupts the 'either/or' structure of the binary opposition 
of speech/writing and makes writing an undecidable. He prioritizes first writing and 
then speech. This binary opposition relies on the assumption of presence, for 
example, the first or privileged binary term 'speech' carries full presence, its 
subordinate 'writing' absence. Speech is commonly assumed to represent self-
presence of being in breath. No lapse of time, no surface, no gap comes between 
speech and thought. As Msimang indicates, writing however, doesn't need the 
presence of the writer, or of the writer's consciousness. The written marks are 
abandoned, cut off from the writer, yet they continue to produce effects beyond his 
presence and beyond the present actuality of his meaning. However, the order of 
writing is distance, delay, ambiguity, and death - 'dead' meaning, not the living 
meaning of a present speaker. Msimang keeps his writing alive by transforming it 
to a type of oral literature. Through generations to come the words on the paper 
will be read and also related verbally: 
Ihlanganise amnyama kwelimhlophe, 
Axoxeleizizukulwaneindaba 
Ethi: Kwasukasukela; Zithi: Cosu! 
(It [the mind] will join together the black and the white, 
Which will tell the generations a story 
Saying: Once upon a time; They say: Go on![a little bit]) 
The writing he uses here plays all ways - it won't be fixed down. It leaves no 
certainty of privileged foundational term against subordinate second term. Writing 
no longer designates scripting rather than speaking but rather the undecidable play 
in both. Writing inhabits spoken words as well as inscribed marks. 
In the last line of the poem, the word "cosu" is an ideophone describing an act of 
chipping, cutting or tearing away in small bits. When used in an oral folktale 
performance, it signifies that the narrator of the story has to continue, once began, 
she/he cannot back down. Msimang (1986a:221) attests that the word implies 
that the folktale performance is a gradual process marked by a series 
of phases from harmony to disharmony, and its resolution is a neat 
tying up of all the loose threads. The exposition is marked by rest-
points or pauses after every phase (or bit) to ensure that the audience 
is listening attentively. 
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This ideophone, normally used in the exposition of a story is the conclusive word in 
the resolution of the poem. This complete reversal of folktale order signals that the 
story to be verbally told at the end is only the beginning of things to come, which 
refers the reader back to the commencement of the written poem in a never-ending 
cycle. 
The speaker's search for a truly new beginning emphasizes this aspect as well. The 
conclusion of the poem with an initiatory formulation realises a circular or spiralling 
movement in the poem, in its search for the paradoxical or self-contradictory 
position of making a wholly new beginning, and reaching back to an origin which 
was once, at the beginning of time, the beginning. As Heidegger adds: "Since it is 
a beginning, the beginning must in a sense leave itself behind" (Riddel, 1974:58). 
The project of this poem equates a new sense of being with the original source of 
being, thus it maintains a kind of double-focus between its sense of loss and its 
incipience of hope, between reaching back and reaching forward. 
This is not standard literary procedure where a clear answer is expected : a clear 
agreement or disagreement. That would be the normal analysis, the attempt to 
master undecidability. Instead of countering the normal analysis, or approving it or 
modifying it, deconstructionists insist on its instabilities. It is the ludism or play of 
possibilities which is all-important, as Hawthorne (1992:95) exclaims: 
The central idea behind all these usages is that once the illusion of 
presence has been dispensed with, reading and interpretation no 
longer involve a decoding that is subject to the firm discipline of 
some centre of authority that has access to the code book; instead 
the reader can observe and participate in the free play of signifiers 
endlessly generating a succession of meanings none of which can 
claim superiority or authority. 
78 
The concepts of contradiction, the deferral of meaning in Msimang' s poem, as well 
as the echoes of other ideas and texts, determine that 'Iziziba zo Thukela' can never 
be reduced to a single, univocal meaning or reading. Many critics detest the open 
play of signification which to them results in a certain sense of lack of discipline. 
However, the interrelated tensions and forces which result from a deconstructive 
reading, can only be achieved when the potentialities of textual significations are 
explored without searching after ultimate truths or unified meanings. 
In the poem 'Uthando' (1980:8), the productive interaction of signifiers and 
signi:fieds again produces endless meanings and relationships. 
Uthando 
1 Uyimpicabadala we Thabisile, 
2 Uyinqabakayitshdwana weDuduzile; 
3 Uyindida weBathandekile, 
4 Uyinkinga weBazondekile; 
5 Uyingwijikhwebu Bahlukanisile. 
6 Ngikubonile ulumba inkomo edlelweni, 
7 Yakhotha enye bathi ngeyikhothayo. 
8 Ngisho nezinambuzane uzihungulile, 
9 Izintothoviyane zaze zafa zibelethene; 
10 Abantu bona bazethuke sebakhe emkhathini. 
11 Nami wangithwebula ngandilileka, 
12 Ngamfoma izithukuthuku kulel' ungqoqwane, 
13 Ngakhangwa ukukhanya kumnyama khuhle, 
14 !mamba nendlondlo zaphenduk' iziquzi, 
15 Amagquma nezikhinsi kwaphenduk' amathafa. 
16 Yebuya luthando unuka njengeqaqa, 
17 Umuncu njengomhlonyane, 
18 Ubaba kunesibhaha, 
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19 Uqanda kuneqhwa. 
The poem gives a vivid reflection of a disappointment in love. The title proclaims 
the poem to be about love, although when one starts reading, a direct contrast of 
conventional love is experienced. The poem's thought can be summarised in a series 
of points: Love appears mysteriously as a comfort and as happiness, but love is in 
fact callous. Love changes animals, insects, reptiles, geography and people. The 
speaker was also affected by love, but it leaves him/her with negative reflections. 
The metaphysical hierarchies operating in the poem are love/hate, confused/clear, 
apart/together, transience/permanence, dark/light, cold/warm, harmful/harmless, 
unpleasant/pleasant, bitter/sweet, foul-smelling/sweet-smelling. In the poem, the 
first term in each case is valued above the second, except for the opposition 
love/hate, which the poem deconstructs itself The poem's notion is captured in the 
reversal of the typical positive and negative oppositions. Love is bitter, smelly and 
cold, a witch capable of hypnotizing and rendering a virulent entity innocuous. Love 
is a transience, a loss - there is no permanent essence in it. Msimang' s initial 
privileging oflove over hate changes in the fourth line when he immediately reverses 
the more usual prioritization. 
This metaphorical poem's first stanza is a composite of basically nouns only, 
identificative copulative nouns at the beginning of a verse-line and directly 
afterwards personal deverbative nouns at the end. Msimang has, in the first stanza, 
enriched the compounded copulatives which refer to love by coupling them with 
different contrastive personal names that he confers on love. These names reflect 
the many facets oflove and the results thereof The nouns are juggled from the one 
side to the other; on the one side metaphors which have an element of mystery in 
common are found, and on the other side personal nouns which mostly have 
emotional components in common, like happiness, comfort, love. But in line 4, the 
mood changes to hate and parting. The whole balancing act of the rhythmic pattern 
is disturbed, and this is only restored in the last stanza. This of course binds the first 
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and last stanzas together, not only through rhythm and use of metaphors and similes, 
but also through shock value. By the juxtaposition of successive noun units, 
Msimang weaves an intricate pattern in his poem: 
impicabadala +-+ 
puzzle 
-phica (trick, entwine, interweave) 
t 
inqabakayitshelwana 
incomprehensible 
inqaba (difficulty, fortress) 
-nqaba (refuse, excellent) 
indida 
riddle 
t 
-did.a (confuse, mislead) 
t 
inkinga +-+ 
mystery, inexplicable 
-khinga (complicate, bind tightly, tangle) 
t 
ingwijikhwebu 
unreliable, surprise ending, mislead 
khwebu<-khwebuka (go back on one's 
word, break promise) 
I 
x 
we Thabisile 
delight 
t 
weDuduzile 
comfort 
-duduza < dubuza 
(break, make to crumble or 
fall to pieces) 
t 
weBathandekile 
loveable 
-thanda (love, wind, twine 
around) 
t 
weBazondekile 
hate 
t 
Bahlukanisile 
separate, divide, divorce 
The above stanza visually displays echolalia at work. Echolalia conveys "the 
ceaseless echoing back and forth between signs whose significance is determined 
only relationally and not by any over-riding presence or fixed authority" (Hawthorn, 
1992: 5 3). Msimang represents the subject of his poem by manipulating a cause and 
effect pattern. The compound noun "impicabadala" is combined :from a verb "-
phica" and a class two noun "abadala". The merged word literally means 'what 
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puzzles the old folk'. However, the verb "-phica" comprises the content of 'trick', 
as well as 'entwine', 'interweave', which again links with "Bathandekile" (-thanda: 
'love', but also 'weave', 'twine around' and 'encase with coils'). This again 
connects with "inkinga" (-khinga: 'complicate, tangle, bind tightly'). The notion 
of entrapment, being tied up or entanglement is being insinuated. The last personal 
noun of the stanza "Bahlukanisile "undoes these constrictions with its significations 
of 'separate, divorce, divide'. 
In a similar manner, the compound noun "inqabakayitshelwana" (literally 'a 
difficulty which cannot be told to each other') has the noun "inqaba" ('difficulty, 
fortress, stronghold') as a component. Cast against this noun in the same line is the 
personal noun "Duduzile ", derived from the verb "-duduza" ('lull to sleep, 
comfort' but also 'make a thudding noise'), which has a synonym dubuza. This verb 
contains the meaning of 'breaking up' or 'to fall to fragments'. It is a case of 
opposites attract, the incomprehensible concept called love which gives comfort, but 
as it can break down any defences to achieve its purpose, it can also break up an 
affair. The same sense of a love-hate relationship is reverberated in the verb "-
nqaba" found in "inqabakayitshelwana". Not only does it have the negative 
connotation of 'forbid or refuse', but also 'to be fine, excellent'. A hidden warning 
is even perceptible in a related proverb: "inqab 'inqabel' umniniyo" (the fort thwarts 
the owner). With this play of words, the rhetoric implies that one is hoist with one's 
own petard. One affects oneself by one's scheme against others. This insinuates to 
certain sinister developments of potential importance in the coming stanzas. This 
first stanza already portrays the speaker's intensely emotional relationship with love 
in which ambivalent feelings oflove and hate are experienced. On a small scale, the 
stanza represents the abyss of the metaphor, a notion advocated immensely by de 
Man. 
The predisposition displayed by deconstructors is for setting in motion a dynamic 
flux of ideas; just as illustrated in this verse. Signifiers are never themselves alone: 
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to function they need to be interpreted, and this involves the creation of a new sign 
which produces a new signifier which needs to be interpreted - and so on ad 
infinitum. This process is termed 'radical alterity' by Derrida. The posited process 
is completely internal to language, it allows for no way in which the signifier can 
function other than by means ofinteraction with other signifiers. This view has been 
adopted by other deconstructionists who allow for a more lenient engagement of 
linguistic engagement with non-linguistic reality. 
Deconstruction views the birth of thought as synonymous with the birth of 
metaphor, and that metaphor (as a substitution) leads to the infinite deferral and play 
of meaning. This poem could denote :frustration about the creative process and 
creative muse. "Uthando" also has the meaning of 'one who does artistic work' 
such as plaiting, weaving, moulding, carving, etc. This is substantiated by other 
words in the poem, as illustrating above. The last noun "Bahlukanisile" of the first 
stanza literally divides this stanza from the next. Msimang is sculpturing his craft in 
a clever manner, just like the title "uthando" intends. In the second stanza, the 
speaker continues to fabricate stories with metaphors and proverbs, as the verb "-
lumba" (conjure tricks, fabricate, invent stories or concoct) so ambiguously 
suggests. The first disguised proverb in the second stanza "ikhoth ' eyikhothayo" 
(it licks the one which licks it or one good tum deserves another) is a relative clause 
formation based on the main verb "-khotha". The idea of reciprocity is clearly 
illustrated with the depiction of cattle standing licking one another. Like people, 
beasts are sensitive to acts of kindness and cruelty. Thus a beast will lick the beast 
which licks it - one helps the one who helps one. This is further observable in the 
hidden contrasting idea which is coupled with this expression. The continuation 
clarifies it in a full expression with a second principle verb of the parallelism -
"ikhab' eyikhabayo" (it kicks the one which kicks it). Another variant is 
"engayikhothi, iyayikhahlela" (the one which does not lick it [it does not care for] 
it simply kicks away). In this context the proverb relates to social or emotional 
matters. 
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As the poem unfolds, however, the notion of an emotional difficulty gives way to 
that of a sexual adversity. As in other poems to be analysed, there is a confluence 
between the mystical (mysterious love and its entrancing characteristics) and the 
physical and erotic. The verse-line "Jzintothoviyane zaze zafa zibelethene" (locusts 
eventually died carrying each other on their backs) reaffirms the mystical-erotic 
substantiality of the love already established with the first proverb. This phrase 
seems to originate from the proverb "haze balibona neboni ukuthi libelethe indoda" 
(They [people] eventually realized that a female locust was carrying a male locust 
on her back) The reference is to locusts mating. The saying is a warning to someone 
who does things secretly that one day he/she will be exposed. Nothing remains a 
secret for all time (Nyembezi, 197 4: 173). The poem contains sexual associations 
not only through the sensual words 'lick one another' and implicit reference to 
mating, but also through the use oflove-charms. By means of cultural implication, 
many love charms and traps are mentioned: -thanda (encase with coils, like a snake, 
entrapment); intando (love-charm); -lumba (practice witchcraft, conjure tricks); -
hungula (entice, allure); -thwebula (mesmerize, bring under one's control by 
charming); amathwebula (medicinal concoctions or powers for charming); -nuka 
(smell but also smell out 'divine'). The last two lines of the third verse read as 
follows: 
!mamba nendlondlo zaphenduk' iziquzi, 
Amagquma nezikhinsi kwaphenduk' amathafa. 
(The mamba and the horned viper turn into lizards, 
The hillocks and hollows change to plains.) 
The Zulus view the above two snakes as the same reptile, they distinguish between 
a young "mamba" and an old mamba "indlondlo". They are of a very venomous 
nature and are regarded as the most dreaded of snakes. Furthermore, the specific 
type of lizards into which the snakes metamorphose are regarded as harmless 
animals which do not bother people at all. Symbolically seen, the two snakes are 
phallic symbols, which turn into non-phallic creatures, suggesting a loss of sexual 
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virility. Similarly, the geographical terms indicate that which goes up "amagquma" 
and goes down "izikhinsi" alter to a state of horizontality and neutrality 
"amathafa". The poet's speculations about "uthando" is seen as essentially 
directed towards a philosophy of experience, rather than a transcendental essence. 
From the first stanza, the relations of life and love are no longer determined by 
dualistic divisions between appearance and reality, or thing and idea, but they are 
simply a texture of being, a sense of one thing changing into another, diversity 
evolving into unity. 
In the third verse, after three initial verse-lines relating personal experiences referring 
to the effects oflove on the speaker, the poet continues with descriptions analogous 
to those employed in the second stanza. The two lines seem out of place here. The 
effect produced is that in the second and third stanzas, one event does not grow out 
of the other, instead it is imposed on it. The gradual construction of incidents 
alternates from a beast to a climbing plant or small, slow-moving animal or person, 
to insects and people. The focus shifts then to the speaker him/herself, to snakes and 
lizards and geography. This seems to confer on events a random disorder and 
discontinuity and obviates any neat causal link one might have been tempted to 
establish between these events. The only tie between these events is the catastrophic 
effect change has on certain entities which again reflects the speaker's dazed and 
bewildered emotional state of mind. 
Love which is normally ascribed with positive attributions, is adorned with negative 
connotations. Although the speaker is still in awe of love which can perform 
miracles, the message he gives is that love is unnatural, like witchcraft. It is an entity 
conferred on something or someone without any power of choice, like being 
hypnotized. Hypnosis is defined as a state like sleep in which the subject acts only 
on external suggestion, a situation clearly depicted in the poem. The speaker, in a 
hypnotic state, experiences fever-like symptoms in a delirium induced by love. 
However, the narrator now associates love paradoxically with light "ukukhanya": 
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Ngakhangwa ukukhanya kumnyama khuhle 
(I was attracted to the light in the pitch darkness) 
One must take into consideration that hypnosis has the synonym of trance with its 
dualistic meanings of a state of extreme exaltation or rapture, ecstasy, or a cataleptic 
circumstance. The speaker was enveloped in darkness, love appears as a light to 
him, love becomes an undecidable in a love/hate relationship itself Love is a 
cardinal component of every human being's emotions, but as illustrated, it can also 
monopolize a human being's emotions which can lead to disastrous consequences, 
to the person's own destruction. By charming, hypnotizing and alluring beings, it 
takes over the being's normal existence and this brings about, in the case of the 
speaker, negative consequences, as he/she discards love completely. But this also 
cannot be accomplished, for love's relationship is that of supplement. It's a never-
ending spiral. Love equals the speaker as artist - both fabricate stories, entice and 
hypnotize. Love becomes a floating signifier, because of its dualistic nature - it 
extends itself to be both positive and negative. 
The tone in this poem changes from beginning to end. The first and last stanzas 
become more personal and are emphatically "u-" (you) based, versus the middle two 
which concentrate more on "ngi-" (I), and what this person observes. The first 
stanza consists of emotions, feelings, matters of the mind. The last stanza embodies 
the senses. The similes employed by Msimang in this stanza appeal to at least three 
of the five senses making even abstract phenomenon, like love or complex feelings 
and experiences describable in perceptible terms. 
The change in being, already denoted from the first stanza, modifies most of the 
senses graphically illustrated by Msimang in this stanza. Love becomes repellant, 
with a very offensive, nauseating smell. Again, this line harbours a hidden proverb: 
"lqaq' alizizw' ukunuka" (The polecat does not know its own smell). The skunk 
is not aware of its own smell and does not seem to be inconvenienced by it. This 
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proverb means that nobody recognizes his/her own faults. Yet this repulsive stink 
is not without its value because "iqaqa lisinda ukuzalusa" (the polecat escapes by 
watching itself). The opposing poles seem to annul each other. Love tastes bitter 
like bark of the African wormwood tree. Interestingly, these African herbs are 
actually used for enemas, not for oral consumption. This implies that the once 
beloved one, has become unpalatable, it is not worth 'tasting' figuratively. The 
sense of taste is accentuated and extended in the next phrase- love is more pungent 
than fever tree root/bark. The adjective 'pungent' combines both senses of a sharp 
or strong taste and smell, so as to produce a pricking sensation. The last sense is 
that of touch- love is colder than ice "ubanda kuneqflwa". Cold to the touch, but 
also ruthlessly callous. Like the snakes and the lizards, love is a cold-blooded reptile 
which only needs momentary warmth before it hibernates again. The synaesthesia 
of the images combines the optical, the olfactory, the gustatory and the tactile to 
suggest the interpenetration of the orders of existence, the erasure of difference to 
create an unusual and illusionary identity for love. 
"Uthando" presents its contents well for deconstructive reading. In the speaker's 
resentful disparagement oflove which he/ she cannot personally acquire, all opposing 
elements are nullified. However, much the same as a juggler tosses objects in the 
air and catches them, keeping several in the air at the same time; the same act is 
repeated by deconstructionist critics with language, obliging the reader to think of 
its negative dismantling, as well as promissory, aspects. The praxis is that the 
signifier functions to establish a theory of meaning in which the actuality of infinite 
substitution is acknowledged. 
In the poem 'Ndiza Nyoni' (1980:50) the delineation ofa bird in flight presents a 
vision of an ideal world where death and miseries are left behind, but there is also 
a firm sense of the gap between how things might be in a perfect world and how they 
are in the everyday world. The text is elaborately patterned to reinforce this sense 
of something ideal and remote from ordinary life, but there is a further complication 
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in the presentational mode of the narrator, who hints at the perplexing nature of 
experience. This speaker of the poem is on a quest - he/she is on a symbolic journey 
in order to gain intellectual, moral or spiritual qualities. Msimang could be seen as 
morally instructive in this poem, intent on demonstrating the difference between the 
ideal order and what he perceives in this world. The poem reads as follows: 
Ndiza nyoni 
1 Kusakuvumile wena nyoni, 
2 Suka kulengatsha uh/ale kuleya. 
3 Tshilotshiloza uzixinge macala. 
4 Bhula amaphiko kabili, kathathu. 
5 Shiya phansi izigodi zosizi 
6 Namahlungu alomhlaba ahlabayo, 
7 Ujubalale ... 
8 Suka kwelo ntulo 
9 Uye kwamasi-aziphihli, 
10 Kwanyama-iziduli. 
11 Damuza amadamu esibhakabhaka. 
12 Cababa emagcekeni akwankululeko, 
13 Ngale kwezintaba namafu. 
14 Uyokuthola ukwaneliseka? 
15 Kusakuvumile nawe nhliziyo yami, 
16 Suka kuleli gumbi uh/ale kuleliya. 
17 Ndizandiza uzixinge macala. 
18 Bashiye phansi abanotwayi, 
19 Ungangixhawuli ngesandla nginokhwekhwe. 
20 Shiya phansi elempofana 
21 Uvakashele kwelawomakhomba-ngophakathi, 
22 Unyenye ngonyenye, undize ngendiza. 
23 Phezulu ... phezulu ... 
24 Indiza yobankulu, 
25 Inwebe amaphiko ibhonge kakhulu, 
26 Umoya uyihubele ihubo elikhulu, 
27 Umhlaba ube ligenqelana, 
28 Phansi ... phansi ... 
29 Inyoni indiza iphelele emafini? 
30 Ndiza phela nawe ngqondo yami, 
31 Shaya amaphiko kabili, kathathu, 
32 Ngiphaphame ebuthongweni bobusuku. 
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33 Suka uphele ezigodini zobunyama, 
34 Udabule umlalamvubu nenkungu, 
3 5 Uhlangabeze ilanga, 
36 Nanto liqhamuka eMpumalanga. 
37 Uqhwakele eziqongweni zezintaba. 
3 8 Ushonise izinzwani phansi, 
39 Uzabalaze njalo uzimelele, 
40 Iziphepho ziyaphephula. 
41 Ugwinye imisebe yelanga liphuma, 
42 Ikhanyisele imicabango yami. 
43 Ingikhanyisele ngokukhanya, 
44 Ngiyokhanya. 
This poem has the flavour of a typical Romantic verse. Romantic poets return to 
nature to find a truth and value which had been lost sight of, similarly to what 
Msimang aims for in the poem. Msimang follows a more parallel pattern than that 
of the Romantic poets. He presents the reader with a picture of something natural 
(a bird) on which he imposes an imaginative interpretation. The emphasis on the 
imagination suggests how the mind is central in the poem, and the awareness of how 
the poet creates ideas in the imagination puts a new importance on the fantasies that 
can be created in the mind. The concept of imagination is cardinal in romantic 
thought, for it is the creative insight of the poet that allows him/her both to perceive 
and create an order in the natural world. The speaker of the poem wants to shift 
from the problems of the real world to how he would like things to be. In a literal 
flight of imagination, a perception of a harmonious world could be created in the 
speaker's mind. The make-believe world he creates in his mind is, however, always 
put in conflict with the real world. Perfection is transient, so the disorder of life 
intrudes into the poem. Like the Romantic poets, Msimang does not have a simple 
philosophy to offer. In the end, the poem demonstrates that reality is more complex 
and confusing than any order the poet might create. This is the point the poem 
eventually arrives at - Msimang realises that it is nature and his mind working 
together that create this deeper harmony. 
Deconstruction and Romanticism share a certain relationship. In both, the point of 
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departure is a cognizance that considers language as producing rather than reflecting 
meaning. This multiplication of meaning is viewed to ensue from the play of 
correspondence and difference that constitutes language. In the same way as 
Romanticism aspires not to mirror experience but to extend and transform it, post-
structuralism does not purport to master the literary text and represent its meaning. 
Additionally, the nature and function oflanguage in Romanticism is closely bound 
up with the nature and function of the imagination, as does Msimang in this poem. 
Romanticism marks the elevation of the imagination from a secondary status as mere 
fancy to a primary status as an agent of creativity, just as post-structuralist criticism 
privileges rhetoric over meaning. Finally, in both post-structuralist criticism and 
Romanticism there is a scepticism of reason. Both see reason as a misrepresenting 
rather than elucidating experience, in that reason inflicts a subjective and restrictive 
structure on experience. Both transgress the limits and systems of reason 
stylistically by heightening the disruptive elements within rational discourse, and 
therefore undermining reason, as it were, from the inside through paradox, inversion, 
irony, ambiguity, discontinuity, contradiction. By going beyond the bounds of 
reason, post-structuralist criticism and Romanticism show experience to be quite 
different from what reason suggests. Most of all, the indeterminate and shifting 
aspects of experience hidden behind the reassuring veil of reason, are uncovered. 
Searching for the main hinge-words in the poem delivers interesting results. The 
term 'hinge-words' originate from Derrida's writings and contains a paradoxical 
logic which must be explored by deconstructive analysis. Commenting upon 
Derrida's use of this term, Robert Young suggests that the effect of such hinge-
words "is to break down the oppositions by which we are accustomed to think and 
which ensure the survival of metaphysics in our thinking" ( 1981 : 18). The title of the 
poem suggests the first hinge-words. The poet chose to utilize the verb "-ndiza" 
although he could have used a selection of other verbs, like "-phaphazela", "-
phaphalaza", "-phapha", "-phepha", etc. instead. The verb "-ndiza" not only 
indicates the action of flying, but also has the meaning of loss of mental balance 
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through excitement, or to be overexcited. This unbalanced state of mind seems to 
connect to the mood of the poem. A noun, "indizane", formed from this verb, 
contains the meaning of a vacillating person, one who fluctuates in opinion or 
resolution. This can also be seen as equivocation where ambiguity is used to conceal 
the truth. 
Furthermore, the noun "nyoni" (bird) also denotes anxiety, nervousness or mental 
derangement. It cannot be accepted as coincidence that these two words were 
chosen as the focus, the hinge words of the poem. The poem ostensibly traces the 
bird and its flight, but it also relates to intellectual or spiritual imbalance and agony. 
This is pertinently established in the line which claims: "Ndiza phela nawe ngqondo 
yami" (fly away my mind). Like the bird, his mind or mental pressures and abilities 
must escape the pressures of daily difficulties and calamities. Terminology 
connotating to mental suffering in the poem abound: usizi (mental pain, distress, 
aftliction), -hlungu (pain), -hlaba (hurt the feelings, wound mentally, criticize), 
nhliziyo (conscience), ngqondo (mind, understanding, intelligence). In the first 
stanza, the poet employs an interesting synonymic parallelism by final linking: 
Shiya phansi izigodi zosizi 
Namahlungu alomhlaba ahlabayo 
(Leave below the valleys of sorrow 
And the black-burnt fields of this hurtful world) 
The noun "usizi" indicates sorrow, pain or distress, but also conveys the content of 
the black ash left on the veld after grass-burning. The noun "amahlungu" connotes 
a newly-burnt veld or burnt grass patches, but also incorporates the noun stem 
-hlungu which denotes pain. By means of dual accentuation, stress is laid on the 
words indicating pain, but which also vividly depicts the barren and desolate valley 
of pain and death "izigodi zosizi". 
Msimang emphasizes the element of suffering moreover by employing unique Zulu 
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socio-cultural images which are localised to time and space. These images reveal 
cultural traits with a specific context and specific culture-orientated attitudes to 
given phenomena. In line eight of the first stanza, the speaker bids the bird "Suka 
kwelentulo" (Go away from that of the lizard). In its literal translation, the phrase 
denotes hardly anything, but seen against the Zulu cultural imagery, it evolves into 
an elegiac proverb. The full expression is "sibamb' elentulo" (we are holding to 
that [the word] of the lizard) and refers to the myth regarding the origin of death. 
The lizard was the messenger of death to the people, because the chameleon failed 
to deliver his message first. According to Nyembezi ( 1974:197), this saying means 
that one will abide by the first information, and will not change one's mind in the 
light oflater information. This locution connects well with the theme of sorrow and 
death, as well as with the unbalanced mentality topic. 
In the second stanza two proverbs are found. Line 20 incorporates the relative 
"elempofana" (that of the poor man). Again, this saying needs to be made clear 
additionally with detailed information in order to be grasped thoroughly. The 
unabridged proverb is "elempofana livunywa muva" (that [the word] of the poor 
man is taken last). The saying originates from olden Zulu society, where it was a 
usual thing to discuss all matters of importance at court (ebandla). All men, even 
strangers, are welcome in the ibandla. However, the wealthy men have a certain 
position ofimportance and power, and their words of wisdom are weighed carefully. 
In contrast, a pauper is not expected to make any intelligent contribution to the 
debate. Even a wise suggestion made by him, will be ignored until a 'big' man 
supports it (Nyembezi, 1974:197-198). The next saying correlates with this 
proverb: "kwelawomakhomba-ngophakathi" (at the place of those who point with 
the middle finger). Many people use the fourth finger (index finger) to point with, 
just as many people live in want. However, not many people use the middle finger 
to point with, similarly well-to-do people are much fewer than the poor. This 
describes a prosperous person who lacks nothing. The middle finger is also 
protected by the other four fingers (Nyembezi, 1974:93). The opposition of the 
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wealthy against the poor is made here, but it strikes deeper than this - the suffering 
oppressed form part of the dark underworld from which the speaker wants to 
escape. Ironically, the speaker pleads repetitively that the bird must leave behind 
( "shiya phansi ")the sorrows of this world, yet it could be deduced that he was left 
by the bird, "washiywa yinyoni ". This saying affirms that the speaker feels solitary 
and abandoned. 
The speaker/poet implores the bird to fly and to give his heart and mind wings so 
that he may gain inspiration or spiritual renewal. Illumination of the rising sunbeams 
will clarify his thoughts. As a poet, the light will recharge him and improve his 
artistic abilities, so he can 'glow'. The first phrase of the poem already expresses the 
desire to 'turn out well'(-vuma) ; to be able to produce a good piece of work. In 
order to accomplish this, the poet must leave behind the worldly troubles (-shiya), 
but this word also mean excel or surpass. It is worth remarking that in man the 
highest, most noble pursuits (which are conventionally of truth and knowledge) -
are expressed as a hunger, a thirst, a need - ironically all metaphors are ofbody-
sustaining functions. In 'Ndiza Nyoni ' the same wish is expressed in an identical 
manner, the bird must fly (and the speaker wants to go) to kwamasi-aziphihli (the 
place where there is an abundance of curdled milk), kwanyama-iziduli (the place 
where there are mounds of meat), amadamu (a large quantity of beer). 
When invoking the bird (seen as a muse), the speaker is professing a dependence on 
the favours of this inspiration for his/her compositions. This ought to be examined 
more carefully than is the practice by literary critics who frequently regard this 
invocation simply as a device. What the poet essentially does when he invokes the 
muse is to recognise that he is not the source of his poetry, paradoxical as this may 
appear. The speaker is seen as the subject of the poem, but in contrast to the 
traditional sense of subject which believes that the individual human being possesses 
valid self-knowledge and is self-actuating (in charge and control of him/herself), 
deconstruction views subject as secondary, constructed (by language, or ideology, 
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for instance), volatile, standing in its own shadow, and self-divided (Hawthorn, 
1992: 180-182). As subject of the poem, the speaker does not have control over his 
utterances, they do not originate with him. His self-consciousness has already been 
transformed by language, ideology, etc. The subject is a rhetorical fiction, an 
illusion, a construction in language - the subject is constituted and controlled by 
language. 
The thrust of this argument is to reverse the notion of the autonomous subject from 
whom language originates and who consequently exercises control over language. 
The subject is no longer seen to be at the centre of his discourse: he is displaced and 
dispersed within language and at the mercy oflanguage, which is beyond his control. 
The subject uses language only to find he is being used by language, in the sense of 
having become a victim of, and a construction in, language. The subject is site 
rather than centre or presence, in other words the subject is where things happen, 
or that to which things happen, rather than that which makes things happen: extra-
individual forces use the subject to exert their sway, the subject does not use them 
(although he thinks that he does, and this is part of the cunning of the system). 
The speaker yearns to have wings like a bird. But the bird is merely the means by 
which his aspiration can be acquired - that of enlightenment; obtaining light. The 
bird is in the ideal position of being a constituent of both earth and heaven, an 
intermediary between earth and sun, day and night, light and dark. Being 
oppositions, the one exists because of the other, but the bird symbolizes the point 
where they come together. 
The second stanza resembles the first, but reveals significant growth. At this point, 
the speaker enters the poem for the first time in a personal capacity. This emergence 
coincides with the determination to contrast himself with the world around him. He, 
however, identifies with the night-time world - the sorrows of the world-weary of 
the first verse - not with the day-time world. The speaker states in line 9: 
Ungangixhawuli ngesandla nginokhwekhwe 
(Don't greet me by the hand, I have mange) 
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The sick and indigent people - like the speaker - are associated with aftliction, pain 
and darkness. His initial thoughts are of a sombre nature - dark thoughts, not 
daylight thoughts, thoughts that are opposed to the celebratory ideas associated with 
sunrise. Assuming the associations of night and death, day and life, are valid, his 
identification with the night rather than with the day suggests that what he relates 
to is death, not life. The phrase 'deep sleep' in the following two lines could denote 
death: 
Shaya amaphiko kabili, kathathu, 
Ngiphaphame ebuthongweni bobusuku. 
(Beat your wings twice, thrice, 
So that I wake up from the deep sleep of night.) 
The speaker finds himself at a point ofintersection where the axis of the night fleeing 
ahead and the sun rising behind (the horizontal) crosses that ofheaven above and the 
earth below (the vertical). At this central point in space and time, this intennediate 
moment of transition from night to day, the speaker desires to awake from a deep 
sleep. However, the implication is that if the speaker had literally been sleeping, 
what he had encountered in the previous two stanzas had been a dream, induced by 
sleep. This dream would however have obscured the natural world. It is also clear 
from the poem that the speaker's sleep does not cancel out the natural world. 
However, the possibility exists that his experiences occurred in a dream, and thus 
ironically, none of his aspirations will be realised. His desire to awake is underlined 
by the ambiguous meaning of the verb "-phaphama", which not only denotes 'to 
wake up', but also 'to begin to show intelligence and ability'. His wondrous vision 
of being illuminated will be a waking dream in the fully paradoxical sense of this 
phrase. 
95 
The nature of the sleep is therefore such that it erases dualism. The sleep the 
speaker describes is thus no ordinary sleep. The speaker is not asleep, yet he is not 
awake. In the death-like sleep, the speaker struggles to suppress and forget all 
sensibility of the pain experienced before. In a passage applicable to the poem 
under discussion, de Man wrote that 
... to 'wake' from an earlier condition of non-sleeping into this harsh 
world of life can only be to become aware of one's persistent 
condition of slumber, to be more than ever asleep, a deeper sleep 
replacing a lighter one, a deeper forgetting being achieved by an act 
of memory which remembers one's forgetting. And since Heaven 
and Hell are not here two transcendental realms but the mere 
opposition between the imagined and the real, what we do not know 
is whether we are awake or asleep, dead or alive, forgetting or 
remembering. We cannot tell the difference between sameness and 
difference, and this inability to know takes on the form of a pseudo-
knowledge which is called a forgetting. Not just because it is an 
unbearable condition of indetermination which has to be repressed, 
but because the condition itself, regardless of how it affects us, 
necessarily hovers between a state ofknowing and not-knowing, like 
the symptom of a disease which recurs at the precise moment that 
one remembers its absence. What is forgotten is absent in the mode 
of possible delusion, which is another way of saying that it does not 
fit within a symmetrical structure of presence and absence (In 
Hartman, 1979:51). 
The speaker's sleep occurs within life and marks a break in life and a transition from 
one facet oflife to another. Life is not a growth and development from one stage 
to another, but an imposition of one experience (moment) on another, and by the 
erasure and forgetting of the former - the blotting out of it. 
The occurrence described in lines 33-35 is one in which the characteristics oflight 
and dark are merged: 
Suka uphele ezigodini zobunyama, 
Udabule umlalamvubu nenkungu, 
Uhlangabeze ilanga 
(Get away from the valleys of darkness, 
Tear through the thick fog and rainy mist, 
Go out to meet the sun) 
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Darkness is a curtain drawn over light, yet the fog which his mind 'cuts through' -
although it hides everything from view - is a shade of light, of darkness 
dematerializing. Awakening from sleep spreads a light on the natural world which 
serves to illuminate what was formerly hidden or obscured from sight. In addition 
to this state of transition from dark to light, a telling inversion is contained in lines 
36 and 38. The speaker is narrating the remarkable particulars of that which 
happened at sunrise, yet he includes the verb pertaining to sunset- "-shonisa" - a 
verb which also refers to dying. This implies that in his present frame of mind the 
two are not distinct and antithetical phenomena. It could also suggest that what in 
the natural world is experienced as birth and renewal is for him a kind a death. And, 
over and above, it collapses the oppositionary conceptualizations through shifting 
inversions and reversal, shaking dualistic thought at its foundations. 
The last four lines reads as follows: 
Ugwinye imisebe yelanga liphuma, 
Ikhanyisele imicabango yami. 
Jngikhanyisele ngokukhanya, 
Ngiyokhanya. 
(You swallow the rays of the rising sun, 
It [the rays] will clear my thoughts. 
Its light will give me light, 
I will shine forth.) 
Taken at face value, these lines are a celebration of the sun and sunrise, which here 
connotes mental and spiritual regeneration and victory over benightedness. Sunrise -
which is the birth of light - is pictured as a swift, ardent action: 
Nanto liqhamuka eMpumalanga. 
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(There it [the sun] suddenly comes into view in the East.) 
It enacts its ascendancy over night in a single, assertive decisive gesture. The birth 
of light occurs through a conquering of night, an erasure of darkness that is 
compared with the lifting of fog. The curtain of darkness (night, pain, poverty, 
sickness) draws away from an awakened earth. The ascendency of the sun is, 
therefore, consistent with convention, associated with birth and awakening - life's 
triumph over death. 
The sun is also here an ancient symbol representing a parental (inspirational) divinity, 
its phallic potency generating life. The speaker 'swallows' the rays (phallic symbol) 
which causes a rebirth (line 41 ), also sits on the apex of the mountains to meet the 
sun (line 37). Ironically, the sun as giver and regenerator also causes the daily toil 
that his progeny suffers. This last observation radically undercuts the impression of 
the benevolence initially created. The struggle the sun imposes on his scion is 
unpleasant. The ambivalence thus created spreads over the text, fracturing even its 
most assured statements. The light ( "ukukhanya'') oflines 42, 43, 44 reveals itself 
as inextricably bound up with darkness. The sun creates life but also represses it. 
It is not rebelled against, but is worshipped, nevertheless, as the poem will make 
clear, the sun is also condemned in so far as life itselfis condemned. In desiring to 
obtain light, to become glowing, the speaker inherently expresses the ambition to 
become the sun, thus usurping the father-sun. The conventional values attached to 
the father-son symbol are therefore both upheld and inverted, in a double register 
operating not alternately but simultaneously, so that antithetical values co-exist. 
The structural principle operative in the poem is that of repetition and difference. 
Repetition excludes linear development and functions differentially. From the first 
stanza a certain decisive moment recurs, replacing and erasing its earlier 
manifestation, supplementing it in the Derridean sense of the term: an addition to an 
already supposed fullness revealing the inherent lack of the former and purporting, 
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through the supplement, to confer on it finally a real fullness, though it is itself 
susceptible, in tum, to the action of the supplement. 
In this poem, the everyday world is characterised as dark, disfigured, disformed and 
void, it is given a figure or form through the positing action of thought. It is thus 
a hermeneutical construction represented by unreal figures of thought, by language. 
Clearly seen in this poem is de Man's notion of the retreatment from the "original 
self' to the "linguistic subject" (1979b: 199), exchanging the "empirical world" for 
"a world constituted out of, and in, language" ( 1979b: 196), a language in which "the 
relationship between sign and meaning is discontinuous" (1979b: 192). For language 
is hopelessly differentiated from the world and cannot bridge the abyss between 
them: the temporal void is revealed "in the narrowing spiral of a linguistic sign that 
becomes more and more remote from its meaning, and it can find no escape from 
this spiral" (1979b:203). Consequently, applying verbal knowledge to the empirical 
world is an "impossibility" (1979b:203). Accordingly, the poem is to yield to this 
referential incapacity oflanguage. But since the poem is also an allegory of man as 
subject, the poem is being allowed by de Man - in spite of himself - to find a bridge 
after all, and cross over to thematise itself by illuminating our "temporal 
predicament" as existents (Krieger, 1989:22). 
3.3 Resume 
In this chapter an endeavour was made to give an informed commentary on the 
occurrence of rhetoricity in a selection of Msimang' s poetry. By rhetoric, 
deconstructionists do not mean the common definition of the term, that is, the skilful 
use of words to persuade, but rather an allusion to words' figural capacity. De Man 
( 1979a: 8) defines figurality as words' ability to refer to different meanings at once, 
each meaning being an 'error' in relation to the others. De Man explains that it is 
because language is thoroughly rhetorical that it generates multiple, contradictory 
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meanings: "Rhetoric opens up vertiginous possibilities of referential aberration" 
(1979a:10). 
A deconstructive reading ofMsimang' s poetic texts according to rhetoricity yielded 
very curious results. The poem 'Iziziba zoThukela' demonstrated that none of the 
interpretations are in conflict with each other or compete against each other. As de 
Man highlights, to assert one meaning is to undermine and deny the others. To read 
the poem in one way only, is to ignore or fail to recognize that it also sponsors some 
other interpretation that subverts meaning. In 'Uthando 'it was again confirmed that 
meaning never finally settles into a single assertion but instead is fractured and 
multiple, circulating among opposed senses. Finally, the text 'Ndiza Nyoni' was 
disclosed to be subject to ironic interpretation, as de Man (1979a:9) maintains, it is 
at least double voiced, saying contradictory things simultaneously. 
In the reading ofMsimang' s poetry, an attempt was made to centre less on poetry's 
licence to reveal moral contingencies and focus more on the revelatory capacity of 
poetry to create complex illusions. This was achieved by bringing to the foreground 
certain surface features of words, like similarities of sound, root meanings as well 
as reverse values of words, which are crucial to the overall meanings of the poems. 
On deeper investigation, Msimang' s poems absolutely refuse to yield to a simple 
interpretation whereby a coherent and consistent pattern of imagery, thought and 
feeling is revealed. Instead, one is confronted with shifting values and abrupt 
displacements of meaning. It became impossible to sustain a univocal reading, for 
the language explodes into a multiplicity of meaning. The above observations 
should, moreover, suffice to caution against any attempt to discover a consistent 
pattern in Msimang' s employment of symbols. The values and significance with 
which any given symbol is endowed are determined by the immediate poetic context 
and not by an eternal, transcendental, coherent, closed system. This will be fully 
explained in a further chapter. 
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By way of conclusion it ought to be pointed out that reading and interpretation in 
deconstruction are not just reproducing what the writer thought and expressed in the 
text. Critical reading must produce the text, it has to be de-constructive rather than 
re-constructive. Furthermore, it has to be kept in mind that any literary work is a 
self-conscious fiction, and any attempt at reading the work while operating within 
a certain moment of aesthetic perception can only be achieved within such a 
temporariness and within the reader's cognisance. Any critical commentary is a 
thoroughly self-conscious - reflexive as well as reflective - representation of 
rhetoricity. 
CHAPTER4 
REPRESENTATION AND TRUTH IN DECONSTRUCTING 
MSIMANG'S POETRY 
4.1 Introduction 
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A critical deconstructive reading recognises that, in the inevitable lack of a "natural 
presence'', a text "has never been anything but writing"; that is "substitute 
significations which could only come forth in a chain of differential references" and 
which "opens" meaning and language, as Derrida phrases it, "to infinity'' (1976: 158-
159). The deconstructionists believe that no truth, no knowledge of any sort, can 
be conveyed by literature which is only a freeplay of signifiers. De Man maintains 
that the primary nature oflanguage is figurative. He assents to Nietzsche's opinion 
that "no such thing as an unrhetorical natural language exists that could be used as 
a point of reference" (De Man, 1979a: 105). 
In the previous chapter where the rhetoricity of language was focussed on, it was 
concluded that as metaphors and other figural devices are omnipresent in language, 
true knowledge or meaning can never be ascertained. This indeterminacy of texts 
touches on the impossibility of deciding truth or conveying truth in any work. All 
that can be communicated is the illusion of truth which is characteristic of the 
rhetorical mode. Nietzsche had declared: 
What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, 
anthropomorphisms; ... truth are illusions of which one has forgotten 
that they are illusions, worn out metaphors which have become 
powerless to affect the senses, coins which have their obverse 
effaced and now are no longer of account as coins but merely as 
metal" (Derrida, 1976:xxii). 
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Literature cannot lay claim to truth. In recent years, the questions raised by 
deconstructionist criticism regarding the foundation of truth and reference have 
appeared to many readers to constitute a dangerous denial of any link between texts 
and reality. The possibility that reference is indirect seems to mean that there is no 
credible or dependable access to experience or to history. 
The dismantling of truth claims through the power of rhetoric has particularly 
interesting implications for poetry, especially the concern of this study, Zulu poetry. 
If poetry presents non-truths, what about the magnitude of historical poems or 
izibongo found in Zulu? How are these to be viewed? How might one have entry 
to a history in a poem that is established by its endlessly delayed entrance into 
experience? In what ways could a historical happening or religious statement be 
explicated ifit emanates from a position in which full understanding is not possible? 
In this chapter, these questions will be given attention to. Furthermore, this section 
will question the assumptions underlying the critique of deconstruction: the belief 
that knowledge is attained by meaningful perception, that history is fundamentally 
available as the completed knowledge of a past, that political and ethical resolutions 
can and do arise only from a situation of understanding and self-understanding 
(Caruth, 1995: 1 ). 
4.2 Signification, reference and truth in Msimang's poetry 
There are certain texts which pose problems for deconstructive interpretation. 
These texts claim to convey referential truth but they may rely on metaphorical 
language or other indirect means of expression. As such, their language disfigures 
experience or reality, and hence leaves it ultimately inaccessible. 
This is not a modern literary problem. Attempts to assess the truth value of such 
texts frequently oscillate between traditional models that claim that literary texts 
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refer directly to a world outside the text, and theories that emphasize that because 
all texts can always be fictional, they therefore do not reliably refer to any reality, 
which consequently remains inapproachable. 
In poetry especially, the poem's alleged autonomy is under attack. Many poems 
depict the human in all its generality, however many portray historical events or 
personages. Deconstructively seen, the first mentioned type are more true than 
those that depict history. History is understood as what is referred to outside the 
text or through its perceptual presentation and as such unreliable. Past critical 
enquiries have alternated from perceiving poetry as concrete historical verity in 
attachment to a certain context, to regarding the poem as a self-sufficient and 
meaningful ideality of a fiction. The loss of reference to empirical experience in 
certain literary theories has been deplored by some, but others have felt it to be a 
sacrifice made for gain. Post-structuralist critiques of the subject have modified the 
assessment somewhat. This theory which views texts as self-reflexive structures has 
dispelled the illusion that poems represent a generalized, fictional self These critics 
praise poetry for its undoing of ideal fictions, rather than for its production of them. 
As concluded in the previous chapter, the metaphor and other rhetorical devices are 
consequential in deconstructive readings. The philosopher Nietzsche describes the 
figurative drive as 
that impulse towards the formulation of metaphors, that fundamental 
impulse of man, which we cannot reason away for one moment - for 
thereby we should reason away man himself(1964:188). 
Nietzsche holds the view that man and metaphoricity are inextricably bound. It is 
in man's nature to make metaphors, it is a fundamental impulse to name 
things/objects - to supplant a word for an image, a concept for a word. The word 
'man' itself is a metaphor - a substitution of one thing for another. To excise 
metaphor from man is to obliterate man himself, he is a dependant of metaphor. 
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Both Derrida and de Man turn to Friedrich Nietzsche's tenets in creating a new view 
of interpretation. Nietzsche contributed to the realisation that no pure and simple 
basis exists on which the interpretation of signs can be founded. In Derrida's 'White 
Mythology' (1974), and Paul de Man's 'The Epistomology of Metaphor' (1978), 
they tried to illustrate the problem of relationship between metaphor and knowledge, 
metaphor and truth. According to the two scholars, words are generally 
distinguished by those embodying reality in a direct and immediate way, and those 
words figuring reality in an oblique and displaced way. Figuration is judged by its 
proximity to truth - with the supposition that truth is self-present and self-evident 
(Derrida, 1974:73). Derrida and de Man question this claim to self-present and 
self-evident truth. According to them, language is always and everywhere 
figuration. For this reason it falls victim to itself- it cannot stand outside ofitselfto 
reflect on itself; it cannot place itself above the chain of signification. Language 
cannot escape its tropological status. 
Derrida is attracted to Nietzsche's scepticism regarding knowledge and truth, as well 
as his discovery of the inevitability of figurative language in philosophy. Derrida's 
sympathies lies with the Nietzschean affirmation of a world of signs which are not 
"to rejoice in uncertainty" (Derrida, 1976:xxx). The language is always 
metaphorical in character, and even philosophers cannot escape from it. The 
assumption that reason can operate in a sovereign sphere which guarantees entry to 
the truth, is a phantasm because reason self works by means of figural language. 
The figurality of the language subverts the reason's claim to truth. 
Derrida accepts that one cannot exist as a social being without some reliance on 
metaphysical commitments. However, he wants to show how impossible it is to 
escape the differential nature of language, or to extricate oneself from the aporias 
of discourse (the 'undecidable' flow and counterflow of all signification 
characterizing the rupture between language and thought, the discrepancy between 
statement and meaning). Derrida further illustrates that it is impossible to escape the 
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differences and the traces of differences which are historically constituted. All 
discourse is subject to historical conditions. Nevertheless, history cannot be taken 
as the basis of meaning. The import of time does not bring a stable point of 
reference, but rather the inevitability of the play of differences. History is not a 
privileged instance which can, by means of authority, stabilize or fix meaning. It is 
part of a general text which has to be continually interpreted and re-interpreted. As 
Derrida suggests: 
A text ... is henceforth no longer a finished corpus of writing, some 
content enclosed in a book or its margins, but a differential network, 
a fabric of traces referring endlessly to something other than itself, 
to other differential traces. Thus the text over-runs all the limits 
assigned to it so far ... - all the limits, everything that was set up in 
opposition to writing (speech, life, the world, the real, history, and 
what not, every field of reference - to body or mind, conscious or 
unconscious, politics, economics, and so forth)(1979:84). 
One cannot distinguish between text and world, by positing the world as a presence 
or substance that exists apart from the processes of constitutive difference that 
characterise literary texts. To say the world is the text is to say equally that the text 
is the world. Derrida confirms this by writing: "the task is ... to dismantle the 
metaphysical and rhetorical structures which are at work (in the text), not in order 
to reject or discard them, but to inscribe them in another way" (1976: lxxv). 
In the essay 'Rhetoric of Tropes (Nietzsche)' in Allegories of Reading (1979a), de 
Man also follows Nietzsche in that language can never be the object of 
consciousness or of knowledge or science. This is because consciousness is 
language - meaning that it is false and misleading, that is, history or ideology is 
aberrantly referential. Nietzsche first shows that although language seems to state 
knowledge, it actually performs an act, but then he shows that it is just as uncertain 
that language performs an act. De Man contends that the pretension oflanguage to 
offer knowledge of the world is rooted in the principle of noncontradiction: that A 
cannot simultaneously be and not be A. Insofar as language is constituted by the 
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unstable relation of grammar and rhetoric, it is unable to come into being as an 
object of knowing, consciousness, science (y.1 arminski in Caruth, 1995 :30). De Man 
holds that in language referentiality is anomalous, while figurality is radical -
the straightforward affirmation that the paradigmatic structure of 
language is rhetorical rather than representational or expressive of a 
referential, proper, meaning ... marks a full reversal of the established 
priorities which traditionally root the authority of language in its 
adequation to an extralinguistic referent or meaning, rather than in 
the intralinguistic resources of figures (1979a: 106). 
It is the figurality that forms the base of the language and referentiality is only a 
deviation from it (1979a:202). De Man is of the view that the literal and figural 
meanings co-exist in a diametrical opposition making it impossible for any truth or 
meaning to be conveyed. However, de Man does not renounce the referentiality of 
language but reckons it secondary. De Man explains as follows: 
It would be unfortunate, for example, to confuse the materiality of 
the signifier with the materiality of what it signifies. This may seem 
obvious on the level of light and sound, but it is less so with regard 
to the more general phenomenality of space, time or especially of the 
self; no one in his right mind will try to grow grapes by the 
luminosity of the word 'day', but it is very difficult not to conceive 
the pattern of one's past and future existence as in accordance with 
temporal and spatial schemes that belong to fictional narratives and 
not to the world. This does not mean that fictional narratives are not 
part of the world and of reality; their impact upon the world may 
well be all too strong for comfort. What we call ideology is precisely 
the confusion of linguistic with natural reality, of reference with 
phenomenalism. It follows that, more than any mode of enquiry, 
including economics, the linguistics ofliterariness is a powerful and 
indispensable tool in the unmasking of ideological aberrations, as 
well as a determining factor in accounting for their occurrence. 
Those who reproach literary theory for being oblivious to social and 
historical (that is to say ideological) reality are merely stating their 
fear at having their own ideological mystifications exposed by the 
tool they are trying to discredit. They are, in short, very poor 
readers of Marx's German Ideology ( 1982: 11). 
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De Man shows that language is not co-extensive with meaning; rhetorical reading 
becomes in part an exposure of the ideological imposition of meaning as a defence 
one builds against language. The reader or critic confers a sense or meaning on 
language through figuration: 
How can a positional act, which relates to nothing that comes before 
or after, become inscribed in a sequential narrative? ... it can only be 
because we impose, in our turn, on the senseless power of positional 
language the authority of sense and meaning ... We cannot ask why 
it is that we, as subjects, choose to impose meaning, since we are 
ourselves defined by this very question (1984:117-118). 
One transforms language into historical and aesthetic objects, or embeds discursive 
occurrences in narratives that provide continuities, in a process that de Man calls 
"the endless prosopopoeia by which the dead are made to have a face and a voice 
which tells in turn the allegory of their own demise and allows us to apostrophize 
them in their turn" (1984: 122). 
There is a tendency among critics to see deconstruction erroneously as a non-
historical critique of all rational procedures. Although Derrida does criticise 
philosophy, his critique is, within its immediate historical context, essentially a 
radical response to liberal reason that promotes a more socialised, historicist and 
ethical way of thinking. Derrida does not deny any reality outside the text, but wants 
to rethink the usual, assumed relations between reality and text. 
De Man also does not repudiate that language has any referential property. He 
believes that language has two distinct properties, literal and figural, which he 
designates as signification and symbolisation. All deconstructive discourse always 
"states the fallacy of reference in a necessarily referential mode" (De Man, 
1979a: 125). This necessity is a function oflanguage itself, not of any language user 
- "deconstruction is not something we can decide to do or not to do at will. It is 
coextensive with any use of language, and this use is compulsive or, as Nietzsche 
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formulates it, imperative" (De Man, 1979a: 125). The very existence of figural 
language presupposes the existence of non-figural language from which it can be 
distinguished and with which it can be contrasted. The very fact that deconstruction 
is the deconstruction of referential meaning implies that referentiality is present in 
language. De Man writes: 
The situation implies that figural discourse is always understood in 
contradistinction to a form of discourse that would not be figural; it 
postulates, in other words, the possibility of referential meaning as 
the telos of all languages (1979a:201 ). 
Literary theory shows up the questionable passages of argument in the form of 
unlooked-for textual aberrations. This may help to explain the common misreading 
of de Man which takes him to deny all practical commerce between language and 
reality. "In a genuine semiology" he writes, "the referential function oflanguage is 
not being denied - far from it; what is in question is its authority as a model for 
natural or phenomenal cognition" (1982:11). Caruth (1995:2) affirms the above 
misreadings and states that 
in increasing numbers of texts, deconstruction has been wrongly 
identified with the claim that reference is a fiction, and has 
accordingly been dismissed as denying memory, history, and all 
notions of truth. What is crucially important, on the contrary, about 
the intervention of deconstruction in literary theory - and by 
extension, within larger debates about history and memory - is 
precisely that it searches for a way to think of language, and 
specifically reference, in terms that do not fall prey to the dynamic in 
which every textual affirmation meets with a seemingly inevitable 
denial. 
She suggests a rethinking of the notions of reference which does not close down any 
access to reality, but rather opens up an inquiry in which experience can be 
rethought and recognized anew. Traditional models do not capture either the 
specificity of history or the way it may occur as a continuing event, which must be 
continually reconfronted - a point confirmed and emphasized by other critics as well: 
The space available for movement between any given text's formal 
coherence and referential force, or between its truth and history, 
always outstrips the possibility of a definitive calculation, and ... 
always remains to be determined anew (Newmark in Caruth, 
1995:172). 
The thinking of how the then and there ... may implicate us, here and 
now, poses the challenge of thinking history, not as a symmetrical, 
totalizing narrative of origins and ends, but in the precise terms of 
the material specificity of the event (Esch in Caruth, 1995:194). 
To reanchor a poem too quickly in a context by a referential 
determination is to foreclose on the very place where poems could 
be speaking to the question of their historicity (Burt in Caruth, 
1995:130). 
109 
Krieger (inRajnath, 1989: 17) argues that moral and ideological (historical) meanings 
are ever present in literary theory, even when the critic's focus is on the verbal 
structure. His attitude to the structure itself brings out his moral concern. Johnston 
(1989: 14 -15) is of the opinion that deconstruction has often given nothing but 
negative help in the attempt to read literature with history and biography. In saying 
that history is a fiction, a text is subject to ideological skewings and mystifications, 
and that it cannot be relied upon as a source of objective knowledge. 
Deconstructive theory sometimes seems to block all access to the possibility of 
reading explicitly 'referential' documents in conjunction with literary or speculative 
texts. However, Johnston encounters that 
Yet in practice, we find Derrida drawing upon Freud's life and letters 
in his analysis of 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle', and de Man often 
beginning an article with a historical account that in some way 
doubles the rhetorical problem he is about to discuss. The question, 
then, is how to use history and biography deconstructively, how to 
seek in them not answers, causes, explanations, or origins, but new 
questions and new ways in which the literary and nonliterary texts 
alike can be made to read and rework each other [my 
italics](1989: 15). 
The notorious proclamation "all readings are misreadings" (Miller, 1979:467) does 
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not simply deny the notion of truth. Truth is preserved in rudimentary form in the 
notion of error. This does not mean that somewhere there is, forever unattainable, 
one true meaning. Rather, it implies that the reasons a reading might be considered 
true are motivated and undercut by the text's own interests, blindness, desires, and 
weaknesses, and that the role of truth cannot so simply be eliminated. To reject 
objective truth (like historical facts) is to make it harder to avoid setting oneself up 
as an arbitrary arbiter. Historical happenings as in Msimang's 'Siwela iMoretele' 
(1990:14 - 15) do consist of some truths. Thus, the one imperative areading must 
obey is that it follows, with rigour, what puts in question the kind of reading it 
thought it was going to be. However, expectations about the reading as historical 
reproductions are reversed. Msimang' s text is a statement about a distinct historical 
event. A text, as de Man states, 
is defined by the necessity of considering a statement, at the same 
time, as performative and constative, and the logical tension between 
figure and grammar is repeated in the impossibility of distinguishing 
between two linguistic functions which are not necessarily 
compatible (1979a:270). 
This discrepancy between language conceived as grammar and language as reference 
or intentional action, is the rhetorical structure, and the indeterminacy of this 
structural relationship is what de Man calls 'text'. Msimang's poem is a good 
example of the two types of language views. 
Siwela iMoretele 
1 Uquqaba olugqishelene hvaqoqana phezu kwalo mfala, 
2 Kwakungathi wuquqaba hvabantwana bakwa-Israyeli 
3 Beqoqene benqwabelene phezu koLwandle Olubomvu; 
4 Sasiluquqaba sibalekela ulaka lukaFaro, 
5 Sasiluququba sihlasele esigodhveni sikaFaro, 
6 Sasingeluquqaba luwelel' ezweni loju nobisi. 
7 Amanzi eMoretele athenek' amandla nethemba, 
8 Awagagamelanga okwamagagas' oLwandle Olubomvu, 
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9 Awasithibelanga, azedlulela ejeqeza ebalisa, 
10 Ali/a isililo sezililo nesilokozane, 
11 Amafu phezulu ahlangana ehlulmna, 
12 Nelanga elalisihola laholekela emuva. 
13 Yasithibel' inkomo !«JHaga ngenganono, 
14 Y ayithibel' imithonselana yemithelela, 
15 Ingezithibele izikhukhula sezikhandene, 
16 Zawela izigagayi kwababaza ibhuloho, 
17 Amadwala phansi abamba ongezansi, 
18 Izinhlanzi zakuyek' ukutshuza zakhex' imilomo. 
19 Jsikhonyane sasisitheka sisindana 
20 Ngevuso lengebhe yomsizi wabasizili, 
21 Baningi osondonzima ababemadolonzima, 
22 Ithemba selibashiyile sebeyinkundla yetwetwe; 
23 Baningi abaninga ngezinsapho ezisele emuva, 
24 Eziyosala dengwane sebesele kwaSaha. ** 
25 Qiz! Qiz! Laduma! 
26 Qiz! Qiz! Laphindelela! 
27 Bani! Lamthatha! Phazi! Lamsonga! 
28 Phazi! Lamsonga! Bani! Lamthatha! 
29 ''Maye! Kodwa bengisho!" 
30 ''Maye! Shwele, nkosi yomusa!" 
31 Ukhozi olumaphiko azinkemba lwabasibekela, 
32 Izigagayi zaphenduka, isanhlaka, senhlalmnhlalm. 
33 !Moretele zayiwela amanhlukanhlulmno, 
34 Abaningi lmbayiwelanga okwesibili, 
35 Balibona liphuma, abalibonanga lishona, 
36 Nanamuhla amanzi asasilila leso sililo. 
Msimang' s poetry is the product of his subjectivity that has undergone alteration in 
his understanding of language and has recognized it to be historical. As such, it is 
difficult to interpret and separate the figural meaning from the literal in his rhetorical 
text. Both are simultaneously present, contradicting and undercutting each other. 
The figural and the literal meanings conflict with each other without either of them 
becoming predominant. Furthermore, the level of meaning, rhetoric, always comes 
to interfere with the grammar of the sentence (De Man, 1979c:129). Miller also 
suggests that referentiality is never completely absent from language. He contrasts 
referentiality with deconstruction: 
It [the text] says something which is capable of being interpreted in 
two irreconcilable ways. It is 'undecidable'. One way is referential 
(there is an origin) and the other deconstruction of this referentiality 
(there is no ongm, only the freeplay of linguistic 
substitution)(l 975 :30). 
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It is impossible to remove critical discourse from the question of rhetoric, and it is 
also inconceivable to unmask its ideologies once and for all. De Man (1982: 11) 
points out that those who fill up the content with form or with content, intrinsic or 
extrinsic, sign or meaning, and think that they are making a theoretical, practical, 
political difference are only reproducing and teaching ideology not history. He 
emphasizes 
That literature can be ideologically manipulated is obvious but does 
not suffice to prove that this distortion is not a particular aspect of 
a larger pattern of error. Sooner or later any literary study must face 
the problem of the truth of its own interpretations, no longer with 
the naive conviction of a priority of content over form, but as a 
consequence of the much more unsettling experience of being unable 
to cleanse its own discourse aberrantly referential implications 
(1993: 174). 
The text may indeed be seen as a deceptive ideological instrument, however, it 
would do well to let it make its claims and to examine these on their own, as if they 
were objective pokes at the truth. 
One does not have to recourse to the poet's biography or psychology to understand 
the effect of his poetry, which is produced by linguistic structures and figures. It is 
possible that this poem refers to a specific event of a change in consciousness within 
Msimang' s history as poet, an event that marks the appearance of a new subjectivity. 
This venture could be looked into. However, one does not seek to establish any 
causal connection between the events of the Moretele massacre and a psychology, 
be that of an individual or of the masses. The poem does not support a crude 
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causality of this sort. Finally, however tempting it would be to explore the poem as 
a history written within a psychoanalytic framework, there are reasons for preferring 
to start with a less subjective landscape. 
The urge to apprehend what this undeconstructed text is trying to claim still remains 
- to apprehend that claim and to judge it as a claim to be true. In reading this poem, 
the text will not be tested to see whether the historical or political content is 'true' 
or not. There is no need to accept the historical evidence, however, the historical 
truths in this poem will also not be disregarded. The text was written by a certain 
individual during a particular time span. The poem dates to approximately late 1985, 
after the actual event took place. The title - translatable as 'We cross the Moretele 
river' - suggests that the poem will be about the Moretele river, or a happening 
which concerns the Moretele river, or else about the apartheid struggle in general. 
Msimang focusses the reader's attention on the specifics of the happening by 
including a prosaic epilogue. This seems necessary, for ifit wasn't for the Moretele 
river being mentioned twice in the poem, this poem could represent other historical 
incidents as well, for example the Blood River bloodbath. The question to be 
pursued is the question of what this poem has to say about the pressures in language 
toward reference and signification, as also what it says about its historicity. 
The poem by Msimang ostensibly refers to the historical event of 21 November 
1985 when the residents of Mamelodi East crossed the Moretele River to the 
superintendent's office, to negotiate about their rentals. Before they could reach the 
offices, officers blocked the marching residents and shot at them. In his notes on his 
poetry, Msimang affirms the above: 
Ngo-1985 kwenzeka isehlakalo esinyantisa igazi eMamelodi 
ngoNovemba 21. Phela ngalelo langa kwasuka iziqumbi zabantu 
zawela umfula iMoretele ziyokhalaza ngokukhushulwa kwentela 
emahhovisi kansumpa welokishi. Lowo mgidingo waba 
nomphumela wokufa kwabantu abevile eshumini bedutshulwa 
ngamaphoyisa. Ngabe sengiwuqopha lowo mlando enkondlweni 
ethi: 'Siwela iMoretele' (1990:74). 
(In 1985, an apprehensive event happened in Mamelodi on 
November the 21 81• Indeed, on this day a large group of people 
crossed the Moretele river to complain about the escalation of 
rentals at the offices of the superintendent of the location. This 
undertaking had as a result the death of more than ten people who 
were shot by the police. Thereafter, I wrote this historical poem 
called: "Siwela iMoretele "). 
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What could be inferred from the statement above is that the senseless deaths of these 
people of Mamelodi made such an impression on the poet that he wrote a poem on 
the incident in order to pay homage to them. This implied intention of the writer is 
not as such accepted by the deconstructionists. De Man has distinguished between 
the intention in the mind of the writer and that realised in the structure of the work 
and argues that it is the latter rather than the former which is significant for the 
literary critic. "The structural intentionality" writes de Man, 
determines the relationship between the components of the resulting 
object in all its parts, but the relationship of the particular state of 
mind of the person engaged in the act of structurization to the 
structured object is altogether contingent (1979b:25). 
The poet wrote this poem, as he himself asserted, in a state of personal compassion 
and political crisis. The implications of his thought and writing in the violence of 
history are legio. Msimang' s text was thought out during the apartheid struggle and 
are directly linked to an anguished meditation upon the historical destiny of the 
oppressed people of South Africa, a meditation that finds an echo in his poem. This 
poem not only serves as a memorial of a tragedy, but also a unifying bond, linking 
the nation in solidarity through similar experiences. Critical reading of Msimang is 
a way of undoing this mystification that draws from poetry a supposed reconciliation 
which repairs the divisions of human experience and offers this as an organic model 
for human destiny. Ironically, de Man states that poetic language, far from serving 
as 'common ground' on which 'poetically man dwells' is a site of division and 
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struggle, "always constitutive, able to posit regardless of presence, but, by the same 
token, unable to give a foundation to what it posits except as an intent of 
consciousness" (1984: 6). 
By commemorating this event in this poem, Msimang brought into being 
monumentalization. This involves turning people, events and even texts into 
historical and aesthetic objects. The key component to monumentalization is one's 
shirking of the text's power by means of a cognition based on a notion of unity 
between what is known and the knower; a knowledge and a value that one might 
then praise or condemn. Deconstruction argues that readers fool themselves into 
thinking that they see a line of continuity, which only serves to mask their own 
present state of deficiency. Such a reading is a recovering of what is missing by 
appealing to another to which one bears some sort of natural relation. Critical 
deconstructive reading must account for the blindness, for the critical failure of 
cognition to inscribe a certain history. 
Msimang chose the genre of poetry to render the historical happening. Since in its 
interpretation, the written word is also involved - in an infinite play of differences -
different meanings are endlessly deferred from the thing itself And 
if in language there are only differences with no positive terms, it is 
in literature that we have least cause to arrest the play of differences 
by calling upon a determinate communicative intention to serve as 
the truth or origin of the sign. We say instead that a poem can mean 
many things (Culler, 1975:133). 
One is always in the situation of having to revise a judgement to a work, for a new 
fact, a new text, makes a difference in the way one reads. Indeed, eventually there 
is no restraint to the play in the interpretation of literature except the limitation of 
the critic's imagination, a limit which grows or changes with each reading. 
De Man's readings always start out from the quite traditional questions ofliterary 
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theory - but merely to underline the fact that the discipline of history can do its work 
only by suspending the rhetorical dimension of language and hence by not reading 
texts. De Man's commentary on historical poems more or less ignores any national 
themes and focuses on the imagery that fills in the decisive structural framework for 
the description. The reading of this poem will also concentrate on imagery by firstly 
construing the text and explicating the implied purport of the different meanings in 
ways closely tied to the construal. 
The poem 'Siwela iMoretele 'is read as a verbal presentation of human experience, 
its presentation is ordered, especially in sharp division of stanzas and spacing. The 
whole poem is descriptive except for six lines of active animation. The poem is 
organized into sequences, of which the coordinating principle is that of a progressive 
narration. This poem can be summarized in its main points: a crowd on the banks 
of the river resemble the fleeing Israelites, nature is a witness to the happenings, they 
cross the river and are fired on. Still advancing, they get shot at - retreating, many 
dead are left behind. The poem expresses both eloquently restrained grief for the 
deaths and belated knowledge. 
The poem is the utterance of a particular speaker, identified as 'we' of the text. The 
possibility exists that the speaker/poet was an eyewitness to this incident, he/she 
could have been a participant in the event, or he/she could be simply sympathizing 
with the victims by including him/herself Even as an observer of the occurrences 
which took place, the narrator's coverage of the episode cannot be taken as an 
account of the truth for it occurs in the form of a poem, which is unreliable for it 
makes use of metaphorical language. 
The tense of the verbs ranges from past perfect (signifying an event in the past) to 
the present (sustained 'today', that is, of the speaker's utterance) and future tense. 
The shift from past to present tense (which occurs in the last line of the poem) 
opposes the then to now, ignorance to knowledge, naivete to experience, life to 
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death. The speaker/poet has moved across the line from innocence to knowledge 
through the experience the poem represents. 
This experience might be specified as a shocking discovery of the savagery of 
oppressors, or the awful suddenness, unexpectedness and finality of death. This 
poem can be an elegy for the departed, illustrating their hope, courage, despair and 
death or an ideology or socio-political commentary on the government of the day. 
Nonetheless, Msimang terms it a simple "umlando "(historical poem), and by doing 
this, he obfuscates the situation. However, since literature is not grounded in 
something outside language, the determinate bounds ofits meaning are undermined 
by the text itself, in a play of tropes that leaves an unassimilable residue of meaning. 
As such, the determination of specific meanings in the poem read as an entity -
which is an initial phase in deconstructive readings - is subverted beyond any 
unifying boundaries. 
In the deconstructive over-reading of the poem, the text is undermined, and the 
construed meaning explodes into an undecidability among contradictory alternatives 
of meaning. The first stanza is connected not only by an ecumenical image, but also 
in structure. The first three lines are related; the second and third lines repeat the 
first, and a similar situation occurs with lines four to five, except that the last clause 
contains a negative statement. The poet sets himself the objective of finding an 
image for the marching crowd. His starting point is the vision of the crowd 
assembled on the upper bank of the river. This beginning occurs within a 
representational system (metaphor/simile) asserting that the crowd was like the 
Israelites: 
Kwakungathi wuquqaba lwabantwana bakwa-Israyeli 
(It was as though the crowd oflsrael' s children) 
Deconstructively, the first focal point will be to fix upon the word 'as though' or 
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'like' (kwakungathi) - that word which subverts the force of full assertion by its 
introduction of the element of analogy. A would-be affirmation of a presence 
outside the mind is withdrawn into a mere analogy, the desire for a union of all 
beings. Dualism and difference can be resolved, but only in the figurations of 
language. What the poem would like to retrieve is the claim: 'as though'. But it 
questions its own supposed assertion to firm knowledge by the use of the word 'as 
though' and all that this simile implies, for this allegory is marked through and 
through by a contradiction. In comparing the marching crowd with the Israelites, 
the poet affixes more detrimental than favourable connotations. One can infer that 
with this image he wanted to foreshadow the crowd's promising destiny - that God 
guided them like he guided the Israelites. However, the differences between the 
simile's tenor and vehicle are far more than the similarities. Both gatherings were 
down-trodden and enslaved people, but while the Israelites crossed the sea in order 
to escape Pharaoh's forces who resolved to recapture and enslave them once again, 
the Moretele crowd crosses the river in order to confront their oppressors. This is 
confirmed by the use of the verb "-hlasele" (gone out to war, invaded, attacked, 
go against, hunted). God made his presence clearly known to the Israelites, 
travelling before them by day in a pillar of clouds (Exodus 13:21), similarly to the 
clouds appearing before the protesters in the poem. These clouds, however, behave 
discordantly - they cannot reach unity - momentarily merging and disintegrating as 
if fleeing from the scene: 
Amafu phezulu ahlangana ehlukana 
(The clouds above accumulated and parted) 
The book of Exodus stressed that the Israelites' deliverance from Egypt was an act 
of God. This was demonstrated through miracles that touched almost every detail 
of the Exodus story. Again, in 'Siwela iMoretele' amazing phenomena also occur: 
Awasithibelanga, azedlulela ejeqeza ebalisa, 
Ali/a isililo sezililo nesilokozane, 
Amafu phezulu ahlangana ehlukana, 
Nelanga elalisihola laholekela emuva. 
Zawela izigagayi kwababaza ibhuloho, 
Amadwala phansi abamba ongezansi, 
lzinhlanzi zakuyek' ukutshuza zakhex' imilomo. 
(It [the water] did not restrain us, it passed by solicitously glancing, 
It wept a mourning of deep sorrow and sobbing, 
The clouds above accumulated and parted, 
And the sun which guided us, retreated to the rear. 
The march crossed and amazed the bridge, 
The slippery stones below showed astonishment, 
The fish stopped swimming and stupefyingly stared. 
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To the Israelites, the crossing was a miraculous path to freedom - to the marchers 
it was a path to despair and destruction. Upon seeing the approaching army, the 
Israelites lost faith and cried out to the Lord. But Moses said to them "fear not, 
stand firm, and see the salvation of the Lord"(Exodus 14: 13). The deduction made 
from this comparison is that the Lord had forsaken the Mamelodi crowd's plight and 
had no salvation for them as He had for the Israelites. The roles are reversed, and 
when, like Pharaoh's forces, they retreat in a panic, they leave many dead behind. 
Instead of being the victors, they were the victims. Whereas the Israelites sang a 
hymn of triumph and praise to the Lord for delivering them from the Egyptians, in 
Mamelodi the water of the Moretele simply murmurs a lamentation (line 36). 
In his poem as a whole, Msimang oscillates between these contraries: the alternate 
priorities of subject and object, humans and nature. His poem makes evident that 
an external world can be constructed and believed in if the stimuli for sensations 
originate outside the mind. If, on the other hand, sensations are like metaphors 
themselves, then their constructs have little validity outside the mind. Riddel picks 
on the second possibility: 
Nietzsche radically situates the notions of essence and truth, located 
as it were in the 'thing-in-itself, in the evasions and discontinuities 
oflanguage that are taken for 'truth' because the origins of truth in 
metaphoric accident have been forgotten. For Nietzsche, even a 
percept is a 'first metaphor', discontinuous with the unknowable 
stimulus that provoked it, and language, or the sign ... of the percept 
is a metaphor of a metaphor, a 'second metaphor' at best. There can 
be no movement of essence or presence through these discontinuous 
planes, hence no access to a 'truth' or its 'origin', the 'thing-in-
itself, by a regression from late to earlier metaphors (1980:356). 
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In his desire to encompass the experience of the Moretele crossing, and its 
resemblance to the fleeing Israelites, the poet employed the belated secondariness 
of language or in de Manian terms poetic logos made flesh. The Biblical image of 
the Israelites is thus a delicate image indeed. It is a second metaphor, but is still 
further estranged from the truth because of the type of metaphor it represents. The 
question of Biblical evidence as truth will be dealt with later. 
The poem contains an interrelated set ofbinary oppositions: past/present, life/death, 
here/there, positive/negative, hope/despair, river/sea, etc. The seeming boundary 
between each pair of these terms dissolves into an inevitable structure of chiasmus 
(inversion in the second of two parallel phrases of the order followed in the first). 
As a result there is a constant slipping of entities across borders into their opposites 
so as to effect a perpetual reversal of properties; this cross-over is forced on the 
reader by a remnant of meaning within the text of the poem itself The sun is 
mentioned for the first time in line 12 of the poem: 
Nelanga elalisihola laholekela emuva. 
(And the sun which guided us, retreated to the rear.) 
At first it seems as if the clouds and the sun mark only the passage of time elapsed, 
in other words, the sun was ahead of them (as in the morning) and then behind them 
(as in the afternoon). However, with a second reading the allusion could be made 
that the sun is backing out, abandoning them. This exposes the sun as a coward, a 
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circumstance quite different from the usual associations of splendour and glory. The 
sun is further the source oflife; sunrise equals life or new life and sunset death. This 
is represented in the following line: 
Balibona liphuma, abalibonanga lishona 
(They saw the sun rise, they did not see it set) 
A reverse situation is experienced here: to see the sun set, meant to be alive. Sunset 
thus constitutes life. This overturns the conventional figurative association between 
darkness and despair, and light and hope. The antithesis of passive and active are 
also reversed in this poem. The river is passive, its water does not - like the Red Sea 
- bar or detain the crowd from crossing to a certain death, which it has pre-
knowledge of: 
Amanzi eMoretele athenek' amandla nethemba, 
Awagagamelanga okwamagagas' oLwandle Olubomvu, 
Awasithibelanga, azedlulela ejeqeza ebalisa, 
Alita isililo sezililo nesilokozane 
(Moretele' s water discouraged and diminished in strength and hope, 
It was not brash as the waves of the Red Sea, 
It did not restrain us, it passed by solicitously glancing, 
It wept a mourning of deep sorrow and sobbing) 
The river does not give any assistance, its water is discouraging. It passively shows 
concern and trepidation about the venture while simply mourning the people passing 
by (line 9-10). The huge rocks, the fish and the bridge (lines 16-18) simply show 
astonishment at the crusade, but do nothing to stop them. Nature which is vital, acts 
dormant, while that which causes death is active like the gun blasts in the fifth stanza 
and the eagle of death (line 31 ). The inertia encountered in the natural objects in the 
poem first creates a more generalised sense of despair which casts a shadow over the 
cursed quest. This desperation continues throughout the poem, whether one delves 
into its human history or into the self, whether into the past or into the future, 
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whether the quest is seen in space or in time. 
The fact that the poem is yet to be established before a reading opens a space 
simultaneously between it and the letters on the page. This is called spacing in 
deconstruction and it refers to the fundamental separation of the poem from the 
black marks on the page. It calls attention to the material space and time in which 
one exists. Derrida points out that spacing and temporization (the way the poem is 
deferred and never quite established) are joined, that they are co-existent with one-
another and hence their different meanings are contained in the one term. Because 
of the spacing of language into space and time, meaning arises through systems 
(codes) as well as through semiotic contexts, but this very spacing leads to 
randomness, indeterminacy. 
The above situation is clearly illustrated in the word 'cross' which already implicates 
a change, a going over from one situation to another, going across to the other side. 
The term denotes movement, usually with the idea of accomplishing a particular 
matter. When crossing a river, one succeeds firstly in safely reaching the other bank. 
In the Zulu culture, there are many proverbs in this regard, for example: "Awuwelwa 
umfula ugcwele" (A river is not crossed when full) - meaning one has to take the 
right opportunity to do something. In the statement "siwela iMoretele '', one can 
thus infer that the river is crossed for a specific reason. This reason is not supplied 
in the poem itself, but stated by the poet afterwards - to state their grievances 
concerning the recent rental escalation. Seen however, in the light of the image 
mentioned previously, it is not for this cause alone. Like the exiled Israelites, these 
burdened beings seek freedom. Freedom from oppression, from apartheid - simple 
human freedom. Crossing the river would be a type ofliberation for these masses. 
In the outset of the poem a state of devoted hope is experienced, but this quickly 
deteriorates into despair. The stirring events that follow the march over the river 
come to a climax in the fifth stanza with guns firing and mortals collapsing on the 
ground. One has to consider that the other verb "-we/a" - which is different in tone 
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from "-we/a" (cross) - has connotations that might be very revealing. This verb 
expresses the idea of falling for or into an entity, or to make a mistake, to be misled, 
or to make a slip. In crossing the river, the community made an error. Whatever 
this oversight was, perhaps to trust the authorities, had deadly consequences. 
The notion of error is confirmed by the speaker him/herself The speaker commits 
to two stages of consciousness, one belonging to the past and mystified, the other 
to the now of the poem, the stage that has recovered from the mystification of a past 
now presented as being in error. The stance of the speaker, who exists in the 'now' 
is that of a subject whose insight is no longer in doubt. First there was error, then 
death occurred and now a perspicacity into the rocky barrenness of the human 
predicament prevails. 
The speaker's feelings are not proclaimed, but must be inferred from the terms with 
which he asserts the state of affairs. This allows for considerable room for variance 
in this aspect of interpretation. The descriptive stanzas in which the speaker's 
sympathy with the crowd's predicament can be deduced is contrasted with the 
animated execution of the fifth stanza, which is also visually placed differently from 
the rest of the text. There is a major time shift and change in viewpoint encountered 
here which actualizes a shift or break in the continuity of the poem. This shift 
reveals an instability of attitude in the poem, as will be disclosed shortly. The direct 
speech in quotation marks (lines 29-30) attracts attention for it seems like an 
intrusion of another voice than that of the narrator. It could also be the narrator 
speaking out in his/her own voice, now identified as a first person narrator "ngi" (I): 
"Maye I Kodwa bengisho I" 
"Maye! Shwele, nkosi yomusa!" 
("Alas! But I had said!" 
"Alas! Forgive, lord of grace!") 
The curious question to be asked here is not merely who the speaker of this 
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discourse is, but also to what and to whom the content refers to. What was it the 
speaker had said, and to whom did he/she say it? Was it a warning to the crowd 
before the event? Who asks for forgiveness and why? Is it the narrator of the poem 
or/and a person or persons in the crowd, and do they ask forgiveness on behalf of 
themselves, the police or the crowd? Are these speakers present in the activities as 
onlookers, or are these statements uttered in surprise by panicked people in the 
happenings? The tension between these non-disclosures and the suspense leads to 
a disequilibrium in the text. This subversion ties in with the instability and 
incoherence determined in deconstructive texts. The clash of voices as well as 
positions in this historical period challenges and undermines what might have seemed 
to be its central assumptions, rather than just expressing a straight-forward 
ideological stance. 
What can be concluded from this passage is that a subject is presented who is 
contradictorily both situated and cited. It seems as if this enunciative 'I' is only now 
entering a discourse which has excluded him/her. But the performative effect of 
bearing witness, the sense of the subject's action of urgency, does not seem denied 
by this splitting. In a quite determinate and empirical situating of him/herself, as well 
as his/her audience, this passage calls forth the exigency as well as the position and 
pathos of political powers. 
The use of ideophones to convey movement and visual suffering makes this verse 
unique. This is the only locale in the poem where this exceptionally creative part of 
speech is encountered. Mono- and disyllable ideophones which appear as predicates 
on their own are utilized. The word "qiz" is indicative of gunshots and "bani" and 
"phazi" of the sparks from the barrel of the gun after firing a shot. The interjection 
used emphasises the emotional state of the speaker exclaiming his disbelief It is 
clear from these passages in the poem that the compatibility between the inner states 
of consciousness and acts of power is a thematic concern. 
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The life/death, sunrise/sunset opposition acquire further supplementary meanings. 
In the assertion that the second line of direct speech is representative of what the 
speaker him/herself states, one can deduce that, in what the speaker believes to be 
the final hour of reckoning, he asks for forgiveness for his wrong-doings, whatever 
they may be: "Shwele, nkosi yomusa!". The speaker has a firm conviction of his 
mortality. This conviction is associated with a strong sense of participation in a 
nature both permanently material, therefore immortal (river) and at the same time 
enduringly spiritual, therefore also immortal. The nature/culture opposition 
collapses with the other binaries, resulting in the proclamation made by this first 
person speaker which is exemplary of one trying to clear his name. A feeling of guilt 
could be traced here. Guilt perhaps because he/ she did not die for the cause, like the 
others did. His only hope for re-establishing the bond that connected him to the 
people and their world is to die without dying - to be dead, and yet still alive. The 
poem is thus his displaced representative of the above commiseration. The deaths 
of the Moretele multitude is an allegory for the loss of logos, leaving the poet, his 
words groundless. After the violence and losses, he can simply state in his presence: 
Nanamuhla amanzi asasilila leso sililo. 
(Even today the waters still wails this lamentation.) 
The poem thus performs an act of self-qualification which, in the view of the poet's 
desires, must be seen as an act of self-subversion, or self-deconstruction. The writer 
deconstructs whatever he constructs, or unbuilds whatever he builds. The poet's 
succour lies in language, its capacity for lies. Whether these deliberate lies, or 
illusions restore any semblance of a presence is the question. 
These people, just like the exiled Israelites, were taught by sorrow and disciplined 
by suffering to usher in a new day, not only for their own people, but for all 
mankind. As such the poem reads about the retrieval of a sense of direction; a poem 
which falls back upon memory to renew a sense of purpose, and on forgetfulness to 
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give its beginning again a sense of newness. The poet forgets the harshness of the 
actuality by writing his version of history. The possibility of writing and of history -
like the possibility of writing history - thus is conditioned by, in de Man's terms, a 
'forgetting' that occurs through writing. In forgetting, one reverses a consciousness 
to the certainty of perception and the conviction it can say what it means. 
Consciousness always forgets the negative insight it had achieved, and 
"recommences that movement from the start" (Hegel in Caruth, 1995:78). 
It is true that historical things happen in ways people do not necessarily expect or 
control. And when it is a question of reading a text - like this one, for example - this 
means that the reader may not yet know all that is already truly happening in it. 
Msimang's poem invokes the authority of history, the urgency of political agency, 
and the strange intertwining of chance and necessity that attends historical event. 
The description of the Moretele crossing encountered in this poem could be exactly 
the same as the true occurrence, the poem could be read - descriptively and 
historically - to mean the same things one is mostly familiar with. In this poem, 
history can be seen as a report or description of what has happened, history as the 
actual event which happens in its own right. Nonetheless, the poem also allows a 
distinction between a poetic space where an interrogation into the verbal nature of 
literary language continues, and the public, historical space where language aims to 
represent the world as in a painting. In the poem's focus on a tragedy in history, it 
tends to reverse into its opposite and end up creating the history it attempts to 
reveal. The conviction that a text points 'outside' to a certain reference ultimately 
inverts into the certainty of a text pointing to itself: 
Every report or description about the past, in other words, about the 
steps leading up to the question . . . is concerned with what lies at 
rest; this kind of historical report is an explicit laying to rest of 
history - whereas history is on the contrary a happening. We ask 
historically when we ask what is still happening, even when, to all 
appearances, something belongs to the past (Heidegger quoted in 
Newmark, 1995:172). 
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The truth of history, as Heidegger proclaims, is itself put into movement when one 
interrogates hinge words, for history can always be determined in at least two very 
different, and perhaps incompatible ways - as descriptive knowledge and as an actual 
event. In fact, Heidegger says that such a kind of history is simply arrested for the 
time being between the words and concepts of history and history. The potential of 
this type of history consists in that it could somehow stir the truth (at rest in the 
description) towards becoming a true occurrence. However, only by asking about 
the kind of truth that could still be happening in every historical event, continually 
reinterpreting every text, would it be possible to avoid falsifying the truth of their 
historical occurrence in empty formulae. Deconstructive critics do not simply want 
to parrot opinion and insist that the totalizing schemes of explanation are henceforth 
redundant since nothing could intelligibly count as supporting their truth-claims. 
Derrida pleads that historians must be attentive to rhetoric, to the type and state of 
utterances, at the very least to their grammar. He insists that his method in general 
is deeply historical, indeed deconstructive readings are political and institutional 
interventions that transform contexts. Historical and social meanings in literary 
texts, are constructed by representations and discourses; they are not of the nature 
of a pre-discursive 'truth' that appears in an unmediated luminousness to the mind. 
There is no unity or natural meaning or truth to those conflicting historical or social 
relations, they consist of separations without any closure. Closure in deconstruction 
is simply a conclusion of a literary work, and reflects a desire "to create an 
enclosure, make the definition coincide with the defined ... close the circle"(Spivak, 
1976:xx). However, Derrida rejects closure. A work of art is never complete, but 
open-ended as Spivak explains: 
Deconstruction seems to offer a way out of the closure of 
knowledge. By inaugurating the open-ended indefiniteness of 
textuality - by thus 'placing it in the abyss' (mettre en abime) ... it 
shows us the allure of the abyss as freedom. The fall into the abyss 
of deconstruction inspires us with as much pleasure as fear. We are 
intoxicated with the prospect of never hitting bottom ( 1976:1 xxvii). 
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As a result, one is to view the following poem as a nominal 'closure' from which one 
has to evince an 'opening'. 
In the poem 'Inkondlo kaMkabayi ' both social and historical relations are 
encountered. The poem's historical figure forms part of the oral traditional past, and 
as such presents the critic with new obstacles and insights: 
lnkondlo kaMkabayi 
1 Ntombi zakwaZulu, 
2 Ngivumiseni le ngoma; 
3 Ntombi zikaMalandela, 
4 Ngihayiseni le nkondlo; 
5 Yinkondlo yomzwangedwa, 
6 Yinkondlo kaMkabayi, 
7 Yinkondlo kaLamula. 
8 Ngikhumbula mhla eqhamuka 
9 Eziqongweni zezintaba, 
10 Imizwilili yatshiloza, 
11 Iminduze yahlabelela, 
12 Kwakusengathi yihubo 
13 LikaNomkhubulwana. 
14 Ngilamleleni wemathong' ohlanga, 
15 Ngilamleleni nakhu sengemuka, 
16 Ngibambe, ngibambe weNobamba, 
17 Ngibambe, ngibambe weMalandela. 
18 Zintab ' ezinhle zakwaZulu, 
19 Enakhe uNdi nangikaka, 
20 Msitheni kimi uLamula, 
21 Ngilamleleni zintaba kuLamula, 
22 Gugu likaZulu nithi mangithini? 
23 Gugu lobusha nithi ngenzenjani? 
24 Zinhle izintaba zakwaZulu! 
This poem is based on a historical figure, Mkabayi. Msimang states his reason for 
writing this poem as: 
Ngo-1983, yena belu umhlobo wami uMzilikazi esanda kufunda 
inoveli lami elithi: Buzani kuMkabayi. wanginxusa ukuba ngibhale 
inkondlo ngothando lukaMkabayi noLamula esihloko sithi: 
Inkondlo kaMkabayi. Kuchazwe kabanzi futhi ngogqozi 
olwabangela ukubhalwa kwale nkondlo kuso isahluko sokuqala 
(1990:73). 
(In 1983, once more, this friend of mine, Mzilikazi, having just read 
my novel entitled Buzani kuMk:abayi, pleaded with me that I write 
a love poem of Mkabayi and Lamula with the heading: Inkondlo 
kaMkabayi. This, in short, is the explanation for the inspiration for 
writing this poem in the first chapter.) 
Msimang explains the plot of the story as follows: 
Babethandana ngothando oluyinkatha, sekusele kuphela ukuba 
uMkabayi amnike ucu uLamula lowo. Nokho lokho kwakulukhuni 
satshe futhi kwamdalela udweshu oluxakile uMkabayi. Phela 
wayesefungile ukuthi olwakhe uthando lobusha kanye nobutombi 
bakhe ukunikelela umbuso kayisemkhulu, uNdaba. Kwakungekho 
okunye ayesazokuphilela ngaphandle kukaNobamba obambe 
amadoda, nezintab' ezinhle zakwaZulu. Waphoqeka-ke ukuba 
ayilandulele insizwa yakwaNgcolosi (1990:v). 
(They loved each other with a complicated love, all that was left was 
for Mkabayi to give Lamula love-beads. But, that was extremely 
difficult, further it created conflict which encompassed Mkabayi. 
Indeed, she swore off her new love together with her maidenhood to 
be given to the kingdom of her grandfather, Ndaba. There was 
nothing else that she would live for except Nobamba that held men 
and the beautiful mountains of Zululand. She was forced to deny the 
young man of the place of Ngcolosi.) 
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What can be deduced from Msimang' s objective is that, although it contains a true 
historical character, the content concentrates on the relations between the main 
character and a fictitious lover, rendering this poem as pure fiction. Thus, the poem 
finds itself cleared of any charge of historicity. De Man asserts that any language 
that tells the reader that it lies, reveals the truth about language, and is literary. 
However, any language that does not tell its lie, lies with respect to itself (Fineman, 
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1986:77). De Man further complicates the matter by asserting that even the 
knowledge of this lie raises it to 
a new figural power, but nonetheless a lie. By asserting in the mode 
of truth that the self is a lie, we have not escaped :from deception. 
We have merely reversed the usual scheme which derives truth from 
the convergence of self and the other by showing that the fiction of 
such a convergence is used to allow for the illusion of self-hood to 
originate (1979a:l 12). 
Mkabayi' s historical character differs from the fictional character. However, finding 
any factual historical data about this particular character seems to prove a difficult 
objective, for there are no written records in the form of historical texts where 
research can be done. The Zulus had no means of conserving these fascinating 
relics other than by word of mouth, passed down the ages from one generation to 
another. As stated in a previous chapter, Derrida valorises visible writing over 
audible speech. Deconstruction suggests that the real problem with such oral 
traditions is not that they are fictions with no claim to scientific standards or truth, 
but rather that they do not know, or have allowed themselves to forget that they are 
such fictions. Even when recorded, traditional oratory history is given a negative 
thrust by deconstruction, for not only does it deny language the status of 
performance and of knowledge, but claims that language keeps continually 
oscillating in an aporia between trying to assert and act. 
The only oral forms in which any data could be found were traditional poetry, oral 
narratives and one of the first texts published in Zulu, i.e. Magema Fuze's Abantu 
Abamnyama Lap ho La vela N gakhona. Traditional praise poetry could be seen as 
a somewhat true reflection of character during the praised person's era. Msimang, 
however, remarks in his article on izibongo (1980:233), that the praise poem cannot 
be viewed as a strict biographical account of an individual. It can also not be 
considered as furnishing accurate historical records, as many historical allusions are 
made up without any explanatory details. Nevertheless, inMkabayi's praise poem, 
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she is addressed as 'USoqili' (Father of Guile). She is addressed as a man, as the 
prefix uso- indicates a male. This is significant as a reflection of her character. She 
is described in her praises as a cunning person, a dangerous morass, who destroyed 
many people. Cope ( 1968: 110) relates the following regarding her praise poem: 
She is supposed to have encouraged the ambitions of Shaka, which 
resulted in the murder of his brother Sigujana, to have inspired the 
plot against Shaka in the conspiracy with his brothers, Dingane and 
Mhlangana, which resulted in the assassination of Shaka, and to have 
supported the claim ofDingane, which brought about the murder of 
Mhlangana. 
Also in her praise poem reference is made to the fact that she refused to marry, a 
very uncustomary circumstance for traditional Zulu times: 
Intomb' ethombe yom' umlomo, 
Zase ziyihlab' imithanti ezawonina (Cope, 1968:173). 
(Maid that matured and her mouth dried up, 
And then they criticized her amongst the old women.) 
Although this praise is extremely obscure, and interpretation can be anything, it 
seems to refer to her rejection of men and marriage. It is also said in her praise 
poem that she determined the course of Zulu history. Raymond Kunene (1962:97-
98) gives a short summary regarding Mkabayi kaJama' s life history. His information 
is based on oral narratives. Mkabayi was the sister of Senzangakhona, daughter of 
Jama and his chief wife, Mntaniya. She played a very important role in shaping Zulu 
history. When Jama died, it was she, as the crown-princess, who along with her 
cousin Mudli, looked after the kingdom whilst Senzangakhona was still a minor. 
She is very often described as the terrible woman of antiquity. She, together with 
her nephews, Dingane and Mhlangana, planned the murder of Shaka. Desirous to 
put Dingane on the throne, she later devised the murder of Mhlangana. She is 
described as a crafty, powerful woman, who had her own district called eBaqulusini 
(Mkabayi's followers were called the abaQulusi - meaning: those people who live 
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in the veld without sufficient covering). She built her own house from which she 
wielded great influence in the affairs of the country. She detested being controlled 
and especially her masculine qualities drew admiration from the poets. She died 
aged about 95 in the year 1825, having survived five Zulu kings. 
The poem, however, is based on Msimang' s novel Buzani KuMkabayi. In it he 
reflects how a certain fundamental choice of the main character, Mkabayi, of not 
marrying but to dedicate herself to her father and the Zulu nation, initiates disparate 
development. She devises a political career for herself, and in doing so, influences 
all the Zulu kings and their decisions during her life time, which is sometimes not to 
their advantage. She rearranges her life as political manipulator, first of 
Senzangakhona, then Shaka and lastly Dingane. And while she is working for 
apparent peace and political reconstruction she, inadvertently, brews social ferment 
and political unrest. Ironically, she engineers destruction of the kingdom she has 
arduously laboured to preserve. Throughout the text, Mkabayi is mainly seen 
exhibiting male qualities in action, in thought and in personality. One has to consider 
that Mkabayi was never really deemed a woman in the general sense of women in 
Zulu society of the time. In Zulu culture the father's sister is acknowledged as 
'Baba', thus Mkabayi was addressed as 'Baba' (father) by all her nephews and 
subjects. In addition, her praises are very similar to the izibongo written in honour 
of men. By giving her male names; e.g. "Baba" (father), "Jama", ''Mageba", etc. 
she is accepted as a male in Zulu society. She was the girl who did not become a 
woman, but a man, dutifully tied to tradition. 
In the reading of the poem, one has to 'forget' about the above historical references. 
The forgetting of what is achieved or past is necessary in order to concentrate on the 
text itself. One should try to disclaim all referentiality in the text, however, the poem 
becomes a portrait of its own deconstruction of referentiality and thus restores, 
although in a negative way, its referentiality. The failure to remove all the referential 
restrictions from a text is not simply a failure. Indeed, the relapse of the rhetoric of 
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figuration, or of rhetorical reading into the referential, into meaning and truth, 
represents the deconstruction of the totality rooted in lexis, to which all rhetorical 
reading is prone (De Man, 1979a:49-52). Forgetting is an ongoing process that is 
never complete because of the reader's own act of reducing the violence of 
language's positing by imposing meaning on the text in order to recuperate. De 
Man recapitulates: 
What is it one 'forgets' when consciousness bends back on itself in 
this way? It is not being, for it was never known in the first place, 
it is not the source ... Rather, we have to forget the fullness of our 
thought itself when it has been put back on the path of truth -
especially in its almost uncanny understanding of the past and its 
concrete anticipation of the future ... (1984:44). 
It is further possible to distinguish chains of connection that are material elements 
in the text, however, none of these chains has priority over the others as the true 
explanation of the meaning of the poem. Each is a permutation of the others rather 
than a distinct realm of discourse. For de Man poetic language is a language which 
denounces and disrupts all these possible totalizations, those of figurative language 
included. Miller states that rather than figures of speech being derived or 
'translated' from proper uses oflanguage, all language is figurative at the beginning: 
The notion of a literal or referential use of language is only an 
illusion born of the forgetting of the metaphorical 'roots' of 
language. Language is from the start fictive, illusory, displaced from 
any direct reference to things as they are. The human condition is to 
be caught in a web of words which weaves and reweaves for man 
through the centuries the same tapestry of myths, concepts, and 
metaphorical analogies, in short, the whole system of Occidental 
metaphysics (1976:11). 
Rhetoricity provides a way to move beyond the closure of referentiality - a way to 
break through the tradition of presence. 
The poem has as its title the simple statement: 'Inkondlo kaMkabayi' (Mkabayi's 
134 
song). This suggests a dual meaning, either the song is about Mkabayi or the poem 
is (belongs to) Mkabayi' s. The name "Mkabayi" is ironic, for it contains the 
possessive formative "-mka- '', meaning "the wife of-" (but it can also connote "the 
husband of-" in the Doke-Vilakazi dictionary) since she never married. It is also 
significant in view of the fact that Mkabayi' s name exhibits an identification problem. 
Kunene (1981:x:xxv) says that 
Names .. have a close relationship to the meaning of their functions. 
This is common in the Zulu tradition where the meaning of a name 
is often an expression of a wish that an individual will meet an ideal. 
Names are thus more than labels; they are in themselves part of a 
socialization process. 
The question also arises to whom the second part of her name refers to. No known 
person by that name exists, but explanations could be that "-bayi" refers to 
"bhayi ", an ideophone connoting acting confusedly, without plan. The speaker in 
the last stanza seems confused, and does not know what to do. The name could also 
be a compilation of "Mka + abayi". In this case it would refer to those (people) 
who do not go. Ironically, Mk:abayi is trapped in a situation where she feels she can 
go nowhere. A further irony is that the noun "inkondlo" also signifies a dance used 
on important occasions such as a wedding, funeral or coronation. In this word is 
tied already most of the binary oppositions which will be discussed later. Her 
yearning for the mountains: "Zinhle izintaba zakwaZulu!" (Beautiful are the 
mountains of Zululand!) equates the longing for Lamula (and a wedding) but her 
bondage at KwaNobamba is associated with reigning (and coronation). Both of 
these associations are found in the word "inkondlo ". 
At first reading this seems to be one ofMsimang's historical poems which he had 
structured as a lyric. It is a highly formalized construct in which rhythm is strong 
and regular. The repetitive elements, so familiar in song (the poem was set to music 
and sang by a women's choir), is also present in traditional praise poetry or 
izibongo. But poetically his strategy is complicated and provocative. This sweet 
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and simple lyric is ordered around a moment of conversation and conversion that 
entails an increased awareness in poetic consciousness. The speaker lives in a captive 
world, burdened by her memory, by the dead weight of all the past names which 
prevent her from seeing herself in her true being. Ironically, the only way in which 
she can escape her misery, to experience a truly new beginning, is to be free of the 
burden of her memories of the past. She attempts to do this by hiding behind the 
mountains. 
The poem recounts a longing - possibly the coming to life of a love story and the 
loss oflove - although nowhere in the poem the verb or noun 'love' is encountered. 
This longing seems to be directed towards a certain 'Lamula ', a name directly 
mentioned three times in the poem and implied several times. But no clue is given 
to whom this Lamula is. It could be said that the core word of this poem is this verb 
"lamula", which has the meaning of making peace between contending parties, 
mediating or giving help. The poem is not only a representation ofher physical love, 
but also her love for the Zulu people. The speaker in the poem could be the poet 
himself, a third person outside the occurrences, but most conceivably it is Mkabayi 
herself Throughout the poem she has different audiences; the girls of Zululand, the 
ancestors, the mountains and lastly, the cause of her longing. The poem seems set 
in Mkabayi's youth at a critical time of her life, when she was to depart for 
KwaNobamba, although the poem could also be timeless. 
She addresses the "izintombi" (unmarried girls) in the first stanza. There may be 
different reasons for this; for example to offer them advice, but it appears to be 
something more profound. She requests not only the girls' attention, but also their 
concurrence by calling on their shared forefather, Malandela, who binds them into 
a unity as Zulus. The first stanza is an imperative and interlocutionary utterance 
which can be likened to the primordial elocution of biblical diction: 'Hear 0 Israel'. 
This is a communication which in effect tells its addressee, 'Get yourself into a 
situation where you are ready to hear me'. It also resembles the introductory 
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salutation of a Zulu praise poem, which consists of an alternate address and plea 
followed by three assertions: 
Ntombi zakwaZulu, 
Ngivumiseni le ngoma; 
Ntombi zikaMalandela, 
Ngihayiseni le nkondlo; 
Yinkondlo yomzwangedwa, 
Yinkondlo kaMkabayi, 
Yinkondlo kaLamula. 
(Girls of Zululand, 
Sing this song with me; 
Girls of Malandela, 
Compose this poem with me; 
It is the song of personal pain, 
It is the song ofMkabayi, 
It is the song of Lamula.) 
In the second stanza the speaker remembers a certain occurrence. Not only does 
this recollection include personification (canaries and lilies sing) but it is also masked 
in a metaphor. This faunal and floral importation seems purely descriptive, but 
enhances the metaphor to follow. The speaker has a special fondness for the 
mountains and she places the object of her longing on the mountains' peaks on an 
early summer day when the Cape canaries sang and the Crinum lilies bloomed. 
These objects are not only perceived by a sense of sight - the mountains' tops are 
visual, the canaries are not only seen but also heard, while the lilies are seen, heard 
and possibly smelled in an euphoria which saturates the multiplex. 
This appearance is equalled to the song ofNomkhubulwane. Nomkhubulwane is 
said to be the daughter of UNkulunkulu (the Great One). Krige (1988:197-198) 
explains Nomkhubulwane, her appearance on earth and her songs as follows: 
When the valley mists of spring appear they are believed to enshroud 
Nomkhubulwane, the Inkosazana yasezulwini or the Princess of 
Heaven. She seems to be a kind of goddess of the com, virtually a 
Zulu Ceres presiding over the growth of the grain . . . It is she, too, 
who has the power of bringing rain . . . Every year in or about the 
month of October, she is thought to visit the earth, and there are 
celebrations and a feast called uNomdede in honour of 
Nomkhubulwane .... Girls sing songs in her honour. It is customary 
to make use of the opportunity to entreat the princess of Heaven to 
relieve the people of hardships or difficulties, such as drought. If 
there is drought, the fathers of the girls will instruct them to take 
their brothers' loin coverings, sticks and small shields and go out and 
herd the cattle on the morning of the feast. 
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With this image, the speaker is trying to align Lamula' s arrival with the advent of 
Nomkhubulwane (which precipitates her songs), an attempt that succeeds only in 
part. A metaphor/simile supposes, when it substitutes one property for another on 
the basis of resemblance, a necessary link or an organic link between the poles of 
exchange. The representation of the nature in the poem correlates satisfactorily with 
Nomkhubulwane' s macrocosm. She makes her visit to the earth in spring and is said 
to 
present the appearance of a beautiful landscape with verdant forests 
on some parts of her body, grass-covered slopes on others and 
cultivated fields on the rest, or a very little animal as large as a 
polecat and marked with little white and black stripes; on one side 
there grows a bed of reeds, a forest and grass; the other side is that 
of a man (Krige, 1988:197). 
All similarities are produced out of differences. Thus difference is constitutive of 
resemblances, repetitions and similarities. Most basically, differences are established 
in the dissimilarity between word and referent. The relation of the sign Mkabayi to 
another sign like N omkhubulwane or this text with Buzani KuMkabayi (source-text) 
is likewise encompassed as difference. To say then that the two events resemble 
each other is to affirm their initial difference. But because they are thought to be 
similar, their differences are erased and all the interchangeable terms become parts 
of one whole. This aspect is suggested by de Man when he accentuates that the 
resemblance which seems to have been "made possible by a proximity or an analogy 
so close and intimate that it allows the one to substitute for the other without 
revealing the difference necessarily introduced by the substitution" ( 1979a: 62), is not 
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only a preclusion of this inescapable difference, it is in particular a "way to disguise 
difference" ( 1979a: 16) between the poles of the metaphoric exchange. Since the 
relation which exists between the parts of a metaphorical system is one of mutual 
resemblance, and since this resemblance binds them necessarily into a whole, the 
relation in question is organic, a link, as de Man (1979a:62-63) argues, which must 
be endowed with attributes of naturalness. 
The concepts, figures and stories of the Zulu culture, incorporated as materials in 
their language and in this poem, contain both logocentric metaphysics and its 
displacement. This subversion is forged into the conceptual words, the figures, and 
the myths. The extraordinary occasion on which Mk:abayi visualized her mystery 
person resembles the hymn of Nomkhubulwane because this myth embodies the 
strange potential to be readily transformed into a phantasmal vehicle. But this image 
tells one more about the speaker herself than the one visualised. Strange similarities 
exist between the two characters: Nomkhubulwane's songs are incorporated in 
Mk:abayi' s song; both N omkhubulwane and Mk:abayi are daughters of a regent; both 
have special intercourse with the girls of Zululand. Mk:abayi is confined by 
Nobamba and cannot have a normal relationship with Lamula or any other man, and 
it is said ofNomkhubulwane that 
if she meets a man she conceals herself and speaks to him, for it is 
said that if a man looks upon her, face to face, he will be ill and very 
soon die. . .. Everyone is afraid to disobey her word lest he should 
die, and therefore her wishes are made known and obeyed (Krige, 
1988:282-283). 
It is as ifMk:abayi's wish for freedom is transferred onto Nomkhubulwane whose 
field of play exists outside the fences of Nobamba, in nature. But with this 
traditional binary opposition of nature versus culture, the existence of hidden 
articulations and fragmentations within this hypothetical totality is revealed for this 
binary is illusory. Mk:abayi yearns for something which is unattainable for nature 
turns out to be a self-deconstructive term. As Derrida illustrated in Of 
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Grammatology, culture is initially beneficial - nature comes first and culture comes 
afterwards; culture is grounded in and added to the natural state. As culture lingers 
on, it comes to substitute for nature, thereby creating a detriment. In other words, 
culture supplements nature in two ways - as addition and as substitution. But the 
notion of an unsupplemented nature has no truth-value, it is only the expression of 
a desire - an illusion. Nature is shown to be always already supplemented; that is, 
nature from the start is structured as differential. The concept of nature is a concept 
produced, as are all concepts, by culture, and furthermore nature's identity is 
constituted as that which is not culture. Nature is dependent upon there always 
already being culture before it in order for it to be what it is. In short, nature comes 
after and is derived from culture. The system has been reversed, the hierarchy 
collapsed. Far from denoting a homogeneous mode of being, nature signifies a 
process of deconstruction redoubled by its own misleading retotalization. 
Complementing the nature/culture binarism is the antithesis between inside and 
outside. To the extent that the denotation of any term is always dependent on what 
is exterior to it, the inside/outside polarity is an essential example for understanding 
the intricate workings of this poem. Inside/outside functions as a perfect figure for 
signification and the mechanisms of meaning production. The unsustainable 
opposition encapsulates everything concerning the structures of alienation and 
identification which together produce a self and an other, a subject and an object, an 
unconscious and a conscious, an interiority and an exteriority. As the following 
chapter will explicate, one of the cardinal insights of Lacanian psychoanalysis is the 
concept that any identity is founded relationally, formed in reference to an exterior 
or outside that which defines the subject's own interior boundaries (Lacan, 1977: 1-
7). 
Mkabayi is trapped 'inside', and longs to be 'out'. This opposition unravels in 
exactly the same way as the nature and culture binary. The perspective of the 
outside is played off against the inner space. These oppositions are rendered 
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inadequate, aside from their incorporated inadequacies of endless perspectivism. 
The figure inside/outside can be turned inside out to expose its critical makings. 
'Out' cannot help but to carry a double denotation for the subject. To be 'out' 
conjures up the elimination of her negative experiences. On the other hand, it 
suggests the process of coming out - a movement into presence, speech, and cultural 
visibility. Because of the infinitely permeable and shifting boundaries between 
insides and outsides, the risks of being outside are always incalculable. The word 
'outside' does not only entail being with Lamula and nature. Mkabayi has to choose 
to be inside or outside a system of power, authority, and cultural legitimacy as well. 
To be on the 'outside' envisions Mkabayi's fall from power and privilege, just like 
to be 'inside' facilitates her rise to a position of influence and authority. The 
succinctly formulated 'either/or' choice not only asks the subject to take a stand but 
foregrounds for her a fundamental rift, the poem seems to imply that it is demanded 
from her that she chooses one tradition or another. 
In this poem, one begins to recognize that any outside is formulated as a 
consequence of a lack internal to the system it supplements. The greater the lack on 
the inside, the greater the need for an outside to contain and to defuse it, for without 
that outside, the lack on the inside would become all too visible. To protect herself 
against the recognition of the lack within herself, she erects the borders against an 
other which is made to represent that same lack. The mountains are not only 
beautiful because of her figural vision there once, but in view of the above 
inside/outside polarity also because they enclose and protect her. The mountains 
serve as the border between herself and the outside, but they also form part of both 
inside and outside which renders them undecidable. She is on the 'inside' because 
she chooses to be: "Ngibambe, ngibambe weNobamba" (Hold me, hold me oh, 
Nobamba). Mkabayi however yearns for the lost love object of her youth, and her 
ego compensates for this unobtainability by repressing this desire. Another 
misplaced signifier of desire for Mkabayi is the place itself, kwaNobamba, which 
again is just a substitute for her lost object, acceptance and love. Any misplaced 
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nostalgia for or romanticization of the outside as a privileged site immediately gives 
her away, for in order to idealize the outside she must already be, considerably, 
comfortably positioned on the inside. 
The prepositions 'in' and 'out' generate a host of other associations which often 
exceed even this simple tension. The usual sense of invisibility (in) and visibility 
(out) is reversed in the poem in a confused entanglement. The metaphysics of 
gender identity, has, until now, depended on the structural symmetry of these 
seemingly fundamental distinctions and the inevitability of a symbolic order based 
on a logic of limits, margins, borders and boundaries. Sexual object choice is not 
even so simple a matter of psychical identifications and defences, it is also a result 
of the complex interaction of social conflicts, historical pressures, and cultural 
prohibitions (Fuss in Caruth, 1985 :234). But borders are notoriously unstable, and 
sexual identities rarely secure. Being 'inside' for Mkabayi means abandoning her 
youth, maidenhood, marriage, lover, etc. in order to labour for her people, which, 
according to the Zulu tradition, is a man's task. On the surface, it seems as if 
Mkabayi is demarcated according to traditional patriarchal thinking: stereotypically, 
she is passive, quiet and emotional - illustrated adeptly in the last stanza. However, 
the choice she makes delineates her in masculine terms: active, rational and brave. 
With her changing position in society, she is being freed from traditional oppressive 
gender restraints. But this constructs and fixes her identity as possessing qualities 
considered appropriate to a man. This perpetual displacement (mise en abime) 
constitutes a fluidity of identities that suggests an openness to resignification and 
recontextualization. 
One is aware of a sense of how order imprisons the speaker. Not just physical 
constraints but the whole fabric of life which keeps women closed in. Although 
marriage is viewed in Zulu culture as the central embodiment of order and harmony, 
the idea is reversed in the poem. The order that marriage brings in a Zulu woman's 
life is one of submission which would rob Mkabayi of her pride and movement. It 
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is ironic that in the poem she bewails her entrapment, but a choice to the other side 
would have set greater limits on her life. The vision of freedom she has is wholly 
illusory. She is trapped inside and out. The figure is a captive, but it is herselfrather 
than the mountains or Nobamba which appears to be the captor. She could break 
her limitations by an act of will but she chose her situation consciously, she is 
illustrated as a votary of power and a splendid and sterile lady of pain: 
Yinkondlo yomzwangedwa, 
Yinkondlo kaMkabayi) 
(It is the song of personal pain, 
It is the song ofMkabayi) 
It could be said that Mkabayi has chosen the tradition of difference over the tradition 
of presence. With her choice she challenges the canonised tradition of her culture. 
She wants to be in control of her world through her words, but language is in 
control of her. Mkabayi is trapped in this poem within the system oflinguistic signs. 
The condition of man is to be caught in language, as Miller (197 6: 11) would have 
it or putting it differently, language constitutes for man the world - reality. Rather 
than saying man employs language as an instrument, Miller suggests that language 
uses man: "language is not an instrument or tool in man's hands, a submissive means 
of thinking. Language rather thinks man and his 'world'; including poems" 
( 1977 :444). It is language that determines consciousness and human intentions 
rather than the reverse, which is the traditional explanation of the relation of 
language and the self. Miller (1976:345) states that "the self is a linguistic 
construction rather than being the given". As emphasized by all deconstructors, 
there is no literal language of consciousness, the self of any author as well as of any 
literary character is mere figurative construction. Mkabayi is an effect of the text, 
there is not any Mkabayi herself 
As such, Mkabayi exists in a prison-house oflanguage (Millerin Rajnath, 1989:21 ). 
Language in the prison-house is differential as well as referential and rhetorical. The 
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disturbing discontinuous aspect oflanguage comes about because words are really 
figures - substitutions or displacements - which stand for something. Insofar as 
language is rhetorical, her world is text. Contrary to those seemingly radical bounds 
beyond Mkabayi, bounds which invariably only lead her back deeper into what she 
was trying to escape, slight deviations carry the promise of some fundamental 
displacements. This is not determined by '"coercive sources' which have imposed 
themselves century after century, but is a matter of concepts, metaphors, and myths, 
each generating the others, which are latently there in the lexicon, the grammar, and 
the syntax of our languages" (Miller 1972: 10). As soon as a thing or a thought or 
a feeling is mentioned, it enters a system of words where it joins the forces already 
at play in language. The poem is furthermore an utterance to convey her choice to 
Lamula, she wants to convey her decision through words, she is already mediating 
herself 
But the figure inside/outside, which encapsulates the structure of language, 
repression, and subjectivity, also designates the structure of exclusion, oppression 
and repudiation. The wisdom of the text is self-deconstructive, but this self-
deconstruction is infinitely displaced in a series of successive rhetorical reversals 
which, by the endless repetition of the same figure, keep it suspended between truth 
and the death of this truth. 
The force of the past, the strength of her own poetic tradition drives Mkabayi on to 
the next threshold, the disjunctive gap that she leaps between the poem's second and 
third stanzas. The transition is from a dreamworld to an anguished appeal for 
arbitration. The third stanza is critical, not only because of the concentration of the 
subject concord "ngi" (I), but also because of her repetitive plea to be mediated for. 
She beseeches the ancestors to acquiesce for her as intercessors, a function she 
fulfilled all her life with disjunctive consequences. It appears that the traditional 
beliefin 'amathongo ' (ancestral spirits) plays a very important role in Mkabayi' s life. 
She as well as the rest of the Zulu nation feared and respected the forefathers, and 
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complied with their every law. All Zulus are aware of the importance of the direct 
and indirect intervention of the amathongo in one's life. There are four distinct and 
definable rites connected with the times of crises in life, i.e. birth, puberty, marriage 
and funerals, which are related to the brooding of the amathongo (Berglund, 
1976: 129). These four rites are also present in the dance "inkondlo ". The ancestors 
serve as symbol ofMkabayi's consciousness. The question to be asked at this point 
is why and for what she wants to mediate for. She considers herself a mere vassal 
of the ancestors, however, she could unconsciously only use the ancestors as tools 
to· manoeuvre her own decisions. 
The third stanza is structured as repetition, yet such repetition is ultimately liberated 
and hollowed out by difference. Her utterances seem like a gesture of restitution. 
Mk:abayi oscillating between her two desires (Lamula and Nobamba) diffuses the 
sense of a coherent subject into indeterminacy. The indeterminate effect seems to 
give her space to operate in, momentarily opening the prison of determinism. 
Mk:abayi as a performative subject asserts her ability to act, opens herself up to 
chance and escapes determinism by placing the responsibility on the shoulders of the 
ancestors. Nevertheless, she had made her choice and the act stands, unjustified by 
any moral or ethical imperatives, braced only by a historical placement of herself. 
Mkabayi represents a self that is a situated body, simultaneously subjected to 
determination by forces of history, culture, and language. 
The fourth stanza is structured as repetition, beginning and ending with a syntax 
reversal. The poet departs from his previous syntactic pattern by means of an 
inversion of the word order for the purpose of emphasis and to draw attention to the 
contrived nature of the utterance. In this light, the ending with the questions both 
notes and splits the fragile solidarity Mkabayi has established at the beginning, 
replacing her firm stance with one balanced precariously on the edge. Her figure is 
seeking, failing or falling, and seeking again. She does not know what to do or what 
to say. Knowing depends on the substitution of a semiotic, metonymic mode of 
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reference for a substantialist, metaphorical one (De Man, 1979a: 122-123). This 
pressure compels her to ask rhetorical questions out of desperation in order to find 
meaning in her life: 
Gugu likaZulu nithi mangithini? 
Gugu lobusha nithi ngenzenjani? 
(Zulu favourite, what must I say? 
Darling of youth, what must I do?) 
Her questions indicate the undecidable, pointing to difference, change, the unknown 
future - all the things necessary for a politics of liberation. The all-too-human 
questions posed by the poem's narrator takes the form of a trope which is the 
impossible imposition of meaning (illusion of meaning) on language. The loss of the 
stability of the figure is never recuperated in the text. This dramatic final stanza 
effects a deliberate reversal. She becomes speechless, not knowing what to say. 
When deconstruction criticism focuses on questions of writing and voice, it does not 
deny that at another level this poem speaks oflove. It merely tries to elucidate the 
most general sources of authority on which the work relies and the sorts of 
articulation on which it claims to base meaning. The critic has to undertake the 
difficult task of understanding these complex webs of meaning, which are not 
dependent on a speaker or situation, but signify broadly, giving the reader not just 
a situation but a world. Deconstructively seen, the critic has to make connections 
between these webs of meaning that one will not have thought of, and offering 
suggestions that some readers may be able to develop further in interesting ways. 
Deconstructive rhetoric, then, is not a science of truth: "the study of rhetoric leads 
to the abyss by destroying, through its own theoretical procedures, its own basic 
axiom" (Miller, 1976:345). 
Msimang' s indeterminate subject, his move from history to rhetoric, his evasion of 
recognizable historical or ideological statements all contribute to the effect of the 
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poem. The spirituality of his discourse manifests itself in writing, which frees one 
from the visibility and limitation of situations by opening up a world for the reader, 
that is, new dimensions of one's being-in-the-world. Viewed traditionally, it was 
believed that poetry forces the reader to share the life of others at the deepest 
possible levels. There is an attempt to experience life in a total fashion, to involve 
oneselfin the business oflife in order to come at some external truth. Whatever this 
poem knows, its knowledge is not that of a heightened, progressive self-
consciousness. And whatever this allegory of unreadability does, it is not to get one 
further from error and closer to truth. There are no final answers to questions about 
the nature of this text and how it relates to its person, although it seems to create a 
much more uncertain sense of self and a disturbing view of the power relations of 
society. 
Thus far, remarks about truth and reference regarding historical texts were ventured 
into. The same strategy will continue into theological particularities. As complex 
as the post-structural theoretical texts on deconstruction are, the nuances of the 
Christian theological writings can be just as challenging. By looking into poems 
written by Msimang concerning religious issues, one does not offer a set of probable 
claims or solutions regarding truth and reference in the Bible. The challenge is to 
engage the details of religion - and in this case, specifically Christianity - with that 
of deconstruction. 
Both Christianity and deconstruction make a person see things anew. Christianity is 
a religion of conversion, or turning away from one life orientation toward another 
from which the prior stance looks different. The world as a whole becomes subject 
to such a reseeing or revision in Christianity. In the rereading of the Old Testament, 
the tum of Christian conversion takes the literary form of a trope - a word or phrase 
that turns away from one meaning (often regarded as the literal meaning) toward 
another. Words become figures of meaning other than those that once seemed 
obvious. 
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Although largely unconcerned with religious conversion, literary theorist Paul de 
Man is much concerned with the character of tropes. De Man's words are that "as 
soon as one is willing to be made aware of their epistemological implications, 
concepts are tropes and tropes concepts" ( 1978: 23). This leads to "the recognition 
of language as trope" (1978:23) and finally to the view that it is "impossible to 
maintain a clear line of distinction between rhetoric, abstraction, symbol, and all 
other forms oflanguage"(1978:28). The implications of this for a philosophy of 
knowledge, meaning, and truth are obviously disruptive. Writing is disruptive in that 
it exposes the emptiness of the word. Far from referring to a self-evident meaning 
contained in the word, writing refers only to itself 
Paul de Man makes a distinction between tropological and persuasive functions of 
language. The epistemological relation between de Man's image of the trope and 
its meaning is essentially the same as that between a metaphor and its meaning, or 
between an Old Testament shadow and its New Testament reality. In all the cases, 
the reader is fundamentally a knower, either remaining blind to the true meaning of 
a text, or overcoming blindness with insight. It makes little difference to the 
similarity between tropes, metaphors, and shadows that where Christian readers 
discover knowledge, de Manian readers discover only the absence of knowledge. 
De Man's debate over the nature and function of tropes intersects in various 
illuminating ways with religious Christian reflections. Deconstruction's very nature 
points to reading as disfiguration. Deconstruction employs language in such a way 
as to reveal its contradictory, and ultimately illusory, character. The implication for 
theology or even poetry containing biblical references is negative. Even Jesus's 
name is dissected according to deconstructive tactics. The name Jesus comes from 
the Greek form of the Hebrew name Joshua, meaning 'Yahweh is salvation' as 
predicted by the angel in Matthew 1 :21. This already confirms something unusual. 
By uttering the above words, the angel is implying that Jesus himself will assume an 
activity hitherto assigned to God alone. The name Yahweh was abbreviated as the 
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Tetragramrnaton YHWH, the most sacred name of God revealed to Moses. 
Although the pronunciation of the four consonants was banned by the Jews, a secret 
pronunciation of the name may have been imparted by Jesus to his disciples who 
confirmed the meaning of the divine name as 'He who is' (Guinness, 1990:284). 
The presence in the name of Jesus is put under erasure. This is done in order to 
escape the closure of traditional metaphysics, for deconstruction asserts that 
presence is illusory. De Man seeks to avoid idolized conceptions of presence as 
found in the name of Jesus. Again it must be taken into consideration that 
deconstruction focuses on the way signifiers are not only set free from reference to 
the world, but also from any literary system or structure (like the Bible) that might 
seek to contain or control them by giving them determinate meanings. By means of 
erasure, Derrida makes use of words and terms which he feels to be inadequate but 
for which he finds no viable alternatives. Communication is thus impossible without 
the evocation of this erased presence. Derrida apparently adopted the practice after 
noting Martin Heidegger's use of it: 
He lets the word 'being' be read only if it is crossed out ... That 
mark of deletion is not, however, a 'merely negative symbol' ... That 
deletion is the final writing of an epoch. Under its strokes the 
presence of a transcendental signified is effaced while still remaining 
legible ... this last writing is also the first writing (1976:23). 
This 'erasure' cannot be done to any word, it can only be done to a written word, 
obviously, and is meant for words which are suggestive with existential 
permutations, that is 'being'. The word 'is' in the description ofJesus's name above 
which has been, still remains in a shadow in the present; the word seems to be the 
same thing, yet it is not, it is a sign transformed by new significance which displaces 
the old, yet does not censure the former connotations of the word. Derrida refers 
to such words as the 'arche', and those words which may be 'Xed' over, as 'the 
transcendental arche'. For Derrida, the outcome of erasure is that "the sign is that 
ill-named thing, the only one, that escapes the instituting question of philosophy: 
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'what is ... ?"'(1976:19). 
Deconstruction, with its dissociations oflanguage from reality and the emphasis on 
pure temporality, expresses by implication faith in the 'disappearance of God'. 
Furthermore, Nietzsche's view was that Christianity's desire for truth can (Nietzsche 
went further and claimed that it not only could, but did) tum against itself, rendering 
Christianity a kind of self-consuming artifact. Theologists lament the antihumanism 
or nihilism of deconstructive theory, deconstruction theorists take the Christian 
theological tradition to task for a naive faith in the sacramental presence of meaning 
in texts. It is suggested that the two oppositions can however learn from each other: 
Ever since Ludwig F euerbach announced that theology is an inverted 
anthropology (God is humanity writ large), or Kenneth Burke 
observed that, whatever else it might be, theology is always logology 
(talk about God is always talk about language), we have had the 
modem starting points needed for theorists and theologians to be 
able to begin to talk to one another about their meanings, if not their 
truths (Dawson, 1995:3). 
Derrida and de Man would not completely agree with the statement above, because 
they view all language as inhabited with no constant presence, truth or meaning. De 
Man makes assumptions about language and meaning only in order to undermine 
them. De Man reduces all meaning (and ultimately, all reality and all truth) to modes 
of textuality- modes of the intrinsic linguistic functioning oflanguage as such. Bible 
scholars recognise that, if one imagines meaning as logos and text as human being, 
de Man's insistence that textuality reveals only the perpetual absence of meaning 
indicates that Christ is, has always been, and will always be merely human (Dawson 
1995:120). 
De Man insists that meaning is simply not to be found while the Christian account 
insists that ultimate meaning has become integrated with all material of life. This 
dissension is observed in a deconstructive reading of the poem 'lndlela ' (Msimang, 
1980:39). In this poem no explicit Biblical names are cited as in 'Insimbi yesonto' 
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(Msimang, 1980: 16) where the name ofMaria, mother of Jesus, is mentioned. This 
poem can however be read as agreeing with religious principles: 
Indlela 
1 Nanxa ilukhonjwana, 
2 Jyokuthatha iye ikubeke. 
3 Iyozombeleza nawe, 
4 Igwincigwincize njalo, 
5 Jbuye ithi thwi, 
6 Ize ikuthi qithi. 
7 Ngibelethe sigoduke 
8 Wena ongesabi mahlathi, 
9 Thubeleza ungichushise. 
10 Wena ongeyiswa miqansa, 
11 Yiqophe uyiqombole. 
12 Ngikhwexele emhlane, 
13 Ungibelethe ngembeleko, 
14 Hamba sihambe. 
15 Angazi ekhaya, 
16 Wen' uyazi. 
17 Angikwazi okungale, 
18 Wen' uyakwazi. 
19 Angibaqondi abangaphesheya, 
20 Wen' ubaweze bonke. 
21 Hamba nami ungitotobise, 
22 Angiwuphangile umdaka, 
23 Ngiphokophele ukuyofika zwi; 
24 Ngihole. 
25 Dabula izinkungu namafu obumnyama; 
26 Hambanami. 
27 Wena ongukwenziwa kwezinto; 
28 Bamba isandla sami. 
29 Kungaziba umeno, 
30 Kungasithaamazolo, 
31 Angedukelwa ngabazi bendlela. 
32 Nampaya! Bahamba ngendlela, 
33 Habel Bawela ngezibuko. 
34 Nebala! Bangena ngesango. 
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When attesting that this poem reads according to spiritual aspirations, this must not 
be seen as its only meaning or interpretation. By concentrating on these aspects, the 
aim is only to tease out those features of the inner logic of de Man's views as 
associated with that of a doctrinal reading. By means of the language of poetic 
imagination a specific illustration of de Man's more general theoretical claims 
regarding language - and indeed, truth and reality - will be given. 
The poem 'Indlela ' mirrors certain passages from the Bible. The noun "indlela" 
has the meanings of path, road, way, journey of even manner of action. The first 
stanza is reminiscent of Psalm 23 and Matthew 7: 13, 14 where it is stated that the 
road to eternal life is narrow and difficult and the way to destruction is wide. The 
stanza however contradicts this as well, for the road is not only narrow, but winds 
in and out: 
Iyozombeleza nawe, 
lgwincigwincize njalo 
(It shall wind in and out with you, 
It meanders about continually) 
In the Old Testament (Isaiah 40:4, 45:2, 59:8, Psalms 125:5, Proverbs 2:15, 10:9, 
21: 8) the claim is again that the way of the guilty is crooked. This contradiction is 
confirmed by the use of the verb "-gwincigwincize ", connoting not only zigzagging 
or meandering, but also indulging in immorality, following a morally crooked path. 
In this contradiction, deconstruction sees a 'fault line', a discontinuity, where 
language is shown its unreliability and the adequacy oflanguage itself as a medium 
of communication is called into question. The critic is given the freedom to play with 
the text by means of this irresolvability revealed at its stress points or fault lines. In 
the second stanza a relationship between a dependent "ngi" (I) on a fearless "wena" 
(you) is encountered: 
Wena ongesabi mahlathi, 
Thubeleza ungichushise. 
(You who are not afraid of the forests, 
Move about and let me creep through.) 
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Traditionally, the Zulus do not fear a forest - it is a symbol of sanctuary and shelter, 
so much so that even God is identified with this place of protection: "Ulihlathi 
Jami" (Thou art my refuge). The action awarded to the object of the 
poem "thubeleza" (dodge about or continually shifting one's place to avoid capture) 
has equally contradictory aspects. Although the implication is here that the 'you' on 
which the speaker relies, is not trapped by the entangling forest, there is a further 
meaning of 'being unreliable'. 
At this stage, the entity being relied on is embellished as a female figure; specifically 
that of a mother carrying her dependent in a carrying-skin on her back. The third 
verse, which is placed in the midst of the poem differs structurally from the rest. 
The speaker professes his not-knowing of a specific location "ekhaya" (at home), 
"okungale" (that far away on the other side). The third verse continues the 
knowing/not knowing opposition, but the ignorance diminishes for the 'you' is 
qualified forthe first time directly as "wena ongukwenziwa kwezinto "(you the maker 
of things). Although the speaker needs to be guided "ngihole" and carried on the 
back "ngibelethe ", the paradox here is that he/she aims to complete the journey 
alone "zwi". There is a constant fluctuation between the ignorance of the speaker 
and the omniscience of the second person singular. This being knows the dwelling, 
what exists on the other side, because he is responsible for taking those across to the 
other side. De Man criticizes certain subjects for having a naive confidence in their 
ability to know things. They have made an unwarranted substitution of thing for 
sign instead of recognising a purely metonymic link between sign and a thing, a link 
that is other than the 'thingness' of the sign itself They operate with what de Man 
calls "misinterpreted systems of relationships" ( 1979a: 123). Both the absence and 
presence of knowing are rooted in the same naive confidence in the ability of a sign 
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to signify. De Man insists that there can be no continuity or development from the 
situation of not knowing to that of knowing: "the reversal from denial to assertion 
in deconstructive discourse never reaches the symmetrical counterpart of what it 
denies" ( 1979a: 125). Instead of the continuity of a reversal that reaches its 
counterpart, there is only an interminable oscillation back and forth between 
knowing and not knowing, between the presence and absence of meaning. 
Christian faith agrees that one cannot grasp the truth of things as they presently are 
apart from what they are destined to be. Christians, however, claim that the Word 
of Scripture is a means through which believers can grasp certain truths. However, 
in his early deconstructive essay, Paul de Man attacks what he regards as the 
Romantic symbol's illicit assertion of the presence of meaning in an image. He 
explicitly dismisses the possibility that a divine will might generate a form of 
language that was simultaneously symbolical and allegorical. After contrasting the 
temporally cognizant allegory with the time-denying, spatially dependent symbol, de 
Man rules out a mode that would somehow combine the two in a single figure: 
The secularized thought of the pre-romantic period no longer allows 
a transcendence of the antinomies between the created world and the 
act of creation by means of a positive recourse to the notion of 
divine will; the failure of the attempt to conceive of a language that 
would be symbolical as well as allegorical, the suppression, in the 
allegory, of the analogical as well as the anagogical levels, is one of 
the ways in which this impossibility becomes manifest (1979b:206-
207). 
If Christian faith is true faith, it is a sure trust and firm acceptance in the heart. 
Christ is the object of faith, or rather not the object, but, so to speak, the One who 
is present in the faith itself Thus faith is a sort of knowledge or darkness that no-
one can see. Therefore one's righteousness is not a love that informs faith, but it is 
a faith itself, that is, a trust in a thing one does not see. These aspects are reflected 
in the text. In answer to the request of "bamba isandla sami" (hold my hand), the 
Bible answers: "I am the Lord, your God, I will take your hand, saying to you: Fear 
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not, I will help you"(Isaiah 41: 13). "Jzinkungu" means mists as well as ignorance. 
Cutting through the mists and the black clouds in order to see clearly as encountered 
in the poem, follows de Man's conviction that naive ignorance needs to be 
eliminated. A similar trope is that of the dew "amazolo" where the speaker implies 
that the dew is shaded from view and light in the jungle "umeno" (referring back to 
the forest image). With this image, the speaker attempts to delineate the thickness 
and deception of the thick brush, but inherently this trope dismantles itself This 
shielding ironically ensures the existence of the dew, for if exposed to the sun it 
disappears, becomes non-existent. 
The last stanza concentrates on "ngabazi bendlela" (those who know the way). 
The spiritual speaker knows that things are signs "izibuko" (crossing), "isango" 
(door), but do not expand on what they signify. He has one kind of knowledge and 
lacks another for he is situated on the one side of the 'crossing' and the others on 
the other side. They know: "ngabazi bendlela" while he is just an observer. In 
contrast, de Man's oscillation describes a situation in which "we cannot say that we 
know ... [the thing] nor can it be said that we do not know it. What can be said is 
that we do not know whether or not we know it" (1979a: 123). The possibility of 
a performance that is not epistemological (knowledgeable) reflects the basic 
Christian insistence that faith, while it properly seeks knowledge, is not itself an act 
of knowing. 
De Man seeks to erase all connections with a knowledge or meaning that might be 
present to the text, or which the reading of a text might make present to a reader. 
His rejection of presence as an obvious religious cast to it: presence is a kind of 
seduction or temptation, which the lucid reader must renounce or sacrifice (Brooks, 
Felman and Miller, 1985:81). It is, in short, simply a false view of reality, and 
anyone taken in by it will lead a life of self-mystification, ofblindness. To recognize 
this truth is to gain a kind of sober lucidity or insight into one's inevitable site - and 
the fated but always futile means that one will use to try to evade that state. De Man 
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links the state of blindness or self-mystification to an aesthetic perspective that is, 
in his view, a self-mystifying appropriation of an incarnationalist sensibility (Dawson, 
1995:79). 
The poem's representations of self-knowledge has a reflecting structure, a structure 
in which the text serves as a mirror of one's own knowledge and one's knowledge 
mirrors in its turn the text's signification. Such tropes express those notions of 
identity, unity and continuity which are very important to the recuperative sensibility. 
The last stanza can be seen in the light of a 'crossing' to heaven after death or even 
as the second coming. However, self-knowledge becomes erased when the material 
or literal articulation by language comes to "extinguish and bury the poetic and 
philosophical light" (De Man, 1984: 113). The stance of Christian faith reflects the 
confidence that the most truthful accounts of reality are not the accounts that a 
reality uninformed by an eschatological (concerning death and final destiny) vision 
gives of itself. 
Deconstruction agam proclaims an essentially meaninglessness dimension of 
existence. Death by itself can bring no meaning forward nor provide any conclusion. 
Christian faith however presupposes that existence on earth is already meaningful. 
However, perceiving the truth of everything on earth only comes from the 
perspective called the Kingdom of Heaven. Only from that stance could one gain 
a view of sufficient 'otherness' to understand the full truth. 
Christianity simply does not rely on the category of representation which de Man is 
devoted to undermining. Where Christians see the presently productive 
superimposition of seemingly irreconcilables, de Man sees only an undecidable 
alternation between irreconcilables across an unbridgeable void - the "gap that 
cleaves Being" (1979a:245). As such, the target of de Man's critical deconstruction 
is seen by Biblical scholars as a rather serious misconstrual of the Christian reflection 
on Biblical texts and presence. 
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A similar binary situation of knowledge/ignorance is continued in the poem 
'Luthando olungangiyekiyo' (Msimang, 1980:58). The content of this poem of the 
way human beings fail to know all they wish to know echoes something of de Man's 
view of the continual absence of meaning and truth. Although only the first stanza 
will be looked into, a summary of the plot of the poem, while by no means the key 
to its internal textual dynamics or deep pathos, may nonetheless help orient readers. 
The dominant image in the poem is that ofLove seeking destruction. This negative 
vision is intertwined with images of hate, adultery, neglect, distrust, death. The 
poem's narrator tells of certain situations in which Love enters only to destroy 
relationships. Whereas every stanza ends in the similar question "Ungifandiseleni 
ukuthanda?" (Why do you teach me to love?), the last stanza contains multiple 
questions and the text ends with a statement: "Ungafandisi mina ukuthanda I 
Fundisa isintu ukuthandana" (Do not teach me to love, teach mankind to love each 
other). The poem bristles with negative evaluations: the non-act in question is 
arbitrary, fictional, artificial, unwarranted, illusory and illegitimate. 
The visions of the speaker, though severe and disenchanted, seem recognizably and 
courageously in touch with actual human experience. Each stanza projects an 
intensification of estrangement as the speaker gradually rejects the object of his 
disillusionment. He seeks understanding as the Christian denomination which has 
often defined itself as faith seeking understanding. However, God's word and 
works proceed in a way incomprehensible to all reason. The Christian perspective, 
though immediately rooted in concrete historical communities, strives to be universal 
in scope - the understanding sought by the speaker is equally universal, seeking to 
interpret everything called reality. The speaker appears as a questioning entity, 
standing within the pathos of his/her own indetermination. The structure of the text 
is not one of question and answer, but of a question whose meaning, as a question, 
is effaced from the moment it is asked. There is no answer, no explanation, no true 
meaning. One can however argue that this very unattainability of meaning and 
significance has a meaning and significance all on its own. 
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One could presume a failed love relationship for this poem, however the poem 
mostly reflects a disillusionment with the situation of the world in general: 
Luthando olungangiyekiyo 
1 Zaphuma izinkomo zamabheka 
2 Bakikiza ungenil' umakoti 
3 Umakoti eseshaye ezimhlophe 
4 Ngababona ababili beguqa 
5 Umfundisi wabanika izibusiso. 
6 Ngambona eqhamuka uLuthando 
7 Echichima inzondo, ebopha esonga. 
8 Ngesandla wayepheth' inkemba, 
9 Wagadla zaphophoza izinyembezi. 
10 Ngesandla wayepheth' umkhonto, 
11 Wagwaza laphophoza igazi. 
12 Obevethe ezimhlophe usembethe emnyama. 
13 Luthando olungangiyekiyo 
14 Ungifundiseleni ukuthanda? 
One form a relationship might take is temporal - critics might conceive of a relation 
between a past and a present, and then seek to deduce the past from the present to 
which it bears some essential relation. Or, as will be seen in this poem, the 
relationship might take a spatial, synecdochic form, joining a fragment to something 
whole, such as this poem to a larger idea like the Bible. But, as the 
deconstructionists warn, it would be naive to assume that such continuities actually 
exist in the poem. On the contrary, the poem warns that there are no relationships 
in reality, only random occurrences, and that the reader's efforts to evade this 
chaotic circumstance by the imposition of pseudo-continuities, despite recognition 
of their fictionality, is inevitable. This is viewed as the readers' impositioning of 
meaning on the text, however, the poem performs its own "imposition of meaning 
... in the form of the questions that served as point of departure for the reading" (De 
Man, 1984: 118). This, however, proves illusory for although language posits, and 
although language means, language cannot posit meaning. De Man indicates that 
both the positing and the erasure of positing by the imposition of meaning are acts 
oflanguage. "Positing" says de Man'" glimmers' into a glimmering knowledge that 
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acts out the aporias of signification and of performance" (1984: 119). The reader's 
awareness of this aporia is an awareness of a perpetual and undecidable struggle 
within language itself between language's violent positing power (performance) and 
language's forgetting of that positing power (by imposing signification). This poem 
acts as an aporia itself by expressing those irresolvable doubts and hesitations. 
Stanza one of the poem starts out with a beautiful image of a traditional Zulu 
wedding with lobola cattle and the bride performing her cultural obligations. This 
image is transposed onto a Westernized type of wedding with a minister and a 
kneeling couple. Then Love enters: 
Echichima inzondo, ebopha esonga. 
(Overflowing with hatred, cursing and threatening.) 
This description of love is conflicting with a preconceived notion of what is 
customary or reasonable. It is a paradox, on which the whole poem is built. This 
paradox reflects the way the world of this poem is simultaneously a recognisable 
version of the world one lives in, and an inversion of that world. For the 
deconstructionist, again, such moments are symptomatic of the way language 
doesn't reflect or convey the world but constitutes a world of its own. 
De Man replaces all paradoxes with aporia because his vision is monistic: though it 
can allow for two oscillating perspectives on the same thing, it can tolerate no true 
doubleness. De Man's notion oftextuality obliterates any dualism in language that 
would make a place for meaning. What remains is the text's own trampling over 
those who mistakenly think that they use language to mean, rather than recognising 
that they are used by language. 
What can be furthermore deduced from the above paragraph is that deconstruction 
for de Man is utterly violent. Aporia pertains to two apparent incompatibles which 
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cannot occupy the same space, and yet, since they are versions of the same thing, are 
equally entitled to that space. As such, they will compete for it - and such 
competition will generate a continual violence. The violent, positing power of 
language to which de Man points, though it can be interpreted religiously as 
manifestation of sin, is rooted theoretically in the theorist's commitment to an 
essentially monistic conception of reality. This monism clashes head-on with 
Christianity, which proclaims neither a monistic nor a dualistic view of things but 
rather a complex, paradoxical difference-within-unity in which differences tum out 
to be the necessary means to the self-constitution of the integrity of the whole. In 
contrast to de Man's vision, in the Christian view of things the only reason for 'the 
other' is the expression of love. Paradoxical phrases in this poem such 'hateful 
Love' show the signifiers at war with the signified and reveal its repressed 
unconscious (which is the subject of the following chapter). Even the poem's binary 
oppositions, such as love/hate, life/death, groom/bride, white/black, learn/teach are 
violently overthrown, making the second term, rather than the first the more 
privileged. The poem itself has already reversed the polarity of the common 
opposition of love/hate. This chaos continues in the poem itself in the very violent 
lines 8 - 11: 
Ngesandla wayepheth' inkemba, 
Wagadla zaphophoza izinyembezi. 
Ngesandla wayepheth' umkhonto, 
Wagwaza laphophoza igazi. 
(In his hand he carried a sword, 
He struck and tears gushed out. 
In his hand he held a spear, 
He stabbed and blood flowed.) 
The lines above could be a reference to the sacrifice made to the ancestors at a 
traditional wedding, but it is also very indicative of certain passages in the 
Apocalypse. In Revelations 6:4, 6:8 when the four seals are opened, God (the 
original Love) gives power to the red horseman "to take peace from the earth, and 
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that they should kill one another: and there was given unto him a great sword". The 
complete Revelations is reminiscent of the poem: those who wear white clothes 
(Rev. 6:11, 3:4, 7:13,14) will be spared, Death on a pale horse wears black robes 
(Rev. 6:8, 6: 12); tears flowing (Rev. 7: 17). All the abominations present in the 
poem such as killing, hunger, cheating, promiscuity, neglect - even false prophets are 
encountered in this last book of the Bible. The second stanza of the poem is 
evocative of "Babylon, the great, mother of harlots, and of earth's 
abominations"(Rev. 17:5) which is described as a woman drunk with the blood of 
saints, filthy because of her fornications. 
Although it is possible to infer meanings such as the above, meanings are not stable 
and present, but forever deferred. Christians believe that human life is not about the 
recognition that meanings are not to be found (though it must include something of 
that insight), but it is rather about the way all those things do receive unification, 
integration, and wholeness. For de Man, there is no need of any other at all, people 
are all equally the pawns of language, and everybody will suffer their own private 
fates at its hands. De Man sees differences as only negatively related, Christians 
challenge that vision, for, a resistance to idolatry that entails the absence oflove is 
no virtue. 
The life described by the speaker seems much the sort that Nietzsche celebrates - a 
life of ceaseless, vigorous struggle rather than condescending, morally superior pity. 
Nietzsche displays a weak understanding of Christian love when he confuses it with 
pity, but he speaks with religious insight when he remarks that the reverence (not 
contempt) that the noble feels for his enemy is a bridge to genuine love of neighbour 
(1967:39). Lovelessness, indifference, will never be able to generate sufficient 
power to heal wounds - only love is capable of being productive, but only in 
correlation with the loved is fullness of the manifold possible. The paradox is that 
only by means of understanding the concept of love, can one teach others to love. 
Ironically, the speaker is accomplishing exactly that which he accuses Love of doing: 
161 
'Luthando olungangiyekiyo' (Love which does not let me be). Although his view 
is that Love is misrepresented (in language), by dwelling on the subject, he is the one 
not letting love go. Finally, the speaker rebelliously utters: 
Ungafundisi mina ukuthanda 
Fundisa isintu ukuthandana. 
(Do not teach me to love, 
teach mankind to love each other.) 
Christians would argue that the negative attitude of the speaker in this poem already 
demonstrates the greatest love of all: God's condescension of man's ability to tum 
his/her will against others or even against the deity. However, in the Old Testament 
another adversary of God was cast from Heaven for being rebellious and thus 
become evil incarnated. The consequence of this action was the creation of the 
binary opposition God/Satan. This contrariety is illustrated in the following 
Petrarchan sonnet (Msimang, 1980:22): 
Ngiyamazisa 
1 Lapho sezigwaba ezevangeli, 
2 Lapho sezikhokhelwa ngokuzidela; 
3 Lapho sebefakaza abavangeli, 
4 Lapho sezivuma izindela; 
5 Ziboshwe bhande linye lezwi, 
6 Zikhwele sihlenga sinye sikamoya, 
7 Ziyowela ulwandle ngomoya, 
8 Zimpampa ngamagagasi kamoya, 
9 Uqhamuka engasadle nkobe, 
10 Ekhihlaza nezithelo zakwamhlaba, 
11 Abethembise igolide lakwamhlaba. 
12 Uyawaqaqa amafindo awagqabule amagoda. 
13 Maye! Ngiyamazisa. 
14 Siphe amandla simnyathele. 
The antithesis of God/Satan has to be handled with extreme care. The Hebrew 
word, Satan, was used originally as a common noun for adversary (2 Sam. 19:22; 
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1 Kings 5: 4, 11 :23, 25). Satan was disposed of because of his desire to be like God, 
or rather to be God. He aspired to claim God's autonomy for himself, or in a 
deconstructionist terms, he wanted to transpose the binarism. But Satan cannot be 
a true opponent of God, for he is subject to God's authority and except for the 
absence of divine intervention, unable to carry out his evil purposes. As such, the 
boundary is already transgressed. Furthermore, as emphasized by 
deconstructionists, oppositions cannot confront one another as fixed presences 
because differance calls the notion of oppositions into question. For de Man, the 
extremes endlessly converge only to diverge, producing an undecidable oscillation 
. . 
man apona. 
The endeavour to express wholeness (presence) creates a pressure, a force that 
dissipates it. This degeneration is already noticeable in the title 'Ngiyamazisa' 
where the verb "-azisa" has conflicting meanings. Not only does it denote to be 
acquainted with or to be anxious about an entity, it also implies showing 
appreciation, respect or honour towards somebody. One is also unsure of whom the 
object concord refers to, the speaker could honour God, or keep a watchful eye on 
Satan, or even vice versa. This ambiguity continues in the poem itself Ironically, 
the typical pattern of the Petrarchan sonnet is reversed in this poem. Traditionally, 
the octave sets out disorder and problems in life, and the sestet is used to resolve 
those problems, concentrating on the possibility of creating an ordered response. 
In this poem, the first eight lines concern religious activities, while the last six lines 
are troubled. 
Derrida's deconstructive interpretations are in essence not anti-religious via a 
negative path. He even admits that 
Only infinite being can reduce the difference in presence. In that 
sense, the name of God . . . is the name of indifference itself 
(1976:71). 
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De Man, however, is very explicit about the way deconstructive reading, in its very 
resistance to idolatry, opposes Christian concepts such as the incarnation of the Son 
of God in Jesus of Nazareth. De Man's opposition seems entirely negative; the 
lesson he teaches is that one endeavours not to be taken in by the false god of 
apparently present meaning - not because there is a true god that deserves one's 
regard, but because it is a good characteristic to be the kind of person who is not 
fooled (Dawson, 1995:83). De Man insists that texts do not signify meanings, 
rather, the rhetoricity of language - the play of signifiers - continually works to 
ensure the absence of meaning. The result is a futile epistemological situation in 
which, although nothing substantive can be known, but the reader is constantly 
seduced into thinking that it can. 
The Bible is alluring to deconstructionists because of its implicit and explicit 
reference to language such as 'the Word (logos) of God', etc. According to the 
book of Genesis, God created the earth and the surrounding universe with words, 
and Adam domesticated the animals of the world by naming them. The 
deconstructors reverse this process: by decreating the world to reach logos. Miller 
even altered the Genesis saga by claiming that in the beginning was the system of 
discontinuous words making up language, and these words were with man 
(1972:143). 
The category of Biblical text enters in this poem as "ezevangeli" (those who value 
the Gospel) referring to the Scripture: 
Lapho sezigwaba ezevangeli, 
Lapho sezikhokhelwa ngokuzidela; 
Lapho sebefakaza abavangeli, 
Lapho sezivuma izindela; 
Ziboshwe bhande linye lezwi, 
Zikhwele sihlenga sinye sikamoya 
(When those who value the Gospel preach, 
When they are counselled about the significance of sacrifice; 
When the evangelists testify, 
When devotees sing; 
They are united by the cord of the word, 
They climb on one raft of the Holy Spirit) 
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The phrase "ngokuzidela" (sacrifice) obviously refers to Jesus Christ, while 
"sikamoya" (of the spirit) attains to the Holy Spirit. The placement of spirit opens 
up a place for the action of God in the person of the Holy Spirit upon the inner lives 
ofJesus' followers. Satan enters in line 8 by way of an elliptical proverb, disrupting 
the calm of the previous lines: 
Uqhamuka engasadle nkobe, 
Ekhihlaza nezithelo zakwamhlaba, 
Abethembise igolide lakwamhlaba. 
Uyawaqaqa amafindo awagqabule amagoda.. 
(He suddenly appears ablazed with anger, 
Overloaded with the fruits of the earth, 
He promises them the gold of the earth 
He unties knots and breaks off ropes.) 
The full idiom appears as "ukungadli nkobe zamuntu" which describes a situation 
of being extremely angry or spirited, or as someone who does not plea or is 
indulgent. The devil is fully prepared and ready to act, and ruthlessly draws upon 
whatever worldly ways to coerce humans to his side, whether by means of material 
seductions or pain, distress and torment. The poem concludes with a repetition of 
its title making clear that the object referred to in the predicate is indeed the Devil. 
Finally (and quite fiercely), in the mode of the Psalmist the speaker appeals: 
Siphe amandla simnyathele. 
(Give us strength so we can crush him) 
This request of God to steer man in the way of moral righteousness is again rejected 
by de Man who refuses to accept the interdependence of intention and action that 
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lies at the basis of moral character. De Man wants to avoid idolatry, but the absence 
of meaning that is the cost of that denial seems unavoidably connected with a sort 
of violence. De Man insists that signifiers never merge, or achieve a synecdochic 
relation, with any larger meaning, truth, or presence; he counsels instead an ascetic 
renunciation of all such idolatrous seductions. Scholars of religion again, have never 
accepted de Man's views but still fear that de Man's post-structuralistic thought 
might systematically lead devotees away from distinctively Christian forms of 
spirituality and textuality. 
4.3 Resume 
Whereas the previous chapter centred on poems concerned almost exclusively with 
an introspective self-scrutiny, this chapter focussed on Msimang' s writing concerned 
with socio-historical and socio-religious issues, as seen in the two historical and 
three religious poems. As concluded from this chapter, the self-avowed language 
scepticism that deconstruction cultivates, its self-proclaimed resistance to the 
tendencies toward positive and exploitative truth built into any critical system - be 
it historical, Marxist, semiological or theological - obviously have grave institutional 
consequences. 
In focussing on the problems of the representation of history, religion and truth, the 
deconstructionist' position that truth is not something which already exists and 
therefore only to be discovered, was presented. Derrida's point is that truth, and its 
various correlates such as being, consciousness and presence, "are produced effects 
... which do not find their cause in a subject or a substance, in a thing in general ... 
[but] in the play of differance" (Derrida, 1982: 11 ). One consequence of this is that 
the meaning of these terms is never self-evidently there but dispersed in the 
discourses that produce them. In addition, the mention of each term, for example 
truth, is partly conditioned by a sense of other contexts in which it has appeared and 
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those in which it may appear. Bearing within itself "the mark ofits relation to the 
future element" (Derrida, 1982: 13 ), truth is divided both from its present and self-
presence. 
De Man especially remains the most arduous of anti-philosophers, demystifying and 
undermining the traditional truth-claims of epistemology only by way of a rigorous 
thought-out rhetorical critique. De Man offers a construal of all reality (including 
human subjects) as modes of textuality. De Man offers a hyperkenosis (or complete 
emptying out) of self and meaning into letter. Religious critics, especially, regard 
his theories as antihumanistic bleakness. De Man calls for a reading as disfiguration, 
which stands opposed to the kind of reading it more typically elicits -
'monumentalization', as was illustrated in the poems, especially 'lnkondlo 
ka.Mkabayi '. This, according to de Man is a futile, self-mystifying evasion of 
disfiguration. Disfigurative reading undermines any recourse to system, method, or 
theory, all of which presuppose the presence of unities and continuities that ground 
claims to knowledge; instead, it brings one face to face with the dark inevitability of 
the slide in all reading, away from any understanding, toward an abyss of mere 
repetition, a 'madness of words': 
.. to read is to understand, to question, to know, to forget, to erase, 
to deface, to repeat - that is to say, the endless prosopopoeia by 
which the dead are made to have a face and a voice which tells the 
allegory of their demise and allows us to apostrophize them in our 
tum. No degree of knowledge can ever stop this madness, for it is 
the madness of words (De Man, 1984:122). 
The resulting de Manian aporia marked out by the poles of the representational 
spectrum, will, then always be a matter of undecidability or indeterminacy. The 
creation of a critical reading is the production of failure. Trying to ground the 
interpretation in some element of the text, the critic always discovers that the ground 
collapses into the freeplay of figure. But even though "reading as disfiguration" is 
"historically more reliable" than the recuperative reading it resists, "to 
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monumentalize this observation into a method of reading" (De Man, 1984:123) 
would again result in regressing from the essence of deconstruction: 
Deconstruction is the enigmatic relation between truth and history. 
Or rather, since it tests the limits of knowledge and power, this kind 
of questioning has as its object the truth of history, the truth that 
actually does happen in preference to the one that is merely believed 
or described or promised. What would seriously miss the point, on 
the contrary, would be to believe that deconstruction somehow tries 
to privilege itself in naming the truth of history - for in that case it 
might just as well call itself pure ideology from the start (Newmark 
in Caruth, 1995:162). 
Lastly, it was evident in this chapter that poems do more than signify, they also refer. 
Words are not only interpretable figures, they are also signs of that point. The self-
reflexive language of poetry has been identified as the source of meaning and its 
undoing in the poem. As such, it becomes possible to suggest that the referent of 
modem poems could be precisely the historical event of a change in the way that 
poets think about language and poetry, the event of the establishment of a new and 
more modem understanding ofliterature and literariness (Burt in Caruth, 1995: 128). 
In this sense, as Hamacher, Hertz and Keenan (1988:128) observe, history is 
what is happening to us . . . Even when it seems to go back to a 
buried past, what comes about always comes from the future. 
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CHAPTERS 
DEATH AND DESIRE IN MSIMANG'S POETRY 
5.1 Introduction 
Deconstruction is a natural continuity, not a conversion of literary theory. As such, it 
seems to have a remarkable affinity for especially the psychoanalytic literary theory. The 
writers associated with post-structuralism and deconstruction seem to favour the gloss of 
psychoanalysis, perhaps more cautiously in the case of Derrida and De Man. Both 
theories share a common negativity directed against it. The reaction to deconstruction is 
synonymous to a still persistent reaction to psychoanalysis -
an irrational fear that, if this sort of analytical activity is pursued, the 
subject ofit, be it literature, the personality or even the person himself, will 
veritably disappear, be analysed, as it were, out of existence (Felperin in 
Rajnath, 1989:185). 
These anxieties that literature or human personality have believing that their very existence 
are endangered by the way these two theories scrutinize them, are viewed by 
deconstruction as having in common a superstitious or sacramental view of language, 
within which words mean exactly what they say. Hence the primal terror aroused in some 
quarters by the very term 'deconstruction'. After all, the word has the same root-meaning 
as 'analysis' and 'unmaking' - quite apart from the actual disintegrative thrust of 
deconstructionist thinking, in which that fundamental relation of language is seen to be 
problematic (Culler, 1989:274). However, deconstruction engages in the same activity 
as a post-structuralist psychoanalytical criticism which attends to conflicts in texts' 
rhetorics and in psyches and explores how texts are structured by the psychic and 
rhetorical operations they theorize. 
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5.2 A working relationship between psychoanalysis, deconstruction and Msimang's 
poetry 
Although the analysis focusses on deconstruction, many of the ideas in this chapter are 
elaborated on in terms of psychoanalytic terminology. The predominance of 
psychoanalytic concepts and terms in deconstruction, require some further explanation. 
The notion of application will be replaced by the radically different notion ofimplication. 
This entails bringing analytical questions to bear upon literary questions, involving 
psychoanalysis in the scene of literary analysis, not to apply to the text an acquired 
science, a preconceived knowledge, but to generate implications between literature and 
psychoanalysis - to explore, bring to light and articulate the various (indirect) ways in 
which the two domains do indeed implicate each other, each one finding itself enlightened, 
informed, but also affected, displaced, by the other. The idea is still, however, that 
deconstruction is simply still a rhetorical strategy and in no way the positing of a 
self-present structure within the text. 
Psychoanalytic practice is based upon specific theories of how the mind, the instincts, and 
sexuality work, developed by the Austrian, Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). Freudian 
psychoanalysis has effected a revolution in the ideas about it, by radically questioning the 
validity of the hierarchies. Freud, for example, upset the conscious/unconscious hierarchy 
by showing how the unconscious influence the conscious life. The famous Freudian slip 
was Freud's discovery revealing that what interrupts the speaker's intentions has deeper 
and more shocking truth effects than the intended thought. Lacan says of this that Freud 
discovered that truth manifests itself in the letter rather than the spirit, that is, in the way 
things are actually said rather than in the intended meaning. 
All ofFreud' s work depends upon the notion of the unconscious. By opening signs to the 
unknown unconscious, Freud gives one, as it were, a grammatology of the psyche, a 
deconstruction of the consciousness. He illustrates how conscious items in their apparent 
clarity are interwoven with the unknown world of the psyche. Linked with this is the idea 
of repression, which is the forgetting or ignoring of unresolved conflicts, unadmitted 
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desires, or traumatic past events, so that they are forced out of conscious awareness (ego) 
and into the realm of the unconscious (id) (Bowie, 1988:38). The selfis a text entwined 
with absent texts. So the selfis decentred, and it seems that the selfis not present in itself, 
not identical to itself, not in possession and control of itself (Lodge, 1988: 101 ). The 
unconscious should however not be represented as singular or simple but as a concealed 
reality whereby one gains access to understand the consciousness. 
Freud regards literature, with its ambiguities resulting from the use of figurative language, 
as an important gateway to the unconscious. The paradoxical character of the compilation 
of a literary text, i.e. that on the one side it functions consciously, and on the other side 
it contains unconscious utterances, makes it equal to the structure of the dream (Skura 
1981 : 14 2). The operations of the dream-work are condensation (i.e. the manifest dream 
has a smaller content than the latent one, and is thus an abbreviated translation ofit) and 
displacement (i.e. elements in the latent dream-thoughts are replaced via a chain of 
associations with elements in the actualised dream), which are prevalent in literary works. 
Displacement and condensation disguise the repressed fears and wishes and fashion these 
into images, symbols and metaphors. 
Freud devised the contextual method of 'free association' as an alternative to the 
cryptographic method of interpretation, which treated the dream as a message in cipher 
from the unconscious and sought to decode it by reference to a dictionary of typical (or 
even universal) symbols. Although Freud allowed some typical symbols, he cautioned that 
an analyst should never presume that he knows what a dream means but should instead 
induce the dreamer to interpret the dream by means of free association. According to 
Freud, this was the only way to allay the suspicion that a specific interpretation was simply 
an arbitrary construction on the part of the analyst. 
Freud later modified some of his earlier views, by placing more emphasis on literary talent 
and skill. His greatest contribution was probably in the subtle application of his theories 
and discoveries to individual writers and artists. Freud's original remarks have been 
expanded, developed, modified, and transformed, in an enormous mass of writing, turned 
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out by psychoanalysts of various schools and by different kinds of critics. 
Although a student of Freud, Carl Jung (1875-1961) differs extensively from the first-
mentioned. Freud confined his theories largely to instincts and their satisfaction or 
repression. The events of psychic life were for Freud the result of environment or chance. 
The pleasure principle was directed to material ends, because, as he saw it, human beings 
are basically enemies of civilized life, since it puts restraints on their sexual and animal 
urges (or libidos). Jung thought that psychic energy results from a tension between the 
two poles of man's natural instincts and traditional religious principles. Whereas Freud 
regarded the unconscious as the dustbin of unfulfilled desires, Jung (1963:298) saw it as 
an instrument of creative personality, liberating the psyche from the domination of the 
conscious mind. 
Jung's archetypal psychoanalytical criticism solicits for the existence of universal symbols, 
specific neither to the individual nor to his immediate cultural setting. The stress falls on 
the 'collective unconscious' common to all cultures; a phrase which signifies a deeper 
layer than the personal unconscious, in being a psychic disposition shaped by the forces 
of heredity. •This third realm of the psyche is made up of archetypes, potential images 
which each man inherits from his ancestral past and which enables him to respond to 
certain experiences in the same way that his forebears did. The text is thus explored for 
its revelation of the images, myths and symbols of past cultures: texts are found to contain 
recurrent figures, which are produced to compensate for psychic impoverishment in 
human beings and society. The images used in myths are sometimes magnanimous and 
remote from experience. In these there is overwhelming support for the magical power 
of words to attract and convince. The Jungian critic does not, therefore, explore the 
personal unconscious of the writer or look at the text for neurotic symptoms of its 
author's repressed desire, but characteristically, sees a common quest motif in works of 
literature. 
Jacques Lacan' s ( 1901-1981) psychoanalytic theory declares that the operation and effect 
of the text is determined by the unconscious. The unconscious is for Lacan more than the 
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source of primal instincts that are casually connected to ideas and images. Lacan' s work, 
the Ecrits in particular, can be read as a 'translation' of Freud's theories in terms of the 
Saussurian model. Hereby, the unconscious is to Lacan the so-called 'floating signifier', 
of which the definitive meaning cannot be determined. As Selden (1988a:82) puts it: 
In Lacan's version of the sign, the signified 'slides' beneath a signifier 
which 'floats'. 
That is, words and meanings have a life of their own and constantly override and obscure 
the supposed simplicities and clarity of external reality. If signifiers relate only to one 
another, then language is detached from external reality, and becomes an independent 
realm, a crucial notion in post-structuralist thinking. 
Lacan argues that the two dream-work mechanisms identified by Freud, condensation and 
displacement, correspond to the basic poles oflanguage, i.e. metaphor and metonymy. 
The use by the unconscious of these linguistic means of self-expression is part ofLacan' s 
evidence for the claim that the unconscious is structured like a language, and at the same 
time it is the product of language. Language usage is therefore actually a translation of 
hidden discourse. The source for searching and understanding of the meaning is thus 
situated in the desire or longing of the subject to know and understand his own 
unconscious and suppressed messages. 
Like Freud, Lacan pays close attention to unconscious motives and feelings, but instead 
of excavating for those of the author or characters, he searches out those of the text itself, 
uncovering contradictory undercurrents of meaning, which lie like a subconscious beneath 
the 'conscipus' of the text. This is another way of defining the process of deconstruction. 
Lacanian psychoanalysis offers a much more direct engagement with the whole idea of the 
structure of the self, the ideas of the split human subject with its desire for unity. With 
Lacanian thought, psychoanalytic criticism can move from the fringes to the centre ground 
in considering the whole notion of the construction of the subject. 
Central to Lacan' s conception of metaphor is the idea of repression. According to Lacan, 
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"every successful symbolic integration involves a sort of normal forgetting" (1988:192) 
and "one word for another: that is the formula for metaphor"(1977: 157). Substitution is 
very much the act of metaphor. But Lacan has a more radical notion of metaphor, which 
is that it precipitates "the formations of the unconscious" (1977 :200). The relevant point, 
in a highly complex argument, is that the unconscious comes into existence with the 
acquisition of language. What is most important in this process is that the subject is not 
even aware of what has been repressed in the formation of the unconscious. This is 
because of the dialectic between need, demand and desire (1977:285-287). It is the split 
between need and demand, this difference between physiological basis and linguistic 
expression that gives rise not just to desire but to its "etemalization" (1977:104). 
Lacan views desire as an important psychoanalytical concept. Desire is eternal because 
"it is not articulable" (1977:302) and therefore has no possibility of being satisfied or 
being expressed, constituted by language it continually escapes it. Desire constantly 
unsettles the subject's attempts to use language to create a unified and settled identity. 
Desire means that language can never be closed and hence texts can never be self-
contained and, since this is the case, criticism can never reproduce them. And, since 
language cannot capture its object - an object which, according to Lacan, it consistently 
misrecognises as its true desire, so criticism cannot coincide with or reproduce the work. 
The relevant consideration here is Lacan's claim that "man's desire finds its meaning in 
the desire of the Other ... because the first object of desire is to be recognized by the 
Other" (1977:58). This means that the subject wins recognition by naming his or her 
desires in language, what in his early writings Lacan calls the 'symbolic system' and in his 
later ones 'the Other'. In naming his or her desires in language, the subject names them 
as 'Other' to him or herself And although this implies that the subject has 'true' desires 
which languages cannot express, this is not in fact the case. What happens instead, 
according to Lacan, is that 
something of the subject's becomes detached in the very symbolic world 
[language] that he [she] is engaged in integrating. From then on it will no 
longer be something belonging to the subject. The subject will no longer 
speak it, no longer integrate it. Nevertheless, it will remain there, 
somewhere, spoken, if one can put it in this way, by something the subject 
does not control (1991:191). 
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Lacan' s theory furthermore comprises of various stages of development. The 
development begins at birth, and then moves in tum through the mirror stage, access to 
language, the development of desire, and the Oedipus complex. In the mirror stage the 
child sees its own reflection in the mirror and begins to conceive of itself as a unified 
being, separate from the rest of the world. At this stage the child enters into the language 
system, essentially a system which is concerned with lack and separation - crucial Lacanian 
concepts - since language names what is not present and substitutes a linguistic sign for 
it. This is the realm of the Imaginary, a world in which language gestures beyond itself, 
beyond logic and grammar, rather in the way that poetic language often does. 
A notion important to this development is that of self-loss or lack. Loss is always 
connected to deeper unconscious losses. Eagleton (1983:85) explains how Freud's and 
Lacan' s interpretations differ: 
In Lacanian theory, it is an original lost object - the mother's body - which 
drives forward the narrative of our lives, impelling us to pursue 
substitutions for this lost paradise in the endless metonymic movement of 
desire. For Freud, it is a desire to scramble back to a place where we 
cannot be harmed, the inorganic existence which precedes all conscious 
life, which keeps us struggling forward: our restless attachments (Eros) 
are in thrall to the death drive (Thanathos). 
Jacques Lacan deals with the general problem of representation in the following way: he 
says that "no signification can be sustained other than by reference to another 
signification", and that "if we try to grasp in language the constitution of the object, we 
cannot fail to notice that this constitution is to be found only at the level of the concept" 
(1977: 150). Accordingly, the essence or constitution of the object can never be grasped 
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as such by language. The psychoanalytic theory of Lacan can be variously utilized in 
literary criticism, and Lacan appears in the literature of critical theory in diverse contexts. 
As the father of deconstruction, Derrida's thinking is often close to Lacan's. Derrida 
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attended Lacan's seminars in Paris, where he was perhaps first introduced to Lacan's 
ideas. However, it is not that Lacan has influenced Derrida, but rather that Derrida and 
Lacan have reached almost similar conclusions by different and independent means. It 
might be said that while reading Freud, Derrida elaborated on a notion of writing best 
characterized by the well known statement ofLacan's that the unconscious is structured 
like a language. The idea of deferred action, deferral, as posited in the word differance, 
is also from Freud. Derrida's return of the unconscious adds new elements of'play' in the 
interpretation of language. 
Derrida rescues writing from what he calls the colloquial, reductive view by proposing a 
broader view of writing than the traditional, empirical one - a view that sees writing as 
including the content and workings of the psyche. With the word 'psyche' placed under 
erasure, the rather generalized representation of Derrida's thinking on the subject finds 
support in the following statement: "The 'objectivist' or 'wordly' consideration of writing 
teaches us nothing if reference is not made to a space of psychical writing" (1978:212). 
Derrida seems dedicated to the combination of space and time. 
At this point, one has to take note that the term 'writing' is extended in the way to include 
the psychical apparatus and thus the very means of human existence. Rorty comments: 
"Derrida thinks that the proper moral to draw is that language is not a tool, but that in 
which we live and move" (1978:150). This holds equally, and perhaps even more 
emphatically, for writing. To this end Derrida borrows Saussure's concept of the psychic 
imprint and relates it to "the idea of articulation" ( 197 6: 66): 
... it should be recognized that it is in the specific zone of this imprint and 
this trace, in the temporalization of a lived experience which is neither in 
the world nor in 'another world', which is not more sonorous than 
luminous, not more in time than in space, that differences appear among 
the elements or rather produce them, make them emerge as such and 
constitute the texts, the chains, and the systems of traces. These chains and 
systems cannot be outlined except in the fabric of this trace or imprint 
(1976:65). 
For Derrida, the psychoanalytic model is a metaphorical structure, not a literal one. He 
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is opposed to adopting any one specific model of interpretation, even a psychoanalytic 
one, because it represents a stable point of reference and a closed system. Accordingly, 
he takes Jacques Lacan to task for postulating the phallus as a transcendental signified. 
For Derrida, Lacan is guilty of phallogocentrism (combination of phallocentrism and 
logocentrism) because Lacan sees the letter unproblematically as phallus, rather than 
recognizing that meaning cannot exist in such unproblematic one-to-one relationships. 
Finally, however, Derrida points out that it is also possible to believe in a transcendental 
signifier, and he gives as example the phallus, when seen "as the correlate of a primary 
signified, castration and the mother's desire" (1981b:86). 
The attempt to work out the relationship between de Man's non-psychoanalytic accounts 
and an analytical discourse inspired by Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan is a challenging 
task for criticism and theory. With de Man, the generative forces of textuality are 
grammar and rhetoric with no linkages to the body, the unconscious, and the social order. 
Predictably, de Man displays no abiding interest in psychoanalysis, sociology, or political 
theory. His mode ofreading appears, consequently, obsessive and puritanical. Questions 
of gender, race, unconscious, etc. receive no special emphasis: 
The symbolic (mis)representations within the social order, the 
(mis )constructions of the body-self, the (counter )forces of will, power, 
ideology, and praxis, the (de )formations enforced by institutions - all such 
concerns wait at the threshold of grammar/rhetoric, the space where 
phenomena come into undecidable being (Leitch, 1992:153). 
De Man's account of the character and functioning of the relationship invalidates 
psychoanalytical criticism in the traditional sense, for him this relation is structural, not 
psychological. The mode of analytical atomization developed by de Man can be used to 
deconstruct and demystify questionable theories, political practices, institutions and social 
arrangements. But de Man himself permanently defers cultural critique. Certain followers 
of de Man like Shoshana Felman and Barbara Johnson have reemployed his categories and 
tactics with overt psychoanalytical and political interests in their work of cultural analysis. 
To recap, the point of contact between psychoanalysis, deconstruction and literature is 
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obviously the nature of certain language utterances. Also, the earlier Freudian and the 
more sophisticated Lacanian readings share an undeniable application ofinterpretation to 
literature. Freudian readings interpret literary texts to show, for example, anal drives or 
negative oedipal complexes, while Lacanian readings show symbolic fathers and signifying 
chains. As illustrated, certain models of the psyche, certain psychological truths 
discovered in psychoanalysis operate as the revealed latent content of a work ofliterature. 
What is of importance though is that deconstruction is an effort to counteract the 
pervasive tendency to interpret the image, that is, to reduce it to a concept - to what it 
'means' in hermeneutic terms. (In deconstructive jargon, the image is, of course, the 
signifier and the concept, the signified). Interpretation, as both Freudian and Jungian 
analysts practise it, is invariably a reductionistic conceptualisation of the imagination. In 
short, interpretation (whether by free association or by amplification) is an attempt at 
demystification, which deconstruction is against. 
In his lyrical poem 'Uze ungiphuzise amanzi' (1980: 12), Msimang traces the theme of an 
inaccessible longed-for beloved. In this poem, a (male) speaker strives to unite with the 
female figure. He aims, upon waking, to search for and captivate her. The female figure 
represents the 'Other' in the psychological dialectic of Self and Other. (The word 
'dialectic(s)' is used here to mean something similar to dynamic interaction. It is used to 
denote a process in which there are no fixed points of reference, or rather, in which the 
points of reference are displaced). Around this dialectic the poem envelops complex and 
elusive notions involving desire and language, life and death: 
Uze ungiphuzise amanzi 
1 Ngiyovuka kanye nekhwezi 
2 Ngiphehle ubulawu obumhlophe, 
3 Ngithake ngomthole novuma 
4 'Ze ungithole ungivume. 
5 Ngiyophuma nenhlamvu yelanga 
6 Lapho ukusa kuqhakaze amazolo 
7 Ngikubone uza, ukhashwa 
8 Amakha amnandi kusasa; 
9 Ngiyokulindela ngisemthonjeni, 
10 Ngikulindele, ngikulindele. 
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11 Umoya wakho ngiwubone 
12 Uphakama kunye nomlalamvubu 
13 Kuphakame ithemba lami, 
14 Lapho uthwele imbiza 
15 Emnyama eyindilinga 
16 Phezu kwekhanda eliyindilinga 
17 Namehlo ayindilinga, 
18 Nami ngawe ngiyadilingana; 
19 Ngiyokunaka ngomnako wenyosi 
20 Uze ungiphuzise amanzi. 
21 Ngokhangela inxuluma lakwenu 
22 Elitshalwe lamila entabeni; 
23 Ngeke ngize ngimagange 
24 Hleze ngibe ngisakhwele ngidilike, 
25 Hleze ngiqanse imithambo, 
26 Umqansa ungime esifubeni, 
27 Ungikhendle ungigqib ' ithemba, 
28 Nawe ungishingilele 
29 Kumbe ungishalazele 
30 Kumbe ungibhembesele. 
31 Ngiyogcakela noNokubekezela 
32 Nginqume neqele noSineke; 
33 Ngishaye ugubhu ngihaye 
34 Ngivume inkondlo kaNomathemba 
35 Ngigudle izintaba ngihaye, 
36 lzintaba zingisondeze kuwe. 
37 Uyokuzwa inkondlo usexhibeni 
38 Ingqongqoza esifubeni sakho, 
39 Ingqongqoze ingqongqoze, 
40 Uze ungivulele ngingene. 
41 Wena ophezu kwezihlahla 
42 Noma uphezulu kwelenyoni, 
43 Inhliziyo iyonombela 
44 Nomphefumulo ubambelele 
45 Kuwo amagatsha emithi 
46 Ngitibile ngizabalaze 
47 Ngezikhwepha zokunxanela, 
48 Ngesibindi sokulangazelela, 
49 Ngikunxuse ngikunxuse, 
50 Uze ungiphuzise amanzi. 
51 Wena ophansi ekujuleni 
52 Ngiyojula ngithubeleze nami 
53 Njengezimpande zomthombe 
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54 Njengomnyezane ngijule 
55 Njengabavukuzibegolide 
56 Njengabavukuzi bedayimane, 
57 Noma ngigqula phezu kwedwala 
58 Noma izidladla ziqundeka 
59 Ngikuqhwebe ngikuqhwebe, 
60 Uze ungelulel' isandla. 
61 Nakushisa, ngisho nakuqanda 
62 Soze kungivimbele, phinde I 
63 Jsithwathwa esembeth' izintaba 
64 Asinamandl' okukwemboza; 
65 Naliqhwa nangqoqwane, 
66 Noma liza nesangquma 
67 Noma liza nesiphepho 
68 Siyongiphephetha singisondeze 
69 Kuwe, ungibambe ngesandla 
70 Unginike ukuphumula. 
71 Wena ongaphesheya kwezilwandle, 
72 Lapho umsinga udloba okwendlondlo 
73 Namadlambi edlangile ngolaka, 
74 Ngiyokweneka inhliziyo yami 
75 !be isihlenga sokuwela, 
76 Ngihlambe phezu kweJolidane 
77 Ngiwele uLwandle oLubomvu; 
78 Ezweni loju nobisi 
79 Ngakhe khona nami 
80 Ngibuse nami nawe. 
81 Wena ongaphezu kwamafu, 
82 Umphefumulo wami uyakuhluma 
83 Umile izimpiko zokhozi 
84 Ngimpampe phezu kwesibhakabhaka 
85 Ngidabule amagagasi omoya; 
86 Njengo-Elija wasendulo, 
87 Ngigibele inqola yomlilo 
88 Ngingqongqoze emasangweni ezulu, 
89 Wena ongukuphila kwami 
90 Ungivulele, ungivumele ngibuse. 
The poet gives the picture of someone prepared to go to any lengths to win someone's 
love. This includes using love potions, climbing mountains, singing songs, ardently 
pursuing the object oflove to the highest tree, the deepest depth, across the oceans, to all 
extremities in order for the speaker to gain her love and acceptance. The poem thus 
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envisions an introspective quest which will lead to an encounter with a woman. This figure 
is regarded by the speaker as the personification of natural beauty and the incarnation of 
an ideal self Furthermore, she is the divine female which is seen as a figure of 
signification. 
For the sake of perusal, it is useful to divide the poem into three parts. In the first, the 
narrator reveals the fervid agitation with which he has to attract the attention of his beloved 
or desired object. This section comprises of a focus more on the speaker's intentions, 
hesitations, hopes and despairs. Dawn shall resuscitate the speaker while the morning star 
"ikhwezi" is still shining and in this still sleepy hours of nighttime, the revived speaker 
plans to concoct love potions to entrance his beloved. Here the conventional figurative 
association between darkness and despair, between light and hope, has been made use of 
as the poem manages to equate light with the memory of new beginnings, fresh starts: 
"Ngiyophuma nenhlamvu yelanga" (I shall go out at sunrise). He plots to spy on her as 
she goes to draw water. Everything about her hypnotizes him: her water-pot, head, face, 
eyes. Her homestead lures him, but he is afraid of failure and rejection: "Hleze ngibe 
ngisakhwele ngidilike,/Hleze ngiqanse imithambo" (Lest each time I climb and slide down, 
I Lest I bulge the veins). In the third stanza, after it seems as if the speaker has been 
plunged into despair, he rejuvenates with a sense of freshness. 
The identification and delineation of the beloved coexists with the manifestation of nature, 
which also refers to the phenomenal world in general. This heightened sensitivity to the 
natural phenomenon suggests that the narrator desires to acquaint himself with the deep 
mysteries of nature, personified in the beloved. In loving the person with such intensity and 
single-minded devotion, the speaker cannot but follow the promptings of his soul, just as 
he cannot resist the allure of her head, eyes, etc. 
The second part starts with the salutation to the wanted "wena" (you). This section 
consists of three stanzas, basically depicting the person high on top of the trees and below 
in the depths. However, these extremities of nature and her powers will not stop him, he 
is determined to endure. The narrator pursues the secret underground, he projects himself 
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into substitutive figures - "njengabavukuzi begolide " (like mmers of gold), 
"njengabavukuzi bedayimane " (like diamond miners) - seeking ecstatic union. He 
compares his dedication as akin to two enduring trees. The wild fig tree's roots grow over 
rocks to reach a source of water which sustains the tree. Those of the willow go very 
deep, for the same reason. Patience, perseverance, hard work, hope and determination can 
lead to fulfilment and achievement. 
In the third part, there is a shift to a more religious tone. This shift is exhibited in the last 
two lines of the seventh stanza and following two stanzas. This is also marked by a change 
ofimagery from natural phenomenon to Biblical imagery "phezu kweJolidane" (top of the 
Jordan river), "uLwandle oLubomvu" (Red Sea), "njengo-Elija" (just like Elijah), 
"emasangweni ezulu" (at the gates of heaven), etc. Consequently, the personality of the 
addressee is dubious, one is uncertain whether it is still the human 'you' who is invoked. 
Here, it seems as if the narrator relinquishes his physical longing for his beloved. Though 
the possibility still remains that she might unveil herself, teasing his desire, she desists from 
revealing to him her innermost sanctuary. His pleas remain unanswered in the poem. In 
the eyes of the narrator she is therefore both object and non-object of desire, and his desire 
is then transformed onto a more divine crusade. This intensity of the poem rises until the 
end. These three parts correspond to the three phases of the narrator's quest. 
As previously recognized, deconstruction places a question mark over a compartmentalised 
conception of time as effected in the above summary. This reading fails to account for the 
literary qualities of the poem, which must be accomplished forthwith explicitly in 
correlation to a psychoanalytical tract. In deconstructive reading, though, one of the first 
moves is, of course, to identify in the poem interrelated sets of binary oppositions. It is 
natural to categorises phenomena into oppositions. These oppositions also seem to be 
genuinely exclusive, with a distinct boundary line between them: male against female, hope 
against despair, acceptance against refusal, high versus low, up and down, light against 
dark, hot against cold, soul against body, man and woman, human being versus nature, 
good against evil, superior or inferior, heaven and earth, life against death. However, these 
oppositions are subjected to scrutiny and the reduced images are revisioned to concepts. 
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There are furthermore in this reading a number of oppositions mentioned that exert a 
further subliminal influence on the analysis. One can illustrate this perhaps with the famous 
psychological opposition of ego against id, which Freud immortalised: 'Where the id was, 
there shall the ego be'. His id (unconscious) is controlled by the ego (conscious) and 
superego (conscience). The id accounts for the instinctive drives that originate from the 
needs of the body; the ego develops from the id, and governs and opposes the instinctive 
drives. Freud thus privileged the ego over the id. With most of the other oppositions, both 
Freudian and Jungian analysts have established an order of priorities that privileges the 
conscious over the unconscious, the rational over the irrational, the normal over the 
abnormal. 
What Derrida would rather have, is a logic of differences rather than oppositions. This 
would result in a nonviolent communication rather than violent confrontation between the 
Self and the Other (Adams in Rajnath, 1989:140). He does not want one side of an 
opposition to be assimilated into the other, or that one should be inferior or superior to the 
other. This attitude seems very close to the African view of the binary man/woman, where 
the man represents the right and the woman the left. However, the "Zulu claim that 
women, and therefore the left side, are not regarded as necessarily inferior to men and the 
right side. Nor are men superior to women. It is rather a matter of opposites which 
complement each other" (Berglund, 1989:363). They simply appreciate and respect the 
other as different from, yet equal to the self 
As Christopher Norris observes, deconstruction is "not simply a strategic reversal of 
categories" (1982:31). De Man (1979b:269) also argues that the two terms of a binary 
opposition are played off against one another, are interchanged and inverted, displaced, and 
finally undermined. This does not mean however, that the binary opposition is discarded. 
It is retained as an indispensable structuring principle, but one that is dynamic, decentred, 
and necessarily tentative. Neither of the terms of the binary opposition is granted self-
identity; each finds its identity in the other; each is postulated solely in terms of 
displacement and difference. 
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In the poem, a contradiction is evident right from the start. Desire for unity with the 
female is founded on an insistence of dualism: man/woman, Self/Other, etc. The 
presupposition of presence is merely the outcome of a fundamental dualistic opposition 
between body and spirit (with all its ramifications of outside and inside, existence and 
essence, language and thought, conscious and unconscious). Msimang undermines this 
dualism: his poem has precisely this function of erasing the barriers erected by dualism. 
Not only does he achieve this through his imagery, casting the beloved in the role of one 
high in the heavens as well as deep in the earth, but the opposition between body and soul 
is also erased in the poem. Although the soul is privileged over the body, it is the body that 
the speaker covets. This is confirmed by the round imagery as well as the repeated 
requests to open up "Uze ungivulele ngingene " (until you open for me so that I can enter). 
This is even more significant if one considers where the beloved is situated at the time of 
the request - in the hut "usexhibeni" - and the entrance or doorway of the hut is associated 
with the female organ (Berglund, 1989:228). 
Similar to Western philosophy, the earth is viewed as feminine by the Zulus "the earth is 
a mother" (Berglund, 1989:34) and the sky as a man: 
The sky is like a husband because the sky is above the earth ... they are 
twins, but they are also husband and wife. We call them twins because we 
do not know which one is the more important .. we do not say that one is 
greater than the other (Berglund, 1989:34). 
The above interpretation contains interesting possibilities of an 'incestuous' relationship. 
Initially, the beloved is mainly associated with the earth. Even when she is associated with 
a high entity like the top of the highest branches, the tree is still firmly planted on the 
ground. In the second last stanza however, this aspect changes dramatically. She is 
transposed now as a being high up on the clouds - the dominion of the masculine. The 
speaker himself is connected (quite rightly) to the realm of the heavens, "Ngimpampe 
phezu kwesibhakabhaka" (I move swiftly above the heaven). This blurring of the 
boundaries which categorise the beloved exists throughout the poem. As such, the poem 
deconstructs itself The poem signals a divergence in its effort to overcome dualism. It 
brings out into the open the hidden nostalgia for presence, which is suppressed and 
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paradoxically, intensifies this nostalgia, makes it an end in itself through sheer intensity of 
concentration and feeling. 
One image to be dealt with at this stage is that of circular objects; like 'water-pot', 'head', 
'eyes', 'kraal', 'hut'. The circle is implicit throughout the poem in the images depicting 
the beloved as 'round'. These round images are representations of the fertile womb (like 
mind) which receives the divine seed of revelatory knowledge - the conception being the 
goal of his desire. This is confirmed by the prominent motif of water, as found in the title 
and throughout the poem. The significance of the water image in the proposed 
transformational process becomes apparent if it is borne in mind that water and thirst 
represent not only bodily needs, but also intellectual needs - a thirst for knowledge. Man 
is born thirsty, created with certain wants which demand immediate slaking iflife is to be 
sustained. The request for a drink of water can thus be read in these terms, as well as a 
desire for sexual intercourse. This is substantiated by the traditional Zulu view of water: 
Conception comes through water (of men). Clarity comes through water 
... always drinking the water of the vessel (Berglund, 1989:178) . 
... life (impilo) comes from the one above. He was giving fertility to the 
woman (Berglund, 1989: 143). 
It is interesting to note that the verb "-vuka" (awake) in the first line of the poem also 
constitutes the noun "ukuvuka" associated with alertness, and which is also related to the 
erection of the male member (Berglund, 1989:354). But water is also a healing and 
cleansing symbol as well as a carrier of power. It is not only a fertility symbol and medium 
of purification from evil, but 
it is also a carrier of life itself in that semen is described as water and it is 
from 'the water of the womb' that the child is born (Berglund, 1989:338). 
Considering the view that the earth is female and the sky male, the water image enhances 
the picture as follows: 
The husband fertilizes the wife.. It is the water of the sky which causes 
something to happen on the earth. Like no woman can bear a child without 
the assistance of a man, so the earth cannot produce food if the sky does 
not work with water on it (reference to sexual act) (Berglund, 1989:62). 
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It is furthermore significant that the poem consists of nine stanzas of ten lines each. The 
number ten is extremely symbolic in Zulu tradition, as well as the number nine, both 
relating to a woman's pregnancy period before giving birth. Water places a role here 
again. The child grows for nine months (or moons) and is born in the tenth. The Zulu tend 
to compare the child in the womb to a snake (symbol of ancestors): 
It (the snake) is like the child when it comes out of the womb. The snake 
discards the skin as the child discards the placenta. That is the first thing. 
The second is that it does this thing in water, in the time of the dew. When 
the grass is wet and the water is on it, then the snake does this thing, 
discarding the skin. The dew is like the water of the womb .... The third 
thing is that the snake discards (its skin) in the night. That is in the 
darkness. The child is moulded in the darkness. The darkness is the womb 
(Berglund, 1989:94-95). 
What the speaker desires is a perfect relationship, but the imagery suggests how a sensual 
thirst and desire is something that has to be taken account of in his feelings. There is a 
repeated pattern of something ideal set against the complexity of feelings and experience. 
This is done with increasing subtlety. However, perfection is transient, like the waves of 
the sea. For example, in the stanza describing the crossing of the great and tumultuous 
oceamc divide, the depiction of the surrounding sea mirrors at the same time a 
psychological state: 
Lapho umsinga udloba okwendlondlo 
Namadlambi edlangile ngolaka, 
Ngiyokweneka inhliziyo yami 
!be isihlenga sokuwela 
(When the whirlpool rages unrestrained like a homed viper 
And the waves are overpowering with wrath, 
I shall spread out my heart 
To become a raft to cross) 
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The speaker believes his inner faculties to be so calm that he will be her saviour or lifeboat. 
The impression gained from the previous stanza, however, argues against this statement. 
He is agitated, on an emotional joyride - "Kuphakame ithemba lami" (my hope is raised), 
"ungigqib' ithemba" (you annihilate hope) - like the indlondlo in these lines, an old and 
overgrown venomous imamba, very quick and easily irritated. Even the noun "ulaka" 
is ambiguous, for anger, wrath and passion are all termed "ulaka". 
It is clear that, what excluded the future usefulness of the metaphor of 'water' is the fact 
that an aporia was revealed through it. Ifhe does drink her water, the speaker will become 
an illuminary, impregnated with divine knowledge. However, his desire is not satisfied, his 
quest not at an end, even though he has reached fulfilment and is pregnant with the word 
(as a compiler of poems and songs): 
Ngishaye ugubhu ngihaye 
Ngivume inkondlo kaNomathemba 
Ngigudle izintaba ngihaye 
(I play the harmonium and compose 
I sing a song of Hope 
I skirt the mountains and sing) 
The knowledge is not illuminative but illusionary. De Man concurs with this and specifies 
that "there is no longer such an illusion as that of knowledge but only feigned truths" 
(1979b:272). He suggests that one adopt a sceptical attitude to experience, saying that 
"we can no longer hope ever 'to know' in peace" (1979b:273). In so far as the speaker 
wishes to fulfil his desire and achieve a permanent condition ofideal love, he is doomed to 
failure. At the very moment of the closing of the circle of desire and fulfilment, the object 
thus enclosed loses its efficacy and the circle is immediately erased. 
Repetition is observed in this stanza, but the whole poem moves in the same direction, 
emphasizing the permanent cyclical repetitions of natural temporality. Each repetition 
regarding roundness is however not another circle going around and around in the same 
grove, but rather is in the form of a 'widening gyre' like the image of the whirlpool 
"umsinga" in the poem. Jacques Lacan explains that 
the key to this insistence on repetition is that in its essence repetition as 
repetition of the symbolical sameness is impossible . . . it assures the 
difference only of identity - not by effect of sameness or difference but by 
the difference of identity (1977:192). 
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Every stanza is thus a repetition which encompasses most of what has previously been 
brought to light, and moves the entire :framework forward slightly, into a new field, where 
new things can be brought to light, and the old items restudied in light of this new 
understanding. 
The narrator's avid search for the female figure and her hidden knowledge, which could 
be of the meaning and origin of life, is first shrouded in the imagery of magic and 
enchantment. The speaker depicts himself as a herbalist engaged in pounding white powder 
"ubulawu obumhlophe" to be used as a love potion. Krige (1988: 117-118) affirms that 
this practice is not unusual among the Zulu: 
Right from the time of puberty love-making plays an important part in [the 
man's] life; and there is no medicine that is in greater demand than the love-
charm. There is a great variety of love-charms in use among the Zulus ... 
Medicines can be used by a man to make himself attractive to the girls, but 
most of them are administered to girls to cause them to love him, and there 
are some medicines that make girls dream about a man and others that 
cause hysterical fits in a girl, so that she will cry for the man who has 
administered them. 
This preoccupation to possess the desired being encompasses the whole poem. The 
herbalist-poet professes to making love potions which should generate a positive response. 
An ambiguous confluence of opposites is established, which is to be developed in the poem 
in the subsequent equivocations of good and evil, truth and falsehood, vision and illusion. 
If successful, what the use of the medicinal love-charms will result in, is gaining influence 
over the female. But in 'fixing' the female, her power of choice will be erased. This would 
not be a positive outcome (for her). The question, however, is not whether the notion of 
the spell-casting speaker and procedures is morally correct, but, rather, what it means and 
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how it contributes to an understanding of this poem. In other words, the efficacy of his 
spell is at stake. 
It appears, moreover, that the narrator himself is doubtful of acquiring the secret 
knowledge he aspires to. Although he professes to be inspired, he is nonetheless desperate, 
staking his life on some hope. There is no suggestion here of calm certitude: 
Nawe ungishingilele 
Kumbe ungishalazele 
Kumbe ungibhembesele. 
(And you tum away from me 
Perhaps you shun me 
Perhaps you treat me inconsiderately.) 
The purpose of the ritual is to make manifest that which is hidden from the speaker, to 
make visible what is invisible. This is first taken to be the female's declaration oflove to 
him. He has perceived the evidence of her absence, and by pursuing these signs 
endeavours to arrive at the full presence of her being. Furthermore, the potential fullness 
of sexual union resides in its promise to overcome the duality of subject and object. But 
the envisaged fullness is delusive and what opens up between the self and other is the void 
of death. Fullness is actually emptiness. The magic that would have exposed the female's 
secrets proves to be impotent. The revelation never occurs, the mystery remains veiled and 
the answer is deferred. 
Language offers a tantalizing promise of full satisfaction of desire, of merging with the 
'Other' who is the centre of speech. Language presents itself as self-consciousness, the 
identification of self with consciousness and the transformation of the divided self to 
become the unitary self This is the allure of language. But language is differance: the 
displacement and deferral of self-presence, fulfilment, identity. The projected 
transformation is transgressive and remains at the level of potential and promise. Instead 
of containing the identification of consciousness and expression, idea and representation, 
and thus effecting a germination of transformational meaning, language disseminates 
meaning in consequence of what, in psychological notation, can be termed castration, its 
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failure to be the organ of penetration into the mystery and impotency of being (Derrida, 
1981a:86). The trauma of castration condemns language to perpetual and futile repetition 
and thus orientates it towards death (De Man 1979b: 108). The aim oflanguage is death: 
there is a significant configuration of desire and death. 
The speaker's pursuit leads him to the threshold of death, beyond which he cannot explore 
in person, bounded as he is by his physical state. The only way in which this point can be 
transgressed is with the aid of an intermediary operating between these exclusive realms, 
and this is found in the figure of Elijah: 
Njengo-Elija wasendulo, 
Ngigibele inqola yomlilo 
Ngingqongqoze emasangweni ezulu, 
(Just like Elijah of antiquity, 
I ride the chariot of fire 
I knock at the gates of heaven) 
As such, the speaker seeks to bring about a transformation from one state to another: from 
the state of finite, phenomenal existence to the state of ideal, infinite existence found with 
his love. The subject/object union, striven for, is unachievable, and the self is always 
prevented from fulfilling "an illusory identification with the non-self' (De Man, 
1979b:207). The motivation for seeking this union is that the existence of natural objects, 
or at least nature altogether, is not time bound, like that of a human being, who has "an 
authentically temporal destiny" (De Man, 1979b:206). Humankind, for whom 
"understanding can be called complete only when it becomes aware of its own temporal 
predicament" (De Man, 1979b:32), yearns to escape time, to "take refuge against the 
impact of time in a natural world to which, in truth [the self] ... bears no resemblance" (De 
Man, 1979b:206). Humans exist only in time, that is their definition, their destiny and their 
tragedy, since time must bring with it death. The quest of poetry, as Bloom will repeat 
again and again, is the quest for eternity, the overcoming of death. This awareness of 
death is ever present. "The intermediary of death" states Lacan, "can be recognised in 
every relation in which man comes to the life of his history" (1977: 104). 
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The rest of the poem can also read in the light of this perception. The spell-casting speaker 
gambles on the possibility of eternal life which, in his idealistic conception, is the only life. 
This analysis also explains why the narrator should be oppressed with misgiving and 
uncertainty as to the success of his pursuit. Subsequently, the desired penetration of the 
depth of the deep mysteries never occurs. The act never materializes and the narrator is, 
in fact, no closer to the secret than he was earlier at the start. The last line of the poem 
echoes a desperate plea: 
Ungivulele, ungivumele ngibuse. 
(Open up for me, allow me to enjoy life.) 
Language cannot but collapse under the weight ofthis mystery. The only change that is 
possible at this point is not transformation but substitution; that is, the replacement of one 
image or verbal configuration by another. The supplementary, phenomenal chain of 
signification fails to be interrupted by the intrusion of an absolute, transcendental meaning 
of origins. There is a sense, however, in which the transformation of the phenomenal into 
the ideal does occur. But in order to perceive this, the poem needs to be read in a different 
register. In this register, the frame of reference is not primarily the effects of magic and the 
secret of eternal life but incestuous desire and sublimation. Reading the text as such, helps 
to endow it with a diversity of contradictory sexual significations. 
It has already been noted that the poem makes use of natural images: earth, ocean, air. The 
speaker declares his desire for his love via nature, identifies his love with nature and aspires 
to recompense nature's love with his own. However, both the sensitivity to perceive and 
the power to give such love is contingent on the will of the mother (Lacan, 1994: 11 ). As 
conceived in especially Jungian literature, it is the 'Great Mother' who determines the 
affections which binds all nature. The mother is the force behind nature, the mysterious 
original power holding it all together. It could therefore be the mother to whom the pleas 
are then addressed. The possession of the female form could then be a replacement for this 
lost mother. Through his mother he establishes a direct filial bond to nature, and the poem 
is thus a re-enactment of that search for the lost bond. 
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When viewing the text in this manner, one has to accept Freud's doctrines about the 
unconscious attitudes of a male to his mother, father and lover and the disguised 
manifestations of these attitudes in the mode of symbolic displacements, condensations and 
inversions. The mother is seen as the parent of the unfathomable world. In an attempt to 
penetrate the unfathomable mystery of the world the speaker therefore invokes the mother 
from whose womb the world issued. The narrator is thus in search of the secret of the 
womb. She is the earth, he is the sky, just as a husband and wife. In other words, the 
speaker's desire could be interpreted as 'incestuous'. However, this desire is incapable of 
being fulfilled because its object is denied. Consequently it must seek transformation, it 
must undergo sublimation whereby a new object replaces the forbidden one. His sexual 
energy is diverted into a culturally higher activity, that of religion, as seen in the last two 
stanzas. The 'incestuous' wish remains the source of desire, but the love object is 
indefinitely displaced. 
However, the notion of the mother should be placed under erasure as well. It is not the 
mother as such who is the object of desire, she is simply a metaphor, an image, an arbitrary 
and shifting collection of emotional needs. Desire attaches itself to the idea of the mother, 
as it is attached to the idea of an originary truth - and, by extension, to the idea of the 
beloved who fulfills the lover by conferring wholeness and meaning on his experience of 
incompleteness and meaninglessness. Desire is not primarily for the mother, for truth, or 
for the beloved. It is, before all else, desire for the undefinable 'Other' (Lacan, 1991 :221 ). 
Desire constantly transfers its attention from one object to another, as the Other changes 
and assumes a variety of faces: "Wena ophezu kwezihlahla" (you on top of the shrubs), 
"Noma uphezulu kwelenyoni" (or high up on the highest branch), "Wena ophansi 
ekujuleni" (you below in the depths), "Wena ongaphesheya kwezilwandle" (you across 
the oceans), "Wena ongaphezu kwamafu" (you above the clouds). In Lacan the subject 
constantly seeks for unity with the imagined source of truth, with the 'Other'. But because 
this 'Other' is not available, the result in the subject is unrelieved desire, a desire 
occasioned by its own lack (Lacan, 1994: 11 ). 
Otherness is both an inner condition (the relationship between the consc10us and 
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unconscious systems) and an outer condition (the relationship between the subject and the 
external world). And because of this flexibility of the term, as well as the ease with which 
it can be displaced in the dialectical formulation, it serves at the same time to break down 
rigid dualistic oppositions between, for example, inner and outer, subject and object, 
conscious and unconscious, thought and language, spirit and matter, ideal and phenomenal. 
One encounters the 'desire for the Other' especially with Lacan. One's relation with 
oneselfis constructed from the outside. As such, one learns who one is because others tell 
one. Eagleton (1983:174) puts this as follows: 
We desire what others - our parents, for instance - unconsciously desire for 
us; and desire can only happen because we are caught up in linguistic, 
sexual and social relations - the whole field of the 'Other' - which generate 
it. 
Lacan brings together the two notions of otherness and desire, which consequently makes 
the semantic and syntactic strains become even more evident: 
Desire is that which is manifested in the interval that demand hollows 
within itself, in as much as the subject, in articulating the signifying chain, 
brings to light the want-to-be, together with the appeal to receive the 
complement from the Other, if the Other, the locus of speech, is also the 
locus ofthis want, or lack (1977:263). 
This bottomless abyss of desire is here represented in the very idea of the beloved as idea, 
is a projection of the speaker longing for complete communion. She is the complement and 
completion of his discourse with himself: the beloved Other to whom the Self addresses 
its speech and in the process creates in its own image. Ideal love is the perfect communion 
of the lover and the beloved, of Self and Other. On closer inspection such a love betrays 
itself as ideality - the very concept of love includes the notions of knowledge and truth, 
notions exposed by deconstruction as fallacious. 
The Self engages in a discourse with the Other because of an enigmatic experience of 
absence - of that which would confer on it fullness of being. It is therefore a restless, 
searching discourse. The Self speaks, but its speech is situated in and directed towards the 
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Other, since the Self is voice. Conversely, the Self is eloquent in its discourse of absence 
and lack. Nowhere in this poem does the Self and Other unite in speech. The Self speaks 
to the Other only to erase the Other, between whom there is an unbridgeable gulf and thus 
in reality speaks only to itself This illustrates the insufficiency of the Self and its 
displacement in the Other. The subject's failure to recognise this means that he will not be 
able to escape the captivations of the imaginary. That is, the subject will continue to 
assume lack of fulfilment and a false sense of being are the result of identifying with the 
wrongly named desire, something that can be remedied by renaming it correctly. The 
subject, says Lacan, "exhausts himselfin pursuing the desire of the Other" because he does 
not realise that his "own desire is the desire of the Other" (1991:221). 
For a Freudian interpretation, one can furthermore focus on the longing of the incomplete 
self (psyche) for fulfilment: "The mind (psyche) imaginatively creates or envisions what it 
does not have ( epipsyche ), and then seeks to possess epipsyche, to move towards it as a 
goal" (Baker, 1948:35). The speaker's mind is suddenly awakened and thirsts for 
intercourse with an intelligence similar to itself He emulates to himself the Being whom 
he loves. Conversant with speculations of the sublime and perfect nature, the vision in 
which he embodies his own imaginations unites all of the wonderful which the lover could 
depicture. The perfect (but impossible) ideal Being is a projection in which is embodied 
the speaker's imaginations. He seeks in vain for a prototype of his conception. The 
awakening to love is thus defined as a sudden realization of absence, which then gives rise 
to longing. The speaker is certainly not at peace after his encounter. It leaves him with 
a feeling of uncertainty since he cannot extract from it an unequivocal meaning. 
A Jungian reading of the poem would see this desire to penetrate the realm as a desire to 
penetrate and be absorbed in the unconscious mind, from which the archetype of the eternal 
woman had surfaced and briefly revealed itself to the conscious mind. The motive of this 
subliminal journey would be the quest for selfhood. In Jungian terms selfhood is brought 
about by the reconciliation and integration of psychical opposites - and more especially by 
the reconciliation of the masculine and feminine aspects of the psyche. This alternative view 
would see the poem as revealing the fallacy and futility of this Jungian quest for selfhood. 
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To support this contention, there are in the poem unmistakable references to the doubts 
and possibilities of self-delusion accompanying the speaker's quest. The speaker fails to 
realize this ideal of integrated selfhood. The principle objection to this type of reading, 
from the deconstructive point of view, is the postulation of selfhood as a determinable, 
stable, unified, and self-identical entity. 
Given this ambiguity and uncertainty, together with the suggestion of self-negation, the 
conditions and objectives of the quest are seriously questioned. It is clear, moreover, that 
self-knowledge is a hazardous goal to attain, as the quest for it leads the speaker into the 
perilous depths and vertiginous heights of experience. To repress self-knowledge is to 
avoid the dangers of the quest, but in so doing the possibility of mastering experience is 
lost. Knowledge of selfis linked with the development of the imagination and the potential 
for creative action in word and deed. Far from indicating that selfhood is a determinable 
goal, the implication is that it is always receding, always doubtful. The quest is never at 
an end. 
Thus far the general picture painted regarding this poem reads as follows. The narrator is 
in search of what he lacks, the lost object of desire, the female figure, the mother, the 
Other. This object is polymorphous, representing an open field of play in which desire is 
given limitless gratification. The narrator, as subject, is a discursive, written subject, and 
therefore seeks the lost object of desire in language. Hence language is both the object of 
desire and the expression of desire. As discursive subject constituted by desire, the 
narrator discovers himself only in relation to the Other. He is structurally displaced as a 
dialectic of Self and Other. His desire is deflected from the figure, the open tropological 
field of play, onto a seemingly infinite object, yet this also turns out to be a closed trope. 
So far in this discussion the dialectic of Self and Other has been deployed in what is 
perhaps a bewildering variety of contexts. The purpose, however, is to attempt to dislodge 
the reader's habitual thought structures and set in motion a resonance and amplification of 
dialectical play. Deconstructive strategy requires this kind of conceptual flexibility to bring 
about the liberation of the signifier from metaphysical and textual closure. In particular, 
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it is Lacan who gives sanction to this specific rhetorical device. Malcolm Bowie 
comments: 
More consistently than any other ofLacan's terms 'the Other' refuses to 
yield to a single sense; in each ofits incarnations it is that which introduces 
'lack' and 'gap' into the operations of the subject and which, in doing so, 
incapacitates the subject for selfhood, or inwardness, or apperception, or 
plentitude; it guarantees the indestructibility of desire by keeping the goals 
of desire in perpetual flight (1979: 134). 
Through imagery of nature, the speaker attempts to decipher the mysteries. However, his 
perseverance is never rewarded in the poem. Deconstructively seen, what is offered to his 
sight as presence immediately, then, becomes a figure of absence. He is deluded by a 
dissimulation of truth, by a simulacrum of an originary essence or centre that is 
determinate, comprehensible, and unchanging - for all eternity. Truth is ambiguous, 
indeterminate, and displaced - never identical with itself - truth without centre: knowledge 
and meaning are deferred and postponed indefinitely by the intervention oflanguage. In 
summary, the search for truth and the search for the lost object oflove are governed by the 
same mechanism of substitution. In both, blindness, not insight, governs expression. 
Analogous to previous chapters of this thesis, one observes that Msimang' s verse displays 
a logic of substitution corresponding with that proposed by deconstructive theory and 
therefore aligned with the notions of'self-effacement', 'differance', and 'play'. In its most 
subtle form, the logic of substitution (which is also the logic of the trace) requires a 
suspension oflinearist thinking in favour of what Derrida terms pluri-dimensional thinking. 
In this poem, there is also a continuous play of substitution traversing and going beyond 
the text - a flutter ofinnumerable veils beyond which there is nothing but more veils. When 
something definite and originary seems to present itself, it turns out that this is only a 
deceptive substitute of presence. 
Msimang' s poem is a flexible, open indeterminable realm of shifting and elusive 
perceptions; a realm without centre and without limits, founded upon a dialectic rather than 
a dualistic assumption. And finally, permeating the text is the free-play of desire - the 
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forbidden discourse of desire; discourse structured as desire - displaced, substitutive, 
indeterminate, founded on a lack, an absence of presence, a longing to create presence, and 
issuing in a passionate drive to unite with the Other. 
Another poem with similar echoes of desire and death is 'Langa lami' (Msimang, 1980: 1 ): 
Langalami 
1 Siphethu sempilo yami nentokozo, 
2 Ngiyini ngaphandle kwakho? 
3 Nxa bekusitha kimi 
4 Ngiyogqokwa yithunzi lobumnyama ... 
5 Nokufa! 
6 Lapho ungikhanyisela 
7 Umphefumulo uqhakaza injabulo, 
8 Inhliziyo yembathe imfudumalo. 
9 Umoya wezinsunsu 
10 Namathunzi emishwabulo 
11 Kushabalala njengamazolo. 
12 Ungashoni langa lami, 
13 Sihambisane sixhakene 
14 Size sehlukaniswe ... 
15 Ukufa! 
In this poem, the speaker professes an utter dependence on his/her "langa" (sun), avowing 
that this entity is his/her life and without this being, he/she is nothing. This confession is 
constructed on certain conspicuous imagery and oppositions. One can deduce that it is a 
male speaker addressing his female beloved, since the subject is the male poet. Again, as 
in the previous poem read, it would however, be more acceptable to regard the addressed 
person or entity simply as the Other, and, in so doing, to accept rather than attempt to 
suppress the ambiguity this status embodies. 
The first section of the poem delineates the Other as of an earthly nature "Siphethu 
sempilo " (spring/fountain of life). In the second part, this being is transformed to a 
celestial body, the sun. The sun is customarily regarded as a source endowing objects with 
splendour. The sun is the primary source oflight and life, just as woman is traditionally 
a metaphor of love and beauty. In this poem the two are fused visually as well as 
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conceptually. But the poem starts off with the image of a spring- the result is a complex 
image offering in terms of meaning the multi-dimensionality it embodies visually. In the 
first line of the poem, the Other already has an identifiable form which is an intermixture 
of light ( "ilanga ") and motion ( "siphethu "). 
A deconstructive reading, however, complicates this by questioning these distinctions 
which are all dependant on the determining metaphor "ilanga" of the division between the 
invisible and visible worlds (Self/Other, day/night, light/dark, inner/outer, ideal/fallen, 
perfect/ imperfect, spirit/matter, permanent/transitory, union/division, whole/fragmentary). 
By simply glancing at the oppositions listed, it is apparent that they are not stable, for 
Other (which is placed as the subordinated second term) is parallelled to dark, imperfect, 
fragmentary, etc. This is not the intent which the poem imparts. Additionally, by reversing 
the hierarchy of domination of certain binary oppositions in the poem, the other binarisms 
also collapse. 
The day/night opposition, for example, is a tried and tested deconstructive archetype. 
Derrida himself stresses the reliance of traditional philosophical systems on certain 
metaphors or 'tropes' such as day/night, in which terms for the visual sense-perception in 
the presence or absence oflight are applied. The sun, as the source oflight, constitutes the 
necessary condition for the very opposition between seeing and not-seeing, hence between 
presence and absence: 
Such mental tropes, like their visual correlates, must assume a source of 
light, which is ultimately the sun; and with his customary wit, Derrida 
names this key trope of West em thought - which as metaphor is also an 
instance of what are traditionally called 'flowers of rhetoric' - the 
'heliotrope' that is, a kind of sunflower of rhetoric (Abrams in Rajnath, 
1989:59). 
As such, this metaphor in which the sun or day are equated with light undoes itselfin the 
duplicity of its equation. The visible sun, itself ever turning, rises only to set again, 
similarly light only appears to disappear. For as a new day arises, so will the night also set 
in, and the cycle will begin again, for ever keeping the idea of a beginning in alternate 
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freeplay with the idea of a return. 
The sun serves Derrida as a classic trope for the founding presence, or logos, which by 
logocentric language is ever needed and always lost. The poem thus allegorically re-enacts 
the inescapable dilemma of logocentric language, and that is the reliance on a logos, or 
ground outside the system oflanguage which is always needed, always relied on, but never 
available. By following a logical track through the poem by means of undoing oppositions, 
the reader arrives at blank contradictions. The reader is caught in an irrepressible 
vacillation unfulfilling to the mind and incapable of being grounded in anything outside the 
activity of the poem itself 
It is curious to notice that in this poem the sun is assumedly equated with a woman, while 
the normal human association will be a man. One of the meanings of "ilanga" is then also 
a fine, handsome fellow. Traditionally, the sun is symbol of the direct son and heir of the 
god of heaven, the sun is also associated with the hero and the father who comforts the 
heaven, the father-sun as logos, as head, power and source of meaning. The water-
metaphor enhances the muddling of the margins more; "isiphethu" (spring) is described 
as living waters and is associated with a man and his virility. However, the spring is 
earthly bound, and the earth is female, endowing the figure with androgynous 
characteristics. 
The poem thus enacts a version of a constantly repeated drama of the lost sun. To possess 
the Other would be a means of rejoining the source oflight. To the speaker, death would 
mean the loss of both light and the source oflight: 
Ngiyogqokwa yithunzi lobumnyama ... 
Nokuja! 
(I shall be covered by the shadow of darkness ... 
And death!) 
This represents the loss of the logos, willing his words weak. This is typified by the dots 
in the fifth and fourteenth lines. The dots tempt the reader into picturing some reality 
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outside themselves, but the picture is finally another sign or text that perpetuates the chain 
that it promises to end. The dots inspire the longing for something there, yet render 
arbitrary whatever appears. Accordingly, every thought is cancelled out and erased - made 
void by the three dots on the page - instead of the expected revelation, there is a break in 
the sentence, followed by the single revelation of death. This affirmation of death is 
deliberately suspended in uncertainty and equivocation, so that the poem does not yield to 
a simple interpretation. The life and death antimony is interwoven with the oppositionary 
pair light and darkness. As the embodiment of life and light, the Other represents an 
animating and glorifying principle producing happiness in his soul and warmth in his heart: 
"Umphefumulo uqhakaza injabulo,I Inhliziyo yembathe imfudumalo." 
The death image effectively conveys the sense of rupture and the feelings of absence and 
longing which will haunt him if they part. Without the Other, the speaker is without being, 
without substance, in despair. His conviction then is that his centre does not lie in himself 
but in something beyond him, in the Other. Therefore, and this is the important point, it 
is in the Other, in that which is not him, that he must find himself As such, the poem itself 
undoes the Self/Other opposition. The Other is the substantive reality, the speaker is 
simply a reflection of this Other. The Self is perceived in the Other, just as God perceives 
himself in creation. He is not an originary and autonomous subject, his existence is 
derivatory. The notion of the sun as an originary source of course defines the speaker as 
supplementary, with its usual associations of addition, replacement and usurpation. In this 
way the dialectic asserts itself as a complex and inconclusive process of inversion and 
reversion - a process in which the dualistic opposition serving to increase the dialectical 
play is erased. 
What the speaker has striven to do is to achieve a transformation of himself whereby he is 
permanently united, fully merged with the Other, until "sehlukaniswe . .. ukufa" (we are 
parted by ... death). In this poem he seeks a divine oneness, in order to overcome the 
dualism of subject and object, man and woman, Self and Other. The speaker sees himself 
as light-dependent and the Other as light personified, this union achieves self-sufficiency 
in that he is sustained exclusively by the Other: 
Ngiyini ngaphandle kwakho? 
Nxa bekusitha kimi 
Lapho ungikhanyisela 
Umphefamulo uqhakaza injabulo, 
Inhliziyo yembathe imfadumalo. 
(What am I without you? 
If they shade you from me 
When you give light to me 
The soul bursts into happiness 
The heart is enveloped in warmth.) 
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Their relationship constitutes neither one of symbiosis nor antibiosis, but could be 
parasitical on behalf of the speaker. As such, one has to conceive of the unity as 
simultaneous with the diversity, and the transformation stated here is therefore chimerical. 
The coexistence of difference and unity is of course a paradox, since it contradicts logical 
reasoning to conceive of such a thing. This paradox (or paralogism) is, moreover, evident 
in deconstruction theory as well. The deconstructive phrase 'differential network', used 
to describe language, also contains a paradox - the paradox of difference and unity. The 
differential network of signification exists as a play, a dialectic of difference and unity. 
In the presence and/or non-presence of the sun, language, as a play of differentiation, is 
reduced to shade and shadows. The shadow is an interesting concept. It is an image of 
presence and absence, a shadow cast is present, yet precisely as a shadow, it is also absent. 
It is there, but not really. Some of the explications given of the word "ithunzi" (shadow) 
are 'dimness', 'dullness oflight' even a type of 'transparency'. The poem is governed by 
the imagery oflight and shadow, or oflight differentiated within itself. Any reading of the 
poem must thread its way through repeated configurations of the polarity of light and 
shadow. Ironically, the polarity constantly has to reform itself as light turns into shadow 
in the presence of a light. 
The poem also represents a moment of psychic defence on the part of the speaker, who is 
manifesting a death anxiety, a defence against a repressed desire, in this case, death, 
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imagined as shadow (or darkness, which is the absence of colour). The poem takes the 
form of a reaction against that desire, in this case, the perpetuation of life as illustrated in 
the sun, light, the presence of colour. Psychically, the poet has here turned against the 
result of death with an image oflight as reaction formation (life). 
Language remains inextricably bound up with the metaphysical system (presence, dualism, 
origin, non-contradiction). One cannot move out of language without moving out of 
metaphysics. And the possibility of escape, of transgression of the limits of metaphysics 
is dictated by language, for language is the very fabric of desire. Its role is that of the 
Other. To seek to merge with the Other is to seek to and merge with language and desire. 
In these merely fifteen lines of the poem, the speaker tries to define what the Other 
represents to him, but language is still inadequate for the task. This is contemplated in the 
application of the diacritical dots. This inability of language to characterize the Other 
stems from the fact that she is the embodiment of empyrean life, while language is 
inextricably bound to earthly existence, which is death. Above all, the Other is a metaphor. 
This term effectively embraces the others: 'spring' , 'light' , 'sun', which can be regarded 
as the characteristics, the defining features, of the metaphor of the Other. However, ifthe 
Other is to be regarded as a metaphor, it means she is a linguistic construction. 
Conversely, language is metaphor, for as Iginla (1978:30-31) observes "language ... is a 
metaphoric machine in which bodies and objective are transferred, transposed, displaced, 
substituted, and repressed". The significance of the addressee lies in her alleged otherness; 
she is a mark of absence. She cannot be reduced to a single signification and as such is an 
idealistic figure representing a play of presence and absence, resemblance and difference, 
sameness and otherness, transformation and change, and thus to the perpetual deferment 
of meaning. 
Death is not portrayed in the poem as a liberating and affirmative occurrence. Death is 
here simply a trope, and has been deployed as such throughout this reading. What is of 
special concern is the different forms or meanings of death encountered - its multiple 
metaphorical connotations. Hope is linked with the promise oflife - the promise of a more 
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intense and abundant life. On the other hand, despair is linked with death, with a feeling 
of the emptiness and separation. However, this death impulse is given the character of 
inevitability and necessity. Just like day leads night, the speaker is naturally progressing 
towards the portals of death by a relentless and irresistible force, called life. It is his destiny 
to die, a fate against which he is powerless to exercise his free will. Nietzsche (1974:49) 
makes the following observation: 
Let us beware of saying that death is opposed to life. The living is merely 
a type of what is dead, and a very rare type. 
This reference effectively illustrates cryptically that life is contained in death, not set against 
it. In terms ofthis thinking, life is governed by death and, conversely, death is immanent 
in life. What is important in this conception is that the dualism of life and death is erased. 
The noteworthy point is that death is not a negation, a negative value to be contrasted with 
the positive value oflife. Rather, life is a type of death. That is, it is of the same order as 
death, and this order is that of the trace. Derrida takes his use of the word trace from a 
Freudian essay 'Note on the Mystic Writing Pad': 
The writing-pad in question was a toy sold for children on which messages 
could be written with a hard stylus, but apparently removed by detaching 
its double covering sheet from the wax slab on which this rested. What 
interested Freud was that although this operation rendered the writing in 
question invisible, it did not remove it utterly. The written message was 
still there, imprinted on the wax, hidden but not completely erased. Thus 
the wax base could be compared with the unconscious, from which (as 
Freud repeated on several occasions) nothing was ever completely erased, 
while the outer layer of celluloid and translucent waxed paper would 
accordingly be taken to represent the conscious mind which sends 
information on to the unconscious without retaining it. Moreover, the 
writing that becomes visible on the pad as a result of the use of the stylus 
was already there, in the sense that the use of the stylus only makes visible 
part of the wax block that pre-existed the act of writing (Hawthorn, 
1992:7). 
When the words written on the writing pad are removed, a slight scratch or trace of them 
remains on the surface. Freud sees this to be representative of the manner in which a trace 
"is left in our psychical apparatus of the perceptions which impinge upon it" (quoted by 
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Derrida 1978:216). But the perceptions themselves are more than this trace: they are 
constituted by the relation between this trace and that which makes them visible. For 
Derrida, the trace would thus be 
the erasure of selfhood, of one's own presence, and is constituted by the 
threat or anguish ofits irremediable disappearance, of the disappearance of 
its disappearance. An unerasable trace is not a trace, it is a full presence 
(1978:220). 
Articulated psychoanalytically, a stimulus which lands in the unconscious, leaves a 
permanent trace, which much later surfaces as delayed action in the consciousness. Not 
as 'original' stimulus, but as trace which is absent in its presence because it is transcribed 
in a texture/weave/web which exists out of traces: 
The unconscious text is already a weave of traces, differences in which 
meaning and force are united - a text nowhere present, consisting of 
archives which are always already transcriptions (Derrida, 1982:21). 
That is why an analysis of the traces in the psyche is unending: "The dream-thoughts ... 
cannot ... have any definite endings: they are bound to branch out in every direction into 
the intricate network of our world of thought" (Freud as quoted by Spivak in Derrida, 
1976:xl vii). A continuous and permanent renewal of differentiations and interpretations 
is thus necessary. 
In this sense, neither life nor death is originary nor present in and of itself, referring only 
to itself The presence-absence dichotomy dissolves into a structure of difference, the play 
of differences and of the trace of difference. Life and death as positivist concepts thus give 
way to the notion oflife and death as differentially related, with neither being ontologically 
secure. Derrida (1976:71) touches on this relationship when he speaks of"death as the 
concrete structure of the living present". 
It seems here, at least, that the originary proto-writing is almost analogous to Jung's 
collective unconscious: in the trace may be found the memories of the human race. One 
might call the poem self-deconstructive in the sense that the despair at absence questions 
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the inception of presence which its metaphors generate. The speaker's endeavour to lift 
the surface veil of language and thereby discover a depth of meaning and reality is 
parallelled by his endeavour to discover her essential being, comprising 'light' , 'love', and 
'immortality'. 
The knowledge conveyed by language is illusionary, an entanglement ofinner wishes and 
external impressions. If language is identified with the unconscious, and ifit is irreducibly 
figurative, one is forced to conclude that the division between illusion and knowledge, 
internal processes and external perceptions, unconscious promptings and conscious 
understanding, is tenuous indeed. 
De Man would describe the condition of the poem as a celebration of the word's "pure 
anteriority", which surrenders "the desire to coincide" with "another sign that precedes it", 
instead assenting to its "temporal difference", "its authentically temporal predicament" 
(1979b:190-191). However, the word "predicament" in the last citation unlocks and 
releases language forth to mankind: 
the fate of being only temporal starts by belonging to a sequence of words 
but shifts to the consecutive, unrepeatable moments of our lives. And with 
the prohibition against the spatiality of a return, against any simple 
repetition, the moments can only run out, following one another to death 
(Krieger, 1989:21). 
The human condition is to fall into "the temporal void" (De Man, 1979b:203), just as the 
consciousness of death is in each moment. As such, one is compelled to concede to the 
alienation of the human subject confronting the "unbreachable distance" (De Man, 
1979b:209) in his/her transient deadlock, and with it the void, in effect his/her own death 
(Krieger, 1989:21). Death is the sole certainty in life. 
Death is acknowledged and confronted in the following poem by Msimang (1990:12-13), 
'Leso sivakashi ' (that visitor). The dominant image of death in this poem is of an uninvited 
guest, literally at the expense of the host: 
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Leso sivakashi 
1 Babengammemanga . .. 
2 W ayengalayezanga ... 
3 Ilanga lase lizihambele, 
4 Lase lingishiye ngingedwana. 
5 Ekusondeleni kwakhe endlini, 
6 lndlu yaqubuk' uhlevane, 
7 Iqhuqhiswa yilowo ngqoqwane, 
8 Nomlilo eziko waqal' ukulotha. 
9 Ekungqongqozeni kwakhe ngaqhaqhazela; 
10 Wangen' endlini ngingamvulelanga, 
11 Wah/ala nami ngendlovuyangena, 
12 Wala/a nami ngendlovuyangena. 
13 Wangihlek' usulu ngipaqupaquza 
14 Wangihlek' inhlinini ngijilajileka, 
15 Wangincish' umoya eqhosha, 
16 Wangiqhoshela ngikweqa amhlophe. 
17 Wangiwola ngezandlakazi, uNoliqhwa 
18 Wangithinta ngezinyawokazi, uNoliqhwa 
19 Wangembesa ngengubo yamakhaza, 
20 Wangibeka endlini yamakhaza. 
When reading the above text against itself, one uncovers certain unconscious dimensions, 
which its overt textuality glosses over or fails to recognise. This repressed unconscious 
within language is sensed, for example, heretofore in its title. The noun "isivakashi" 
(visitor) derives from the verb "-vakasha" meaning not merely visiting, but also to keep 
watch at night, patrol or be on sentry. This hints at the potential double aspect of 
"isivakashi ", as either welcome or unwelcome, or as changing from one to the other. This 
insinuation is further confirmed in a synonym of "isivakashi ", that is "umhambeli" 
(visitor) which has the same original root as "isihambeli'', which again is cognate with 
"isihambi" (passer-by, visitor, stranger). All these words thus also contain the meaning 
of someone unknown, against whom must be guarded, thereby inadvertently manifesting 
the potentially unwelcome status of the visitor. Similarly, the English word visitor or guest 
is etymologically cognate with the Latin word 'hostis ', which also means a stranger or an 
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enemy. This notion of hostility, then, is like the repressed unconscious of the word, and 
the process of deconstruction, in revealing the unconscious of the text, draws upon such 
disciplines as etymology in this way. 
The above categorisation of "isivakashi" (visitor) and 'host' has further consequences for 
the life and death binary. By means of word association, 'host' connects with its opposite 
'parasite', an additional manner of describing the relationship between the two opponents 
in the poem. Parasite is one of those words which calls up its apparent opposite, there is 
no parasite without its host. It has no meaning without that counterpart. According to the 
two main meanings in English, a parasite is any organism that grows, feeds, and is sheltered 
on or in a different organism while contributing nothing to the survival of its host, or a 
person who habitually takes advantage of the generosity of other without making any 
useful return. The image of host and parasite no doubt also describe 
the way some people feel about the relation of a deconstructive 
interpretation to the obvious or univocal reading. The parasite is 
destroying the host. The alien has invaded the house, perhaps to kill the 
father of the family in an act which does not look like parricide, but is 
(Miller in Rajnath, 1989: 218). 
The invader is as parasite so close that it cannot be noticed until it is there, an alien who 
has the ability to invade a domestic enclosure, consume and kill the host. The host is 
viewed again in the sense of enemy rather than host in the sense of open-handed dispenser 
of hospitality. The word 'host' is also the name for the consecrated bread or wafer of the 
Eucharist, fromMiddleEnglishoste, fromLatinhostia, sacrifice, victim. Thehostmaythen 
become host in another sense, not etymologically correlated. The host is himself the food, 
his substance consumed without recompense. For the host, the speaker, there is no 
asylum, no place of refuge from the invader. 
Still surveying the historically verifiable sources of the formation of words and the 
development of their meaning, in the second line, the sentence "wayengalayezanga" (he 
had not given a message/warning), the verb "-layeza" (give a message/instructions) has 
cross-references to alternative renderings and to words where fuller information is to be 
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obtained. This verb is analogue to "-laya" which derives from the Ur-Bantu form "-la Ya" 
meaning 'to take leave'. Nowadays this verb "-laya" also conveys the connotation of 
teaching by painful experience, correcting or admonishing. This meaning is considerably 
removed from the context of giving messages, forewarn, etc. In such style of derivational 
reading, the impression is given that the speaker deserved his punishment for previous 
wrongdoings. Furthermore, the verb "-layeza" is dialectically akin to "-yaleza ",to which 
again the verb "-ya/a" is equivalent. This verb has the same meaning as "-laya", plus 
additional meanings of 'to impose an untoward happening', as well as 'to warn, put on 
one's guard'. 
Connecting with above-mentioned ill-conceived happening, is the subject of the poem. The 
previous paragraph insinuates that the speaker seemed to invite violation. However, it was 
the desire of the intrusive character to penetrate, grasp and possess the speaker. As 
illustrated already, in all psychoanalytic criticism there must be an accounting of the 
presence of sexuality in the text. The desire to dominate suggests an aggressive male 
sexuality in relation to a female and this again reflects masculine ambitions and anxieties. 
This necessarily affects the sexuality that is a constitutive factor in the construction of the 
poem's subject, however it should not be taken for granted that the speaker is female, as 
it is nowhere explicitly cited in the poem. The poem appears to import that the speaker 
was raped and murdered: 
Wala/a nami ngendlovuyangena. 
Wangibeka endlini yamakhaza. 
(He forcefully slept with me. 
He put me in the cold house [mortuary].) 
In this narrative the violence ofrape is illustrated graphically. Baker (1995: 104) suggests 
a "rape culture" in which the idea is that sex is something that women have and that men 
try to get. The ways in which the incident is addressed reveal some interesting details. The 
verb "-/ala", of course, not only means sleep, but also having sexual intercourse. The 
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simile used to describe the action is even more telling: "ngendlovuyangena" (literally, like 
an elephant enters). Not only is this image visually befitting, but the verb "-ngena" in the 
composite noun also comprises the meanings of invading, or getting to know intimately. 
Other words implicating this rape culture is the verb "-h/eka," (laugh), which also 
betokens opening up, gaping open or spreading open, until at last, the speaker falls apart, 
into pieces, which is implied as the invader had to gather her/him up "wangiwola". 
As such, the emphasis in the poem as a whole falls more on the torments of the body than 
of the soul. The sufferings of the soul is scarcely mentioned (when it is, it is in terms of 
bodily terms: "ngaqhaqhazela ", "ngikweqa amhlophe "), while the body is articulated 
significantly. The visitor is described in physical, corporeal terms - he/she has oversized 
hands and feet "ngezandlaka.zi ", "ngezinyawoka.zi ". His/her coldness and cruelty is 
visible in his mocking arrogance, his grinning "inhlinini" - a term described in Zulu as 
"ukuh/eka, ungahleki" (to laugh while not laughing) - an action ironically resembling 
deconstructive activity. It seems that with these carnal cogitations, the idea is given that 
the urges of the body are harmful to the soul and thus emotions and feelings must be 
repressed. The result is that the body lies in pieces, while the soul can still recount the 
occurrence. 
And it is this recounting of the death experience which presents the poem's greatest 
challenge. Although the poem is an account of the death of a person who speaks in his/her 
own voice and laments his/her fate, at a deeper level it projects the Selfs fear ofisolation 
and death: 
Babengammemanga .. . 
W ayengalayezanga .. . 
llanga lase lizihambele, 
Lase lingishiye ngingedwana. 
(They had not invited him . . . 
He had not given a message ... 
The sun was just moving about freely, 
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It simply left me behind all on my own.) 
In these first four lines, the speaker's feelings professed are at odds with those expressed. 
The claim is that 'they' (whoever they may be) had not invited the unexpected guest, and 
'he' (the guest) did not give notice of his visit. In these two lines already, the speaker 
seems to blame the visitor for being impolite, for causing a disturbance. The sun then joins 
the queue of guilty by being blamed for abandoning the speaker. This deed affiliates the 
sun with the visitor, for not only does the sun move about freely "ukuzihambela '', but his 
action constitutes him to be an "isihambeli" (visitor). As such, the sun is equated with 
the visitor, which is a transgression of the usual 'sun symbolises life' trope. 
Again, the life/death opposite is addressed. The creation ofbiological life is coupled with 
its attachment to death. It has been shown, on the basis of previous discussions, that life 
is not a seamless continuity. It has a boundary, which make for parts, fragments and 
supplements. Life in its fullness and depth is correlative to death, which may either be the 
delicious promise of release or it may cause terror at the prospect of the abyss. 
It seems as if the speaker views death as the second option, as a negative. Freud 
(1991: 43 8) notes that a "negative judgement is the intellectual substitute for repression". 
The question then arises as to what it is that is repressed. It is not possible to identify any 
specific desire, so it might be more useful to consider the general character of desire. For 
Lacan, it is "paradoxical, deviant, erratic, eccentric [and] scandalous" (1977:286). Desire 
has little respect for boundaries and dividing lines. If the disruption of unity is a mark of 
desire, then its presence is very much a feature in this poem. 
Death as impersonator of a visitor causes the principal disruption of unity. The 
unexpected call of the visitor surprised the speaker, as he/she did not invite him/her. 
Similarly, no one knows about death until one is there. However, when one is there, one 
is no longer in a position to know anything at all - one is dead, drawn out of the network 
of possible relations that constitutes the world of knowledge. The speaker therefore 
cannot have a determinate relation with death, for death is the disruption or stoppage of 
life and the absence of all relationality. His/her death prompts one to ask what the point 
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ofliving is, if death can intervene so cruelly in life. All living organisms are confronted by 
the inevitability of death, just like everybody battle the painful disorder oflife. However, 
by the end of the poem one expects that the speaker would have come to some terms with 
his or her fear. This does not happen, as nothing is acknowledged. 
The speaker's non-relation of death to life is precisely why death has to be mastered by 
dialectical thought, it must be brought into a (productive) relation with life if there is to 
be any 'progress' for the speaker. Death is productive in this poem as that which fuels 
dialectical thinking, that which allows the very movement of progress. The dialectic 
moves forward only when it procures the negative moment of death. Death or non-
actuality is of all things the most dreadful, but one who truly lives does not shrink from 
death and keep him/herself untouched by devastation, but rather endures and maintains 
him/herself in death: 
if death did not dwell within him as the source of his anguish . . . there 
would be no man or liberty, no history or individual. In other words, if he 
revels in what nonetheless frightens him, if he is the being, identical with 
himself, who risks (identical) being itself, then man is truly a Man (Hegel 
in Nealon, 1993: 117). 
When death, the absolute Other, as that which cannot be understood, appears and comes 
to thought, thought must find a way to master that death, to find some way to make it 
productive, or at least to preclude its potentially interruptive or dismembering effects. 
Thought will try and make sense of death through the comfort of the poem. In short, the 
poem tries to produce comfort in the face of death, if in no other way than through the 
knowledge that humans can (re )produce death (in words), control its randomness (through 
language), make death's negativity productive (in a poem), put it at the service ofa cause 
or a useful end, in a determinate relation with life. 
Language, of course, does not 'know' death. But it is only in language that the dimension 
of the death can loom up as a subject. One way in which death functions rhetorically is 
within deconstructive analyses. Jacques Derrida has attempted to reread and revalue the 
association of speech with life and writing with death, demonstrating that even 'living' 
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speech is based on a split between signifiers and signifieds, on self-difference and deferral 
( differance) rather than immediacy. Derrida pursues the analysis of differance - which is 
incorporated in the human even in contexts where it is the mind itself that is being 
described - finding 'writing' to be the central figure Freud uses to describe the functioning 
of the mental apparatus: 
No doubt life protects itselfby repetition, trace, differance (deferral). But 
we must be wary of this formulation: there is no life present at first which 
would then come to protect, postpone, or reserve itselfin differance. The 
latter constitutes the essence of life. . .. Life must be thought of as trace 
before Being may be determined as presence. This is the only condition on 
which we can say that life is death, that repetition and the beyond of the 
pleasure principle are native and congenital to that which they transgress 
(Derrida, 1978:203). 
In other words, without memory, both conscious and unconscious, human beings could 
hardly be what they are. But with memory as its ever more complex constitutive structure 
- the structure that underlies learning, loving, and loss - the 'living' psyche derives its 
specificity from its own 'dead' traces. For De Man, the association between 'death' and 
'linguistic predicaments' was perhaps even more central. He analyses the underlying 
reversibility of the two modes in a fashion which seems to bring the dead back to life and 
threatens to strike the living dead: 
The fiction of an apostrophe to an absent, deceased, or voiceless entity ... 
posits the possibility of the latter's reply and confers upon it the power of 
speech . . . The dominant figure of the epitaphic or autobiographical 
discourse is, as we saw, the prosopopoeia, the fiction of the voice-from-
beyond-the-grave . . . Such chiasmic figures, crossing the conditions of 
death and life with the attributes of speech and silence ... evoke the latent 
threat that inhabits prosopopoeia, namely that by making the death [sic] 
speak, the living are struck dumb, frozen in their own death (1984:75-76). 
To read this poem is to be drawn into an experience of voice as irreducibly plural - past 
but present. The past tense opening of the poem freezes the reader in time - suspending 
him or her before the stoniness of the first words into the frozen world of the dead. The 
one who narrates is the one who dies, but also the one who is present, lives on: 
Living on, the very progression that belongs, without belonging, to the 
progression of life and death. Living on is not the opposite of living, just 
as it is not identical with living. The relationship is different, different from 
being identical, from the difference of distinctions - undecided (Derrida, 
1979:135). 
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This living on is phantom revenance (the one who lives on is always a ghost) that is 
noticeable and is represented from the past tense beginning, from the moment that the 
declarative, posthumous, testamentary character of the narrative comes to unfold. Yet, 
if the poem is a general statement about how everybody has to face death alone, one 
would rather expect the present tense rather than the past. If the speaker is both dead and 
alive, he contains in himself the double antithetical relation. He/she is hauntingly present 
as a voice from the dead (prosopopoeia). 
This state of being at the uneasy border oflive and death is also observed in the figures of 
half-aliveness that the use of personification provides. (Perhaps it is the other way round -
that personification gives the speaker/poet conventionalized access to the boundary 
between life and death). In the first part of the poem, a state of transferred 
correspondence or equivalence is experienced between the narrator's inner nature and the 
surrounding outer nature "indlu" (house), "iziko" (fire-place). His thoughts and the 
house have an equal apprehension, the hyperbolic state of the house reflects the later terror 
felt by the narrator: 
Indlu yaqubuk' uhlevane, 
Iqhuqhiswa yilowo ngqoqwane 
(The house bristled with gooseflesh, 
It was caused to shiver by that frost) 
This premonition is not at first conveyed to the speaker, in this sense the house acts as a 
deaf-mute "isiduli ", a synonym for the condition of "uhlevane ". Personification 
culminates in the appearance of the visitor of death, which is both a figure of self-
knowledge, the figure of thought, but also of the element in thought that destroys all 
thought. 
I 
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The visitor is a symbol of the unconscious itself Nothing is communicated about whom 
the visitor truly is: one merely sees him/her affecting the actions of the speaker in the 
poem. Likewise, the content of the unconscious is, by definition, unknowable, but 
everything done is affected by it. One can only guess at the nature of this content by 
observing its effects, just as one can deduce the general nature of the visitor from the 
anxiety that he/ she generates. Freud's investigations resulted in confident assertions about 
the precise nature of the content of the unconscious, but Lacan is much more sceptical 
about the possibility of such certainties. Like the host, the pieces which might make sense 
of one's inner mental universe have been purloined, and one has to learn to operate 
without them. 
The narratorial voice of the poem is the voice of a speaker recounting something, 
remembering an event, knowing who he/she is and what he/she is talking about. The 
speaker and subject of the poem is merely identified as 'I' ( "ngi-" or "nga- "). This 'I', 
which the speaker uses to refer to him/herself, is an objectification of him/herself, it is not 
itself equivalent to the speaker, who, being constituted by language, cannot unequivocally 
be signified by it. "Discourse of self, then, is a perpetually distanced speech, emptied of 
the real, elusive subject" (Said, 1985:299). The narrative voice is utterly neutral 
vocalizing "the work from the placeless place where the work is silent" (Said, 1985 :299). 
The silent voice, then, is withdrawn into its voicelessness. 
It is as if a force of desire is absent in the speaker, he/she shows no defensive resistance 
in his/her account. The speaker's voice presents purely spiritual depletion, and this is most 
evident in his/her passive, emotionless voice which indicates subjection to forces beyond 
his/her control. He/she is speaking with the silence of the grave. This silent discourse of 
the speaker reveals a voice of solitary suffering, muted by being directly communicative. 
The first few lines of the poem still illustrates signs of strain in the speaker's uneasiness, 
however, with an increase of violence all resistance is erased. The speaker merely echoes 
the visitor's actions and his counteractions in a dragging, staccato-like delivery: 
Wangen' endlini ngingamvulelanga, 
Wahlala nami ngendlovuyangena, 
Wala/a nami ngendlovuyangena. 
Wangihlek' usulu ngipaqupaquza 
Wangihlek' inhlinini ngijilajileka, 
Wangincish' umoya eqhosha, 
Wangiqhoshela ngikweqa amhlophe. 
(He entered the house,· I did not open for him, 
He stayed with me by force, 
He slept with me by force. 
He cynically laughed at me as I wriggled about 
He grinned at me as I tossed about, 
He stinted me in an air of arrogance, 
He boasted as I turned up the white of the eyes). 
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Most noticeably in the excerpt above is the monotonous repetition, which links again the 
view of the visitor as the unconscious, since Lacan described the unconscious as 
repetition: 
The function of repetition is of immense importance ... the beginning self 
of the structure of the unconscious implicates repetition . . . (Macksey & 
Donato, 1972: 192). 
Repetition is also the connection between negative judgements and the death instinct. In 
'Beyond the Pleasure Principle', the death instinct is used to explain the compulsion to 
repeat. Negative judgements thus come to be representative of a force, a desire for death 
(Freud, 1991:311). The fact that it is also associated with life gives it a transcendent 
quality which means it constitutes something more. At the same time it is also very 
opposite since, precisely because it is transcendent, it cannot be contained by the boundary 
lines which are established. Force, in short, threatens to dissolve the dividing lines that are 
necessary for literary criticism to exercise its function. Thus in desiring something more, 
it desires its own dissolution. 
Although Derrida suggests that all humans have a 'desire of presence', this does not 
happen to the speaker; rather, "as the subject's relationship with its own death, the 
becoming is the constitution of subjectivity" (1976:69). Subjectivity is constituted by a 
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relationship to its own not-being, as the sign is constituted by its difference from that 
which it is not. 
What remains of the speaker after the visit is what is most fictive and impossible, a spirit 
which is left behind, yet gone without trace, beyond knowledge. The speaker's remains 
are as the burnt-out ashes in the fireplace: "Nomlilo ezikowaqal'ukulotha" (and the fire 
in the hearth died out). All of Derrida's work can be read as an attempt to respond to this 
question of 'remains' - especially, but not only, to the question of "remains as a written 
thing" ( 1992: 3 7). This is evident from the consistent deployment of a number of terms 
across his oeuvre, including trace, remainder (restance ), remains (reste ), cinders ( cendre ), 
ruins and ghosts. Derrida argues that the notion of remains calls to be thought in terms 
of what was never present. The trace, for example, is not the remains of something that 
was once present and might be rendered present once again: rather it is that which 
prevents any present, and any experience of presence, from being completely itself, from 
ever coinciding with itself Remains are always and only the remains of remains, just as 
there are always and only traces of traces. 
In the final analysis, in any reading regarding death, one is tempted to bequeath the subject 
as having died to bring about some greater revelation. But death by itself can bring no 
meaning forward nor provide any conclusion. It may be alluring to claim that the 
multiplicity of meaning and the alterities of human subjects subside only in death. But not 
even death brings an end to differance. Death is pure and simple elimination. Without 
trace or residue, the subject is burnt up, but is left no possibility for a Phoenix-type rising 
from the ashes. The poem only supplies an affirmation of a radical unconscious or 
essence, a ruinous sense of what is not known and of what one will never know. 
5.3 Resume 
The psychoanalytical approach caused a Copernican revolution, a Freudian metaphor used 
to suggest a range of decentring processes presumedly corresponding to the way in which 
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the theories of Copernicus rendered a belief in the earth as the centre of the universe 
invalid. In a similar manner, deconstruction decentred the text which is no longer seen as 
source and centre of its own meaning; instead, the meaning of the text is detached from 
a fixed centre and thus deprived of that fixity that comes from self-identity. 
In this chapter I have sought to unfold some of the implications of the work of the 
deconstructionists in relation to the question of psychoanalysis, and to sketch a kind of re-
thinking of the relations between these two theories and Msimang' s poems. As seen from 
the three selected poems and the texts ofLacan and Derrida, the core of deconstruction's 
problematic is situated in the attitude towards life of man, as well as in the language 
certainty confronted with the biological involvement with death. 
Deconstruction sees all poems as dealing as much with the nature of poetry as with their 
ostensible subject which are in all three cases, the relationship between the speaker/Self 
and the Other. In fact, this relationship could be seen to be a figurative commentary on 
poetic discourse. The transformation is only achieved, however, through an equivocal 
play of resemblance and difference: that is, through the deployment of a mobile army of 
tropes which follow the indeterminate path of differance. 
It is evident that in the first two poems 'Uze ungiphuzise amanzi' and 'Langa Jami', the 
poet actively transformed received ideas. The way in which he uses the notion oflikeness 
between man and woman as a basis of a fulfilling relationship and transforms it into a 
visionary, spiritual concept on the one hand, and a figure of signification on the other, 
while at the same time subtly exploring the psycho-sexual dynamics of love, lack and 
separation with its three levels of physical, emotional, and intellectual response, is thought-
provoking. 
In the allegory of death, 'Leso sivakashi ', an equivocal richness is found, which resides 
in part in the fact that there is no conceptual expression without figure, and no intertwining 
of concept and figure without an implied narrative, in this case the story of the alien guest 
in the home. But in contrast to the action of the speaker who sleeps with the enduring 
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dead, deconstruction attempts to resist its own tendencies to come to rest in some sense 
of mastery over the work. It is always in movement, a going beyond which remains in 
place, as the parasite is outside the door but also always already within, the eeriest of 
guests (Miller in Rajnath, 1989:218). 
In realising the work, criticism behaves in a manner akin to psychoanalysis, it makes 
manifest what is latent. However, many critics of psychoanalysis have stated that the 
interpretations produced are utterly predictable exercises comprising a veritable monotony 
of concepts. When images cease to surprise the reader, when the reader can expect what 
they mean and know what they intend, it is because the reader has a preconceived index 
of established meanings. For example, iflong things are penises for Freudians, dark things 
are shadows for Jungians. So also, virtually every female figure and image could become 
symbols of the Great Mother. Images can be turned into predefined concepts and indicate 
one dominant hypothesis such as power, sexuality, anxiety, and so on. These factors were 
mentioned but resisted in the three poems read. 
Deconstruction finds the fact that psychoanalytical critique has to rely on concepts in order 
to interpret or define images disconcerting. Even Freud's free association culminates in 
an interpretation, a translation of images into concepts - into what the dream 'really' 
means. In deconstructive terms, analysts have, in effect, opposed the concept to the image 
and privileged the one over the other. They have regarded the concept as primary and 
originative, the image as secondary and derivative. Derrida would substitute hermeneutics 
for dissemination. The 'sem' in dissemination refers to semen, or seed - but, by means of 
an ingenious derivation on the part of Derrida, it also alludes to semeion, or sign, found 
in polysemy. Thus Derrida puns on the infinitely regressive dispersion of the sign or seed. 
Interpretation according to deconstruction is a sterile product, while dissemination is a 
fertile process, a proliferation of signs or seeds that regress to infinity. (A Freudian could 
make much of Derrida's sexually punning terminology; 'hymen', 'dissemination', etc.). 
Derrida advocates a regressively infinite, logically indeterminate member of possibilities 
which is remarkably similar to the trend in psychology proposed by Lacan. Lacan 
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complements Derrida's claim that the movement of differance "puts into question the 
authority of presence [and] its simple, symmetrical opposite, absence or lack" {1982:10). 
Consequently meaning can never be regarded as being simply 'there'. Lacan makes a 
similar point when he notes that the action of the signifying chain is such that "the ring of 
meaning flees from our grasp along the verbal thread"{l977:166). The poem is never 
quite established, partly because there will always be "differ[ ences] about what precisely 
it is" ( 1977: 166) and partly because there is an ambiguity in analysis itself Being cast in 
the mould of deconstructive differance, and entwined in the threads of psychoanalysis, the 
poem presents an inexhaustible source of imaginative possibilities. 
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CHAPTER6 
THE WEB OF WORDS WOVEN IN THE POETRY OF MSIMANG 
6.1 Introduction 
The Preacher or Ecclesiastes once exclaimed that nothing new is brought forth in 
this world -
the thing that have been, it is that which shall be; and that which is 
done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the 
sun (Eccl. 6: 12). 
This perpetual re-expression is explicitly noticed in the relation between texts. For 
a long time, at least since Aristotle, criticism has recognised that each text implicates 
other texts. Aristotle saw poetry as an 'imitation' and by that he meant that poetry 
imitated any subject in words. In modern times imitation in poetry came to mean 
something quite different, that is the copying of a master. B.D. Ntuli aptly observed 
in the early 1970s: "the term 'imitation' is falling into disuse mainly because of its 
negative implication of the spurious. In practice, however, the principles ofimitation 
are operative" (1973:11,12). The trend then was to make use of the term 
'influence'. In recent years, the idea ofintertextuality has increasingly replaced that 
of influence as a way of describing the status of texts within a tradition. However, 
according to some critics, the new intertextuality has ended up doing very much 
what influence did. 
As such, one may see intertextuality either as the enlargement of the idea of 
influence or as an entirely new concept to replace the outdated notion of influence. 
In the first-mentioned possibility, intertextuality might be taken as a general term, 
working out from the broad definition of influence to enclose unconsciously 
stimulated types of text configurations, modes of conception, styles, and other 
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previous restrictions and possibilities for the writer. In the latter case, 
intertextuality might be used to remove and replace the types ofissues that influence 
addresses, and specifically its central concern with the author and the authorial 
intentions and skills (Clayton & Rothstein, 1991:3). In deconstruction, however, 
influence assigns intertextuality - the concept ofintertextuality makes the source of 
influence into a text that is already within a chain of textual substitutions. 
The concepts of host and parasite return with intertextuality as Miller describes a 
text as both host and parasite. The text is occupied by, as Miller would have it, "a 
long chain of parasitical presences" - allusions, imitations, echoes, plagiarisms, 
sources, archetypes and "guests, ghosts of previous texts" (Miller, 1989:225). The 
older texts are the foundation of the new text but also that which the new poem 
must eliminate by assimilating them, in order for the text to become a text in its own 
right: 
Any poem, however, is parasitical in its tum on earlier poems, or it 
contains earlier poems within itself as enclosed parasites, in another 
version of the perpetual reversal of parasite and host. . . . The new 
poem both needs the old texts and must destroy them. It is both 
parasitical on them, feeding ungraciously on their substance, and at 
the same time it is the sinister host which unmans them by inviting 
them into its home (Miller, 1989:225). 
All these texts form links in the chain of intertextuality, and every link played and 
still plays the same role, that of - in Miller's words - "host and parasite, in relation 
to its predecessors" (1989:225). Thus from the Old to the New Testament, from 
Genesis to Revelation, to Dante, to Spenser, to Milton, to Shakespeare and 
Wordsworh - from izinganekwane (folktales) to izibongo (praise poetry), to 
Vilakazi, to Ntuli, the chain leads ultimately to Msimang. In this chapter, 
intertextuality will be discussed in order to indicate the importance it has on the 
composition ofMsimang's poetry. 
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6.2 Texts and intertexts in Msimang's poetry 
Intertextuality is an ambiguous term which has undergone a continual and 
cumulative development and which still causes considerable controversy in literary 
research. Although Julia Kristeva is sometimes credited with being the inventor of 
the term, the idea of intertextuality is not new. Kristeva herself awards Mikhail 
Bakhtin the distinction of having 'introduced' the concept (not the neologism), but 
the notion ofintertextuality itself emerges from the cross-fertilization among several 
major European intellectual movements during the 1960s and 1970s, including 
Russian formalism, structural linguistics, psychoanalysis, Marxism, and 
deconstruction. Yet, it is possible to argue that any system carries with it the idea 
that the individual text is read in a manner determined by its relations with other 
texts. Furthermore, commentaries on literary works from the earliest times have 
also generally involved cross-references to other texts which have served as models 
or contrasts. 
Expounding on the concept ofintertextuality, Leon Roudiez claims that the term has 
been generally misunderstood and abused. According to him, intertextuality has 
nothing to do with matters of influence of one writer upon another, or with the 
sources of a literary work, 
it does, on the other hand, involve the components of a textual 
system such as the novel, for instance. It is defined in [Kristeva's] 
La Revolution du Language Poetique as the transposition of one or 
more systems of signs into one another, accompanied by a new 
articulation of the enunciative and denotative position (Roudiez in 
Kristeva 1980:15). 
One of the contributing factors which leads to the misunderstanding of 
intertextuality is that the term 'intertext' enjoys no single, agreed meaning in current 
usage and the many definitions assigned to it. Kristeva views the text as a complex 
ofintertexts - it is produced by the transformation of various signifying systems into 
language. She presents several explications for this notion: 
a permutation of texts, an intertextuality: in the space of a given text, 
several utterances, taken from other texts, intersect and neutralize 
one another (1980:36). 
any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the 
absorption and transformation of another (1980:66) . 
. . . [view] writing as a reading of the anterior literary corpus and the 
text as an absorption of and a reply to another text (1980:69). 
The one who writes is the same as the one who reads. Since his 
interlocutor is a text, he himself is no more than a text rereading 
itself as it rewrites itself The dialogial structure, therefore, appears 
only in the light of the text elaborating itself as ambivalent in relation 
to another text (1980:86-87). 
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Since intertextuality has too many operative definitions to fix on one only, one has 
to start with the generalization that intertextuality has to do with an impersonal field 
of crossing texts. The broadest definition of intertextuality allows for the text to be 
generated by various systems in order to produce a multiplicity of sources. The text 
itself points to objects, events, memories, and representations as stimuli to the 
process of writing. The textual fragments that are introduced and integrated into the 
central text never exist only as fragments; they are pieces of a whole, and it is 
consequently the entire world from which they have been sifted that enters the text 
along with the fragments. 
Intertextuality is fundamentally an attempt to conceive - or redefine - the concept of 
the 'text' dynamically, as an ongoing operation (what Derrida calls 'structuration') 
involving the continual play of referentiality between and within texts. This means 
that intertextuality defines a text as always in process, continually changing its shape. 
In this view, a text is a fabric simultaneously being woven and unwoven, not made 
up uniformly but by the traces of other texts. At an extreme, this definition projects 
all texts as further divisible into other texts, and these into yet other texts (or 
signifiers), ad infinitum. 
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This concept of intertextual weaving describes the relationship between particular 
texts as well as the relationship of literary texts to the diffuse cultural network. 
Thus, in Culler's opinion, it articulates both the weak and strong forms of 
intertextuality. He declares that these two understandings of intertextuality are, at 
one extreme, the precise intertextuality of reference to "a single anterior action 
which serves as origin and moment of plenitude" (Culler, 1981: 110) - reference to 
some preceding text which, at the utmost, becomes the influence study of traditional 
intertextual readings. Still others spring the text free of its referential bounds, 
reading between the lines. This is an intertextuality of discourse, an intertextuality 
of the diacritical generation of signification in the Saussurean tradition. 
It is from this tradition that one views intertextuality as seen in Derrida's formulation 
of differance (deferment and different). However, if one accepts from the definition 
that the signifier occurs never simultaneously with the signified, then the formal 
analysis of the structures of a text can never be adequate to its virtual significations. 
The signified, or the final meaning of the text, will remain forever deferred by this 
differance within the sign itself What Derrida's deconstruction amounts to, then, 
is a radical theory of the necessary intertextuality of all discourse. Every text, every 
utterance, is an "interweaving" or a "textile" of signifiers whose signifieds are by 
definition intertextually determined by other discourses (198la:26). Derrida 
elaborates in an interview conducted with Kristeva: 
no element can function as a sign without referring to another 
element which itselfis not simply present. This interweaving results 
in each "element" ... being constituted on the basis of the trace 
within it of other elements of the chain or system. This 
interweaving, this textile, is the text produced only in the 
transformation of another text. Nothing, ... is anywhere ever simply 
present or absent. There are only, everywhere, differences and 
traces of traces (Clayton & Rothstein, 1991:62). 
For Derrida, every script is a script of another script. Each utterance holds the trace 
of another utterance; everything written carries the mark of a gap with something 
else that is, or was, written. Even the ultimate signifier itself is a text of another 
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text. In a sense, all writing is a collage of other writing, of language, and of 
tradition. It follows that each interpretation of a text is thus merely a temporary and 
partial "supplement", since the signifiers of a text bear only the "traces" of their 
multiple signifieds. At the same time, each supplementation of a text has itself 
already been contaminated by previous discourses on that text and by other, 
presuppositionally related texts. In short, the play of differance in the sign ruptures 
the very project of intertextuality, because the text itself is an unstable process of 
infinite intertextual transformations. Intertextualitytums out to be amise-en-abime, 
an abyss of infinite semiosis. 
Derrida continually addresses this procedure oftextualization throughout his work. 
Textualization - including the appropriations of the intertextual - is always violent, 
in a violence thatJ acques Lacan figures as "murder" ( 1977: 104 ). Yet such violence, 
Derrida argues, responds to an even greater violence in a kind of panic rush to 
meaning. Derrida (1978:130) would rather advocate the choice of intertextuality 
over discourse without discursive (meaningful) contexts, a discourse of the moment. 
Derrida's much quoted statement that "there is nothing outside the text" ( 1976: 15 8), 
contains an obvious paradox. His own project, as Spivak points out, is to open "the 
textuality of a text" (1976:x1 ix) and thereby link it to texts in general. This assertion 
has to be read in the light of his attack on logocentrism - the text cannot be assigned 
a meaning that is underwritten by an origin, a presence, which resides in self-
validating isolation beyond the confines of the text: 
A text is henceforth no longer a finished corpus of writing, some 
content enclosed in a book or its margins, but a differential network, 
a fabric of traces referring endlessly to something other than itself, 
to other differential traces. Thus the text overruns all the limits 
assigned to it so far (not submerging or drowning them in an 
undifferentiated homogeneity, but rather making them more 
complex, dividing and multiplying strokes and lines) - all the limits, 
everything that was to be set up in opposition to writing (speech, 
life, the world, the real, history, and what not, every field of 
reference - to body or mind, conscious or unconscious, politics, 
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economics, and so forth) (Derrida in Rajnath, 1989:84). 
Although Derrida endorses the idea of not depending too much on reference, he 
acknowledges that presence is always representation. In Derridean terms, there is 
no getting around the inscriptions of writing and their intertextual sedimentations. 
Derrida has influenced Roland Barthes to explore the feasibility of semiotics in 
literary analysis. Like Derrida, Barthes, too, denies the possibility of reference to a 
reality beyond the intertextual network. Literature refers "not from a language to 
a referent but from one code to another" (1974:55). Barthes also adopted 
Kristeva's notion of the intertext, and seems partly in agreement with her. But his 
usage of the term seems significantly more diffuse and all-embracing than Kristeva' s. 
According to him, any text is an intertext or plural text: 
Any text is a new tissue of past citations. Bits of code, formulae, 
rhythmic models, :fragments of social languages, etc. pass into the 
text and are redistributed within it, for there is always language 
before and around the text. Intertextuality, the condition of any text 
whatsoever, cannot, of course, be reduced to a problem of sources 
or influences; the intertext is a general field of anonymous formulae 
whose origin can scarcely ever be located; of unconscious or 
automatic quotations, given without question-marks (1981:39). 
As archetype for the deconstructive path of aporia and the reader's play, Barthes 
detects the fissure in the apparent closure of the text - the irretrievable and 
permanent cleavage between sign and meaning - and reveals the chain of 
substitutions that characterizes the text and links it to all other texts. According to 
Barthes, the text "practices the infinite deferral of the signified [it] is dilatory; its 
field is that of the signifier" (Harari, 1979:76). It is, however, made clear that "the 
signifier' s infinitude does not refer back to some idea of the ineffable (of an 
unnameable signified) but to the idea of play"(Harari, 1979:76). The result is that 
the 
engendering of the perpetual signifier within the field of the text 
should not be identified with an organic process of maturation or a 
hermeneutic process of deepening, but rather with a serial movement 
of dislocations, overlappings, and variations. The logic that governs 
the text is not comprehensive (seeking to define 'what the work 
means') but metonymic; and the activity ofassociations, contiguities, 
and cross-references coincides with a liberation of symbolic energy 
... In this way the text is restored to language: like language, it is 
structured but decentred, without closure (Harari, 1979:76). 
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Barthes insisted on a text that achieves an irreducible plurality of meaning: "The text 
is not coexistence of meanings but passage, traversal; thus it answers not to an 
interpretation, liberal though it may be, but to an explosion, a dissemination" and "it 
can be itself only in its difference" (Harari, 1979:76-77). Barthes demonstrated that, 
in order to appreciate the ramifications of a plural literary text, a "semiotics of 
nuances" must be developed that will unlock univocal interpretations of a text, 
explode its meanings, and map out the organization of its literary space. 
Barthes's vision of intertextuality also highlights the :frequent anonymity of the 
'sources' of intertextual quotations. The text is traversed by language "in a vast 
stereophony" (Harari, 1979:77) where "the citations which go to make up a text are 
anonymous, untraceable, and yet already read" (Barthes, 1977: 160). The "already 
read" in Barthes encompasses more than the idea that everyone possesses 
conventional knowledge whose sources one cannot recall. It extends toward a 
notion of the reader as constituted by the texts of its culture, the subject as the 
already read. Barthes states: "This 'I' which approaches the text is already itself a 
plurality of other texts, of codes which are infinite or, more precisely, lost" 
(1974: 10). The idea of self-expression is meaningless when the 'self in question is 
itself only 'a ready-formed dictionary'. 
Barthes announces the death of the author, which is a rhetorical way of asserting the 
independence of the literary text and its immunity to the possibility of being unified 
or limited by any notion of what the author might have intended, or 'crafted' into the 
work. He declares the text independent - it is not determined by intention or 
context. Barthes' author is stripped of all metaphysical status and reduced to a 
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location (a cross-road), where language, that infinite storehouse of citations, 
repetitions, echoes and references, crosses and re-crosses ( 1977: 142 ). All the author 
can do is to imitate, re-mix, and fabricate "a tissue of quotations drawn from the 
unnumberable centres of culture" ( 1977: 14 2). Barthes replaces the author by a 
"scriptor" (1977: 146) who is merely the owner of an immense dictionary 
( 1977: 146). The scriptor is a socialized figure because the heterogeneous intertext 
constitutes his medium: "It is language which speaks, not the author" (1977:143). 
And elsewhere in the same essay, he asserts that 
... by refusing to assign a 'secret', an ultimate meaning, to the text 
(and to the world as text), literature liberates what may be called an 
anti-theological activity, an activity that is truly revolutionary since 
to refuse to fix meaning is, in the end, to refuse God and his 
hypostasis - reason, science, law (1977: 147). 
Deconstructive skepticism puts in question the unity, meaning, coherence of texts 
which are all tropes of both theology and epistemology. Barthes advances a theory 
of intertextuality that depends entirely on the reader as the organizing centre of 
interpretation: 
A text is made of multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and 
entering into mutual relations of dialogue, parody, contestation, but 
there is one place where this multiplicity is focussed and that place 
is the reader, not, as was hitherto said, the author. The reader is the 
space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are 
inscribed without any of them being lost; a text's unity lies not in its 
origin but in its destination. Yet this destination cannot any longer 
be personal: the reader is without history, biography, psychology; he 
is simply that someone who holds together in a single field all the 
traces by which the written text is constituted (1977: 148). 
Readers are free to open and close the text's signifying process without respect for 
the signified. They are free to connect the text with systems of meaning and ignore 
the author's 'intention'. In 'Pleasure of the Text' (1975), Barthes explores this 
reckless behaviour of the reader. He begins by distinguishing between the two 
senses of pleasure - pleasure and bliss. Within pleasure there is bliss Uouissance) 
and its diluted form, pleasure. The general pleasure of the text is whatever exceeds 
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a single transparent meaning. As one reads, one sees a connection, an echo, or a 
reference, and this disruption of the text's innocent, linear, flow gives pleasure. The 
reader is thus free to enter the text from any direction, there is no correct route: 
this ideal text is a galaxy of signifiers, not a structure of signifieds; it 
has no beginning; ... we gain access to it by several entrances, none 
of which can be authoritatively declared to be the main one; the 
codes it mobilizes extend as far as the eye can reach (Selden, 
1988a:77). 
As the reader adopts different viewpoints, the text's meaning is produced in a 
multitude of fragments which have no inherent unity. Instead, mutations of prior 
identities succeed one another as they are presented to readers of different 
generations. Those readers then unravel the anomalies, as one would unravel an 
onion with many surfaces and no kernel - each surface is a fragment of that onion 
and constitutes a viable reading. 
Still, deconstruction denies the independent or substantial existence of the text - they 
doubt or deny that the text in or of itself has presence. The American 
deconstructionist Harold Bloom also subscribes to this assumption, but with the 
regret of a disappointed believer in presence: 
The sad truth is that poems don't have presence, unity, form, or 
meaning. Presence is a faith, unity is a mistake or even a lie, form is 
metaphor, and meaning is an arbitrary and now repetitious 
metaphysics. What then does a poem possess or create? Alas, a 
poem has nothing, and creates nothing (1975a: 122). 
Similar to Barthes and Derrida, Bloom's version of influence dismisses nonliterary 
references just as decisively. However, Bloom's critical method is not that of 
Derrida or de Man. Though often categorized as a full-blooded deconstructor, 
Bloom sees meaning as coming from outside the text, rather than, as deconstructors 
see it, solely from within it. He also does not perform deconstructive readings and 
he attacks the French post-structuralists. Nevertheless, certain issues that he raises, 
usually sporadically, are those advanced by deconstruction, particularly as these 
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concern the self and creativity. For example, to interpret a poem, according to 
Bloom, is not to elucidate its subject, not to discuss what the work is about, but to 
look at its connections with other poems: 
To study what poems are about is to interpret their outside 
relationships ... To interpret a poem, necessarily you interpret its 
difference from other poems (1975a:75). 
Though Bloom denies that poetry is a source of knowledge, truth or faith, he does 
not declare himself a skeptic in either the epistemological or the theological sense. 
Bloom cultivates illusions without illusion: 
Where the precursor was, there the ephebe [new or latecomer poet] 
shall be, but by the discontinuous mode of emptying the precursor of 
his divinity, while appearing to empty himself of his own ( 1973: 91 ). 
Bloom develops a theory both of intertextuality and of indeterminacy that relies 
upon the consideration of the poem as human action. Intertextuality and 
indeterminacy become psycho-linguistic terms, attributes of the dynamics of human 
interaction through language, rather than attributes of language, or of a single text, 
itself: 
The meaning of poem can only be another poem (1973:94). 
Influence, as I conceive it, means that there are no texts, but only 
relationships between texts (1975a:3). 
Literature, for Bloom, is generated through critical influence, by a writer's creative 
revision of his or her predecessors' works. Such revision Bloom calls 'misreading', 
noting that its purpose is to clear "imaginative space" so that the newcomer author 
will have room to assert his or her originality (Bloom, 1973:5). The young artist 
creates his or her work by attempting to improve upon, to rewrite in fresh and 
original terms, themes and images of past greats. A new poet feels the anxiety of his 
coming afterward, after important things have been said, and this evokes his 
rebellion "against being spoken to by a dead man (the precursor) outrageously more 
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alive than himself' ( 1975a: 19), more alive because recognition and homage through 
hisJorical time bequeath a form of immortality, which the new poet may crave but 
cannot count on. 
Bloom calls this concept the anxiety ofinfluence which sees the struggle for identity 
by each generation of poets, under the 'threat' of the greatness of its predecessors, 
as an enactment of the Oedipus complex. Authors are cast in the Freudian role of 
ambitious sons who anxiously desire to eliminate the powerful, oppressive, and 
seductive presence of their literary fathers in order to establish their own identities 
and dominance. Bloom expresses this ambiguity in terms that are at once Oedipal 
and theological: "Satan is the modern poet, while God is his dead but still 
embarrassingly potent and present ancestor, or rather ancestral poet" (1973 :20). 
Bloom's theory tries to map out the way the patterns ofimagery in any strong poem 
express the psychological defences and rhetorical tropes of the poet against the 
influence of a precursor's poem. For example, when a reader encounters imagery 
of inside and outside in the poem, he or she is often also confronting the trope of 
metaphor and, at the same time and in the same place, so to speak, uncovering a 
moment of psychological sublimation on the part of the poet. 
It is important to note that in Bloom's view the poet, which is the term he uses for 
all types of writers, need not actually have read the precursor text by which his or 
her work is influenced. A poem is a response to some "central poem by an 
indubitable precursor, even ifthe ephebe never read that poem" (1973:70). This is 
because, as Peter de Bolla explains, the Bloomian text functions as if it were the 
author's conscious revision of another text, even if such conscious intent does not 
exist. Bloom, in effect, posits two different notions of 'poet'. It is the poet as a 
voice incarnated in the text that may always be seen as jealously responding to the 
voice in some prior text. The poet as a living human being, who creates the textual 
voice, may or may not consciously experience the anxiety of influence exemplified 
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by the poet incarnated in his or her text (De Bolla, 1988: 18-20). 
Finally, Bloom argues that most 'so-called accurate' interpretations of poetry are 
worse than mistakes, and suggests that "perhaps there are only more or less creative 
or interesting misreadings", because every reading is necessarily a clinamen 
(Bloom's term for a poetic misreading). There are no interpretations, only 
misinterpretations, and true "criticism is the art of knowing the hidden roads that go 
from poem to poem" (1973:96). 
In the discussion that follows, Msimang' s use of intertextuality (conscious or 
unconscious) is essential to an understanding of the deconstructive and 
reconstructive processes that govern his texts. This is because intertextuality 
functions as a mechanism for challenging and subverting the literary ideologies that 
dominate the writing, reading and criticism of most contemporary fiction. In 
determining the connections the intertextual reader draws among texts, one does not 
want to give a value judgement concerning either the borrowed or alluded to 
material of the poet's work. The task simply will be to indicate a diffuse penetration 
of his texts by certain memories, echoes, transformations of other texts. 
Msimang is furthermore an intelligent writer who seeks to appropriate his antecedent 
texts so fully that they appear as his own products, while demanding a thorough 
rearrangement of the source material. As such, it is sometimes very difficult to 
detect the traces of other texts present in his poems. The most obvious way of 
determining intertextuality is of course by comparing two or more texts with one 
another, or even stanzas, phrases or lines with each other. The most recognizable 
traces are of course direct borrowing (plagiarism) of another author's work. T.S. 
Eliot bluntly states that "minor poets borrow, major poets steal" (Plottel, 1978 :xvi) 
while Paul Valery justifies literary borrowings more subtly as follows: 
Plagiarism is as natural to literature as the eating of tame sheep is to 
a lion .... writers feed on other writers and that strong writers [lions] 
are those willing and able to digest fully the sheepish literary flock 
around them. Writers read and borrow from their readings when 
they write (Plottel, 1978:xvi). 
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The reader of the poetic text is the person who determines the extent ofintertextual 
influences in the specific work. This is a rather subjective matter, as Jabbi so 
appropriately remarks: "influence itself is generally a matter of degree and its 
assessment also depends upon personal taste, a thing which enjoys a proverbial 
privilege of non disputandum"(l987: 109). The itinerary of the reader, which is 
shaped by individual interests and experiences (such as conscious and unconscious 
desires, literary training, religious background, nationality, familiarity with popular 
culture, class, gender, race, world-historical events, etc.), determines the direction 
of the relation between text and intertexts. This direction can change over time as 
the reader develops new interests and accumulates further experiences. 
As will be witnessed in Msimang's poetry, every one of his texts is constituted by 
intertextuality because the word stock, the grammar and the syntax of language 
embody innumerable sources and influences. As such, the notion of a unified work 
is inconceivable in that all his texts are unavoidably the production of his language, 
which is always conditioned by a chain of predecessors: 
We combine words, combined a thousand times before. . . . Our 
whole style of expression and sentiment is infected with the tritest 
plagiarisms. Our words are dead, our thoughts are cold and 
borrowed (Rhys, 1971 : 117). 
It is evidently impossible to track down every single source and influence in 
Msimang' s works to their precise points of origin, nor is it the objective of this 
chapter to do so. Not only is the actual place of inception of any word, concept, 
idea or myth indeterminate, but space and time do not allow for this venture as well. 
Accordingly, this exercise will merely demonstrate a fraction of the exploratory 
possibilities ofMsimang' s poetry. A given text repeats, contains and refers to other 
texts which in turn refer to other texts ad infinitum. A deconstructive reading thus 
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searches the text in order to find the points at which the latter's constitutive codes 
'undo' themselves. It entails a reorganization of the corpus of texts that preceded 
the text's appearance, whereby a modification is created in the manner in which 
these texts are read. Thus, the critical concepts of 'origin' and 'unity' are 
undermined by the inescapable operations of intertextuality as well as by the 
omnipresent forces of deconstructive differance. 
The cradle of modem Zulu poetry is traditional praise poetry. These indigenous oral 
traditions were and still are a great source of inspiration. Before the advent of 
writing, Zulu poetry was considered communal possession. A brotherly spirit of co-
operation existed, where one could leave out any undesirable element in a praise, or 
one could borrow from another without acknowledging the source - indeed, this was 
seen as an implicit compliment. The liberal outlook towards borrowing inherited 
from the traditional poets has influenced the modem Zulu poets, who then take 
excerpts from well-known izibongo, usually omitting quotation marks. Traditional 
poetry has become to them a national legacy from which anyone can freely draw 
whatever will suit his/her composition. 
The vitality of the Zulu oral tradition in all respects remains the major Zulu artistic 
achievement. The early writers recognized this, and eagerly sought to preserve it. 
Later writers were heavily influenced by the patterns and these images of the oral 
tradition. Mzamane maintains that the distinction between traditional oral modes 
and Western literary forms is not clearly demarcated nowadays and that "black 
writers often operate, unconsciously most of the time, within both traditions" 
(1984: 147). This can clearly be seen in Msimang's poetry, for when he composes 
written poetry, he unconsciously utilizes a pre-knowledge of izibongo in composing 
new, transformed lines. 
Msimang' s designs are borrowed from a wide range of objects, but mostly from 
izibongo and other traditional oral forms such as folktales, fables, myths, legends, 
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etc. In both poetry collections of Msimang, it is interesting to note that the amount 
of his praise poetry exceeds the other types of poems by far. Inlziziba ZoThukela 
the following titles address praises - 'Ku-D.B.Z. Ntuli ', 'Umntwana 
wakwaPhindangene ', and 'Nge-UNISA eminyakeni elikhulu '. In UNodumehlezi 
KaMenzi one encounters more: 'Inyosi yakwaGwegwazangene ', 'Onoziqu bakwa-
UNISA ', 'UBhambatha KaMakhwatha ', 'KuMzilikazi ', 'Intonga yoSindiso ', 
'Inkondlo yezingqalabutho' and even 'UShaka kaSenzangakhona' which the poet 
describes as an epic, but which contains praises as well. 
Msimang' s choice of linguistic features manifests itself at various levels such as in 
the syntax, semantics and phonology. All these aspects may be borrowed from other 
sources, however in this chapter only the lexical level - the poet's choice and 
assortment of words will be examined. The patterning of imagery by means of 
repetition, the structure and development of an argument through praises and the 
balance of such images will not be considered. 
Repetition, resulting in a variety of parallelistic structures, is a salient feature of 
African oral tradition. As can be expected, Msimang makes use of this stylistic 
device quite often to foreground what he intends to emphasize in his message or 
theme: 
Kunamhla lokhu ningikhumbuz' izingqalabutho; 
Ningikhumbuz' oLangalibalele beno Vilakazi, 
Ningikhumbuz' oJabavu kumaXhosa; 
Ningikhumbuz' oMofokeng kubaShweshwe; 
Ningikhumbuz' oKhama noMoloto kube Tswana; 
Abokhel' ubhaqa basikhanyisela. (Onoziqu bakwa-Unisa) 
(On this day, you remind me of the pioneers; 
You remind me of Langalibalele and Vilakazi, 
You remind me of Jabavu among the Xhosa; 
You remind me of Mofokeng among the Shoeshoe people; 
You remind me of Khama and Moloto among the Tswana; 
They who lit the torch and enlightened us.) (1990:43) 
As can be ascertained from the excerpt above, each name listed comprises a history 
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of its own which again can be alluded to. This regression repeats endlessly. 
However, by isolating a familiar fixed image or even an idea or motif associated with 
praise poetry or a certain poet in Msimang's work, one can analyse the extent of 
intertextuality in his poems. It must furthermore also be acknowledged that many 
ideas are universal. Certain themes, like death is common and a poet, like Msimang, 
may create this type of theme in accordance with his own particular vision, which 
could be completely different from those in his source. Or Msimang may adapt a 
borrowed element to the requirements of a specific context in his own work. Again, 
the extent of adaptation or the exact role played by various fragments of other 
literary texts integrated in his work will not be assessed, only the various types of 
intertexts will be touched on. 
There are certain traditional symbols which are repeated throughout the history of 
praise poetry in Zulu as well as in other cultures. Such traditional symbols are the 
sun, for example. Msimang also makes extensive use of this image in his poetry: 
Ilanga elikhanye eLangeni 
(The sun that shone at Langeni) 
Ulang' eliphume linsizwa, 
Lithe liphezulu lansasa 
(Sun that came forth shining brightly, 
And when it was high it spread out its rays) 
(UShaka kaSenzangakhona) 
(1990:54) 
(Senzangakhona, Shaka) 
(Nyembezi, 1968:12, 21; 
Cope, 1968:77) 
In praising lnkosi Buthelezi in one of his poems, Msimang likens his eyes to sunrays, 
as in the following adapted lines from Dinuzulu's praises: 
Libhekise amehlo eMpumalanga, 
Abesehlaba okwemisebe yelanga (Umntwana wakwaPhindangene) 
(It turned the eyes towards the east, 
They pierced like the rays of the sun) (1980:34) 
Ufana nemisebe yelanga. 
Uliso lifana nonyazi lwezulu (Dinuzulu) 
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(He is like the rays of the sun. 
Eye that is like lightning). (Nyembezi, 1984:107) 
Someone who crosses a river also seems like a traditional universal symbol, for this 
concept also is found in early Greek mythology as well as other cultures: 
Mweli weliphesheya, 
Owe/' uphindelela (Umntwana wakwaPhindangene) 
(Crosser of the other side, 
who crosses and repeats again and again) (1980:34) 
Mwelela kweliphesheya 
(He who crossed over to the other side) 
Umwelela kweliphesheya 
(He who crosses over to the other side) 
(Langalibalele) 
(Cope, 1968:135) 
(Ndlela kaSompisi) 
(Cope, 1968:187) 
Msimang' s poetry futher abounds with local symbolism, used by the Zulus 
specifically, but also sometimes found in other African cultures. The most 
prominent image of the poem 'Amadwal' aseMhlathuze ' is the treacherous 
flagstones on which one could slip and fall: 
Madwala abushelelezi aseMhlathuze, 
Akubambeleli nto kini niyashelelela. 
(Slippery flagstones of the Mhlathuze, 
Nothing grips on you, you are slippery.) 
Umzila ungushishiliza, ngokubashelelisa 
(1980:15) 
Ngokushelelisa oNomavila noBhocobala (1980:2) 
(Path, you are slippery, to make them skid 
To cause those Lazybones and Exhausted to slide down) 
lzibuko likaNdaba, 
Elimadwal' abushelezi 
(Ford ofNdaba, 
which has slippery flagstones) 
lzibuk' elimadwal' abushelezi 
(Ford with slippery flagstones) 
(Dingane) 
(Nyembezi, 1984:48) 
(Zwide, Khondlo) 
(Cope, 1968:129, 141) 
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Ntuli ( 1973: 91) observes that the same image is used by other African peoples, such 
as the Batswana as well; e.g. 
Pilane ketlapa lantswepilwane, 
Ketlapa lelebotsheledi 
(Pilane is a rock of ironstone, 
He is a slippery rock) 
Similar to the traditional Zulu poets, Msimang also draws his ideas and images from 
diverse natural phenomena and other related fields based on his expansive 
knowledge of Zulu culture. Livestock, especially cattle, is very important to the 
traditional Zulu existence, and to be praised as one is an accomplishment: 
Inkom ' ekhal' eSangoyana 
Yakhal' umlomo wayo wabhoboz' izulu (Mnkabayi) 
(Beast that lows on Sangoyana, 
It lowed and its mouth [voice] pierced the sky) (Cope, 1968: 173) 
This pattern is also repeated in Shaka' s praises (Nyembezi, 1984 :20) and Dingane' s 
praises (Nyembezi, 1984: 4 7). Msimang utilizes the same pattern to praise Buthelezi 
in his poem 'Umntwana wakwaPhindangene ': 
UNdaba yenziwe yinkomo yasoSuthu 
Yon' ekhal' iphezulu kwaDlamahlahla 
Umlomo yawubhekisa kithi kwaShenge (1980:34) 
(Ndaba, the beast of the royal house of Suthu 
He who lows above at Dlamahlahla 
It turned its mouth [voice] towards us at Shenge) 
Shaka is praised as a calf, a form which recurs in almost every other praise poem: 
Ithol' elinsizwa likaNandi 
(Powerful calf ofNandi) 
Ithol' elinsizwa lakokalvfbengi 
(Powerful calf of the daughter ofMbengi) 
(UShaka kaSenzangakhona) 
(1990:62) 
(Shaka) 
(Cope, 1968: 115) 
Although only royalty is referred to as "thole " or "inkonyane ", one finds the same 
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praise for Sir Theophilus Shepstone (Cope, 1968:195). This praise is very popular 
and is also found in Dingane and Dinuzulu's praises (Nyembezi, 1984:50, 105). In 
the poem 'KuD.B.Z. Ntuli ',the poet employs the techniques of this traditional praise 
in commending Ntuli for his achievements in education: 
Umahlatsh' ebuhleni njengethole, 
kodwa wena uhlabana ngosiba. (1980: 10) 
(He who is always wounded in the face like a suckling calf, 
but you fight bravely with a pen.) 
Umahlatshwebuhleni njengethole (Ndlela kaSompisi wakwaNtuli) 
(He who is always wounded in the face like a prince) (Cope, 1968:187) 
The simile literally means 'like a calf, but according to Cope ( 1968: 187) a member 
of the Zulu royal family must be addressed as mntwana (child, i.e. prince). Other 
examples of the beast imagery are: 
Jguqa elikhonye lingakamili nampondo 
Jvukan' elithe ukusuka langqabashiya 
Inkunz' ehlab ' usentu phakathi eMalanihili 
Uvava lwenkunzi yakith' eMvoti 
Uvava olubilo luyisilikithi 
Uvava olulunda lingangentaba (UBhambatha ka'Makhwatha) 
(The bull calf which bellowed before it had horns (1990:46, 47) 
The bullock which started to frolic about early 
The bull which tossed up the soil inside Mariannhill 
The upright-pointed homed bull of our place at Mvoti 
The upright-pointed homed bull with a dewlep like a plume 
The upright-pointed homed bull with a hunch as big as a mountain) 
The poet compares B.W. Vilakazi to a sharp upright-pointed, well-experienced bull 
by means of a set of terms concerning a bull at different stages of its development. 
The bull is used by the Zulu as a symbol of manhood, virility, achievement and 
courage. Bulls never accept defeat. This is a common motifin praise poetry as seen 
in the following praises: 
Inkunzi yakith' eMkhontweni 
Wena nkonyane kaPhunga noMageba. 
Inkunz' ebomvu kaShaka 
(Our bull at Mkhontweni 
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(Dinuzulu) 
You calf of Phunga and Mageba. 
Red bull of Shaka) (Nyembezi, 1984:108, 110) 
Descriptive praise poetry imagery is extremely popular amongst all Zulu poets and 
Msimang is no exception. Shaka' s most memorable praise has also found its trace 
into Msimang' s poetry, first as an adapted version and secondly as a direct quote: 
Lokhu ubeseyindlondlo, 
Yebo, esedlondlobele (Umntwana wakwaPhindangene) 
(Since you were a horned viper, 
Yes, he was in a great rage) (1980:38) 
"Udlondlwan' oluya luhlezi 
Oluya lundlondlobele. " (UShaka kaSenzangakhona) 
(The young viper who grows as it sits 
who is always in a great rage) ( 1990: 54) 
Udlondlwane luya luhlezi, 
Luya ludlondlobele (Shaka) 
(The young viper grows as it sits, 
Always in a great rage) (Cope, 1968:97) 
The image of "ingqwayingqwayi" or "ingqungqulu " (bateleur eagle) from 
Dinuzulu's praises is adapted in the following lines ofMsimang: 
Namhla lokhu useyingqwayingqwayi 
Ngokugoq 'amaphiko phezu kweMuckleneuk (NgeUnisa eminyakeni elikhulu) 
(Today since you are an eagle 
By gathering your wings above the place ofMuckleneuk) (1980:3) 
Ingqwayingqwayi yaseGcotsheni, 
Ebhul' amaphikw ' ibhek' eMpumalanga (KuD.B.Z Ntuli) 
(Bateleur eagle of Gcotsheni, 
which flaps its wings flying towards the East) (1980:9) 
Ingqungqul' egoq' amaphiko 
(Bateleur eagle gathering its wings) 
Ingqwayingqwayi ebomvu nezinyawo 
(Red bateleur eagle with red feet) 
La kuqhwakel' ingqwayingqway' uDokhi 
(Dinuzulu) 
(Nyembezi, 1984:109) 
(Senzangakhona) 
(Nyembezi, 1984: 15) 
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Kwabandlebe zikhany' ilanga (UBhambatha kaA!akhwatha) 
(Where the eagle Doke sits up 
Among those whose ears shine in the sun [Whites])(1990:48) 
The last line again alludes to a praise given to Mbuyazi: 
Umhlophe wakithi ondlebe zikhany' ilanga (Henry Fynn) 
(Our white man whose ears shine in the sun) (Cope, 1968: 193) 
The references to bird imagery continues: 
Ukhoz 'olubhul 'amaphikw' eKapa (NgeUnisa eminyakeni elikhulu) 
(Black Mountain eagle which flaps its wings in the Cape) (1980:2) 
Lukhozi lukaNdab' olumaphikw' abanzi (Mpande) 
(Black Mountain eagle ofNdaba with wide wings) (Nyembezi, 1984:66) 
Water imagery has frequently been applied to Dingane in other versions of his 
izibongo, which Msimang again utilized in his poem 'Iziziba zoThukela ': 
Ezizibeni ezizonzobele 
(At the pools which grew overpowering) 
Jsizib ' esinzonzo, sizonzobele 
(Silent pools, they grew overpowering) 
Ziziba ezizonzobele 
Zolani ningisondezele. 
(Pools which grew overpowering 
Become still and bring [it] close to me.) 
(Dingane) 
(Nyembezi, 1984:45) 
(Dingane) 
(Nyembezi, 1984 :46) 
(Jsiziba zoThukela) 
(1980:64) 
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The analogy of an axe in Shaka' s praises not only describes his strength and 
violence, but also refers to his sharp tongue. Shaka was outspoken and quick-
witted, more so than any leader before or after him: 
WeLembe eleq' amanye 
Amalembe ngokukhalipha 
(You Axe that surpasses other 
Axes in sharpness) 
(UShaka kaSenzangakhona) 
(1990:53) 
Ilembe' eleq' amany' amalembe ngokukhalipha (Shaka) 
(Axe that surpasses other axes in sharpness) (Cope, 1968:89) 
In 'Umntwana wakwaPhindangene ', Msimang uses a unique image found in 
izibongo ofDingane: 
Uhlunguhlungu olubabayo, 
Balulume baluphimis' okwesibhaha (1980:37) 
(Peppery shrub which is bitter, 
They bite it and spit it out like the fever-tree bark) 
Indiha lebabayo enjengesibhaha, 
sona sibaba kuMahashanga (Dingane) 
(The bitter herb that is like the fever-tree bark, 
which is biting to the Mahashanga) (Nyembezi, 1984:49) 
Buthelezi is described as a peppery shrub "uhlunguhlungu" as well as an 
"isibhaha" whose very hot and ginger-like root and bark is used for medicinal 
purposes, as a remedy for malaria. This reflection captures both the benefit and the 
diabolic in one phrase. This image also describes a domineering, fiery-tempered 
person, which is a further indirect allusion to Buthelezi' s personality. 
In 'Ubani omkhulu ', again a traditional personification of a rushing wind: 
Ekhethelwa uSivunguvungu benoSiphepho (1980:45) 
(For whom Gailwind and Stormwind are dancing) 
Usiphepho-shunguza ngaseMkhandlwini (Shaka) 
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(He who is the rushing wind in the Assembly)(Cope, 1968: 105) 
Direct quotes also occur in his poetry where Msimang acknowledges the praise by 
placing it in quotation marks as in the following examples: 
"Utshikizane lwakithi koGcabashe, 
Obeyalale wangangemifula, 
Obeyavuke wangangezintaba. " (UShaka kaSenzangakhona) 
(Young girl of our people of Gcabashe, 
who when lying down was the size of rivers, 
who when getting up was the size of mountains.) (1990:54) 
Obeyalala wangangemifula, 
Obeyavuka wangangezintaba. 
Utshezikazana lwakithi lwakwaGcabashe (Ndaba) 
(Who when he lay down was the size of rivers, 
Who when he got up was the size of mountains. 
Precious little amulet of our people, of Gcabashe' s people) (Cope, 1968 :73) 
"Jbhidi elimathetha nangezinyembezi, 
Jbhicong' elimzimba buthaka, 
Obemzimba muhle nangendlal' enkulu, 
Obesiyaka singamanz' endlela; 
Ophoth' intamb ' ende umntakaJama, 
W ayiphotha yayofinyelel' ezulwini" (UShaka kaSenzangakhona) 
(Variegation like a multi-coloured animal, 
Tree with fragile trunk, 
He whose body was beautiful even in the great famine, 
He whose head-dress was wet with the journey; 
He who plaited a long rope, son of Jama, 
Who plaited a rope which reached right up into the sky) (1990:54) 
Ubhid' elimathetha ngezinyembezi 
Obesiyaka singamanz' endlela. 
Jbhicongo elimzimba buthaka; 
Obemzimba muhle nangendlal' enkulu 
Owaphoth' intamb ' ende mntakaJama, 
Owaphoth' intamb' ende waya phezulu (Senzangakhona) 
(Variegation like a multi-coloured animal 
He whose head-dress was wet with the journey. 
Tree with fragile trunk; 
He whose body was beautiful even in the great famine 
He who plaited a long rope, son of Jama, 
Who plaited a rope and climbed up) (Cope, 1968:75, 77, 81) 
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"Usishaka kashayeki kanjengamanzi" (UShaka kaSenzangakhona) 
(He who beats, but is not beaten, unlike water) (1990:56) 
Usishaka kasishayeki kanjengamanzi (Shaka) 
(He who beats, but is not beaten, unlike water) (Cope, 1968:89) 
"Jsizib' esiseMavivane, 
Siminzis' umunt' eth' uyageza, 
Waye washona ngesicoco. " (UShaka kaSenzangakhona) 
(Deep pool which is in the Mavivane river, (1990:61) 
It drowns a person as he is washing, 
So that he disappears even as far as his head-ring). 
Jsiziba esiseMavivane, 
Eseminzis' umuntu eth' uyageza, 
Waze washona nangesicoco. (Shaka) 
(Deep pool which is in the Mavivane river, 
Which drowns a person as he is washing, 
So that he disappears even as far as his head-ring.) (Cope, 1968:113) 
"Udlungwane kaNdaba, 
Udlungwane woMbelebele, 
Odlung' emanxulumeni 
Kwaze kwas' amanxulum' esibekelana. " 
Udlungwane kaNdaba! 
Udlungwana woMbelebele, 
Odlung' emanxulumeni 
Kwaze kwas' amanxulum ' esibikelana. 
(Dlungwana son ofNdaba! 
Ferocious one of the Mbelebele brigade, 
Who raged among the large kraals, 
(UShaka kaSenzangakhona) 
(1990:67) 
(Shaka) 
(Cope, 1968:89) 
So that until dawn the huts were being turned upside-down.) 
244 
The praise listed above last is again manipulated by Msimang in extending his ideas. 
UNISA is compared to the power that Shalrn had as a pioneer, the power of 
changing things: 
UD!ondlwane lwakithi eMzansini, 
Lwanga uDlondlwane loMbelebele, 
Lon' oluhlomis' uZulu ngemikhonto; 
Wen' ohlomise izizwe ngezijula zolwazi. (1980:3) 
(The homed viper of the South, 
which resembles the ferocious one of the Mbelebele kraal [Shaka], 
He who armed the Zulus with spears; 
You who arm nations with the long-bladed assegais of knowledge.) 
The tertiary institution is also given the praise: 
Mthombo wolwazi ogobhoze ngemihoshahosha 
Gobhoza ngiphuze, uz' uphuzise nabezayo. (1980:3) 
(Spring of knowledge which flows in numerous gorges, 
Flow so that I can drink, and give a drink to those to come.) 
This praise has whispers of Sobhuza II' s praise: 
Amanz' amnandi, 
Amanz' asekolishi. 
Mthombo gobhoza siphuz' amanzi (Nyembezi, 1984:150) 
(Nice water, 
Water of the College. 
Spring, flow, so that we can drink the water) 
Although Msimang does make use of direct borrowings, one mostly finds traces of 
praises intermingled with adaptations of his own in his praise poetry collections, such 
as Shaka' s praise poem: 
Sebemcoboshis' abaseMthandeni (UShaka kaSenzangakhona) 
(They now have crushed entirely those at Mthandeni) (1990:55) 
Kalokhu liphahl' eliseMthandeni. (Shaka) 
(For the present it eclipsed the one ofMthandeni) (Cope, 1968:91) 
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Kuze kwenanel' abafazi bakaNomgabi, 
Bathi kayikubusa, kayikubankosi. (UShaka kaSenzangakhona) 
(Until they showed delight, the women ofNomgabi, 
Saying he would not rule, he would not become chief) (1990:55) 
Uteku lwabajazi bakwaNomgabhi, 
Beth' uShaka kakubusa kakuba nkosi 
(The joke of the women ofNomgabhi, 
(Shaka) 
(Cope, 1968:91) 
Saying that Shaka would not rule, he would not become chief). 
Ngoba liyinkosi yaseMashobeni (UShaka kaSenzangakhona) 
(Because he is the chief of the Mashobeni kraal) (1990:62) 
UShaka kuyinkosi yaseMashobeni. (Shaka) 
(Shaka, he is the chief of the Mashobeni kraal). (Cope, 1968:89) 
Usomlilo eseshisa ubuhanguhangu 
(Fire which burned with scorching force) 
Umlil'osh'ubuhanguhangu 
Uzihangulil' izibaya zamakhosi. 
(Fire which burned with scorching force 
It scorched the kraals of the chiefs.) 
Umlilo wothathe ubuhanguhangu 
(Fire of the long grass of scorching force) 
Sambon' uLusiba-gojela 
Egojel' amaf' ezulu 
(We saw him, Feather that bobbed down 
bobbing down the clouds in the sky) 
Ulusiba-gojela ngalaphaya kweNkandla, 
(Ubani omkhulu) 
(1980:45) 
(UShaka kaSenzangakhona) 
(1990:65) 
(Shaka) 
(Cope, 1968:91) 
(UShaka kaSenzangakhona) 
(1990:67) 
Lugojela njalo ludl' amadoda. (Shaka) 
(Feather that bobbed down on the other side of Nkartdla, 
Bobbing down always and devouring men.) (Cope, 1968:95) 
The idea of Shaka being a pillar of the Zulu - as seen in Msimang' s poem - is also 
not new. Msimang repeatedly describes Shaka as: 
Ngisho kuwe Nsika kaZulu 
(I mean you Pillar of the Zulu) 
Kunjalo Nsika kaZulu 
Ngibuza kuwe Nsika kaZulu 
(It is so, Pillar of the Zulu 
I ask you Pillar of the Zulu) 
Wangikholisa Nsika kaZulu 
(You make me content Pillar of the Zulu) 
Uthi mangithini Nsika kaZulu? 
(What must I say Pillar of the Zulu?) 
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(UShaka kaSenzangakhona) 
(1990:53) 
(UShaka kaSenzangakhona) 
(1990:67) 
(UShaka kaSenzangakhona) 
(1990:68) 
(UShaka kaSenzangakhona) 
(1990:69) 
In an 1842 version ofDingane' s praises, the French writer Arbousset cites a number 
of unusual allusions and references, for example the description ofDingane as the 
'pillar of the house of Nandi'. Although the inclusion of this praise could be a 
mistake, it could also refer to the rumour that Shaka himself ordered that his mother 
should be killed, and that Dingane, by killing Shaka, revenged Nandi's death 
(Rycroft, 1984:261). 
Msimang makes use of Dinuzulu' s praises in describing the stature of lnkosi 
Buthelezi: 
UMashesha unjengoMamonga 
UMashesha unjengonyazi 
(Fast one, he is like Mamonga 
Fast one, he is like lightning) 
(1980:36) 
He is as fast as lightning, a praise given again to Dinuzulu: 
UMashesha njengezulu 
Ephikelele kwaNdunu. 
(Fast one like the storm 
As he rushed towards Ndunu.) 
(Dinuzulu) 
(Nyembezi, 1984: 106) 
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The praise name Mamonga was originally given to Dinuzulu: 
UMamonga woSuthu, 
UMamonga kabulali, uyasizila (Dinuzulu) 
(Mamonga of the royal house of Suthu, 
Mamonga does not only kill, he wipes out) (Nyembezi, 1984:105) 
There are certain passages in his poems borrowed from praises, such as Dinuzulu's 
praise which remain unacknowledged: 
Mlomo owodwa 
Sukum ' ukhulume, 
Uyayibona imilomo eminingi 
Iyavunana phakathi kwezwe. 
Kuvunane abasenhla eMtshezi, 
Kwavunama abasezansi eMbumbulu (Umntwana wakwaPhindangene) 
(Lone Voice 
Rise and speak, 
Many people in the country 
Agree with one another [form an alliance] 
It was allied with those higher up at Mtshezi, 
It was allied with those downwards at Mbumbulu) (1980:35) 
Mlom' owodwa, suk' ukhulume, 
Uyayibon' imilom ' eminingi 
Iyavunana phakathi kwezwe, 
Kuvunan' oZibhebhu benoHhamu, 
Kuvunan' oZiwedu benoMnyamana. (Dinuzulu) 
(Lone Voice, rise and speak, 
Many people in the country 
Agree with one another [form an alliance] 
It was allied with Zibhebhu, son ofHhamu, 
It was allied with Ziwedu, son of Mnyamana. )(Nyembezi, 1984: 107) 
The striking image of the white bleached bones on the battlefield of Isandlwana 
(1980: 42) is reminiscent ofa description in Rev. Owen's diary concerning a hill 
which Dingane referred to in a distance, claiming it was white with the bones of his 
victims (MacKeurton in Rycroft, 1984:266). 
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In 'KuD.B.Z. Ntuli' (1980:9), one encounters allusions as well as quotations of 
certain izibongo (praise poems) and izithakazelo (clan praises): 
Ugwabini wemikhonto 
(The rattler of spears) 
Gwabini wemikhonto! 
(Rattler of the spears!) 
(1980:10) 
(Ndlela) 
(Cope, 1968:187) 
Ntuli is portrayed as an expert in using the spear through the use of reference to one 
of his famous ancestors, Ndlela son of Sompisi of the Ntuli clan. The same ancestor 
gives him the praise: 
Ingwazi kaNdlela benoSompisi 
(Hero ofNdlela and of Sompisi) 
(1980:10) 
Implicit references are also made to two of his other clan names - "Mphemba" and 
"Mbhele ": 
UNomangcwemb ' abikel' amaBhele 
Abaphemba ngenkomo (1980:11) 
(Nomangcwembe reports to the Bhele people 
Those who kindle by means of a beast) 
When Ntuli is described as a climber, reference is made to an obscure eulogy of 
Dingane as found in Arbousset' s text: 
UNomakhwela ngokukhwela izintaba. (Dingane) 
(Expert climber through climbing mountains)(Rycroft, 1984:253) 
UMakhwela ngokukhwela izintaba (1980:10) 
(Expert climber through climbing mountains) 
Ntuli also receives a portion ofDinuzulu's praises: 
Izizwe zonke zabuza, 
Zathi kanti uBheki ungakanani. 
(All the nations asked, 
(1980:10) 
Saying, but how great is Bheki.) 
Izizwe zonke ziyambuza, 
Zith' uMamong' ungakanani? 
(All the nations asked him, 
They say, how great is Mamonga?) 
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(Dinuzulu) 
(Nyembezi, 1984:110) 
Strongly reminiscent of the "shikizela" refrain in Cetshwayo's praises is the 
following lines: 
W ayikhulekel' uMbombosh' omnyama, 
Owashikizela washiy' impi yakhe 
(He saluted them, the black Mbomboshe, 
He who moved on, he left his army behind) 
Washikizel' uMashikize/' omnyama 
(The restless black one moved on) 
(UShaka kaSenzangakhona) 
(1990:68) 
(Cetshwayo) 
(Cope, 1968:215) 
The praise name ''Mjokwane" (the persecuted one) which is given to Shaka in 
Msimang's poem, already appears as Senzangakhona's nickname (Cope, 1968:75, 
Nyembezi, 1984:59, 60, 69): 
Imbizo yajub ' uMjokwane 
(The convocation ordered Mjokwane) 
(UShaka kaSenzangakhona) 
(1990:54) 
In 'Umntwana wakwaPhindangene ', Msimang makes repeated use of the Buthelezi 
clan's izithakazelo (clan praises) "Shenge", "Sokwa/isa", ''Mnyamana" in the 
poem: 
Umlomo yawubhekisa kithi kwaShenge 
AmaShenge aqala ukumkhiyazelela, 
AmaShenge ashay' ih/ombe avuma 
Bezith' uShenge kakulutho, 
Bezith' uShenge kakumholi 
Kant' uShenge ebengaxabene namuntu (1980:34-35) 
(Mouth [voice] turned towards us at Shenge 
The Shenge people started to respect him, 
The Shenge people applauded and agreed 
Saying Shenge is nothing, 
Saying Shenge is not a leader 
But Shenge did not quarrel with anybody) 
USokwalisa owaliwayo 
Othande inkatha uSokwalisa 
(Sokwalisa who is rejected 
(1980:36) 
Who formed a grass coil [Inkatha], Sokwalisa) 
Inyath' emnyama yawoMnyamana 
(Black buffalo ofMnyamana) 
Jguqa elimnyama likaMnyamana 
(1980:36) 
Athi inkosi yiMbabazane kwabakaMnyamana. (1980:34) 
(The black bull-calf of Mnyarnana 
Saying the inkosi is a Stinging Nettle of the people ofMnyamana) 
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According to Gunner & Gwala (1991: 88), these izibongo have a number of praises 
in common with those attributed to 'Sophandase ', an uncle of Chief Buthelezi who 
travelled with him and acted as one of his praisers until his death. As such, the last 
praise listed from Msimang concurs with the following of Buthelezi: 
Shenge! Sokwalisa! 
!Mbabazane kaMahaqa ehaq' amadoda 
Kwaze kwasaengabulel'ubuthongo. (Gunner& Gwala, 1991:88) 
(Shenge! Sokwalisa! 
Stinging Nettle Tangler that entangled men 
And kept them sleepless the whole night long.) 
There are further allusions made to the history of Buthelezi via clan names. 
Buthelezi is related to the royal house hence ''yasoSuthu " on the following line: 
UNdaba yenziwe yinkomo yasoSuthu (1980:34) 
(Ndaba, the beast of the royal house of Suthu) 
Buthelezi is referred to as "USibamba" (1980:38): 
USibamba siyephula silibhubesi 
(Catcher who crushes, he is a lion) 
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Shaka is repeatedly praised as such (1990:57), a praise dating back to Dinuzulu 
(Nyembezi, 1984: 112). As can be expected, there are many more praise names and 
clan praises intermingled in the poetry of Msimang, for he specializes in praising 
important figures like J.S.M. Khumalo, and B.W. Vilakazi. The aim here is not to 
supply a full list of every praise used, but only to emphasize the fact that none of 
these praises are new, they are indeed very old, dating back long before Shaka's 
time. 
Msimang skillfully infuses traditional modes of expressions into his creation as a 
whole. In the following expression, incorporated from praise poetry, the moral is 
offered that discression is the better part of valour: 
Waba ngumbebe kamame, 
Beba kumame sigoduke. (UShaka kaSenzangakhona) 
(He became a mother's baby, 
Get on mother's back and let us go home.) (1990:55) 
Umbebe kamama beba simuke (Senzangakhona, Shaka) 
(Mother's baby, get on the back and let us be oft)(Nyembezi, 1984:12, 71) 
Msimang himself admits that proverbs and idioms are used in his poetry but "they 
should not stand apart as jewels or ornaments, but must be part and parcel of, and 
also harmonise with the writers' s work" (Msimang 1986a: 179). In the poem written 
in honour of Ntuli, Msimang utilizes a proverb which derives from Dinuzulu 
(Nyembezi, 1984:110): 
Umthente ohlaba usamila 
!thole likamaShezi 
(An achiever at a very tender age 
(1980:10) 
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MaShezi's calf) 
The adapted proverb above refers to the umthente grass which is very sharp when 
young. Similar to human beings, a child may exhibit in youth what he is likely to be 
when older (Nyembezi, 1974:8). 
The full proverb used in the following allusion is "Jmbila yaswela umsila 
ngokulayezela" (the <lassie lacked a tail by giving directions to others). A <lassie or 
rock rabbit in a folk-narrative ended up without a tail because he relied on the other 
animals to choose one for him and bring it back to him. The lesson is when one 
wants something, one must do it for oneself Many poets still use traditional images 
such as these, but add or adapt these to their own individual taste. 
Hlomani izikhali niye ekulweni 
Makangabikho kini oyimbila (Insimbi yesonto) 
(Arm yourselves and go to war 
Let there be no one of you who will be a rock rabbit) (1980:17) 
Among the many other proverbs are: "Angelahle imbeleko ngokufelwa" (1980:21 ); 
"ithemba alibulali" (1980:20). The first-mentioned saying derives from the proverb 
"Akulahlwa mbeleko ngakufelwa", meaning the child's carrying-skin is not thrown 
away because of (its) death. This expression is used as an encouragement that there 
is no reason why disappointment should make one lose hope. The second proverb 
'hope does not kill' expresses disappointment - for even if one's hopes do not 
materialize, one does not die because of that. 
In Shaka's praise poem composed by Msimang, the image of plaiting a rope to 
heaven comprises a hidden proverbial connotation: 
Wayiphothayayofinyelel' ezulwini (1990:54) 
(Who plaited a rope which reached right up in to the sky) 
The proverb "wophoth ' intamb ' end' eyifik' ezulwini" (you will plait a long rope 
which reaches the sky) is used of a person who has done wrong, and is trying to 
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make an escape in order not to face the consequences. It means that there is no way 
of escaping, that wherever this person goes, he will be found. All the proverbial 
traces in his poems deposit further meaning which has to be taken into consideration. 
Most of the times the meaning contributed by these expressions effects a total 
aporia, as was observed above with Shaka' s praise and proverb. 
Msimang' s language is furthermore interspersed with numerous idioms - the 
following examples "kwelenyoni" (on the branch of the bird; highest point), 
"wukukhotha amafu " (to lick the clouds; attain eminence), "zaqhilika izihlathi" 
(shake the cheeks; laugh) are found in only one stanza of 'Nawe Goli' (1980:5). He 
has even made use of traditional songs and lullabies in 'Uyadelajuba' (1980:27) 
where the traditional dove effigy appears prominently in this biblical poem: 
"Amdokwe amabele avuthiwe I" 
(The sorghum is ready/ripe!) 
The above-mentioned song refers to the cooing sound a dove makes. Although 
orality is a definite formative element in Msimang' s texts, the most apparent traces 
in his poems concerning non-indigenous sources invariably derives from the Bible. 
This is not surprising since religion has had a profound impact on the indigenous 
literature of the Zulu. Many modern poets such as Msimang were either educated 
and developed, or else influenced either directly or indirectly, by missionary outposts 
or missionary-run educational establishments. There is furthermore a close affinity 
between the style of traditional poetry and that of the Bible, especially the earlier 
translations. Similar imagery in both the Bible and Zulu praise poetry, is also 
encountered like springs of water (Rev. 7:17, John. 4:14), and the morning star 
(Rev. 22: 16). 
Msimang' s themes are often Christian themes or sprinkled with Christian values: 
'Nawe Goli ', 'Uze ungiphuzise amanzi ', 'Insimbi yeSonto ', 'Ngiyamazisa ', 
'Uyadelajuba', 'Mehloami', 'Indlela', 'Ubaniomkhulu' inlzizibaZoThukelaand 
'Ngingene endumisweni' and 'Nezinyoni ziyadumisa' in UNodumehlezi KaMenzi. 
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His Christian themes mostly represent not a homogeneous kind of Christianity but 
one that was tempered by a particular Zulu experience. 
In presenting a particular fact, Msimang finds it often necessary to quote almost 
directly from the Bible. Some of these quotable phrases are: 
"Bonani izinyoni zezulu 
Azihlwanyeli azivuni 
Kodwa anizedluli" 
(Look at the birds of heaven 
They do not sow, they do not reap 
But you do not surpass them) 
"Lo uyindodana yami 
Engikholwa yiyo, 
lzweni". 
(This is my own son 
in whom I believe, 
Listen to him.) 
"Uthuli othulini, 
Umlotha emlotheni" 
(Dust to dust, 
Ashes to ashes.) 
(1980:27) 
(Matt. 6:26) 
(1980:29) 
(Matt. 17: 5) 
(1980:46) 
(Gen. 3:19, Job 30:19) 
According to Ntuli (1973:63), the last-mentioned excerpt is an adaptation from the 
Bible as adopted in The Book of Prayer . In his poems that display Biblical traces, 
a fondness for certain books like Psalms and the book of Job are prominently 
detected. References to certain Biblical episodes are made as the description of the 
last judgement: 
Ephethe inkemba yokwahlulela; 
Izulu liyondindizela lingqangqazele ngovalo, 
Unyazi lunyalize ngobunyampunyampu nonya 'Nawe Gali' 
(Holding his judgement sword; 
the heavens will thunder in fright, 
Lightning will play with cruelty) (1980:4) 
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The above scene from Revelations 19: 15, 19 predicts that on judgement day the 
wrong will be judged and found guilty. The judgement scenes again are reminiscent 
of Rev. 20:12, 13. Johannesburg is also described as a towering entity removed 
from everyday miseries which befall the workers in the city: 
Waze wayoqhwakela kwelenyoni, 
Wangibuka ngiphansi ngiyintuthwane. (1980:5) 
(Until you sit up high at the highest point, 
You looked down at me below and saw a small ant.) 
Ironically, God is also described in the following manner in Isaiah 40:22: 
It was made by the one who sits on his throne above the earth and 
beyond the sky; the people below look as tiny as ants. 
The David and Goliath episode appears again in Msimang' s poem 'Ubani omkhulu '. 
The story of the Philistine Goliath being slain by David (I Sam. 17: 4) is well-known 
and rampant amongst writers: 
Ngisakhungathekile kwaqhamuka amaFilisti, 
Ekhuza izaga ehuba elokunqoba, 
Ekhethdwa wuBhongoza uGoliyathi. 
Wabheka uSirayeli kwaxhaphazel' izisu, 
Ngovalo lwezinkemba nezinsabula. 
UDavida isikhundlwana, 
Ehlome ngendwayi namatshana, 
Waphonsa lalinye (1980:46) 
(I was still astonished when suddenly appeared the Philistines, 
shouting war-cries, chanting claims of victory, 
Goliath was their leader. 
Israel looked on with stomachs a-sputtering, 
with nervous anxiety for spears and stakes. 
David, an innocent child before the age of discretion, 
arming himself with a sling and small stones, 
hurled one) 
Certain images are taken directly from the Bible, as these from Ezekiel 36:9, Daniel 
8:8, Revelations 7: 1, and others: 
Umoya waseMpumalanga 
Nomoya waseNingizimu, 
Umoya waseNtshonalanga 
Nomoya waseNyakatho, 
Emagumbini omane omhlaba 
Uyafinyelela kuwo. 
(The wind of the East, 
And the wind of the South, 
The wind of the West 
And the wind of the North, 
From every four comers of the earth 
You reach to it.) 
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(lnsimbi yesonto) 
(1980:16) 
The parable of the sheep and the goats as encountered in the New Testament is also 
alluded to. Goats in the New Testament figuratively represent the wicked, that is 
why the Lord, as shephard, sorts the sheep from the goats by placing the sheep on 
his right hand. Symbolically, sheep denote God's people or Christians: 
Wozani kimi zimvu zami 
Dedani kimi zimbuzi zomubi (1980:18) 
(Come to me my sheep 
Get out of my way, goats of the evil one) (Matt. 25:31-46) 
Other biblical borrowings include: 
Uyoyazi kanjani indlela wemuntu? 
(How will you know the way, oh man?) 
Kuwena Mariya onenhlahla 
Izilokotho nezibusiso esifazaneni 
Isisu sakho sibusisiwe. 
(To you Mary of good fortune 
Favoured and blessed among women 
Your womb is blessed.) 
Wena owakha umkhumbi kaNowa. 
(You who built the ark ofNoah.) 
!so lezulu elimnjonjo 
(1980:26) 
(Psalms 121) 
(1980:16) 
(Luke 1:28-31) 
(1980:23) 
(Gen 6:14, Gen 8:19) 
(1980:25) 
(The eye of heaven is sharp, penetrating) 
lnyoka iyawazi umuthi wolwazi. 
(The snake knows the tree of knowledge) 
Ngingqongqoze bangqongqoze, 
Siyangqongqoza kanisivuleli. 
(I knock, they knock, 
We knock and you do not open for us) 
(Prov. 15:3, Rev. 1:7) 
(1980:33) 
(Gen. 3) 
(1990:23) 
(Rev. 3:20) 
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The door remains closed as in Luke 13 :24-3 0. In the following Biblical story retold 
by Msimang, he not only fuses two images from the Bible, that ofNoah and the ark 
compared to the exiled Israelites, but also incorporates a proverb: 
UNowa wakheth' ujuba 
Ayohlol' amanz' ukujula. 
Ngesathunywa ugwayi 
Sabuya nobulongo 
Esasingabuyela eGibhithe 
Kanti bese siseKhenani 
Bakufunza inkululeko (Uyadela Juba) 
(Noah chose a dove 
To explore the water's depth. 
It is only a person who is sent to fetch snuff 
But returns with cowdung 
Who could return to Egypt 
AJl:erreachingCanaan 
They gave you freedom) (1980:28) 
The line "ngesathunywa ugwayi" is an abbreviated rendering of the full proverb 
"ngesathunywa ugwayi sagijimela iboza" (he was sent for tobacco and hastened 
with the herbal medicine). As this saying suggests that a fool always does the 
opposite, the poet implies that the Israelites were wise. 
Again, the imagery in Genesis 18, 19 where Sodom and Gomora are delineated, as 
well as those scenes from Revelations 18 where the city Babylon is represented as 
a woman, synthesize to give the essence of the poem 'Hhawu! NgoMaganedlula' 
(1990:25-26). The poem 'Luthando olungangiyekiyo' (1980:58) is reminiscent of 
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the Methodist hymn no. 234 'O Love that wilt not let me go' (Klepper, 1987:409). 
The poet closes the poem off with the negative of the great commandment in Matt. 
22:39, which is also a verse in the Methodist hymn no. 38: 
Ungafundisi mina ukuthanda 
Fundisa isintu ukuthandana 
(Do not teach and try to convince me about love 
Teach humanity to love one another) 
The image of a hen incubating her eggs or sheltering her chicks also derives from the 
Bible (Matt. 23:37): 
Fukamela ngokufukamela kwesikhukhukazi 
Fukamela amaqhawe kaZulu, 
Fukamela uZulu. (1980:23) 
(Hatch by harboring like hens do 
Brood the heroes of the Zulu, 
Give warmth and aid the Zulu people.) 
Msimang's image oflife as a flower in 'Yimpi' insinuates to the words of David in 
Ps. 103:15-16: 
lzimbali zomhlaba, mbunce, goqe, lothe! (1980:30) 
(The flowers of the earth are shrivelled, twisted, finished!) 
The poem 'Uthando' (1980:8) reverberates the essence of Ecclesiastes 7:26: 
I found something more bitter than death - woman. The love she 
offers you will catch you like a trap or like a net; and her arms round 
you will hold you like a chain. 
Although Msimang incorporates allusions to Biblical characters or sayings, he does 
not as such concentrate on devoting a complete poem to Biblical themes or 
episodes. Msimang further cautions readers not to expect replicas of Western 
poetry in his collections (Msimang, 1990:80). This is more or less true, for there are 
no full length translations or duplication of any detectable Western source in this 
collections. However, any one text can connect significantly with a virtually 
unlimited set of other texts. As encountered in the imagery of Zulu izibongo and the 
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Bible, culture itself is radically intertextual. As such, one can expect that certain 
images concur with Western images, or particular images alluded to by 
contemporary Zulu poets actually derives from Western poetry. 
The application of European influence ranges from making use of isolated lines, 
producing identical sequence of ideas. Zulu poets may also borrow isolated images. 
D .B. Ntuli ( 1973: 19-20 ), for example, regards Vilakazi's poem 'Inqom.fi 'as recalling 
Keats's 'Ode to a Nightingale', because of the similarities with Keats's line 'Away! 
Away! for I will fly to thee' in the following lines ofVilakazi: 
Suk' uphele phambi kwami 
Funa ngimpampe nami nawe 
(Go away from me completely 
Lest I fly with you) 
(Vilakazi, 1982: 15) 
Other critics find 'Inqomfi' reminiscent of Shelley's 'To a Skylark'. Msimang's 
poem 'Ndiza Nyoni' is evocative of Vilakazi's poem, which entails that his 
intertextual source is indirectly an English poem. Msimang repeatedly requests the 
bird to go: 
Suka kulengatsha uh/ale kuleya. 
Suka kwelontulo 
Suka kuleli gumbi uh/ale kuleliya. 
Suka uphele ezigodini zobunyama (1980:50) 
(Go from this branch and perch on that yonder 
Go away from the place of the lizards 
Go from this comer and sit at that yonder 
Go from the valleys of darkness) 
Other corresponding likenesses are: 
Tshiloza nyoni yamahlungu (Vilakazi, 1982:14) 
(Sing, bird of the black burnt veld) 
Tshilotshiloza uzixinge macala. 
Namahlungu alomhlaba ahlabayo (1980:50) 
(Sing, while dancing, looking at your sides 
And the black-burnt veld of this hurtful world) 
Dweb ' umoya lowo uwudamuz' okwamanzi (Vilakazi, 1982: 14) 
(Cut the air that to you is as splashing water) 
Damuza amadamu esibhakabhaka. 
(Splash the water-dams of the sky) 
Kukhona njalo umoyana 
Wen ' olokh' unawo kimi. 
(There is always affection [for you] 
you who always have affinity for me) 
Kusakuvumile nawe nhliziyo yami 
Ndiza phela nawe ngqondo yami 
(It still favours you my heart 
You too must always fly my mind) 
(1980:50) 
(Vilakazi, 1982:15) 
(1980:50) 
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Although European works obviously influenced Zulu modem poetry, the trend 
currently is to blend this form with the indigenous oral tradition, as seen in many 
contemporary poems. 
Of all the poets in Zulu, Vilakazi, the first outstanding modem Zulu poet, attained 
the most recognition. Many aspirant writers modelled their works around those of 
Vilakazi's. The reason for this is, of course, that Vilakazi's work is of an 
exceptionally high standard, but also because his work was prescribed at schools for 
a very long time. Just as Vilakazi was influenced by the Romantic poets at school, 
present day pupils are being influenced by Vilakazi. A poet, such as Msimang, may 
not even know that he is using an image employed by Vilakazi. This does not mean 
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that he is imitating Vilakazi, merely that Vilakazi used the image before him. As 
such, Vilakazi was and remains the parent text for many of the modem Zulu poets' 
intertexts: his texts function as source and resource. One ofVilakazi' swell-known 
poems entitled 'Impophoma ye Victoria ' contains the lines: 
Unjengesandla somzanyan' ekhanda, 
Selul' iminwe sithungath' unwele 
Silulalisa, siluvusa phansi. 
Nemihambim' ithol' isiphephelo (1982:21) 
(As though the hand of a wet-nurse of the head, 
Spreading the fingers searching the hair 
Smoothing it, stroking it up and down. 
And the desolate obtain a place of refuge) 
Although Vilakazi personifies the Victoria waterfall as a nurse-maid, the same idea 
is encountered with Msimang when he addresses the night: 
Ngigone ngezingalo zokuthula, 
Wena mzanyana wezintandane, 
Mangiphumule esifubeni sakho. 
(Embrace me with arms of peace, 
You nurse-maid of orphans, 
Let me rest at your breast.) 
(Ubusuku) 
(1980:20) 
In the preface to Vilakazi's Inkondlo KaZulu, LB. Gumede quoted what Vilakazi 
wrote concerning the nature of his own poetry, which was: 
Zinjengezinkanyezi 
Ziland' ubusuk' ikhwezi 
Elibik' ukusa 
(They are like stars 
Fetching at night the morning star 
Heralding the dawn) 
(Vilakazi, 1982:viii) 
The Xhosa poet, St. J. Page Yako, echoed this sentiment in the opening line of his 
preface to his anthology, lkhwezi: 
Le nkwenkwezi iliKhwezi iyinto enkulu kumaXhosa ithetha ukuthi 
kuyasa. (1967:iii) 
(This bright star is a morning star, a great thing of the Xhosa, reporting 
dawn.) 
Msimang continues the tradition: 
Indonsa kuhle kwenkwenkwezi yokusa, 
Indons' edons' umthala nesilimela, 
Inkwenkwez' ekhanye phansi eSifuleni 
Ethi khanya nkanyezi yokusa! (Jnyosi yakwaGwegwazangene) 
(The morning star which is like a big bright star of dawn, 
The morning star which pulls the milky way and the Pleiades, 
The bright star shining down on Sifuleni 
When he said, shine you morning star!) (1990:41) 
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Many of Msimang's similes are compounded and extended with great ingenuity. 
They develop into sophisticated metaphors. In the lines above "indonsa" refers to 
L.B.Z. Buthelezi, whom the poet calls a morning star. Msimang extends this 
metaphor with a simile, duplicating the meaning, a pattern which adds to the 
aesthetic value ofMsimang's poetry. 
One of Vilakazi's most notable metaphors can be found in the following lines of 
'UMamina': 
Ungikhumbuza phansi kwaNongoma 
Laph' izintombi zingazalwa, 
Ziqhibuka phansi njengamakhowe. (1980:44) 
(You remind me of that place at Nongoma 
Where the girls are not born, 
They spring from the earth like mushrooms.) 
This mushroom image has been duplicated by other Zulu poets as well (Ntuli, 
1973:127-128), and Msimang also adopts this symbol in his poem 'UShaka 
kaSenzangakhona' where he described Nandi' s unexpected pregnancy: 
Abembes' amathongo ngesiphuku sothando, 
Bekuleso siphuku laqhibuk' ikhowe, 
USishaka ophikwe ngabasekhaya, 
Bath' ulishaka kanti yikhon' ezobashakazisa. (1990:55) 
(The ancestral spirits wrapped them in a blanket oflove, 
From out of that blanket came a mushroom, 
Sishaka who was denied by those at home, 
They said he was a small beetle whereas he would shake them.) 
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According to Ntuli ( 1973: 13 3) many images from Vilakazi' s work can be found in 
other Zulu poets. Vilakazi especially valued water symbolism, which again can be 
traced back to historical traditional praise poetry. Msimang also treasures the water 
imagary as the title of his first poetry collection lsiziba ZoThukela reveals. He sees 
water as life-giving, which causes the drinker thereof to become succour to all 
humanity: 
Kwabhok' isiphethu solwazi 
Esigobhoze ngomthombo kwa-UNISA (Onoziqu bakwa-Unisa) 
(There erupted a fountain of knowledge 
which flowed with the spring ofUNISA.) (1990:42) 
Wabe ecibela isiphethu sesiminya solwazi (NgeUnisa eminyakeni 
Mthombo wolwazi ogobhoze ngemihoshahosha elikhulu) 
(It was shooting into space the source of knowledge 
Spring of knowledge which flows in numerous gorges.)(1980:3) 
The recurrance of these terms in Msimang's poetry and the contexts in which they 
are used makes it clear to the reader that they mean much more than their normal 
everyday usage. Msimang reiterates the above image in two rhetorical questions: 
Lomthombo awusoze washa noma nini 
Lomthombo ungashiswa yini nje nempela? (Vilakazi awusayikubhubha) 
(This spring (source of water) will never run dry anytime. 
What could possibly cause this spring to run dry?) (1980: 19) 
This poem on B. W. Vilakazi is exemplary ofMsimang' s style of merging the praised 
subject's works into his poem. Msimang foregrounds the publications Noma Nini 
and Nje Nempela by using their titles in the two lines. By assimilating these texts 
into the poem, Vilakazi's books act as foundation for Msimang's new poem (as 
parasite), but as host he absorbs and adapts them for his own poem to act as a text 
in its own right: 
Khangelani amal' eZulu 
Nizombona eziqongweni zezintaba 
(Gaze upwards towards the blue horizons 
You will see him on the top of the mountains.) 
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(1980:19) 
This seems a favourite method for Msimang as he repeats the same mode of 
operation in poems for D .B .Z. Ntuli - author of Amangwevu, Izikhwili, Imicibisholo, 
Amehlo KaZulu, Uthingo Lwenkosazana, Ithemba, Indandatho Yesethembiso, 
Imvunge Yemvelo: 
Okhiphe amangwevu osiba, 
Wahloma ngezikhwili, 
Wahloma ngemicibisholo, 
Aphendukisa amehlo kaZulu, 
Akhangwa wuthingo lwenkosazana, 
Uthingo lwawanik' ithemba, 
Indandatho yesethembiso, 
Aqala ukuvuma imvunge yemvelo (1980:10-11) 
(He who delivers with skilful strokes [Amangwevu] of a pen, 
He armed himself with fighting sticks [Izikhwili], 
He armed himself with bows and arrows [Imicibisholo], 
They caused the eyes of the Zulu [Amehlo KaZulu] to turn, 
They were attracted to the rainbow [Uthingo Lwenkosazana], 
The sweet fragrance gave them hope [Ithemba], 
Ring of promise [Indandatho Yesethembiso ], 
They started to admire the murmers of nature [Imvunge Yemvelo]) 
This approach is reiterated for the writer L.B.Z. Buthelezi, who penned Izagila 
Zephisi, Uhlanga Lwezwe, Igula LikaNondlini and Kha/a Nkomo KaZulu: 
Ngob ' uyiphake ngezagila zephisi, 
Ngob ' ikhale ngenkomo yakwabo enco, 
Kwagcwala ngisho igula likanondlini, 
Ingqwele eyelus' ezohlanga lwezwe. (1990:40-41) 
(Because you distribute with the club of an expert hunter [Izagila Zephisi], 
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Because the speckled red and white beast weeped [Kha/a Nkomo KaZulu] 
at their place, 
It became full, I mean the milk-calabash ofNondlini [Igula LikaNondlini], 
Leader who herds, who is the original stock of the nation [ Uhlanga 
Lwezwe].) 
Many ofVilakazi's sayings and poems have found widespread acceptance in Zulu, 
so that they were taken up and repeated in everyday speech by people. When 
Msimang exhibits an image that corresponds to another poet, it could be likely that 
the specific poet was also influenced by Vilakazi. However, Vilakazi himself was 
inspired by writers and those writers were affected and so on. All poems, present 
and previous, contain earlier poems within themselves as enclosed parasites. As 
O'Connell and Con Davis (1989:xiv) state - the intertextual relation generates the 
deferral and rewriting of'parent' texts, themselves 'bastardized deformations' of the 
texts that came before them. The image of a milking cow echoes through Zulu 
poetry: 
Nibon' ukuth' amankonyane 
Osapho lukaMlungukazana 
Asencel' izinkomazana 
Ezazimiselw' abantwana 
Benzalo kaSenzangakhona? 
(You see that the young calves 
Of the race of the despoiling white man 
Are now sucking dry the milk-cows 
Destined for the children 
The offspring of Senzangakhona?) 
(Vilakazi, 1982:19) 
M.S.S. Gcumisa extended the above image in '/nsengakwazi yakwethu' (Our prize 
milking cow) in which he complains that the whites drain the land of resources: 
Kant' uzongemuka zonk' ezakwethu zegula. 
Uthath' unondlini wakwethu wamguda (Msimang, 1996:67) 
(But he took away the whole herd of our milk-cows. 
He took our heavy-milking cow and milked it without 
letting the calf suckle first) 
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Msimang also treasures this image of a milk-cow, but he uses the image more 
positively as in his poetry; e.g. 'Isibaya esikhulu se-Afrika ': 
Afrika usunesibaya, 
Namhla zibuyil' emasisweni, 
Zeqelen' emapulazini zizodl' ekhaya 
(Africa you now have a kraal, 
(1990:37) 
Today they have returned from being loaned out for milking, 
Turn them back from farms, they should graze at home) 
The big kraal under discussion here is the African Bank. The acquisition of the kraal 
of this nature ensures better living standards for those who will put their 'izinkomo' 
(cattle, i.e. money) in it: 
Beze namathunga, yehlisile, 
Ongenathunga ez' azokleza. (1990:38) 
(They should come with milk pails, the cow is yielding freely, 
He who is without a milkpail, should milk into the mouth.) 
The tertiary institution UNI SA is also seen by the poet as a prize milk-cow that lows 
in 'NgeUnisa eminyakeni elikhulu '. A cow lows when her udder is heavy, full of 
milk and when she is ready to feed the calves. UNISA nourishes the mind similar 
to a cow which provides milk for a healthy body: 
UNondlinikazi waseMzansini obhonse kwenanela 
lzintaba nemimango, kwatshakadula imivemve 
Namaguqa asephusa aphindela ayokwanyisa. (1980:2) 
(Prize-Milking cow of the Southern continent which lowed and was echoed 
By mountains and hills, the calves frolicking leap down 
And the grown-up beasts which ceased suckling, resume to suckle.) 
One ofVilakazi' s poems 'Ezinkomponi ' (At the mine-compounds) contains a simile 
in which the mine workers are compared to cattle being herded: 
Sivumile ukuphum ' eqhugwaneni, 
Sazoluswa njengezinkabi (Vilakazi, 1980:62) 
rw e agreed to leave the hut, 
To be herded like oxen) 
This concept is enveloped in Msimang' s poem 'Zindonga zalo muzi ': 
Enibaqoqe ekhaphelweni okwezinkomo, 
Bengezinkomo nabavalela ngemivalo, 
Bala/' esibayeni bengezinkomo (1990:23) 
([People] whom you rounded up like cattle in the grazing fields, 
Although they were not beasts, they were shut in with cross-bars, 
They slept in the kraal, although they were not beasts) 
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Death is a common theme in all poetry. Vilakazi addresses death in an animated 
account: 
Wagwegwesa wathint' izinwele 
Zafongqeka, wangen' engqondweni 
W ayisanganisa wayishiya. 
Wasuqhela uyakud' ubuka 
Wenamile ngomsebenz' omkhulu 
(You went round and touched the hair 
It shrivelled up, you entered the mind 
disarranged it and then left. 
Then did you move away and looked 
basking in your mighty work) 
(1982:77) 
Death to Msimang is a visitor in 'Leso sivakashi ', one who enters the house 
uninvited and violently annihilates the inhabitant: 
Wangihlek' usulu ngipaqupaquza, 
Wangihlek' inhlinini ngijilajileka, 
Wangicish' umoya eqhosha, 
Wangiqhoshela ngikweqa amhlophe. 
Wangiwola ngezandlakazi, uNoliqhwa 
Wangithinta ngezinyawokazi, uNoliqhwa (1990:13) 
(He cynically laughed at me as I wriggled about 
He grinned at me as I tossed about, 
He stinted me in an air of arrogance, 
He boasted as I turned up the white of the eyes. 
He gathered me up with his great, big hands, Noliqhwa 
He tipped me with his great, big feet, Noliqhwa) 
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In his poem 'Wena Kuf a ', D .B. Ntuli ( 1969: 84) also personifies death as a ruthlessly 
destructive man, breaking the pillar of the hut. Msimang' s description of his 'deadly 
visitor' is reminiscent ofNtuli's delineation of the gigantic "isiqhwaga" (fearsome 
person): 
Namagqikolo ezandlakazi nezinyawokazi 
(And colossally massive hands and feet) 
In E. Zondi' s drama Ukufa KukaShaka, Mkabayi regrets the waste of Zulu youth in 
the Shakan wars, which she regards as senseless. She utters the following words: 
Yeka ngekhaba lesizwe elicekelwa phansi kungakabikho mbila 
kusezimpepha. (Zondi, 1960: 1) 
(Alas, that the young plant of the nation should be hewn down 
before it bears fruit [mealies] in its bloom). 
A similar image is encountered in Msimang' s poem 'lsihlava ': 
Maye! Wabugweda ubukhaba bekhaba, 
Labhunqana ithemba lobuhle bobusha, 
Lakhendlek' ikhaba lakhawul' ukukhihliza (1980:5) 
(Alas! You have stunted the good growth of a maize plant, 
put an end to the freshness of youth, 
The mealie plant stopped growing and will not bear fruit) 
This historical drama also proclaims Shaka' s vision and objective of unifying the 
clans as one nation, an echo of which can be detected in Msimang' s praise poem for 
Shaka: 
Ngoba uqoq' izinhlanga wakh' uhlanga; 
Ngob' uqoq' izizwe wakh' isizwe; 
Ngoba uqoq' abantu wakh' isintu. (1990:66) 
(Because he integrated tribes to form one tribe; 
Because he merged races to form one race; 
Because he unified humans to form humanity.) 
Msimang (1996: 62) reiterates L.T.L. Mabuya's poem 'Nkosi sikelel' !Africa' 
(Lord, bless Africa) in which the poet describes "the language storm" (impi yolimi) 
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that is, the Soweto riots regarding the medium ofinstruction in 1976, where bullets 
instead of hail rained down, and guns thundered instead of a natural storm: 
Liyan' izulu lezinganono nezibhamu ... 
Konke kuhlezi kumithiswe ngezinhlamvu; 
Kazi iyozala nkomoni lempi yolim' (Msimang, 1996:62-63) 
(It is a rain-storm of cannons and guns . . . 
Everything is impregnated with bullets; 
One wonders about the outcome of the language war) 
Msimang makes use of the same image: 
Impi yanamuhla yimpi yosiba; 
Impi yanamuhla yimpi yamabhuku! 
(Modem warfare is that of the pen; 
Modern warfare is that of books!) 
(Jnkondlo yezingqalabutho) 
(1990:20) 
Msimang has made use of satire in his poem 'Nawe Gali 'with devastating aesthetic 
effect. When one compares the poem with Mongane Serote' s 'City Johannesburg', 
one encounters similarities. Both poets are disgusted by the exploitation and they 
forecast doom on Johannesburg. Serote exclaims: 
My hand like a starved snake rears my pockets 
For my thin, ever lean wallet, 
While my stomach groans a friendly smile to hunger, 
Jo'burg City. 
Where death lurks in the dark like a blade in the flesh, 
Listen when I tell you, 
There is no fun, nothing, in it, 
When you leave the women and men with such frozen expressions, 
Expressions that have tears like furrows of soil erosion, 
Jo'burg City, you are dry like death, 
Jo'burg City, Johannesburg, Jo'burg City. (Hirson, 1997:40-41) 
Another poem reverberating the agony of Africa and its people is Msimang' s 'Afrika. 
ngingowakho '. In this poem the distress of the African people are captured as they 
saw themselves losing their country: 
Wathalalisa okwendiki Afrika na? 
Awukasizwa yini isililo? 
Uyibonile imihosha Afrika 
Iphenduka izimpophoma zegazi. 
Ubonile emathafeni akho 
Ingcwaba liphezu kwengcwaba. 
Uyothula kube nini Afrika? (1980:48) 
(Why are you so quiet, like a possessed person, Afrika? 
Can you not hear the lamentation? 
You saw the ravines Africa 
They turned into waterfalls of blood. 
You have seen on your plains 
Graves stacked on top of other graves. 
How long are you going to remain silent Africa?) 
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In a similar manner, P. Mamogobo's Northern Sotho sonnet 'Afrika, nagasello' 
(Africa, land of sorrows), the continent is personified and directly addressed 
vocatively and interrogatively: 
Afrika nagamasotosoto, o le ramalwetsi bohloko o kwa kae? 
Naman 'e bohloko go baba kae, o !la sa mogolodi nongyamahlomola? 
0 gatilwe ke maswena dira matlakagothopa, 
Mahala a tserwe o tsenet8we ke phehli o fatolot8wamala, 
0 pherekant8we kgopolo bana bengsako ba bolawa ke tlala. 
Afrika bowa, kgola merithi bana ba dule ka boiketlo. 
(Ntuli & Swanepoel, 1993:57) 
(Africa, land-of-fortune, being a weakling, where do you feel the pain? 
Sick calf, where does it hurt that you weep like a blue-crane, bird-of-
sorrow? 
You are being trampled by the enemies, armies aiming to plunder, 
Your plains are being invaded, you are being penetrated by a borer-worm, 
your intestines torn, 
Your mind is contorted, children, owners of the land, are hungry. 
Africa, come back, clear up the shade so that your children may live in 
peace. (Translated by D. Mampuru) 
There is an appeal not to forsake the speaker throughout the poem: 
Afrika ungangilahli. 
(Africa, do not desert me) 
(Afrika ngingowakho) 
(1980:47) 
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The same repeated request is encountered as a motif in D.B. Ntuli's poem 
'Umhlobisi wesiganga ' (Decorator of the veld), though this request is directed to 
a butterfly: 
Ungangilahli bo! 
(Don't desert me!) (Ntuli & Swanepoel, 1993:101) 
In praising D.B.Z. Ntuli for his writing and other achievements, Msimang made use 
of his clan praise. At an earlier time, D .B .K. Mhlongo also composed a praise poem 
on Ntuli and adopted a slightly variated form of the Ntuli izithakazelo almost similar 
to Msimang: 
Mphemba! 
Wen'ophemba ngebele 
Abanye bephemba ngezibi. 
(Mphemba! 
You who kindle with sorghum 
Others light a fire with pieces of straw.) 
UNomangcwemb ' abikel' amaBhele 
Wona eh/a eLenge ngesilulu; 
Abaphemba ngenkomo, 
(Mphemba wamaBhele) 
(Msimang, 1988:27) 
Kanti abafokazana baphemba ngezibi (1990: 11) 
(Nomangcwembe reports to the Bhele people 
Who descended by means of a grain basket down Lenge mountain; 
Those who kindle with a beast, 
But the worthless men kindle with pieces of straw) 
Seen in the Bloomian context, Ntuli is certainly Msimang' s Oedipal father. Msimang 
admits his admiration for this predecessor in one of his poems: 
USontandwase umntakaNtuli, 
Ngibe ngiyambheka ngamthanda, 
Kanti sengingenwa lugqozi, 
Ngabe ngiyambheke ngamthande, 
Ngaphinda ngangenwa lugqozi. (KuD.B.Z. Ntuli) 
(The beloved one, child of the Ntuli's, 
When I look at him, I love him, 
For that is where I procured inspiration, 
Whenever I happen to look at him, I love him, 
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The inspiration is revitalized.) (1980:11) 
Ntuli as well as Msimang, make extensive use of the ideophone in a highly effective 
manner. Both poets selectively and intentionally use ideophones to evoke different 
senses: 
Haxa! Phoqo! Bhidli! 
Balindelwa, balindelwa, 
Cwe I (Inhlekelele yaseCoalbrook) 
(Collapsing, snapping through, falling down! 
They were waited for, they were waited for, 
Nothing!) (1969:81) 
In Msimang' s poem, a similar use of ideophones are encountered: 
Um bani, bani I 
Qhu ... ! Ngqofo! 
Ngadla! 
Khilikithi I 
Saqanda, qa! 
(Lightning, flash! 
Explosion! Ferocious attack! 
A killing! 
Falling precipitately! 
Suddenly seeing him brought down!) 
(Yimpi) 
(1980:30) 
A favourite image ofNtuli is honey ( uju) which he uses to describe any intoxicating 
emotion, whether audible, tactile or sensory. The harmonious melody of song 
influences him thus: 
Ngidakwe uju lwezekhethelo 
(I am drunk with the finest honey) 
Izindlebe zenu zivuleni 
Ukuze kungene kuzo uju 
Lokwethabisa izinhliziyo zenu 
(Open your ears 
So that honey can enter 
(Ngilalele uMesiya) 
(Ntuli, 1975:64) 
(NginguLanga) 
which will make your hearts exultant) 
... ngilethehve uju, 
Lwaconsisehva olimini hvami 
( ... I was brought honey, 
It was dripped on my tongue) 
(Ntuli, 1972:49) 
(Ngizwa uhleko) 
(Ntuli, 1972:27) 
Msimang also exhibits a fondness for the same image: 
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No ju olumtoti hvaconsel' ulimi nganambitha (Ngiyakhumbula) 
(And sweet honey dripped on my tongue, I smacked my lips)(1980:55) 
[[ju hvengoma yakho lumtoti, 
Ilunambithe inhliziyo yanethezeka 
(The honey of your song is sweet, 
The heart is at comfort when it tasted it) 
(Umculo) 
(1980:56) 
This symbol is infused, depending on the immediate context, throughout Msimang' s 
oeuvre, with diverse associations. Msimang' s poem 'Inkondlo kaMkabayi' which 
derives from the novel Buzani KuMkabayi is a borrowing from a poem by C. S. Ntuli 
entitled 'Buzani kuMkabayi' (Ntuli, 1978:60). In Ntuli's poem, Mkabayi is set to 
marry Dingiswayo, whereas in Msimang' s poem she has to forsake Lamula. 
Msimang' s flower image in 'Yimpi' is reminiscent ofM.J. Khumalo's poem 'Impilo 
yomuntu ' in which a section is found where the arrangement of ideas and the 
wording coincide with that of David in Ps. 103: 15-16: 
Impilo yomuntu ngempela ayilutho, 
Ijana nembali enhle eqhakazile (Nyembezi, 1963:77) 
(The life of man is indeed nothing, 
It is like a beautiful flower which is in bloom) 
Izimbali zomhlaba, mbunce, goqe, lathe I 
Amanoni omhlaba ncibilikiyane! (1980:30) 
(The flowers of the earth are shrivelled, twisted, finished! 
The fat of the earth melts into liquid!) 
The phrase 'Uthuli othulini ' (dust to dust) used by Msimang as mentioned in the 
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Biblical intertexts, also occurred as a poem by P. Myeni (1974:29) entitled 'Uthuli 
othulini, umlotha emlotheni' (dust to dust, ashes to ashes). The title ofMsimang' s 
poem 'lfu elimnyama ' (the black cloud) describing the incidents of violence in South 
Africa during the years 1984 - 1986, was already used by G. Nyanda in 1959 as the 
title ofa novel. Ntuli also wrote a poem called 'lfu elimnyama' (1969:42), though 
his dark cloud is of a more personal nature. Also, Msimang' s poem 'Muhle 
ngempela lo msebenzi ' ( 1980: 60-63) connects well to the Sotho poet, K.E. Ntsane' s 
poem 'Dumedisa Base' (Greet the Boss). Both poets are satirical in tone when 
discussing their subject matter - that of the superior attitude the white employers 
have over their menial workers: 
Rola katiba, o dumedise Base, 
0 siye dieta keiting, 
0 hahabe ka mpa seka-noha, 
0 pate mohwasa, Base a kgahlwe, 
Mmisisi a tshehe, a utlwe monate, 
Le botlelempase ba tlo bona. (Ngcongwane, 1984: 11) 
(Take off your hat, and greet the Boss, 
And leave your shoes at the gate, 
Come crawling on your belly like a snake, 
Move noiselessly, so that the Boss might be pleased, 
And the Missus laugh and be amused, 
And the small bosses also entertained.) 
Bangena behubazela bayazincengela, 
Kuqhamuka mfanyan' omhloshana 
Bashay' isaluthe: ''Mey' Basil" 
Kube ntombazan' emhloshana 
Bashay ' isaluthe: ''Misisi I" 
Bhek' ekhishini, uyothi wabonani? 
Abanumzane bashay' amaphinifa (1980:61) 
(They apologetically enter in a pleading manner, 
Suddenly the little white boy appears 
They shout a salute: "My Boss!" 
Then for the little white girl 
They shout a salute: "Missus!" 
Look in the kitchen, what will you say you have seen? 
Respected headmen dressed in pinafores) 
There are many more intertextual crossings in Msimang's texts, however the 
275 
examples supplied are illustrative of the bulk of traces observed. 
As was ascertained from the aforegoing discussions, Msimang' s texts is a network 
of texts, replete with echoes of earlier texts which could alter the meaning of his 
imagery. These observations should, moreover, suffice to caution against any 
attempt to discover a consistent pattern in Msimang' s deployment of symbols. The 
values and significance with which any given symbol is endowed are determined by 
the poetic context and intertexts and not by a transcendental, coherent, closed 
system. 
6.3 Resume 
In this chapter an attempt was made to explore the dynamics of intertextuality as 
found in the poetry ofMsimang. From a post-structuralist perspective, nothing is 
really new; each text refers back differently to the infinite sea of the already written. 
In the words of Umberto Eco, deconstructionists claim to have 
discovered what writers have always known (and have told us again 
and again)- books always speak of other books, and every story tells 
a story that has already been told (O'Donnell & Con Davis, 
1989:20). 
As was stated, the term intertextuality which has emerged within the past three 
decades encompasses not only influence, allusion, reference, parody, and imitation, 
it also includes ideas, images and words never encountered by the poet. Although 
the discourse of deconstructive intertextuality blends and clashes with the discourse 
of influence, intertextuality contains within it a reference to and quotations of the 
older term. 
Intertexuality challenges the monopoly of the finite, semantically consistent and 
autonomous work. According to post-structural positions, texts are at best regarded 
as collages, rewritten or rearranged versions of already existing texts, but not as 
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ingenious masterworks of aesthetic text production. A given text may appear 
singular and unique, but every syllable, every word and utterance set to paper 
reflects amalgation and repetition of countless types, stereotypes and precedents. 
Intertextuality ranges from relative unconscious allusions to the clever utilization of 
suggestions or features of other people, works, and modes of cultural expression. 
It was not intended in this chapter to present the various post-structuralist 
approaches of this remarkably heterogenous theory ofintertextuality, where there 
is only consent on one point - that intertextuality is based on the idea of relations 
between texts. However, a brief history of the deconstructive philosophy on 
intertextuality was furnished. The deconstructive intertextual position of Derrida 
promulgates the non-privileging of the author as persona. Although the poet may 
feel an intense overwhelming fervor, his poetry is made not with the affective turmoil 
of consciousness but with words, codes, and conventions. Thus, in Derrida's eyes, 
the interrelationships that language itself produces become the major factors in the 
writing of a literary text, and the multiplicity of stimuli that incites the writing 
process replaces the author's single identity as the source of the text. His 
intertextuality signals an indeterminacy regarding authorial, readerly, or textual 
identity. Barthes, again, learned from Kristeva that literature is by its very nature an 
intertext, that is, a plural series of components which have a formal semblance of 
unity which can only really be appreciated in their plural composition. He defined 
the intertext as "the impossibility of living outside the infinite text" (1981 :36), 
thereby making intertextuality the very condition of textuality. Barthes advances the 
text as a complex of voices suggesting premonitions to its readers as they read and 
re-read the texts, and structure these visions into coherent perspectives. Bloom 
returns to the concept of author or 'poet' and incorporates psychology into his 
design. His poet suffers from an anxiety of influence regarding predecessors. For 
these views, he is constantly chided by the other deconstructionists and as such, not 
regarded as a 'true' deconstructor. 
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The deconstructive position on intertextuality views the author as not in control 
(conscious or otherwise) of his or her creation. The author, as subject, is site rather 
than centre or presence, in other words the subject is that to which things happen, 
rather than that which makes things happen. Extra-individual forces use the subject 
to exert their sway, the subject does not use them (although it thinks that it does). 
For post-structuralism the subject is secondary, constructed by language, volatile, 
standing in its own shadow, and self-divided. 
As was observed in some ofMsimang' s poetic texts, intertextuality was a necessary 
precondition for the comprehension and interpretation of the poems as a specific 
interpretation strategy motivating the reader to grasp and to process the expected 
polyphony. This was apparent primarily in his praise poems where a broader 
knowledge of izibongo, izithakazelo and imilolozelo was required. Also, praise 
poems on prominent Zulu writers called for cognizance of the texts written by these 
specific authors. The postulation of a multiple overlay or intertextual overcoding 
in Msimang' s poetry is possible in the course ofconstructive interpretation strategies 
with different results depending on the reader's decisions and his textual and 
intertextual knowledge. 
One can characterize Msimang's poetry as entombing "the words of the dead ... by 
inner quotation, allusion, or the verbatim presence of a piece of precursor" 
(Hartman, 1981:80). Subsequent texts affect the perceptions that writers and 
readers have of works of the past. The lineage of a given text may precede or follow 
said text: sources point not only to beginnings but also to gradual evolution. Every 
writer creates his/her own precursors. His/her work modifies our conception of the 
past, as it will modify the future. It becomes clear that Zulu writers, such as 
Msimang, are influenced by their surroundings and by other factors like European 
poetry, peer prototypes, and most importantly, the oral tradition. Even prominent 
poets like Vilakazi borrowed from his predecessors. Certain poets, like Msimang, 
are truly talented, and whether they utilize borrowed contents or not, they will still 
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produce compositions of outstanding quality. 
Intertextuality illustrates the idea that to analyze and critique texts in the light of 
deconstruction is to confront multiple, sometimes undecidable elements of fragile 
contingency enacting inclusions and exclusions. The intertextual connection of any 
one ofMsimang's texts with any other or with many others is not a given, but an 
arbitrary procedure, as Miller elucidates: 
The apparently solid basis for interpretation becomes a labyrinth of 
endless wanderings, including wanderings back to the precursors of 
the precursors, the labyrinths behind, within, or beneath each 
labyrinth (1975:26). 
This procedure, however, is again deconstructed, for every analytical rendering is 
partial and incomplete. Most importantly, the context of intertextuality in any 
writer's work constantly changes and is changed by the reader's cognizance of 
reading, writing, and memory as components constituting a perspective of 
interpretation. 
Intertextuality is one of the major tasks ofliterary interpretation today to investigate 
further and to define, because the study of the intertext itself is limitless. It is for the 
present and future generations of readers to discover the many other meanings 
implied in the texts of such writers as Msimang. 
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CHAPTER 7 
GENERAL CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
While criticism has been practised for several centuries, the recent advent of 
deconstructive theory has revitalized and transformed it. In this context, this thesis 
sought to introduce this theory to African languages, showing how deconstruction 
offers useful supplements to reigning modes of critical inquiry. 
As was illustrated in this study, deconstruction mainly explores peculiar relations 
within texts and between texts, often involving certain echoes that connect signifiers 
without giving rise to meaning that fits a unified interpretation. As such, citations 
and deconstructive discussions of Msimang' s works were woven together with 
remarks on the literary significance of this theory for employment in Zulu literature. 
In his poems, the structure of double binds, and punning explorations of words 
linked by etymological chains were explored. 
It was contented that there is a place in literary criticism for deconstruction and its 
relevance to African literature. An overview of the contents of this study as well 
as the results obtained in the attempt to deconstruct Msimang' s poetry will now be 
supplied. However, this concluding chapter does not pretend to wrap up the 
arguments of the preceding chapters. It does not attempt to come to a conclusion, 
as this would deny rather than strengthen what this thesis sets out to achieve. 
7 .2 Main observations 
The influential movement of deconstruction has not only evoked a sympathetic 
response but also provoked a hostile reaction. Some critics have regarded it simply 
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as an application of the indeterminacy principle to texts, while other critics have 
regarded it as the essence of irresponsibility with sinister, nihilistic implications. 
Deconstructive critique was not necessarily proposed in this study as a substitute for 
conventional literary theory. This theory does, however, insist on regarding 
language as a system of signs and not a vehicle of meanings. Many critics are 
troubled by the evident anti-humanism of deconstruction since it rendered 
inoperative traditional modes of analysis, by means of its undecidability. Critics are 
afraid that deconstruction will lead to the death of literature and literary analysis. 
David Lehman in Caruth (1995:132) considers deconstruction as follows: 
The impulse of deconstruction is profoundly inimical to art (which 
it subordinates to theory), to biography and history (whose relevance 
it denies), to conventional methods of critical analysis (which it 
considers retrograde), and to any philosophy of action (since 
existential choices are always transmuted into irresolvable linguistic 
predicaments). 
Whatever else it is, deconstruction is a movement, a network oflike-
minded professors who fiercely promote one another's works and 
use their institutional power to further the cause . . . Initiates are 
rewarded with teaching appointments ... (1995:70). 
Deconstruction is a program that promotes a reckless disregard for 
the truth (1995:267) a programmatic scepticism (1995:77) that 
would paralyse the will to act upon our destiny (1995:110-111). 
Bellow (in Caruth, 1995:98) exclaims that 
In the name of 'deconstruction', [younger academics] have taken 
over . . . literature itself, operating in the cockpit side by side with 
Shakespeare, Milton, etc. as co-pilots. These academics - good 
God! - suppose that a dwarf sitting in Shakespeare's lap were to 
imagine that he was piloting the great Shakespearean jet! 
Some of these charges were hasty and ill-founded. The theory of language 
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propounded by deconstructors was not, in fact, anti-referential, anti-expressivism, 
or anti-historicism. Bloom's work pertains to matters of the poet's psyche as well 
as to biographical dimensions; Derrida, Bloom and Hartman's work reflect history. 
De Man and Miller continuously interrogated referentiality, however, without 
renouncing it. Since Bloom, Hartman attended little interest in the mimetic aspects 
ofreferentiality, but they did not give up the referent. Terry Eagleton furthermore 
remarks that hostility to this theory 
usually means an opposition to other people's theories and an 
oblivion to one's own (1983:vii). 
Eagleton backs his position with a comment of John Keynes, whom he quotes as 
observing how "those who disliked theory, or claimed to get along better without 
it, were simply in the grip of an older theory" ( 1983 :vii). 
However hostile these anti-deconstructionist critics were, it was further also 
observed that even among deconstructionists differences of temperament and history 
were reflected. Within the numerous ranks of American deconstructors, 
disagreements occurred between the so-called true followers of Derrida and less 
faithful, more independent critics. These followers have, for example, adopted 
different aspects of Derrida's work, and developed them in particular ways. As 
such, they differed from one another in their degrees of faithfulness to Derridean 
philosophy, their views of the relevance of psychoanalysis, their judgements about 
the pertinence of Derrida's later work and style, and their assessments of the 
political, theological and historical import of deconstruction. All these aspects were 
considered in this study. 
De Man, for instance, is one of the more rigorous deconstructors in the Derridean 
vein. He is interested in the way in which the rhetorical structures of the text, 
particularly its metaphors, apparently construct one kind of meaning, whereas, when 
subjected to appropriate and rigorous analysis, they can be shown in fact to 
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deconstruct that meaning in favour of another whose ideological implications may 
be opposed to those actually articulated in the text. 
This basic background to deconstruction was supplied in chapter two. It was 
demonstrated that although deconstructors claim not to have a method of 
interpretation, they do have a particular reading strategy. Jacques Derrida outlined 
various options for deconstructing the logocentric system. He observed that 
deconstructors could firstly attempt a reading without changing ground, repeating 
the original logocentric problematics and using the system against itself or secondly, 
a critic could change ground and abruptly step outside, affirming total discontinuity 
and difference. In the end, Derrida, recommended that both forms of reading be 
employed. Derrida urges a double or rhetorical reading. 
This rhethorical reading is foremost a reading which shows how the grammatical, 
conceptual and thematic totalisations of a text are being deconstructed by the 
images, the tropes, the rhetoric of the text. Ironically, as soon as the rhetorical 
structure of a poem or piece of literature has served to debunk the mystifications 
specific to the thematic level of the text, it turns immediately into a new unifying 
principle. The totality that it confers upon the text is no longer one rooted in logos, 
but a totality rooted in lexis. Consequently, to deconstruct does not simply mean to 
escape the possibility of error and illusion distinctive of literature in general. 
Derrida has coined a number of terms (which critics describe as an abundance of 
technical jargon) to show how a text escapes what he sees as the constraints of 
logic, reference, and authorial intent. 'Supplementary', for instance, describes how 
one sign seems to add something to its predecessors, extending (supplementing) the 
meaning to which the text as a whole aspires. Paradoxically, the very need for a 
supplement testifies to a lack or absence in what has gone before. 
This necessarily cursory and introductory glance at the principal tenets of 
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deconstruction raised the question: why invoke this critical method at all? The 
corollary of this is the important question as to whether deconstruction did in any 
way illuminate Msimang' s poetry by offering fresh insights into it. This thesis 
attempted to demonstrate that there is a certain complicity between the respective 
texts and deconstruction, deconstructive criticism does indeed provide constructive 
percipience into Msimang' s poetry. 
Chapter three explored the multiplicity of meaning and rhetoricity in Msimang' s 
poetry. This was accomplished by engaging deconstructive strategies which 
generally investigate such matters as the installation of defining binary oppositions 
and the arbitrariness and undecidability ofboundaries. Western thought, and for that 
matter, African thought as well, has always been structured in terms of polarities: 
good vs evil, life vs death, truth vs error, etc. As was illustrated with 'lziziba 
zoThukela ', 'Uthando' and 'Ndiza nyoni ',what these oppositions do is to privilege 
unity, identity, immediacy, and temporal and spatial presentness over distance, 
differance, dissimulation, and deferment. 
Msimang' s texts are heterogeneous: they make, then erase, assertions, they begin 
and end arbitrarily. In any one of his texts, a word never sheds the multiple 
meanings it has acquired in different contexts, meanings that entangle it with an 
unlimited number of other signs and strangle its claims of reference. As was 
demonstrated, a word differs each time it is used, yet retains the traces of its other 
uses. Derrida calls the infinite regress of signifiers the anguish oflanguage -
all possible meanings push each other . . . calling upon each other, 
provoking each other too, unforeseeably and as if despite oneself, in 
a kind of autonomous over assemblage of meanings, a power of pure 
equivocality that makes the creativity of the classical God appear all 
too poor (1978:9). 
However, every reading is still a misreading, an aspect which de Man (1984:123) 
encourages, for a good misreading "produces another text which can itselfbe shown 
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to be an interesting misreading, a text which engenders additional texts". This 
misreading phenomenon (blindness/insight) occurs not because of the reader, but 
with the ambiguity of the language. The fault rests with language, not with the 
reader. 
Because the meaning of a text is not unique, univocal, rigorously controllable, and 
transmittable, it is therefore indeterminate. It was shown in chapter four that the 
truth about interpretation lies somewhere between these two extremes. Texts 
previously regarded as unified artistic artifacts are shown to be fragmented, self-
divided, and centreless. The desire of deconstruction to shatter totality, to break 
form and empty the text of the allusion of truth, stems from Nietzsche. It is 
Nietzsche who comprehended that the quest for truth emanates from motives of 
power impelled by desire, and that metaphysical systems yield not truth but 
structures of language substituting for truth in the name of truth. Truth is thus 
something which already exists and is therefore to be discovered rather than created. 
Derrida's point is that truth, and its various correlates such as being, consciousness 
and presence, "are produced effects ... which do not find their cause in a subject or 
a substance, in a thing in general ... [but] in the play of differance" (1982: 11). 
In questioning the nature of history and religion, deconstruction asserted that if 
history is a fiction, a text subject to ideological skewings and mystifications, then 
it cannot be relied upon as a source of objective knowledge. These aspects were 
illustrated with two historical poems 'Siwela iMoretele 'and 'lnkondlo kaMkabayi ', 
and three of Msimang' s poems which have religious content: 'lndlela ', 'Luthando 
olungangiyekiyo' and 'Ngiyamazisa '. Deconstructive theory sometimes seems to 
block all access to the possibility of reading explicitly 'referential' documents in 
conjunction with literary or speculative texts. Deconstructive skepticism is opposed 
to logocentric knowledge and theologically, to belief or faith. 
As previously explained, deconstructionists do draw on history, however, they use 
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it deconstructively, not to seek answers or explanations, but new questions and new 
ways in which all types of texts can be made to read and rework each other. Derrida 
himself implied that the contingencies and conventions of cultural life do not 
preclude the possibility of truth, rightness, naturalness within that life. Derrida even 
has to rely on concepts (nature, origin. intention, centre, etc.) whose truth value he 
suspects. 
Finally, an attempt has been made to show why the concept of history as 
methodological orientation, as well as the deconstructive procedure of analysing 
texts in such a way as to explicate their partial complicity with deconstructive 
theory, makes possible this deconstructive readings of Msimang. The argument 
could further be extended that Msimang' s poetry reveals this complicity even more 
clearly than does his prose. The reason for this is to be found in the symbolic nature 
of his poetry. 
Chapter five concentrated on the (de )construction of stabilities and the fissures 
wrought by the unconscious. This fifth chapter was dedicated to a confrontation 
between the work of Derrida and Lacan, who in the post-structural discussion has 
a central role. The aim was rather to find a way of allowing deconstructive criticism 
and psychoanalytical critical theory to read and to be read so as to discover the 
parallels, differences and productive tensions between these two theories and 
Msimang' s poems 'Uze ungiphuzise amanzi ', 'Langa lami' and 'Leso sivakashi '. 
Juxtaposing deconstruction and psychoanalysis allowed certain common themes to 
emerge; the importance oflanguage as a model of understanding consciousness and 
change and the fact that language cannot be considered apart from certain 
unconscious motives and themes of desire and death. In psychoanalysis as well as 
deconstruction, knowledge of the world derives from the interaction between a 
primary, originally contentless, subjectivity and a language that pre-exists the user 
of it, which generates the 'self (ego). In both theories language takes a central 
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position in their problem formulation. Since language determines what is (thought 
to be) known, rather than serving as the medium through which knowledge 
independent oflanguage is publicly expressed, traditional philosophical 'solutions' 
lose their ground. 
While a number ofDerrida' s writings could be described as deconstructive accounts 
of psychoanalytic theory, and of (in at least a double sense) the subject of 
psychoanalysis, it is also clear that Derrida is deeply committed to the preservation 
of psychoanalysis (in whatever form this may take). Deconstruction thus aids 
psychoanalytic criticism both as a critical tool and by offering principles that allow 
one to foresee certain emancipatory cultural possibilities in contemporary practices 
of representation. 
This chapter served as merely the basis for a ground clearing exercise, but one could 
conclude by suggesting that the deconstructive literary criticism has only begun the 
work of pursuing the positive possibilities of the psychoanalytical approach. 
Although texts on intertextuality in contemporary narrative are legion, not many of 
these studies trace the deconstructive discourse, but rather other theories such as 
semiotics, cultural materialism or new historicism. In chapter six, Msimang's poetry 
was briefly examined as deconstructive intertexts. A brief survey on the disciples of 
deconstructive intertextuality was given, since not all deconstructors agree with the 
notion of reference in intertextuality. 
Dynamic in nature, intertextuality inevitably takes the form of boundary-crossing; 
it creates crises and aporiae wherever it goes. For deconstructors intertextuality 
designated a text's independence on and infiltration by prior concepts, figures, 
codes, unconscious practices, conventions and texts. 
As a crucial critical instrument, intertextuality brought to the fore in Msimang' s two 
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poetry collections the labyrinthine grounds of texts, facilitated dissemination of 
meaning, and enforced contextual instability. In Msimang's poetry traces of 
traditional poetry, oral sayings, Biblical allusions and modern poetry were found. 
By pointing to these sources, traces, references, allusions, quotations and influences 
of every kind in Msimang' s body ofliterature, one was merely highlighting some of 
the factors which seem to have helped in shaping his work as it is currently known. 
The fertility of language in generating multiple meaning establishes, in the view of 
deconstruction, the priority of equivocal readings over univocal readings. Having 
banished the constraints of writer and intention, deconstruction sanctions the richest 
possible play of meaning or rather the absence of meaning. The deconstructive task, 
of course, is to disrupt the closure, but since each gap or opening closes in a new 
way, the deconstructionist remains, so to speak, parasitically attached to every new 
version of the closure, endlessly performing the disruptive function. 
Finally, it was illustrated that Msimang' s poetry does not reject deconstruction, but 
works through it, conserving its strengths. Deconstruction's conviction is that 
literary works do not lend themselves to absolutely certain interpretations that sum 
them up once and for all. Throughout this thesis, one has tried to show that even 
in the thoroughgoing scepticism of deconstruction the values and interest that 
determine it of necessity have their source in an undeconstructible authoritative 
space beyond sceptical activity itself The task of deconstruction is endless, because 
the emptiness that would resolve all contradictions is unreachable within the space 
of language. Whether deconstruction leads into a dead end is irrelevant, as 
deconstruction is not a method, so clearly it can lead nowhere. It is a way of 
thinking, and influences the thought-processes of a reader, a critic, an analyst. 
It is thus not surprising that many literary critics have been bitter in their criticisms 
of a form of analysis which leaves them with no 'truth' and no determinate 
'meaning'. This indeterminacy affects the critic as much as the text. The critic 
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cannot take up a neutral or objective position from which to make a judgement or 
to settle the meaning of the text. Readers, too, as speaking subjects are caught up 
in the interminable weaving, unweaving and reweaving of the fabric of discourse. 
7 .3 Concluding remarks 
Examining deconstruction from different angles, this study covered deconstruction 
versus conventional tradition, the nature of deconstruction, deconstruction and other 
disciplines such as psychoanalysis, the deconstruction of deconstruction, and also the 
future of deconstruction. It is hoped that this thesis will provide the reader with a 
definitive account of deconstruction and set him/her thinking not only of the aspects 
of deconstruction but criticism in general. Deconstruction can only intervene by 
displacing a mode of thinking and by developing the interpretive processes and 
procedures. The challenge is therefore to think differently and one way of doing that 
is to look at how a particular aspect of the African literary tradition can illuminate 
and be illuminated by deconstructive thought that has dominated and to a large 
extent still continues to dominate thinking in the humanities. 
If this study has succeeded in posing more questions than it has answered, it is 
perhaps time to look, if not for an exit, then at least for a vantage point within the 
maze. Michel Foucault offers such a vantage point for several reasons, primarily 
because he does not abandon the radical insights of deconstruction. Indeed he 
adopts a broadly deconstructive perspective in examining historical forms of 
ideological coercion and in doing so paradoxically reveals the deconstructive 
potential of historicity. 
In a chapter on deconstruction, Frank Lentricchia points out the limitations of a 
certain tendency in deconstruction as well as the potentialities of its most fruitful 
development. There is the danger, suggests Lentricchia, that the aporiae of which 
so much is made by deconstruction may lead to its supplanting presence or 
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logocentrism as a transcendental a priori, a course which is self-defeating. There is, 
however, another course open to deconstruction, the course taken by Foucault in his 
depiction of history as a series of discursive formations. Lentricchia (1980:191) 
phrases the argument succinctly: 
Though American Derrideans almost universally ignore him, 
Foucault accepts Jacques Derrida's major points about decentring, 
difference, and free-play, and he accepts Derrida's banishment of 
ontology and critique ofrepresentation (as straight-forward mimesis) 
and, phenomenology. But Foucault is no champion of the aporiae, 
no connoisseur of abyme. His naked statement of his goals as a 
historian is not evidence of what could be (and has been) termed old-
fashioned historicist naivete, but of a passionate belief that genuine 
history-writing is not only possible, but is made possible, by 
Derrida's revision of traditionalist thought in general and of, 
structuralism in particular. 
This precursory probe is intended to suggest the possibility for further study opened 
by deconstruction and post-structuralist thought. The scope of the present study, 
of course, has been far more limited and can, at most, be regarded as a tentative step 
in the direction of what Foucault calls an effective history. 
The highly original combination of respect for texts and suspicion of meaning will 
give deconstructive writing a continuing power in years to come. Nevertheless, the 
death of deconstruction has been pronounced many times. But to dismiss 
deconstruction is to reject too hastily the logic, however unfamiliar, of Derrida's 
writing. Derrida himself conveyed the idea that the word 'deconstruction' will not 
be used indefinitely. It will wear itself out. But beyond the word, this might take 
a little longer ... 
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APPENDIX 
Iziziba zoThukela (lziziba zoThukela, pp. 64-65) 
1 Ziziba ezizonzobele 
2 Zolani ningisondezele. 
3 Ngiyabesaba oben' ubunzulu, 
4 Ngiphonse itshe lazika, 
5 Nokho ngiyanomela 
6 Ngoba ngiyanazi, 
7 Ophuza kini phinde ome. 
8 Ngibabaza leyo ntobeko 
9 Nokuma ndawonye ngesineke. 
10 lzimpophoma anizigqizi qakala, 
11 Zingishayel' ihlombe liphuma lishona. 
12 Imithelela niyithi klabe, niphole; 
13 Nazi kahle, iphanga nje umdaka, 
14 Ekuphethe akupheleli ndawo. 
15 Ngiphuze qede yangibangel' inkwankwa, 
16 Uphuza kuyo uphinde wome. 
17 Nolwandle niluhlek' usulu, 
18 Lugubh' amagagasi lungaphezi 
19 Lwehla lwenyuka lungenasinqe. 
20 Nimile ngentobeko nibheke phezulu, 
21 Nimile sengathithi anisacwayizi, 
22 Nikhongozele inhlakanipho yezulu 
23 Ephuma ngokuphuma kwekhwezi, 
24 Esa ngokusa kwelanga, 
25 Inifice nikhangezile nilindele, 
26 Nilindele umyalo wengilosi 
27 Eyathi babusisiwe abalindayo. 
28 Kunengcebo ukujula kunobude. 
29 Imifula engemi iphikelele kude, 
30 Ilanga liyilindele emadotsheni, 
31 Ihwamuke iphelele ezeni. 
32 Amanzi izowachitha enqutshini 
33 !sale ize, nisale nimile. 
34 Nami ngimile kini ngazibuka, 
35 Nganibuka niphenduka isibuko, 
36 Nangikhombisa ubunqunu bami, 
37 Ngazibonela ubunhluzwa bami. 
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APPENDIX 
Pools of the Thukela river 
1 Pools which grow overpowering 
2 You become silent and draw me nearer. 
3 I dread your depth, 
4 I hurled a stone in, it sank down and disappeared, 
5 Yet for you I thirst 
6 Because I know you, 
7 Who drinks in you, never thirsts again. 
8 I admire that humility 
9 And your staying in one place patiently. 
10 The waterfalls, you do not take heed of, 
11 They laud me with applause at dawn and sunset. 
12 The rivulets, you mockingly glance at and remain calm; 
13 You know well, they rush [to plough the loam] in vain, 
14 What they carry is of no significance. 
15 I drank from them and experienced a strong desire [for meat], 
16 You drink from them and become thirsty again. 
17 And the sea, you cynically laugh at it to scorn, 
18 It wildly tosses waves about unceasingly 
19 It descends and ascends, it does not have a base (busily). 
20 You are standing with humility, looking up, 
21 You are standing as if you blink no more, 
22 You extended out your hand to receive heaven's wisdom 
23 That emerges at the time of the morning star, 
24 Which becomes bright with the dawn of the sun. 
25 It [star] finds you with outreaching hands, waiting, 
26 Waiting for the instruction of the angel 
27 Who said blessed are those who wait. 
28 Depth, unlike length, contains wealth. 
29 The rivers do not stand still but persist onwards, 
30 The sun is waiting for them in the valleys, 
31 It completely evaporates and ends up nowhere. 
3 2 The river will disperse the water in the sharp bend 
3 3 It will remain empty and you will still be standing. 
34 And I too stood at the pools and looked at myself, 
35 I watched as you changed into a mirror, 
36 And you showed me my nakedness, 
3 7 I saw myself stripped of all my belongings. 
3 8 lngqondo seyagqwala yathomba, 
39 Ngokulalelwa ngamazolo nesithwathwa 
40 Inhluzwa, ingembethe. 
41 Khiphani itshe lelula 
42 Nikhuhle, nihlikihle, nihlambulule. 
43 Ziziba zokucwengeka ngicwengeni; 
44 Uqubhu nezibhidi enhliziyweni, 
45 Olugobhozela kunembeza, 
46 Lugeleze lwemuke, 
47 Sicwebe isiziba semicabango, 
48 Ngibone izimfihlo zokujula. 
49 Ngethekeliseni ezimfihlweni zokujula, 
50 Ngishiyeleni ngentshengula ethongwaneni 
51 Ngicakuleleni ngenkezo embizeni, 
52 Ngikhangezeni ngokhezo okhambeni, 
53 Ngigezeni isigonogono endlebeni, 
54 Nesule ubhici emehlweni, 
55 Nibhucunge insila engqondweni, 
56 Ingqondo ibone yehlukanise 
57 Amabala amnyama kwelimhlophe, 
58 Ihlanganise amnyama kwelimhlophe, 
59 Axoxele izizukulwane indaba 
60 Ethi: Kwasukasukela; Zithi: Cosu! 
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38 The mind has already become discoloured with rust. 
39 Because of dew and frost 
40 Destitution covers me. 
41 Take out the light stone 
42 Rub vigorously; rub and rinse. 
43 Clarifying pools, cleanse me 
44 Of the muddy water and dregs in the heart, 
45 That flows into the conscience, 
46 It should flow away and depart, 
47 So the pool of my thoughts may become clear, 
48 And allow me to see the secrets of the depths. 
49 Solicit for me from the mystery of the depths, 
50 Give me a pinch of snuff with the snuff-spoon from the snuff-box, 
51 Scoop up for me with the ladle from the beer-pot, 
52 Dish out onto my hands with the spoon from the pot, 
53 Wash the earwax from my ear, 
54 And wipe the eye-oozings from the eyes, 
55 Rub the dirt from the mind, 
56 The mind will see and differentiate 
57 The black colours from the white, 
58 It [the mind] will join together the black and the white, 
59 Which will tell the generations a story 
60 Saying: Once upon a time; They say: Go on![a little bit] 
Uthando (lziziba zoThukela. p.8) 
1 Uyimpicabadala weThabisile, 
2 Uyinqabakayitshelwana weDuduzile; 
3 Uyindida weBathandekile, 
4 Uyinkinga weBazondekile; 
5 Uyingwijikhwebu Bahlukanisile. 
6 Ngikubonile ulumba inkomo edlelweni, 
7 Yakhotha enye bathi ngeyikhothayo. 
8 Ngisho nezinambuzane uzihungulile, 
9 Izintothoviyane zaze zafa zibelethene; 
JO Abantu bona bazethuke sebakhe emkhathini. 
11 Nami wangithwebula ngandilileka, 
12 Ngamfoma izithukuthuku kulel' ungqoqwane, 
13 Ngakhangwa ukukhanya kumnyama khuhle, 
14 !mamba nendlondlo zaphenduk' iziquzi, 
15 Amagquma nezikhinsi kwaphenduk' amathaja. 
16 Yebuya luthando unuka njengeqaqa, 
17 Umuncu njengomhlonyane, 
18 Ubaba kunesibhaha, 
19 Uqanda kuneqhwa. 
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Love 
1 You are a riddle, you Delight, 
2 You are inexplicable, you Comforter; 
3 You are confusing, you Loveable, 
4 You are an insoluble difficulty, you Hateful; 
5 You are unreliable, you Separator. 
6 I saw you bewitching a beast in the grazing grounds, 
7 It licked the other, they said, it is the one which licked it. 
8 Even small, slow moving animals are enticed by you, 
9 The locusts died carrying each other on the back; 
10 People were surprised by their act of living in space. 
11 And I, I too was mesmerized and became dizzy, 
12 I slowly exuded perspiration whilst there was frost, 
13 I was attracted by the light in the pitch darkness, 
14 The mamba and the homed viper turned into lizards, 
15 The hillocks and hollows changed to plains. 
16 Alas! Love you stink like a polecat, 
17 You are acrid like the African worm-wood extract, 
18 You are more bitter than the Fever tree herbs, 
19 You are colder than ice. 
Ndiza nyoni (lziziba zoThukela. pp. 50-51) 
1 Kusakuvumile wena nyoni, 
2 Suka kule ngatsha uh/ale kuleya. 
3 Tshilotshiloza uzixinge macala. 
4 Bhula amaphiko kabili, kathathu. 
5 Shiya phansi izigodi zosizi 
6 Namahlungu alomhlaba ahlabayo, 
7 Ujubalale ... 
8 Suka kwelontulo 
9 Uye kwamasi-aziphihli, 
10 Kwanyama-iziduli. 
11 Damuza amadamu esibhakabhaka. 
12 Cababa emagcekeni akwankululeko, 
13 Ngale kwezintaba namafu. 
14 Uyokuthola ukwaneliseka? 
15 Kusakuvumile nawe nhliziyo yami, 
16 Suka kuleli gumbi uh/ale kuleliya. 
17 Ndizandiza uzixinge macala. 
18 Bashiye phansi abanotwayi, 
19 Ungangixhawuli ngesandla nginokhwekhwe. 
20 Shiya phansi elempofana 
21 Uvakashele kwelawomakhomba-ngophakathi, 
22 Unyenye ngonyenye, undize ngendiza. 
23 Phezulu ... phezulu ... 
24 lndiza yobankulu, 
25 Inwebe amaphiko ibhonge kakhulu, 
26 Umoya uyihubele ihubo elikhulu, 
27 Umhlaba ube ligenqelana, 
28 Phansi ... phansi ... 
29 lnyoni indiza iphelele emafini? 
30 Ndiza phela nawe ngqondo yami, 
31 Shaya amaphiko kabili, kathathu, 
32 Ngiphaphame ebuthongweni bobusuku. 
33 Suka uphele ezigodini zobunyama, 
34 Udabule umlalamvubu nenkungu, 
3 5 Uhlangabeze ilanga, 
36 Nanto liqhamuka eMpumalanga. 
37 Uqhwakele eziqongweni zezintaba. 
3 8 Ushonise izinzwani phansi, 
39 Uzabalaze njalo uzimelele, 
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Fly, bird 
1 It still suits you bird, 
2 Go from this trunk-branch and perch on that yonder. 
3 Atwittering, dancing while looking at your sides. 
4 Beat the wings twice, thrice. 
5 Leave the valleys of sorrow 
6 And the black-burnt fields of this hurtful world, 
7 You soar away in the distance . . . 
8 Go away from the place of the lizards 
9 Go to the place of abundant curdled milk, 
10 To the place of mounds of meat. 
11 Splash the water-dams of the sky. 
12 Safely descend on the wide, open plains of freedom, 
13 Beyond the mountains and clouds. 
14 Will you find satisfaction? 
15 It is still in your favour my heart, 
16 Go from this corner and perch on that yonder. 
17 Fly a bit, dancing while looking at your sides. 
18 Leave behind those that have scab, 
19 Don't greet me by the hand, I have mange [eczema]. 
20 Leave the land of the poor 
21 Visit the place of the well-off people, 
22 Cruise with a car, fly with a plane. 
23 Up ... up ... 
24 The plane of our forefathers, 
25 Stretching out the wings, rumbling intensely, 
26 The wind sings a great hymn for it, 
27 The world becomes a small, round object, 
28 Down ... down ... 
29 Does the bird fly and disappear in the clouds? 
30 My mind you too do fly, 
31 Beat your wings twice, thrice, 
32 So that I wake up from the deep sleep of night. 
33 Go from the valleys of darkness, 
34 Tear through the thick fog and rainy mist, 
3 5 Go out to meet the sun, 
36 There it [the sun] suddenly comes into view from the East. 
37 You sit up on the mountains' summits. 
3 8 You cause the toes to move downwards, 
39 You stand steadfast there, holding on tightly, 
40 Iziphepho ziyaphephula. 
41 Ugwinye imisebe yelanga liphuma, 
42 Ikhanyisele imicabango yami. 
43 Ingikhanyisele ngokukhanya, 
44 Ngiyokhanya. 
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40 Stormwinds blow. 
41 You swallow the rays of the rising sun, 
42 So that it [the rays] will clear my thoughts. 
43 Its light will give me light, 
44 I will shine forth. 
Siwela iMoretele (!l.Nodumehlezi kaMenzi. pp.14-15) 
1 Uquqaba olugqishelene lwaqoqana phezu kwalo mjula, 
2 Kwakungathi wuquqaba lwabantwana bakwa-Israyeli 
3 Beqoqene benqwabelene phezu koLwandle Olubomvu; 
4 Sasiluquqaba sibalekela ulaka lukaFaro, 
5 Sasiluququba sihlasele esigodlweni sikaFaro, 
6 Sasingeluquqaba luwelel' ezweni loju nobisi. 
7 Amanzi eMoretele athenek' amandla nethemba, 
8 Awagagamelanga okwamagagas' oLwandle Olubomvu, 
9 Awasithibelanga, azedlulela ejeqeza ebalisa, 
10 Ali/a isililo sezililo nesilokozane, 
11 Amafu phezulu ahlangana ehlukana, 
12 Nelanga elalisihola laholekela emuva. 
13 Yasithibel' inkomo kaHaga ngenganono, 
14 Y ayithibel' imithonselana yemithelela, 
15 Ingezithibele izikhukhula sezikhandene, 
16 Zawela izigagayi kwababaza ibhuloho, 
17 Amadwala phansi abamba ongezansi, 
18 Izinhlanzi zakuyek' ukutshuza zakhex' imilomo. 
19 Isikhonyane sasisitheka sisindana 
20 Ngevuso lengebhe yomsizi wabasizili, 
21 Baningi osondonzima ababemadolonzima, 
22 Ithemba selibashiyile sebeyinkundla yetwetwe; 
23 Baningi abaninga ngezinsapho ezisele emuva, 
24 Eziyosala dengwane sebesele kwaSaha. ** 
25 Qiz! Qiz! Laduma! 
26 Qiz! Qiz! Laphindelela! 
27 Bani! Lamthatha! Phazi! Lamsonga! 
28 Phazi! Lamsonga! Bani! Lamthatha! 
29 ''Maye! Kodwa bengisho!" 
30 ''Maye! Shwele, nkosi yomusa!" 
31 Ukhozi olumaphiko azinkemba lwabasibekela, 
32 Izigagayi zaphenduka isanhlaka senhlakanhlaka. 
33 !Moretele zayiwela amanhlukanhlukano, 
34 Abaningi kabayiwelanga okwesibili, 
35 Balibona liphuma, abalibonanga lishona, 
36 Nanamuhla amanzi asasilila leso sililo. 
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We cross the Moretele river 
1 The crammed crowd assembled on the top part of this river, 
2 It was as though it was a multitude oflsrael' s children 
3 Congregated, heaped up above the Red Sea; 
4 We were the flock fleeing the wrath of Pharaoh, 
5 We were the horde invading Pharaoh's private enclosure 
6 We were not the crowd crossing to a land of honey and milk. 
7 Moretele's water was discouraged and its strength and hope dimisnished, 
8 It was not brash as the waves of the Red Sea, 
9 It [the water] did not restrain us, it passed by solicitously glancing, 
10 It wept a mourning of deep sorrow and sobbing, 
11 The clouds above accumulated and parted, 
12 And the sun which guided us, retreated to the rear. 
13 The Boers suppressed us with a gun, 
14 It warded off some tributaries, 
15 It could not restrain the compressed torrents, 
16 The march crossed and amazed the bridge, 
17 The slippery stones below showed astonishment, 
18 The fish stopped swimming and stupefyingly stared. 
19 The locusts moved slowly and sluggishly 
20 With heart-stopping apprehension of the destroyers' gun powder, 
21 There were many huge ones who were reluctant, 
22 Hope they have forsaken, they are now in a playground of fear; 
23 There are many pondering about children who remained behind, 
24 Those will stay alone when they are at the place of Saha (dead). 
25 Thunder! Qiz! Qiz! It boomed! 
26 Thunder! Qiz! Qiz! It repeated! 
27 Flash! Pain! It took him! Sparks! It finished him! 
28 Sparks! It finished him! Flash! It took him! 
29 "Alas! But I had said so!" 
30 "Alas! Forgive, lord of grace!" 
31 A black eagle with sword-like wings covered them, 
32 The well-organised march turned into scattered disorder. 
33 They crossed the Moretele in different directions, 
34 There were many who did not cross it the second time, 
3 5 They saw the sun rise, they did not see it set, 
36 Even today the waters still wail this lamentation. 
Inkondlo kaMkabayi (Il.Nodumehlezi KaMenzi. pp. 38-39) 
1 Ntombi zakwaZulu, 
2 Ngivumiseni le ngoma; 
3 Ntombi zikaMalandela, 
4 Ngihayiseni le nkondlo; 
5 Yinkondlo yomzwangedwa, 
6 Yinkondlo kaMkabayi, 
7 Yinkondlo kaLamula. 
8 Ngikhumbula mhla eqhamuka 
9 Eziqongweni zezintaba, 
10 lmizwilili yatshiloza, 
11 lminduze yahlabelela, 
12 Kwakusengathi yihubo 
13 LikaNomkhubulwana. 
14 Ngilamleleni wemathong' ohlanga, 
15 Ngilamleleni nakhu sengemuka, 
16 Ngibambe, ngibambe weNobamba, 
17 Ngibambe, ngibambe weMalandela. 
18 Zintab ' ezinhle zakwaZulu, 
19 Enakhe uNdi nangikaka, 
20 Msitheni kimi uLamula, 
21 Ngilamleleni zintaba kuLamula, 
22 Gugu likaZulu nithi mangithini? 
23 Gugu lobusha nithi ngenzenjani? 
24 Zinhle izintaba zakwaZulu I 
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Mkabayi's song 
1 Girls of Zululand, 
2 Sing this song with me; 
3 Girls of Malandela, 
4 Compose this poem with me; 
5 It is the song of personal pain, 
6 It is the song ofMkabayi, 
7 It is the song of Lamula. 
8 I remember the day that he suddenly appeared 
9 On the mountains' summits, 
10 The Cape canaries twittered, 
11 The Crinum lilies sang, 
12 It was like the hymn 
13 OfNomkhubulwana. 
14 Mediate for me, oh, ancestors of the reeds, 
15 Help me since I now depart, 
16 Hold me, hold me, oh Nobamba, 
17 Hold me, hold me, oh Malandela. 
18 Beautiful mountains of Zululand, 
19 You who built Ulundi and you encircled me, 
20 Hide Lamula from me, 
21 Protect me, mountains, from Lamula, 
22 Zulu favourite, what do you want me to say? 
23 Darling of youth, what do you want me to do? 
24 Beautiful are the mountains of Zululand! 
lndlela (lzfr.iba zoThukela, pp. 39-40) 
1 Nanxa ilukhonjwana, 
2 Iyokuthatha iye ikubeke. 
3 Iyozombeleza nawe, 
4 Igwincigwincize njalo, 
5 Jbuye ithi thwi, 
6 Ize ikuthi qithi. 
7 Ngibelethe sigoduke 
8 Wena ongesabi mahlathi, 
9 Thubeleza ungichushise. 
10 Wena ongeyiswa miqansa, 
11 Yiqophe uyiqombole. 
12 Ngikhwexele emhlane, 
13 Ungibelethe ngembeleko, 
14 Hamba sihambe. 
15 Angazi ekhaya, 
16 Wen' uyazi. 
17 Angikwazi okungale, 
18 Wen' uyakwazi. 
19 Angibaqondi abangaphesheya, 
20 Wen ' ubaweze bonke. 
21 Hamba nami ungitotobise, 
22 Angiwuphangile umdaka, 
23 Ngiphokophele ukuyofika zwi; 
24 Ngihole. 
25 Dabula izinkungu namafu obumnyama; 
26 Hamba nami. 
27 Wena ongukwenziwa kwezinto; 
28 Bamba isandla sami. 
29 Kungaziba umeno, 
30 Kungasitha amazolo, 
31 Angedukelwa ngabazi bendlela. 
32 Nampaya! Bahamba ngendlela, 
33 Habel Bawela ngezibuko. 
34 Nebala! Bangena ngesango. 
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The way 
1 Even though it is a small track, 
2 It shall take and eventually place you at your destination. 
3 It shall wind in and out with you, 
4 It will continually meander about with you, 
5 And will become straight again, 
6 Finally it will lay you down gently. 
7 Carry me on the back, let us go 
8 You who are not afraid of the forests, 
9 Move about and let me wind my way through. 
10 You who are not wary of steep roads, 
11 Climb it up. 
12 Let me ride on the back, 
13 Carry me with a carrying-skin, 
14 Go, let us go. 
15 I do not know home, 
16 You know. 
17 I do not know what it is on the other side, 
18 You know it. 
19 I do not understand those on the other side, 
20 You have taken them all across. 
21 Slowly go with me, 
22 I am not in a hurry, 
23 I press on in order to reach the place; 
24 Lead me. 
25 Cut through the mist and clouds of darkness; 
26 Walk with me. 
27 You who are the maker of things; 
28 Hold my hand. 
29 There may be a thick overgrowth of grass, 
30 The dew can obstruct the view, 
31 I do not lose sight of those who know the way. 
32 Yonder they are! They are walking on the road! 
33 Good gracious! They cross by the ford. 
34 Indeed! They enter through the gate! 
Luthando olungangiyekiyo aziziba zoThukela, pp. 58-59) 
1 Zaphuma izinkomo zamabheka 
2 Bakikiza ungenil' umakoti 
3 Umakoti eseshaye ezimhlophe 
4 Ngababona ababili beguqa 
5 Umfundisi wabanika izibusiso. 
6 Ngambona eqhamuka uLuthando 
7 Echichima inzondo, ebopha esonga. 
8 Ngesandla wayepheth' inkemba, 
9 Wagadla zaphophoza izinyembezi. 
10 Ngesandla wayepheth' umkhonto, 
11 Wagwaza laphophoza igazi. 
12 Obevethe ezimhlophe usembethe emnyama. 
13 Luthando olungangiyekiyo 
14 Ungifundiseleni ukuthanda? 
Ngiyamazisa azizibazoThukela,p.22) 
1 Lapho sezigwaba ezevangeli, 
2 Lapho sezikhokhelwa ngokuzidela; 
3 Lapho sebefakaza abavangeli, 
4 Lapho sezivuma izindela; 
5 Ziboshwe bhande linye lezwi, 
6 Zikhwele sihlenga sinye sikamoya, 
7 Ziyowela ulwandle ngomoya, 
8 Zimpampa ngamagagasi kamoya, 
9 Uqhamuka engasadle nkobe, 
10 Ekhihlaza nezithelo zakwamhlaba, 
11 Abethembise igolide lakwamhlaba. 
12 Uyawaqaqa amafindo awagqabule amagoda. 
13 Maye! Ngiyamazisa. 
14 Siphe amandla simnyathele. 
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Love which does not leave me 
1 The lobola beasts were given 
2 They [women] ululated, the bride had entered 
3 The bride is clad in white 
4 I saw the two kneeling 
5 The minister gave them blessings. 
6 I saw Love suddenly appearing 
7 Overflowing with hatred, cursing and threatening. 
8 In his hand he carried a sword, 
9 He struck and tears gushed out. 
10 In his hand he held a spear, 
11 He stabbed and blood flowed. 
12 The one who was dressed in white is now clad in black. 
13 Love which does not leave me 
14 Why do you teach me to love? 
I damn him. 
1 When those Gospel songs are sung, 
2 When they are counselled about the significance of sacrifice; 
3 When the evangelists testify, 
4 When devotees sing; 
5 They are united by one cord of the word, 
6 They are on one raft of the Holy Spirit 
7 They will cross the sea by means of the spirit, 
8 They move swiftly with the waves of the spirit, 
9 He suddenly appears ablazed with anger, 
10 Overloaded with the fruits of the earth, 
11 He promises them the gold of the world 
12 He unties knots and breaks off ropes. 
13 Alas! I damn him. 
14 Give us strength to so that we can crush him. 
Uze ungiphuzise amanzi (lzifaiba zoThukela. pp. 12-14) 
1 Ngiyovuka, ka,nye nekhwezi 
2 Ngiphehle ubulawu obumhlophe, 
3 Ngithake ngomthole novuma 
4 'Ze ungithole ungivume. 
5 Ngiyophuma nenhlamvu yelanga 
6 Lapho ukusa kuqhalmze amazolo 
7 Ngikubone uza, ukhashwa 
8 Amakha amnandi kusasa; 
9 Ngiyokulindela ngisemthonjeni, 
10 Ngikulindele, ngikulindele. 
11 Umoya wakho ngiwubone 
12 Uphaka,ma kunye nomlalamvubu 
13 Kuphakame ithemba lami, 
14 Lapho uthwele imbiza 
15 Emnyama eyindilinga 
16 Phezu kwekhanda eliyindilinga 
17 Namehlo ayindilinga, 
18 Nami ngawe ngiyadilingana; 
19 Ngiyokunaka, ngomnako wenyosi 
20 Uze ungiphuzise amanzi. 
21 Ngokhangela inxuluma lakwenu 
22 Elitshalwe lamila entabeni; 
23 Ngeke ngize ngimagange 
24 Hleze ngibe ngisakhwele ngidilike, 
25 Hleze ngiqanse imithambo, 
26 Umqansa ungime esifubeni, 
27 Ungikhendle ungigqib ' ithemba, 
28 Nawe ungishingilele 
29 Kumbe ungishalazele 
30 Kumbe ungibhembesele. 
31 Ngiyogcakela noNokubekezela 
32 Nginqume neqele noSineke; 
33 Ngishaye ugubhu ngihaye 
34 Ngivume inkondlo ka,Nomathemba 
35 Ngigudle izintaba ngihaye, 
36 Izintaba zingisondeze kuwe. 
37 Uyokuzwa inkondlo usexhibeni 
38 Ingqongqoza esifubeni sakho, 
39 Ingqongqoze ingqongqoze, 
40 Uze ungivulele ngingene. 
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Until you give me a drink of water 
I I shall awake together with the morning star 
2 And stir up white love potion, 
3 I shall concoct the love potion of mthole and vuma tree-bark 
4 Until I get you to accept me. 
5 I shall go out at sunrise 
6 When dawn reveals the dew 
7 I shall see you coming, escorted by 
8 Sweet-smelling fragrance at dawn; 
9 I shall wait for you at the spring, 
10 I shall wait for you, wait for you. 
11 Your spirit I shall see 
12 Rising upwards together with the thick fog 
13 My hope is raised, 
14 When you carry a clay-pot 
15 Dark and round 
16 On top of your round head 
17 And your round eyes, 
18 And I too, spin round because of you; 
19 I shall pester you with the interest of a bee 
20 Until you give me a drink of water. 
21 I am going to watch over your large kraal 
22 Which is planted and rooted on the mountain; 
23 Never will I come eagerly 
24 Lest each time I climb up, I will slide down, 
25 Lest I bulge the veins, 
26 Lest the steep road becomes too difficult for me 
27 And beats me and buries my hope, 
28 And you turn away from me 
29 Perhaps you shun me 
30 Perhaps you treat me inconsiderately. 
31 I shall go up the hillside with Patience 
32 And cut across the slope with Determination; 
33 And play the harmonium and compose/recite 
34 And sing a song of Hope 
3 5 And skirt the mountains and sing, 
36 The mountains will bring me near to you. 
37 You shall hear the song whilst in the [cooking] hut 
38 Banging in your breast, 
39 Knocking and rapping, 
40 Until you open for me so that I can enter. 
41 Wena ophezu kwezihlahla 
42 Noma uphezulu kwelenyoni, 
43 Inhliziyo iyonombela 
44 Nomphefamulo ubambelele 
45 Kuwo amagatsha emithi 
46 Ngitibile ngizabalaze 
47 Ngezikhwepha zokunxanela, 
48 Ngesibindi sokulangazelela, 
49 Ngikunxuse ngikunxuse, 
50 Uze ungiphuzise amanzi. 
51 Wena ophansi ekujuleni 
52 Ngiyojula ngithubeleze nami 
53 Njengezimpande zomthombe 
54 Njengomnyezane ngijule 
55 Njengabavukuzibegolide 
56 Njengabavukuzi bedayimane, 
57 Noma ngigqula phezu kwedwala 
58 Noma izidladla ziqundeka 
59 Ngikuqhwebe ngikuqhwebe, 
60 Uze ungelulel' isandla. 
61 Nakushisa, ngisho nakuqanda 
62 Soze kungivimbele, phinde! 
63 Isithwathwa esembeth ' izintaba 
64 Asinamandl' okukwemboza; 
65 Naliqhwa nangqogwane, 
66 Noma liza nesangquma 
67 Noma liza nesiphepho 
68 Siyongiphephetha singisondeze 
69 Kuwe, ungibambe ngesandla 
70 Unginike ukuphumula. 
71 Wena ongaphesheya kwezilwandle, 
72 Lapho umsinga udloba okwendlondlo 
73 Namadlambi edlangile ngolaka, 
74 Ngiyokweneka inhliziyo yami 
75 !be isihlenga sokuwela, 
76 Ngihlambe phezu kweJolidane 
77 Ngiwele uLwandle oLubomvu; 
78 Ezweni loju nobisi 
79 Ngakhe khona nami 
80 Ngibuse nami nawe. 
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41 You on top of the trees 
42 Or high up on the highest branch, 
43 The heart shall cling firmly 
44 And the soul will hold on tight 
45 To the branches of the trees 
46 I shall firmly plant myself solidly 
4 7 With the power of detemined desire, 
48 With the boldness of ardent longing, 
49 I shall beg you, I shall beg you, 
50 Until you give me a drink of water. 
51 You below in the depths 
52 I shall dive deep and work my way through 
53 Like the roots of the wild fig tree 
54 Like the willow I shall sink deep down 
55 Like miners of gold 
56 Like diamond miners, 
57 Even ifl thrust on top of the rock 
58 Even if my physical strength diminishes 
59 I shall beckon you, I shall beckon you, 
60 Until you extend your hand to me. 
61 Neither the hotness, nor the coldness 
62 Will prevent me; ever! 
63 The frost which covers the mountains 
64 Has no power to cover you; 
65 Even the snow and ice, 
66 Even if it comes with the hail 
67 Even if it comes with the stormwind 
68 It shall blow me, and bring me nearer 
69 To you, and you shall hold me by the hand 
70 And give me rest. 
71 You across the oceans, 
72 When the whirlpool rages unrestrainedly like a homed viper 
73 And the waves are overpowering with wrath, 
7 4 I shall spread out my heart 
75 To become a raft to cross, 
76 I shall swim on top of the Jordan river 
77 And cross the Red Sea; 
78 To the land of honey and milk 
79 I, too, will build there 
80 I shall reign with you. 
81 Wena ongaphezu kwamaju, 
82 Umphefumulo wami uyakuhluma 
83 Umile izimpiko zokhozi 
84 Ngimpampe phezu kwesibhakabhaka 
85 Ngidabule amagagasi omoya; 
86 Njengo-Elija wasendulo, 
87 Ngigibele inqola yomlilo 
88 Ngingqongqoze emasangweni ezulu, 
89 Wena ongukuphila kwami 
90 Ungivulele, ungivumele ngibuse. 
318 
81 You above the clouds 
82 My soul shall grow 
83 It shall grow wings of an eagle 
84 I shall move swiftly above the sky 
85 I shall cut across the air-waves; 
86 Just like Elijah of antiquity, 
87 I shall ride the chariot of fire 
88 I shall knock at the gates of heaven 
89 You who are my life 
90 Will you open up for me and allow me into bliss. 
Langalami (l.ziziba zoThukela. p. 1) 
1 Siphethu sempilo yami nentokozo, 
2 Ngiyini ngaphandle kwakho? 
3 Nxa bekusitha kimi 
4 Ngiyogqokwa yithunzi lobumnyama ... 
5 Nokufa! 
6 Lapho ungikhanyisela 
7 Umphefumulo uqhakaza injabulo, 
8 Inhliziyo yembathe imfudumalo. 
9 Umoya wezinsunsu 
10 Namathunzi emishwabulo 
11 Kushabalala njengamazolo. 
12 Ungashoni langa lami, 
13 Sihambisane sixhakene 
14 Size sehlukaniswe ... 
15 Ukufa! 
Leso sivakashi (!l.Nodumehlezi KaMenzi. pp.12-13) 
1 Babengammemanga . .. 
2 W ayengalayezanga ... 
3 Ilanga lase lizihambele, 
4 Lase lingishiye ngingedwana. 
5 Ekusondeleni kwakhe endlini, 
6 Indlu yaqubuk' uhlevane, 
7 Iqhuqhiswa yilowo ngqoqwane, 
8 Nomlilo eziko waqal' ukulotha. 
9 Ekungqongqozeni kwakhe ngaqhaqhazela; 
10 W angen' endlini ngingamvulelanga, 
11 Wahlala nami ngendlovuyangena, 
12 Walala nami ngendlovuyangena. 
13 Wangihlek' usulu ngipaqupaquza 
14 Wangihlek' inhlinini ngijilajileka, 
15 Wangincish' umoya eqhosha, 
16 Wangiqhoshela ngikweqa amhlophe. 
17 Wangiwola ngezandlakazi, uNoliqhwa 
18 Wangithinta ngezinyawokazi, uNoliqhwa 
19 Wangembesa ngengubo yamakhaza, 
20 Wangibeka endlini yamakhaza. 
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My sun 
1 Spring of my life and joy, 
2 What am I without you? 
3 If they shade you from me 
4 I shall be covered by the shadow of darkness ... 
5 And death! 
6 When you give light to me 
7 The soul bursts into happiness 
8 The heart is enveloped in warmth. 
9 Cold, cutting wind 
10 And shadows of curses 
11 Evaporate like dew. 
12 You must not set, my sun, 
13 Let us accompany each other, holding each other 
14 Until we are parted by ... 
15 Death! 
That visitor 
1 They had not invited him ... 
2 He had not given a message ... 
3 The sun was already gone, 
4 It had left me behind all on my own. 
5 On his approach to the house, 
6 The house bristled with gooseflesh, 
7 It was caused to shiver by that frost 
8 And the fire in the hearth started to die out. 
9 With his rapping on the door, I trembled, 
10 He entered the house, I did not open for him, 
11 He stayed with me by force, 
12 He slept with me by force. 
13 He cynically laughed at me as I wriggled about 
14 He grinned at me as I tossed about, 
15 He stinted me of air in arrogance, 
16 He boasted as I turned up the white of the eyes. 
17 He gathered me in his great, big hands, Noliqhwa 
18 He touched me with his great, big feet, Noliqhwa 
19 He covered me with a cold cloak, 
20 He put me in the cold house [mortuary]. 
